|CHAPTER XXV: QUESTIONS 48, 49 THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS
The Distinction Between Good And Evil
We consider first the distinction between good and evil and then the distinction between the spiritual and corporeal creature.
St. Thomas proceeds methodically by considering first created being as being in the question on creation, then being as one and multiple in the question on the distinction of things in general, and now being as good and the evil that may be in it.
Thus St. Thomas considers creatures with regard to the transcendental properties of being before he considers genera and species. He does not treat of being expressly as true because truth is formally in the intellect, as was already explained in the question on truth in God. In the present question St. Thomas treats rather of evil than of good, because the good in general was already discussed in the question on the divine goodness.
On the subject of evil there are two questions: on evil itself with relation to being and to good (question 48); on the cause of evil, having in mind especially the problem of God's relationship to evil and whether God is in any way the cause of evil.
Question 48 is divided into two parts: 1. the nature of evil; 2. the kinds of evil. The first part, on the nature of evil, has four articles: 1. whether evil is some kind of nature; 2. whether evil is found in things; 3. whether the good is the subject of evil; 4. whether evil completely corrupts the good. The second part, concerning the kinds of evil, has two articles: 5. the division of evil into that of punishment and guilt; 6. which is more evil, punishment or guilt. St. Thomas explained these questions at great length in his <De malo.>
Errors. In these questions we find an exposition of the doctrine of St. Augustine and Dionysius as developed in their controversies against the Manichaeans, who posited two principles, one beneficent, the other malevolent, and against the Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus, who taught that matter was the ultimate terminus of emanation, a kind of non-being and the cause of both physical and moral evil.
The following is an outline of Manichaeism and Plotinus' doctrine on evil. Reviving the errors of the Marcionites, the Gnostics, and of Zoroaster, the Manichaeans posited two supreme principles, one beneficent, the other evil, in order to explain the evil found in the world, since evil cannot come from God, the good principle. They also taught that matter and the flesh are from the evil principle, as is also the inferior or sensitive soul in man, whereas the spiritual soul is derived from the good principle. Thus they said that the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit, and the war of the spirit against the flesh is nothing more than the battle between two souls. They execrated generation and condemned marriage, but not an infecund sexual union. Hence their peculiar immorality. They also taught that Christ did not assume true flesh. Finally, according to their theory, the end of the world will be the separation of the good kingdom from the evil kingdom inasmuch as the good souls will be separated from matter for all eternity while the other souls will be bound to matter forever.
This theory reduces Christianity to a natural philosophy and confuses evil with matter. As descendants of Manichaeism we find the Priscillianists in Spain in the fifth century and the Bulgarians in Bulgaria in the eleventh century, who, when they migrated to the west, originated the sects of the Albigenses and the Cathari. Many of their errors are also found in the teachings of Huss, Wyclif, and Luther on original sin and the fall of man.
Plotinus posited only one principle, the One-Good, but he also taught that an intimate connection existed between matter and evil. In his view the world is explained as a necessary emanation from the One-Good principle; he held a descending evolution, in which through a series of divine generations a gradual descent is made from the perfect to the imperfect, and finally the primitive energy became so weak by these successive emanations that it was no longer able to bring forth real being and in the end there came forth a kind of non-being, that is, matter, which existed somehow, which was said to be the root of all evil and the principle of all corruption. Thus the supreme good by a necessity of its nature produced the root of every evil. Such is the paradox of this emanatism. For Plotinus, matter is evil; it is the primary evil inasmuch as it is the privation of being and good. Thus it is the root of all evils, both physical and moral, for physical evils, such as disease and death, are a kind of corruption inasmuch as matter tries to escape the domination of the form. The spiritual soul, however, is good in itself but it becomes evil as the slave of the body by intemperance and ignobility. From this teaching arose many errors.
St. Augustine attacked Manichaeism and the Neoplatonic doctrine on evil in his <De civitate Dei.> He admitted that the body accidentally weighs down the soul, but he showed that matter is not evil, that the flesh in its rightful place is good, and that there will be a corporeal resurrection. Hence we cannot attribute our sins to our flesh and indirectly to God, who is the author of our bodies; nor do all sins come from sensuality, for example, the spiritual pride of the devils. Further, St. Augustine insisted that the condition of moral evil is our liberty, which is not its own rule and can, therefore, deviate from the rule. In his work, <De natura boni>, written against the Manichaeans in 405, he demonstrated that prime matter is not evil: "Nor is that matter to be called evil, which because of the complete privation of species can hardly be conceived. For it possesses the capacity for forms. Therefore, if a form is some kind of good, without doubt the capacity for a form is also some kind of good." St. Thomas adopted and developed this doctrine.
Finally, in his <Enchiridion>, St. Augustine gave the definition of evil, which later became classical and offered a solution for the problem of evil which was accepted and explained by all theologians. St. Augustine said that evil is nothing more than the privation of good, and from this came the classic definition, evil is the privation of some good that is owing, for example, sickness is the privation of health, and moral evil is the privation of moral rectitude. St. Augustine points out that sickness is not a substance but the privation of health in the body, which itself is the substance and something good.
He affirms that all natures are good since the author of all natures is the highest good, but in these natures the good can be decreased, and this decrease is evil. Then he solves the problem of evil, as follows: "God, since He is the highest good, would in no way allow any evil in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and so good that He could turn evil into good."
St. Thomas frequently quotes these words of St. Augustine as a solution of the problem of evil, for example, "God does not permit evil except for some greater good." This truth had already been stated by Plato and is expressed in different ways in Holy Scripture. The divine permission of evil would not be good and holy unless it were ordered to some good and all things in the universe would not cooperate to good.
St. Thomas also perfected Dionysius' doctrine on evil in his work, "<Expositio in Dionysium de divinis nominibus.>" In several instances Dionysius corrects the teaching of Plotinus by showing that matter is not evil.
In the beginning he shows that "evil is neither existing being, nor from some existing being, nor in existing beings." These last words mean, as St. Thomas says, that evil is not something positive in existing beings as a part or an accident; that in creatures evil is not something positive; that "in the devils and in souls evil is not as something existing but like the defect of the perfection of proper goods."
In a later passage, in opposition to Plotinus, he shows that matter is not evil. He offers a threefold proof: 1. with regard to form; 2. with regard to God the creator of matter; 3. and with regard to the good of the whole universe.
1. Under the form, matter participates in being and beauty, and therefore it is not evil. Indeed, even without the form it is not evil or the principle of all evils because without the form matter is not a principle of action, because matter cannot destroy or corrupt anything, and because matter is the receptive capacity of the form, and therefore good, as St. Augustine said.
With regard to God. The matter which the Neoplatonists call non-being either is or it is not; if it is not, it is neither good nor bad; if it is, it is produced by a good God, and therefore it cannot be bad, as St. Augustine again pointed out.
3. With regard to the good of the universe. Matter is necessary, for example, it is necessary for the generation of plants and animals and for their nutrition, and thus inasmuch as it enters into the order of the universe it is good.
In his commentary on this book of Dionysius, St. Thomas notes that when many of the ancient philosophers, like Plato, say that matter is evil and the principle of evils this was because they were unable to distinguish between privation and matter, and therefore, like Plato, they called matter non-being and consequently non-good.
But Aristotle showed that it is only <per accidens> that matter is non-being, that is, matter is non-being not by its nature but by reason of the privation that is in it. Indeed, matter is something positive, namely, the real capacity for receiving a form, or passive potency, and therefore it is not evil.
Finally Dionysius showed that matter is not the cause of malice in the soul, necessarily drawing the soul to evil, for many souls are not drawn to evil and have a tendency to good. He adds that the malice comes from the inordinateness of free will. These teachings of St. Augustine and Dionysius were stated metaphysically by St. Thomas, as we see in the beginning of the present question.
First Article: Whether Evil Is Any Kind Of Nature
State of the question. 1. Aristotle says that evil is a genus; therefore it is some kind of nature; 2. evil is a constitutive difference in moral matters, for example, we speak of an evil habit, or an evil act; 3. Aristotle says that good and evil are opposed as contraries, that is, as positives; 4. evil acts and it corrupts, therefore it is something; 5. evil pertains to the perfection of the universe because in its own way it enhances the good.
Moreover, as Renouvier says: "According to experience, physical pain is something else than imperfection or privation, and according to our consciences moral evil is something else than ignorance. There is therefore a positive evil."
The pessimists hold that physical evil, such as pain, is not only something positive but something primitive, in the sense that pleasure is only secondary and negative, namely, the cessation of pain. Schopenhauer tried to prove this point by the following argument: Man always requires something, he always desires something. This perpetual desire is not without pain. Therefore the normal state of man is sad and painful. The pleasure that comes from the satisfaction of this desire is simply the cessation of pain. Pain, therefore, is something primitive and positive.
Before Schopenhauer's time, Kant said that punishment preceded pleasure because pleasure is the consciousness of the vital striving and all striving presupposes an obstacle or punishment. Montaigne said: "Our well-being is nothing else than the absence of ill-being." Similarly the Epicureans declared that pleasure is the absence of pain or perturbation, ataraxia.
The reply of the article is, however, that evil is not anything but it is the privation of good.
Proof from authority. Dionysius said, "Evil is not existing." St. Augustine says the same thing.
Proof from reason. This proof begins with the nominal definition of evil, which according to all thinkers is opposed to good and is known through this opposition to good. Going from the nominal definition to the real definition and from the confused concept to a distinct concept, we arrive at this explicative syllogism.
Good and being are convertible. But evil is opposed to good. Therefore evil is not something positive but the negation or rather the privation of good.
Proof of the major. Good is everything that is desirable. But every nature desires to preserve its being and its perfection. Therefore all being and every perfection is something good, and therefore, too, evil is not some being or some positive nature, but it is either the negation or the privation of good. St. Thomas says below more explicitly that evil is the privation of some owing good, that is, in an apt subject, when and where this good is owing.
Reply to first objection. In what sense does Aristotle say that evil is a kind of genus? St. Thomas replies that in his book on logic Aristotle offered examples which appeared probable in his time, and that he took this example from the Pythagoreans. Or, perhaps, Aristotle meant that the primary contrariety was habit, or the having of a thing, and privation, because this contrariety is found in all contraries. Elsewhere Aristotle, treating professedly of the four modes of opposition, distinguishes between privation and contrariety.
(diagram page 462)
From this division of various kinds of opposition it appears that evil is not the negation but the privation of good. No one will say that it is evil for a stone or a tree not to know, nor does anyone say that wood is ignorant. Similarly we do not say that it is an evil that man does not have the strength of a lion. These are negations, not privations. We see, then, that evil is the privation of some owing good and not only a negation of good.
This point is of great importance, for we say that the non-preservation of our will in good here and now is not something good, because it is not being, nor is it something evil, because it is not the privation of some owing good; it is merely the privation of a good that is not owing. God is not obliged to preserve all created wills in good or to prevent every sin. Thus the non-preservation of our wills in good differs from the subtraction of divine grace. This withdrawal of divine grace is the evil of punishment and presupposes the evil of guilt.
Corollary. A lesser good is not an evil, although it implies the negation of a greater good, which, however, is not the privation of an owing good. In the same way, a lesser evil is not a good. In this sense many theologians distinguish between an imperfection and the smallest venial sin, as for instance, between a diminution of generosity (some remissness in an act of charity) and negligence. In the concrete, however, it is extremely difficult to say where the lesser good ceases and where the lesser evil begins, just as it is difficult to say when is the lowest degree of sensitive life and when is the highest degree of vegetative life. Nevertheless the order of things must not be confused.
All ethics would be destroyed by a relativism which teaches that a lesser evil, not only physical (as the amputation of a member) but also moral evil (as a lie) would be lawful to avoid some greater evil. Such action would be against reason; such lesser moral evil can be tolerated but it cannot be positively chosen.
Reply to second objection. Good and evil are not constitutive differences, except in moral matters, for instance, a bad habit, an evil deed. But even in moral matters evil does not constitute a species, except in the sense that the privation of a proper end is annexed to an improper end. Thus the end of the intemperate man is not to deprive himself of the good of reason, his aim is a pleasurable thing according to the senses outside the order of reason. Hence even in moral matters evil, as evil, is not a constitutive difference.
Consequently a sin of commission is a positive act, tending to a changeable good as out of harmony with the rules of morals; thus a good act and an evil act are contrary, as are virtue and vice. But in the contrary positive that we call vice we find the privation of an owing end. Scotus held that good and evil are contrary opposites, but according to St. Thomas this is not true except of good and evil in morality, that is, when we speak of an evil act or a bad habit.
Reply to fourth objection. Evil acts in corrupting the good, but it does not act efficiently, nor does it act for an end except by reason of a connected good; evil is said to corrupt the good by reason of some privation, because it is the privation of good.
Reply to fifth objection. Evil does not pertain to the order of the universe except by reason of some connected good. Thus the corruption of one being disposes to the generation of another. Nevertheless evil as opposed to good, commends the good, as, for example, some lamentable injustice shows forth more clearly the beauty of justice.
What reply can be given to the objection that pain is something positive and not merely privation, as when we speak of a painful toothache?
The reply is given by St. Thomas: "Just as two things are required for pleasure, namely, the union with some good and the perception of this union, so two things are required for pain, namely, the union with some evil, which is evil because it deprives of some good, and the perception of this union....Thus pain, like pleasure, is a movement in the intellective or sensitive appetite. Hence pain, when it is in the sensitive appetite, is properly said to be the passion or suffering of the soul."
Pain and pleasure are contraries, and as pleasure is connected to some good act easily exercised, such as the grace of youth, so pain is connected with some act more or less impeded, or some immoderate act which produces fatigue. Hence pain is not something privative, but it is connected with privation and arises from the perception of the union with some evil.
What is to be said about the pessimists, who say that pain is something primitive, and that pleasure is secondary and negative, that is, the cessation of pain?
We reply with Aristotle, whom Descartes and Leibnitz follow on this point, that there are certain pleasures that precede all pain, and therefore pleasure is not essentially the cessation of pain. For example, the pleasure of seeing a beautiful scene or hearing a beautiful symphony can precede any pain; so also the pleasures of taste can precede any pain of hunger or thirst. Nor is every desire accompanied by pain; for example, the desire for food at the opportune time is often experienced without the pain of hunger. And in reply to Kant, it may be said that not every effort is painful, indeed moderate exercise which is proportionate to our strength is pleasant, such as a brisk walk, a ride, or a hunt.
On those occasions when pleasure comes after pain, there is not only a cessation of the pain. This cessation of pain is the condition of the delight, but the cause of the pleasure, as St. Thomas says, is the union with some good and the perception of that union. The desire for the pleasure is greater than the flight from pain because the good is desired for itself, whereas the evil is fled only as the privation of good.
Hence pleasure is not negative but positive. Pain, too, is something positive, but it is joined with the perception of some privation, and therefore pain is in itself something posterior, just as privation presupposes the good that is denied, and just as darkness cannot be conceived unless the light is first known which is denied by the darkness. Pleasure follows a good act easily performed even before pain follows an impeded act.
All this is in agreement with common sense, or natural reason, and exemplifies the transition from natural reasoning to philosophical reasoning. Common sense would say it was ridiculous to assert that pleasure is the cessation of pain, as it would be ridiculous to say that light is the cessation or privation of darkness.
The principal conclusion of our article therefore stands: Although good and evil are opposed to each other by the opposition of privation, yet the following are contraries: pleasure and pain, true and false judgment, virtue and vice, as well as a virtuous and evil act, such as a sin of commission which, as many Thomists hold, is formally constituted by something positive, which supplies the basis for the privation, namely, the tendency to some changeable good which is out of harmony with the rules of morals. Therefore that which makes a sin of commission evil is the privation of the rectitude that is owing to the act.
Second Article: Whether Evil Is Found In Things
State of the question. This article seeks to offer a more precise real definition of evil, inasmuch as privation differs from negation. It appears that evil is not in things, because then something would be in them and God would not always make that which is better.
Reply. The reply is that evil is found in things, indeed the perfection of the universe requires that there be certain things which can be deficient in goodness, and from this it follows that some things are deficient in goodness.
1. This is proved from the fact that there are prohibitions and penalties, which would not exist except because of evils.
2. An <a priori> proof can be found by reducing this problem to the preceding question about the multiplicity and inequality of beings. The argument may be reduced to the following. The perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality in things, namely, a degree of indefectible goodness and a degree of defectible goodness, that is, corruptible being, which can be defective and sometimes is defective. But the nature of evil is that some being is deficient of some good. Therefore in things we find evil, like corruption, and this is in agreement with the perfection of the universe, or serves to manifest the divine goodness in the various grades of goodness, since, as was said above, "the divine goodness cannot be adequately represented by one creature and therefore God made many subordinate beings."
This article explains the meaning of the statement often made by St. Thomas: "it follows that what is defectible is sometimes deficient," that is to say, it is not surprising that a being is sometimes deficient. The expression, "it follows," is explained in this article in this way: "The perfection of the universe requires that there be some beings that can defect from goodness, and it follows from this that some beings sometimes are deficient."
This expression does not mean that it is congruous that a being should sometimes be deficient, for such deficiency is actually not agreeable to that being, but it is congruous for the good of the universe; for instance, the corruption of one being is the generation of another, and this corruption is agreeable for the generation of the other.
This article more than any other on evil offers an opportunity to explain St. Augustine's and St. Thomas' teaching on the greater good on account of which God permits evil.
Reply to first objection. Evil is not pure negation but the privation of an owing good in an apt subject. Thus we do not say that a piece of wood is ignorant, but that wood has no knowledge. For this reason the Scholastics reject Leibnitz's expression, metaphysical evil, which he used to designate the imperfection of any creature inasmuch as it did not possess every perfection.
Reply to second objection. This privation of an owing good is in things as in an apt subject, for example, blindness is in the eye, not indeed as something positive but as a privation. And when we say that there is blindness, the word "is" does not signify a real entity but the truth of the proposition, namely, that it is true that this man is blind, or deprived of vision.
Reply to third objection. St. Thomas explains that, although there is evil in things and God does not make what is better in every part of the universe, God makes that which is better in the whole, and in the parts with relation to the whole of the universe. He does not mean that the actual world is the best possible of all worlds, for above he said: "God is able to make a being better than any being He has made...., that is, He can always make something better if the better is understood substantively...., but He cannot make something better if the "better" is understood adverbially, that is, with greater wisdom and goodness." In another place he shows that the inequality in creatures manifests the divine goodness.
Now St. Thomas explains the congruity of the divine permission of evil in two ways.
1. On the part of the material cause or the subject. He says: "It is of the very nature of things that those things that can be deficient are sometimes deficient." It is fitting, therefore, that God does not interfere or that he permits this deficiency.
2. On the part of the end. This divine permission is fitting because it is for a greater good. As St. Augustine says: "God, since He is the highest good, would in no way allow anything evil in His works unless He were so omnipotent and so good that He could make good come from evil." For example, the life of the lion would not be preserved unless the ass were killed, nor would there be the patience of martyrs unless there were the iniquity of the persecutor.
This is the solution of the problem of evil, which is at once clear and obscure; it is clear in principle, in the abstract and formally, but it is obscure in the particular, in the concrete and materially. The solution is clear inasmuch as it shows that the most holy and omnipotent God cannot permit evil except for some greater good, otherwise the divine permission would not be holy. But on the other hand this solution remains obscure in the particular and in the concrete because this greater good is generally not clearly understood until we see it in heaven. Nevertheless it sometimes happens that this greater good on account of which God permits evil is clearly seen.
1. In the mineral kingdom we see that the corruption of one being is the generation of another; indeed, of the four elements distinguished by the ancients, the highest, fire, originates from the corruption of the others, especially air. Fire devours and destroys all things, but fire itself has the higher properties, and many things are made through fire.
2. In the animal kingdom, the slaying of inferior animals furnishes food for the higher animals, such as the lion, the eagle; and man.
3. In the human race itself, pain is the stimulus or the goad that urges men on in the intellectual, moral, social, and religious order.
In the intellectual order pain and poverty and need make man inventive and skillful in the arts; a high state of civilization arises in part from the struggle against pain. This accounts for the rise not only of medicine and surgery but also of legislation. In the speculative order higher systems of thought arise from the painful conflict of other systems, and thus a thesis provokes the antithesis before the human mind attains the superior synthesis. In general, as soon as one force appears another opposing force appears, and from the conflict frequently comes equilibrium and harmony. In this struggle for life each individual works with his greatest energy, and sometimes the result is a higher synthesis.
In the moral order, the most painful injustice emphasizes the beauty of justice; the innocent man who suffers a great injustice either desires revenge, and thus becomes evil, or he feels within himself the thirst and hunger for justice and thus becomes holy, according to our Lord's words: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice: for they shall have their fill" (Matt. 5:6). If they had not seen these great injustices, many would never thirst and hunger in this way for justice.
Similarly, out of the knowledge of our own misery arises the desire for a good life. Good exists scarcely anywhere in the world except as the result of struggle. In the social order, the need and suffering of our neighbor arouses sympathy, charity, and benevolence. An unjust war prompts men to make greater sacrifices to defend their country. In the religious order, God permits sin in the lives of the saints, for example, St. Peter's triple denial, so that the saints may attain greater humility and that God Himself may manifest His mercy and justice.
The insufficiency of sensitive life prompts the desire and aspiration for the rational life, and the insufficiency of the rational life prompts men to aspire to a still higher life. Finally, although pain seems to be altogether futile, in the sacrifice of reparation pain is used as the supreme test of love for God and men, and thus pain becomes most fruitful. Indeed, this principle, "God does not permit evil except for some greater good," appears in splendor in the mystery of the cross and in the life of Christ the Redeemer; it appears participatively in the lives of the saints, who can say with St. Paul, "I fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh, for His body, which is the Church."
St. Thomas also states clearly that God permitted original sin because of the greater good of the redemptive Incarnation. He says: "Nothing stood in the way that after sin human nature should be led to something higher. God permitted evil to happen that some thing better might come of it. Hence St. Paul said, 'And where sin abounded, grace did more abound.'" And in the blessing of the paschal candle, we sing, "O happy fault, that merited so great a Redeemer."
This providential law finds its highest expression in the fact that from something that was not only useless but also harmful, the torment of crucifixion, Christ established the font of all spiritual goods. God permitted this most grievous sin of deicide so that Christ by His heroic death might save us from sin. Hence we address the cross, "O Cross, our one reliance, hail!"
This is the Christian solution of the problem of evil, which cannot be comprehended except by faith that is illumined by the gifts of understanding and wisdom. In the chapter on "The Royal Way of the Holy Cross," the Imitation of Christ says: "In the cross is salvation, in the cross is life,....in the cross joy of the spirit, in the cross the perfection of holiness....; if you willingly carry the cross, the cross will bear you up." "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."
This is the true law of progress and ascent, which cannot be understood according to the dicta of determinism and pantheism, for there are many setbacks in the world, there are many crosses that are unfruitful to him who bears them with ill will, like the bad thief. But still they serve to manifest God's justice and the love of God as the supreme good that is to be loved above all things.
Thus we explain evil according to its three causes: 1. according to its formal cause it is the privation of an owing good; 2. according to the material cause it is in a defectible subject, which at times is defective; 3. according to its final cause, it is not impeded by God, but is permitted for some greater good. Finally, in question 49 we shall see that evil does not have an efficient cause <per se>, but merely either an efficient cause <per accidens>, when evil follows on the production of some form, or a defective cause. From this we shall see that the divine permission of evil is nothing but a condition <sine qua non> of evil and in no way the cause of evil.
The concept of the divine permission of evil. From the reply to the third objection we see that the fact that God does not impede evil is the same as the permission of evil; this is especially true in the case of moral evil of which God is not even the indirect or accidental cause. St. Thomas explains the nature of this divine permission in his commentary on St. Matthew: "There are five kinds of permission," and in his enumeration of these five kinds of permission, the object of the first four is not sin, and the object of the fifth is sin. He says: "It should be noted that there are several kinds of permission. The first is the concession of a licit thing, as when the prior grants you permission to visit your parents, which is no sin. The second kind is dispensation, when the superior allows you to eat what is not lawful for you, as eating meat, which is not a sin but would be against the rule unless you were dispensed. The third kind of permission is tolerance, as when the lesser of two evils is permitted to avoid the greater evil; such was Moses' permission to write a bill of divorce. He is said to have granted permission because he tolerated divorce lest a greater evil, namely, murder, follow. This divorce would have been a sin if Moses had not tolerated it, and it is said that Moses did this because of the hardness of their hearts. The fourth permission is indulgence, that is, when something is permitted whose opposite is better, as when the apostles permitted second marriages, when continence of the marital survivor would have been better. The fifth kind of permission is sustaining, as when God permits evil that He may elicit good things," that is, God does not impede and does not wish to impede evil, but this He does on account of a greater good.
We must not confuse this last kind of permission with the others, with which it has not affinity, except with the third. This last kind of permission is called permission only analogically.
Third Article: Whether Evil Is In The Good As In A Subject
State of the question. We see that evil is found in things, indeed in every part of the universe, from the mineral to the spiritual and moral order. We are asking now what is the immediate subject of evil. Is evil in the good as in a subject? It seems that it is not, as we see in the third and principal objection given in this article. One contrary thing is not the subject of the other contrary. The fourth difficulty is that it would follow that good would be evil, contrary to the warning of Isaias, "Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil." This is the language of the perverse man, who inverts the order of morality.
Reply. The reply is that good is the subject of evil.
Proof from authority. St. Augustine says, "Evil is nowhere except in the good."
Proof from reason. In the body of the article, St. Thomas begins with the minor. If we begin with the major, the argument is as follows:
The privation, just as the form of which it is the privation, is in some subject which is in some way being and good. But evil is the removal of good not only negatively but also privatively. Therefore evil is in the good as in a subject.
The major is clear. The subject of privation, like the form, is being in potency, either being in simple potency, as prime matter, or being in potency <secundum quid>, as a diaphanous body, which is the subject of light and darkness. But being in potency is some kind of good, since it is ordered to the good or to a form, which is a kind of perfection.
The minor is the definition of evil, namely, the privation of an owing good; it is not evil if it is only the negation of good. Imperfection is not good, but it does not follow that it is evil except when there is an absence of an owing perfection. This was Leibnitz's error; because a creature did not have the perfections of other creatures, he called it a metaphysical evil. St. Thomas, on the contrary, notes that man is not evil because he does not possess the swiftness of a goat or the strength of a lion. Common sense should be used not only by the farmer and the merchant; it is useful also for the philosopher, because this common sense is nothing else than natural reason, which is in a way the mother of philosophical reasoning. William James said: "The reasoning of the schools is that sister of common sense which attended the university for some years." He might have said: "Philosophical reasoning is the daughter of natural reason, or common sense, and during the Middle Ages it not only attended the great universities but it established them." In these universities, such as those of Paris and Bologna, St. Thomas shows how the transition is made progressively from natural reason to philosophical reasoning, beginning with the nominal definition and arriving at the real definition and at the properties to be deduced from it. The present article is an example of this process; it demonstrates the complete conformity of philosophical reasoning with natural reason.
Corollary. Hence the good whose privation is evil is not the same as the good in which it is as in a subject; for example, blindness is the deprivation of sight and it is in an animal. This is the solution of the problem that one contrary cannot be the subject of the other contrary. This is, of course, true, but one good, for example, animal life, can exist together with the privation of another good, for example, sight. A dog can be blind.
The final difficulty is rather subtle. The subject of evil is said to be evil just as the subject of whiteness is said to be white, But according to the reply above, the subject of evil is good. Therefore, in opposition to Isaias, something is said to be good and evil at the same time.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the subject of evil is evil by reason of itself, I deny; by reason of the deprivation of some owing good, 1 concede. I contradistinguish the minor: the subject of evil is said to be good by reason of itself, I concede; by reason of the deprivation of some owing good, I deny.
From this it follows that even physical pain as it is something, namely, the passion of the soul, has a certain goodness, but it displays a connection with some evil, and often it is important to recognize the existence of such an evil, for instance, a cancer, so that a remedy may be used in time. So also a sin of commission, inasmuch as it is being and a physical act is something good physically, and thus can be produced by God who, however, prescinds from the malice or privation of the owing righteousness. Such malice does not come under the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, just as sound does not come under the subject of vision. Hence if by an impossible hypothesis God wished to be the cause of sin as such and not only of the physical entity of sin, He would not be able to cause a sin, because sin is outside the adequate object of His omnipotence. All this is quite clear, but the exact manner in which God moves in the act of sin remains a great mystery.
Evil, therefore, is in the good as in the subject. There is no perversion of the truth here; it would be wrong to say that the subject of evil was evil by reason of itself, or that the privation of moral rectitude, for example, in pride, cunning, presumption, or luxury, is good. It is also wrong to say that what is good <secundum quid>, as something that is pleasing to the senses, for example, adultery, is a simple and unqualified good here and now. This is the monstrous perversion found in the practical judgment in which a criminal choice is made out of malice.
It is also wrong in the speculative order to say with Hegel that there is no good pure and simple and no evil pure and simple; that there is only qualified good, that is, something good according to the actual concepts of our time which tomorrow may be considered relatively evil. Thus patriotism is not a simple good, but only a good with reference to the ideals of our time; in time to come, perhaps, when some internationalism may prevail, patriotism would be regarded as obsolete. This is the language of absolute evolutionism condemned at the time of the Modernists. This proposition was condemned: "Truth is no more immutable than man himself; indeed truth is evolved with and through man." If this were true, there would be no absolute goodness, only a qualified goodness, or a relative goodness according to the changing ideas of a particular age. The first proposition condemned in Pius IX's Syllabus was: "God actually becomes in man and in the world,....and God and the world are one and the same thing, as are also spirit and matter, necessity and liberty, truth and falsehood, good and evil, the just and the unjust." It was against such pantheistic evolution that Isaias warned when he said, "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil."
Fourth Article: Whether Evil Corrupts Good Completely
State of the question. If the subject of evil is good, as we have said, can this subject be completely corrupted by the evil that is in it, or be totally destroyed? It seems that it can be; this is the opinion of some pessimists. The reason, as given in the third difficulty, is that the evil, as long as it lasts, harms and destroys the good. But a finite good from which something is always being taken away will in some time be destroyed. Thus after a serious illness comes death, and venial sins dispose to mortal sin, which takes away grace.
This question is not of minor importance and it arises again when we speak of original sin and its consequences, under the question, "whether all the good of human nature is destroyed by sin." The Protestants and Jansenists said that by original sin man's liberty was destroyed. On the other hand, most of the theologians of the Society of Jesus say that in the state of fallen nature man's powers are no weaker with respect to moral good than in the state of pure nature; the Thomists and Augustinians teach that man's powers are weakened although his freedom is not extinguished.
Reply. In reply St. Thomas says that good is threefold: the first is opposed to evil and is totally removed by the evil; the second is the subject of evil and it is not even decreased by the evil; the third is the aptitude of the subject to good, and this aptitude is decreased but is never completely removed. Hence, St. Augustine said, "Evil cannot completely consume the good."
This proof is founded on the division of good as given above. In the preceding article it was stated that the good which is a privation is different from the good in which the evil is as in a subject; to this a third kind of good is added, namely, the aptitude of the subject to good, for example, the aptitude of human nature to virtue.
The first two parts of the conclusion present no difficulty.
1. The good that is opposed to the evil can be completely destroyed by the evil; this is evident from an explanation of the terms when the privation is complete for then the good is entirely removed. This is clear from experience: light is completely destroyed by darkness, sight by blindness, corporeal life by death, and the life of grace by mortal sin. So also the good of original justice, freely conferred on all human nature in the first man, was completely taken away by the sin of our first parents.
2. The good that is the subject of the evil is not even diminished by the evil. In the physical order prime matter at least remains, and in the spiritual order the spiritual human soul at least remains. The reason is that the privation cannot take place except in an apt subject, and therefore the nature of this subject must remain, otherwise the same subject would no longer remain, that is, the subject that is apt for the particular privation. If the subject is destroyed, there is no longer any privation, for example, the subject of sickness is a living animal, and the subject of death is a corpse. We do not say that the corpse is blind; blindness is predicated of the living animal.
Hence St. Thomas speaks of the proper subject with respect to the proper privation, and he also speaks of the immutable nature of the subject. This is clear from the example: the substance of the air is not diminished by darkness; darkened air still remains air.
In another place, St. Thomas says: "The principles of human nature, by which the nature itself is constituted, and the properties, such as the powers of the soul, are not destroyed or diminished by sin." Hence the freedom of the will is not extinguished by original sin, otherwise fallen man would no longer be truly man. Fallen man is truly man by his specific difference, which is indivisible, that is, it is not subject to increase or decrease. Either someone has or has not the capability of producing rational acts; even a demented person preserves his nature although he does not have the use of his reason, and as long as a man retains the use of reason he retains proportionately the use of deliberation and of his free will.
Therefore what can be taken from a subject while the subject remains is its integrity. For example, a man can lose his arm or his eyes but not his essence nor the essence of his faculties; the very nature of our will cannot become evil, not even in the damned, for the will preserves its ordination to the universal good by which it is specified. Either it is the will or it is not; in the very nature of the will there is no increase or decrease with regard to the specific object. The will, however, may receive both acquired and infused virtues, by which it is perfected, and it can also lose these virtues.
3. The aptitude of the subject to a good act is diminished but it is never completely removed. For example, in man the natural inclination to virtue, which is increased by virtuous acts and diminished by evil acts, is never entirely destroyed as long as the human nature remains, because this aptitude is founded on this nature.
The proof of this third part of the conclusion is somewhat complex in the body of the article. The argument can be reduced to the following.
The diminution of the subject's aptitude to good is not quantitative, but it is a qualitative loss by contrary dispositions. Such contrary dispositions, however, even when multiplied to infinity, do not destroy the nature of the subject as long as the subject remains, nor do they therefore destroy the root of this aptitude of the subject to good. Therefore this aptitude is never destroyed.
Explanation of the major. What is meant by a qualitative loss of this aptitude by contrary dispositions? Is it an intrinsic diminution or only extrinsic?
We must judge the diminution of this aptitude to virtue by its positive opposite, that is, by the qualitative intensification. We must not confuse the intensification and diminution of this capability with the intensification and diminution of a habit, for an acquired habit is increased intrinsically by the repetition of acts and intrinsically diminished by the cessation of the acts or by contrary acts, so that in the end the habit is completely destroyed, while the natural aptitude to virtue is never completely destroyed. The aptitude to virtue is something else than the virtue itself.
We say, then, that this natural aptitude to virtue is not increased or diminished intrinsically, that is, in itself, on the part of the subject or the root of this aptitude, which is the very nature of the soul or the faculty. This nature is not subject to increase or decrease. Hence this aptitude is increased or decreased, as it were, extrinsically, not on the part of its principle but with regard to the terminus.
In the reply to the second objection, St. Thomas says: "This aptitude is between the subject and act. Hence inasmuch as it touches on the act it is diminished by evil, but inasmuch as it is identified with the subject it remains." Thus the aptitude of wood to burning is diminished by humidity, and the aptitude of the soul to virtue is diminished by contrary dispositions or by venial and mortal sins, both actual and habitual. In this way this aptitude was diminished by original sin, which implies directly a habitual aversion to the final supernatural end and indirectly a similar aversion to the final natural end, for every sin that is directly opposed to the supernatural law is indirectly against the natural law, which commands us to obey God in whatever He commands us. Hence this natural aptitude to virtue is diminished by original sin, not intrinsically, on the part of the principle, but extrinsically, with regard to the facility of eliciting a virtuous act, because of the obstacles placed between the faculty and the virtuous act for which it was intended.
St. Thomas explains this at greater length in his book, <De malo>, where he shows that this aptitude cannot be diminished by the subtraction of parts (intrinsically) but by the addition of contraries (extrinsically). We now ask whether these contraries are able to corrupt or destroy the subject; whether, for instance, humidity corrupts the wood and whether sin destroys the soul or the nature of man.
St. Thomas makes the following distinction. By continual diminution every finite being can be totally removed, this I distinguish: by the intrinsic subtraction of parts, I concede, unless it be a division to infinity, by the extrinsic addition of contraries, this I subdistinguish: of contraries that can corrupt the subject, I concede; of contraries that cannot corrupt the parts, I deny.
The minor requires explanation, namely, why contrary dispositions can never completely remove or destroy the aptitude mentioned above. St. Thomas says that these contrary dispositions can be increased either to infinity or not. If they are not increased to infinity, neither is this aptitude decreased to infinity. Thus, for example, wood becomes less combustible by humidity to a certain stage, and beyond this the wood is corrupted. As long as the nature of wood perdures, its combustibility or the aptitude to combustion remains, but when the nature of the wood is corrupted the aptitude is removed. "If the contrary can corrupt the subject, the aptitude can be completely removed."
If, however, the contrary dispositions can be increased to infinity, the aforesaid aptitude is likewise decreased to infinity but it is never entirely removed as long as the nature of the subject remains. "If by the addition of a contrary, the subject is not corrupted, no matter how much the contrary is multiplied, the aptitude is always decreased as the added contrary increases, but it is never entirely removed." The reason is that the nature is the root of this aptitude. Thus it is with man in the moral order; the man who sins continually retains, together with the incorruptible nature of his soul and his faculties, a certain aptitude to virtue, but this aptitude is decreased to infinity by the multiplication of obstacles between his faculties and the virtuous act to which the faculty is ordered. Thus air can always be illuminated by the sun even though opaque bodies to infinity are placed between the air and the sun.
This is to say, against the Manichaeans, that no created being is evil and that no created nature can become absolutely evil, or completely lose its aptitude to good.
Corollary. In spite of inveterate depraved habits a man still can reform his moral character and arrive at the judgment that God's commandments are in conformity with the basis of his human nature.
Even in the devils a nature remains, which as nature is good, but it can no longer go on to a good act. "Even in the damned there is a natural inclination to virtue, otherwise the devils would not have remorse of conscience."
In the reply to the third objection it is noted that some have offered a faulty proof of this conclusion, saying that the matter is as in the case of the division of quantity where something smaller is always subtracted, for example, first half the whole quantity, then half of the half, so that there is always something remaining to be divided. St. Thomas replies that this is true with regard to quantity but that there is not parity here with sin because the second sin can be more serious than the first, indeed succeeding sins are generally more grave.
This doctrine can be expressed by the following synopsis taken from St. Thomas' De malo.
(diagram page 479)
Diminution of good
Napoleon once said, "I prefer a good synopsis to a long report." But for a synopsis to be good it must be adequate and the divisions must be founded on the nature of things. These divisions must be necessary, not accidental, that is, they must be made according to the formal reason of the whole to be divided, and they must be made in such a way that the members are really opposite so that no member will be overlooked.
We conclude, then, that the natural aptitude to virtue always remains, as long as the soul remains, even though this aptitude is diminished extrinsically by actual sin, especially by actual sin repeated so often that it becomes habitual sin.
In this light St. Thomas explains the wounds which are the consequences of original sin, which is the deprivation of the gift of original justice. "The natural inclination of virtue is not diminished on the part of the root but on the part of the terminus inasmuch as an obstacle is placed in the way of attaining the terminus." Thus in the state of fallen nature man's powers for virtue are weaker than in the state of pure nature because now he is born with a habitual aversion to his final natural end, whereas in the state of pure nature he would have been born neither habitually averse nor converted to moral good; he would have been simply capable of aversion or conversion. Now he is born with a certain weakness for the natural moral good, but his natural aptitude to virtue remains. After baptism these wounds are on the way to being healed.
Fifth Article: Whether Evil Is Completely Divided Into That Of Penalty And Guilt
State of the question. The traditional division is into evil of guilt and penalty but we must now prove that this division is legitimate. We are confronted with the following difficulties. 1. The death of brute animals is something evil for them, yet it does not appear to be either guilt or penalty. 2. The diseases of animals are something evil, yet they are neither guilt nor penalty. 3. In us temptation is something evil, yet it is not guilt if it is immediately resisted, indeed it is an occasion for exercising virtue; neither is temptation a penalty, since it precedes sin. Indeed temptation preceded the first sin of the first man. Further, the trials of the just are something evil, yet they are not always penalties for sins.
In the argument <sed contra>, the objection is given in the opposite sense, namely, every evil is a penalty because every evil is harmful. Therefore guilt is not distinct from penalty.
Reply. In voluntary beings every evil is either a penalty or guilt, that is, it is guilt arising from an inordinate will or the penalty against a culpable will.
What is the meaning of this reply? It refers to "voluntary beings," not all things, not brute animals, not even men, because the trials of the just are neither sin nor a penalty for the sins of the just, nor are they something inflicted on a culpable will.
This difficulty is explained above in the article in the treatise, The One God, "whether God wills evils." Here a distinction is made between the evil of guilt (moral evil) and the evil of nature (physical evil), which can be a penalty if it is inflicted for sin or not a penalty if it exists where no sin is to be punished.
(diagram page 481)
Here we approach the great problem proposed in the Book of Job: whether all human trials are inflicted because of sin.
What proof can be offered for St. Thomas' conclusion given above? It should be noted that the division of evil is based on its definition, and by two syllogisms it is shown that St. Thomas' division as given in the conclusion is legitimate.
In his argument St. Thomas, as in many other instances, begins with the minor, a method that is sometimes more natural in the search for truth. But if we follow the formal method and begin with the major, the syllogism would be as follows:
Good consists in perfection, in first act, that is, in the form and integrity of a thing, or in second act, that is, in proper operation. But evil is the privation of an owing good. Therefore evil consists either in some subtraction from the form or the integrity (blindness) or in the subtraction of some proper operation.
This first syllogism does not yet give the distinction between guilt and penalty, which, as was stated in the reply to the second objection, do not present a division of simple evil, but a division of evil in voluntary things. Thus in brute animals there are evils, such as blindness, which are neither guilt nor penalty. This is also true of men, for instance, when our Lord was asked, "Who hath sinned, this man, or his parents, that he should be born blind?" our Lord replied, "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." Hence blindness in itself is neither guilt nor penalty. How do we then reach the conclusion that evil is either guilt or penalty? We must remember that the conclusion is limited to voluntary beings. We have therefore the following syllogism.
Evil, like good, is the object of the will; it has a special reference to the will. But with reference to the will we correctly divide evil into that evil which is from the will, namely, a disorder of the will's operation or guilt, and that evil which is against the will, namely, the privation of the form or the integrity of the (culpable) voluntary agent, that is, penalty, for instance death or mutilation. Therefore evil in voluntary things is correctly divided into the evil of guilt or sin and the evil of penalty.
Difficulty. In what sense does St. Thomas say that the evil of penalty can be through the subtraction not only of the integrity but also of the form of the agent, for in the latter case not even the subject of the evil would remain?
Reply. The penalty by the subtraction of the integrity is mutilation; the penalty by the subtraction of the form is death. It is true that in the latter case the subject (man) does not remain, but the soul does; and by this penalty man does not become evil, indeed in this way he makes reparation for his sin.
Another difficulty remains. The trials of the just are against their wills, as we see from the Book of Job, and Christ Himself said, "Let this chalice pass from Me." On the other hand, a guilty man sometimes freely accepts the penalty that is justly imposed on him. Hence not every evil that is against the will is a penalty, for example, the tribulations of Job, the blindness of one born blind; nor is every penalty opposed by the one who is punished.
To solve this difficulty we should point out that, although the division of evil into the evil of guilt and the evil of penalty given in the body of the article is legitimate, we do not yet have an explicit statement of the specific difference of penalty by which it is distinguished from the trials of the just. We have clearly stated the proximate genus of penalty (an evil opposed to the will of the one punished), but to ascertain the specific difference the penalty must be compared with guilt. According to common sense every penalty presupposes guilt.
This explanation will be found partly in the reply to the third objection, where it is stated that temptation is not guilt except in the tempter when it is resisted, and partly in the following article in the reply to the objections, and particularly in the <Summa theologica>, in the question on penalty as the effect of sin. The seventh article of this question asks, whether every penalty is inflicted because of some guilt, and the reply is, "If we are speaking of penalty <simpliciter>, in the sense that it has the nature of punishment, then it always has a reference to guilt, either personal, actual, or original..... But it sometimes happens that a man suffers some loss in a minor good in order that he may gain a greater good, for example, for the salvation of his soul or for the glory of God. Such loss is not an unqualified evil for the man, but an evil <secundum quid>, and therefore it is not an unqualified penalty (<simpliciter>), but it is rather medicinal." Such were the tribulations of Job and the blindness of one born blind. Moreover, "sometimes one who has not sinned voluntarily undergoes punishment for another," as Christ did for us.
What, therefore, is the definition of penalty as it differs from the trials of the just and also from voluntary mortification? The answer is given in <De malo>, where St. Thomas enumerates three things that belong to the nature of penalty: 1. it is an evil inflicted for committed sin (St. Thomas says this is the tradition of faith), and in this it differs from the trials of the just; 2. it is something repugnant to the will, either actual or habitual or radical, that is the natural inclination which tends to the proper good (in this way this explains that a culpable man sometimes freely accepts a just penalty, which however is still repugnant to the inclination of his nature); 3. it is from an extrinsic principle, which inflicts an afflictive suffering (thus it is distinguished from the mortification which a man inflicts on himself).
Hence penalty in itself is defined as an evil inflicted for some committed fault or guilt by an extrinsic principle against the natural inclination of the culpable agent.
It is enough, says St. Thomas, that the penalty be against the natural inclination of the will, "as when an individual is deprived of the habit of virtue when he does not wish to have the virtue; nevertheless the natural inclination of the will is to the good of the virtue."
From this definition of penalty we learn its division, namely, the penalty of the senses, inflicted on the sensible part, and the penalty of loss, or the absence of the divine vision. The first is owing to the fault because of the inordinate turning to some changeable good, the second is owing to a grave sin because of the aversion or turning away from the ultimate end.
First corollary. The trials of the just do not always arise from their sins. From the foregoing definition we can see Baius' error in his seventy-second proposition: "All the afflictions of the just are punishments for their sins; hence Job and the martyrs underwent whatever they suffered for their sins."
This statement is against the tradition of faith and of the Scriptures. For example, "Now this trial the Lord therefore permitted to happen to him, that an example might be given to posterity of his patience, as also of holy Job"; "And because thou wast acceptable to God, it was necessary that temptation should prove thee"; of the man born blind our Lord said, "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him."
Second corollary. Hence not every purification of the just is properly penalty; it may be a purification from some imperfection distinct from sin. "In the Blessed Virgin the Holy Ghost effected a twofold purgation. The first was preparatory to the conception of Christ, and this was not a purification from any impurity of guilt or sin but it served to recollect her mind and lift it above the multitude. For the angels, too, are said to be purified and no impurity is found in them. Thus there is a twofold purgation: the purgation from guilt by grace and the purgation from ignorance by the light of doctrine.
The principal differences between guilt and penalty are clearly given in St. Thomas' <De malo>. The difference is threefold:
1. The guilt is the evil of the voluntary action itself; the penalty is the evil of the voluntary agent consequent on the evil of the action, for example, the privation of the form or the penalty of death, or the privation of integrity or the penalty of mutilation.
2. The guilt is according to the will, whereas the penalty is against the will.
3. The guilt is in the acting, the penalty is the suffering.
Moreover it should be noted that the evil that is a disorder in action can be not only in the will but also in the intellect, for example, a speculative error, and in this latter instance the evil is sometimes voluntary and sometimes not. So also with regard to the will we can have a material and involuntary sin, which is not guilt because of the defect of attention.
Doubt. Can all the divisions of evil be reduced to the foregoing, namely, the division between guilt and penalty?
Reply. All the divisions of guilt cannot be reduced to these two because this division refers only to evil in voluntary things. Evil has other divisions inasmuch as it is opposed to transcendental good, which under the aspect of being is divided into the ten categories of being, and thus we have an evil man, an evil fruit, an evil quantity, quality, action, passion, or relation.
Evil is again divided as it is opposed to good in general, which, under the aspect of good, is divided into the honest, delightful, and useful. Thus evil is divided into the dishonest or base (which conforms to guilt), the painful (which conforms to penalty), and finally the harmful, which conforms to both guilt and penalty, but more with guilt, as we shall see in the following question, because a just penalty in itself is something good, and evil only <secundum quid>.
St. Thomas gives another division into the evil of guilt, or moral evil, namely the privation of moral rectitude, and the evil of nature, namely, the privation of the good of nature, which can be a penalty if it is inflicted for guilt, or it may not be a penalty if not inflicted for guilt, as the blindness of one born blind, as mentioned in the Gospel.
(diagram page 486)
evil as the privation of an owing good
In these instances evil is predicated analogically. So also sin is predicated analogically when we speak of mortal and venial sin. According to the Thomistic definition of analogy as distinct from Suarez' definition, venial sin is farther removed from mortal sin for St. Thomas than for Suarez. According to Suarez, in an analogy things are the same <simpliciter> and diverse <secundum quid>; for St. Thomas analogical things are diverse <simpliciter> and the same <secundum quid>, or proportionately the same. For instance, animality, which is univocal, is the same <simpliciter> and diverse <secundum quid> in man and in the worm.
Sixth Article: Whether Penalty Has More Of Evil Than Guilt Has
State of the question. It appears that this is true because: 1. reward has more of good than merit, and similarly penalty has more of evil than guilt; 2. the agent is better than the action, and therefore the evil of the agent, namely, the penalty, is worse than the evil of the action; 3. the penalty of loss is the privation of the vision of God and therefore worse than the privation of moral rectitude. These are clever sophisms.
Reply. The reply is that guilt partakes more of the nature of evil than any penalty, whether it be the penalty of the senses or of loss or of damnation.
1. In the argument <sed contra> this is proved from the reference to the wise being who inflicts the penalty. In His wisdom God inflicts the penalty that the guilt may be averted, that is, He induces a lesser evil that a greater may be avoided, just as the surgeon amputates a member to save the rest of the body from corruption. This argument of St. Thomas applies also for the penalty of eternal damnation, as he explains in the body of the article. Indeed the punishment of hell is medicinal, if not for the damned at least for those still on earth, since it induces a salutary fear. So in society the penalty of capital punishment inspires a healthy fear in the criminal.
2. The proof in the body of the article is twofold: a) from the formal cause and the formal effect of both guilt and penalty; b) from the efficient cause of the penalty, namely, God, who as the author of the penalty cannot be the author of the evil of guilt.
a) The argument may be presented in this form. That by which a man becomes evil in his will is a greater evil than the privation of any one of the things he uses. But it is by guilt that man becomes evil in his will. Therefore guilt is a greater evil than penalty.
Proof of the major. Evil is the privation of an owing good, and the greater evil is the privation of a greater owing good. But good consists essentially in act, and a man's ultimate act is his operation, and moreover it is the will that moves all his other faculties to operation. Thus a man is said to be good by reason of his good will, by which he makes good use of what he has; and he is evil because of an evil will. For it is the will that tends to good, and directs not only to the good of some particular faculty but to the good of the whole man. Hence the will tends to the good of the whole man and averts evil from him. A man who is good without qualification is a man of good will and not the man with a good intellect alone, for knowledge is ordered to the truth, which is the good of the intellective faculty, but the truth is not the good of the complete man. A philosopher or a scientist may, as we know, put his knowledge to evil uses.
It follows that by the deprivation of knowledge or art, by the loss of an arm, a man is rendered evil not completely but only in certain respects. He may be a bad scientist, a poor artist, or a poor musician; But by the privation of good will a man is rendered completely evil.
Elsewhere St. Thomas says: "The subject of the habit that is called virtue can be nothing else than the will or some faculty that is moved by the will. The reason is that the will moves all the other faculties which are in some sense rational to their acts. And therefore the fact that a man actually acts well arises from the fact that the man has a good will."
b) This argument is based on the fact that God, the efficient cause of penalty, cannot be the author of the evil of guilt. It may be stated in the following form. That is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good and cannot be caused by God. But the evil of guilt is directly opposed to the uncreated good and cannot be caused by God, whereas the evil of penalty is opposed to the uncreated or created good of the creature and is caused by God.
The major is evident. The minor is proved as follows: The evil of guilt is opposed not only to the uncreated good of the creature, as in the case of the privation of the beatific vision, but directly to the uncreated good itself. In what way?" Sin is opposed to the fulfillment of the divine will and the divine love by which the divine good is loved in itself and not only as it is participated in by the creature." That is, as St. Thomas explains in the treatise on charity: "We must love God more than ourselves and we must love Him on account of Himself, formally and finally, as He is infinitely good in Himself and our final end, infinitely better than ourselves and better than all His gifts." Mortal sin, on the other hand, is a turning away from God our last end, and this is denying to God the infinite dignity of the last end. Cajetan offers this formula: "the evil of guilt is directly opposed to the uncreated good, not as it is in us but as it is in itself."
But a difficulty arises from the fact that mortal sin takes nothing from God since God is infinitely simple and can lose nothing.
"To this we reply briefly," says Cajetan in the same place, "that the opposition of evil to the uncreated good can be understood in two ways, formally and objectively. Formally such opposition is impossible....since God is pure act who can lose nothing. Objectively, however, the evil of guilt opposes the divine good in itself. This is explained in the place referred to (and in the present article) by the object of charity. Whoever sins mortally wishes explicitly or interpretatively as much as he can that God should not be his ultimate end. This is opposing God objectively as He is in Himself, just as he who loves in charity wishes for God whatever belongs to Him."
St. Thomas' article may be reduced to the following.
(diagram page 489)
Anyone who sins wishes explicitly or interpretatively as much as he can to deprive God of the infinite perfection of the last end, that is, that supreme good on account of which all things were made. Mortal sin practically denies to God the dignity of the highest good, and the sinner places his last end in himself and loves it above all things. Hence St. Thomas says: "A sin committed against God has a certain infinity because of the infinity of the divine majesty. The offense is judged to be graver by how much higher he is against whom the offense is committed. Hence, for condign satisfaction, the act of satisfaction must have infinite efficacy, as belonging both to God and man." The conclusion of the present article is borne out therefore especially for mortal sin, namely, that mortal sin is more evil than any penalty.
Doubt. Does this conclusion apply also to venial sin? The reply is in the affirmative. The term sin is predicated analogically of venial sin, but the analogy is proper and not metaphorical, and therefore the conclusion applies also to venial sin, that is, even venial sin, as something purely evil, is a greater evil than the evil of penalty, because a just penalty, even the penalty of damnation, is not purely evil since in its own way it restores the order of justice. The penalty is, then, merely something evil, as the privation of the good of the creature, and damnation itself is privation of the uncreated good to the creature, which is less than the denial of the uncreated good in itself. Below we shall see that God can in no way be the cause of even venial guilt because even venial sin is something essentially disordered.
Solution Of The Objections
Since the objections are difficult, we present them formally.
First objection. Reward is a greater good than merit. But guilt is related to penalty as merit is to reward. Therefore guilt is less an evil than penalty is.
Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: inasmuch as guilt terminates in penalty, I concede; inasmuch as guilt is intended on account of penalty as merit is on account of reward, I deny. I distinguish the conclusion: if guilt were intended on account of penalty as merit is intended on account of reward, I concede; if otherwise, I deny.
Second objection. That is the greater evil which opposes the greater good. But the penalty opposes the good of the agent, which is a greater good than the good of the action, to which guilt is opposed.
Reply. I distinguish the minor: if by the good of the action is meant the good of the action of the speculative intellect or of the members, I concede; but if the good of the action is the good of the action of the will, which tends to the good of the whole man, I deny, because by an evil will a man becomes purely evil.
The difficulty in this reply to the second objection arises from the fact that a second perfection, which is an accident, is said to be better than a first perfection, which is the substance. How can an accident be more perfect than the substance?
Cajetan replies that the accident is not more perfect than the substance but that the substance as operating is more perfect than a substance that is not yet operating. Only in God is it true that the substance operating <ad extra> is not more perfect than the substance as not operating <ad extra>. Hence we say that every created being is because of its operation, in the sense that it is because of itself as operating.
Third objection. The privation of the order to an end is less than the privation of the end itself. But guilt is the privation of the order to the end, and the penalty of damnation is the privation of the end itself. Therefore guilt is less an evil than the penalty is.
Reply. Let the major pass. I distinguish the minor: the penalty of damnation is the privation of the end itself inasmuch as man is removed from the end, I concede; inasmuch as the infinite dignity of the ultimate end is denied to God, I deny. I distinguish the conclusion: if guilt were only the privation of the good of man, I concede; if it opposes the uncreated good in itself, I deny. Here is subject matter for a sermon: it is guilt alone that makes man evil and is opposed to the divine goodness.
We should note that this doctrine, that guilt is a greater evil than any penalty, even death, was clearly understood in pagan antiquity, particularly in Plato's dialogue, entitled Gorgias.
The thesis which Plato is defending in this dialogue is that it is a greater evil to do injustice than to suffer it, and that it is a greater evil for the criminal to go unpunished than to be punished.
This dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and the three Sophists, Pollus, Callicles, and Gorgias, the rhetorician.
Plato asked Gorgias, "What is rhetoric? What is its object?"
"Orations, speeches, and discourses," replied Gorgias.
"Is it every discourse on any subject, even on the kitchen?" asked Plato.
"It is the discourse intended to persuade men so that the opinion of the rhetorician will prevail," answered Gorgias.
"Is it intended to persuade men of what is really true and just, or that which only appears true and just, or even something purely unjust?" asked Plato. "If this is the object of rhetoric, then the rhetorician acts against right reason, he is immoral, and rhetoric is not even an art but simply an empty exercise."
Gorgias was silent. Pollus tried to defend him, and said, "This is the force of rhetoric: that by his art the rhetorician can persuade men to do what he wishes."
Socrates replied: "What is it he wishes to do? Is it wishing and effecting what is good, what is right for us, and not what is only apparently right; what is really right for us, namely, what is actually good and true?"
"Does the rhetorician," asked Socrates, "do what he wishes when he brings it about that a good citizen is sent into exile? Indeed, he wishes and does something that is not good, something unjust, and therefore something that is not good even for himself. Then this rhetorician is not happy, because that man is happy who wills and does the good."
At the end Socrates stated what the criminal and his defender should do. In order that he may will his own true good, the criminal should go to the judges and say, "I committed a crime," just as a sick man goes to the physician to be cured. And the criminal should willingly submit to the penalties imposed for his crime so that he will once again be reinstated in the order of justice and the good and thus find happiness.
Thus Socrates supports the teaching that it is a greater evil to do injustice than to suffer injustice, and for the criminal it is a greater evil to go unpunished than to be punished, especially if he submits willingly and accepts the punishment justly imposed on him.
The truth that the evil of penalty is something just and that it repairs the evil of guilt appears in its splendor in the supernatural order in the sacrament of penance when the criminal, whose crime is hidden, willingly accuses himself and makes satisfaction in union with Christ the Redeemer.
Thus far we have determined the definition of evil, the privation of an owing good; the subject of evil; and the division of evil. We now turn to the cause or origin of evil.
In the second article of the preceding question we stated that God could impede evil, and that He nevertheless wills to allow it because of some greater good. We thus assigned the final cause of the divine permission of evil, but not the cause of evil itself. In treating of the cause of evil itself, St. Thomas asks three things: 1. whether good can be the cause of evil; 2. whether the highest good, which is God, is the cause of evil; 3. whether there is some supreme evil which is the cause of all evils. In this last article he refutes the Manichaeans.
First Article: Whether Good Can Be The Cause Of Evil
State of the question. In this title cause is understood in its most general sense, without any determination of the kind of cause.
It seems that good cannot be the cause of evil:
1. because "a good tree cannot bear evil fruit," as our Lord said;
But on the other hand, St. Augustine said: "There was absolutely nothing from which evil could arise except out of good."
Reply. The reply has four parts:
First conclusion. It is necessary to point out that evil has some kind of cause. In his proof St. Thomas enunciates first the minor; but we begin with the major as follows:
The fact that anything is deficient in its natural and due disposition can arise only from some cause that draws the thing outside its disposition; for example, an agent does not defect in its action except by reason of some impediment. But evil is the deficiency of some good that is due. Therefore evil has some kind of cause, and nothing can be a cause unless it is being and good in some way.
The major of this syllogism illustrates the entire article, as we shall see. Up to this point there is no difficulty, and the foregoing argument will appear even clearer at the end of the article when we distinguish between evil in action and evil in effect.
Second conclusion. Evil has neither a formal nor a final cause; this is evident because evil is the privation of form and the privation of the right ordination to an end.
The divine permission of evil takes place because of a greater good, but the evil itself is not useful nor is it of itself ordered to the greater good; if it were, it would be something good as matter ordered to the form. Evil, however, is only the occasion and the condition <sine qua non> of some greater good, as, for example, persecution is the occasion of the great constancy of the martyrs. A condition and an occasion differ from a cause inasmuch as they have no influence on the effect, neither efficiently nor finally nor formally nor materially.
Third conclusion. That evil has a material cause is evident because evil is privation in an apt subject, and thus it is in good as in a subject.
Fourth conclusion. This conclusion is more difficult. Evil cannot have an efficient cause <per se> but only an efficient cause <per accidens>, and this is something good.
The proof is rather complex. The following synopsis may be helpful.
Obviously evil does not have an efficient cause <per se>, for such a cause is in some way being and good, which <per se> produces some good, for example, fire produces fire and motor power produces movement. Hence evil can have an efficient cause only <per accidens>. But accidental causes are of many kinds; likewise evil is of many kinds, and therefore this subdivision is necessary.
(diagram page 495)
Good is the efficient cause of evil
in the effect
1. Evil in action, for example, weakness in walking or lameness is caused by the defect of the principal cause (a weakness of the motive power) or by a defect of the instrumental cause (curvature of the leg bones).
2. Evil in anything is of three kinds: a) from the power of a contrary agent, for example, the form of wood or of a house is destroyed by the power of fire; b) from the defect of an action followed by a proper deficient effect, for example, poor hearing is the effect of poor pronunciation; c) from the indisposition of the matter, for example, the birth of a monstrosity.
This enumeration is complete because evil in a thing cannot be produced except by the agent or the matter as considered with regard to the form and the end. Thus the four kinds of causes are included. And evil cannot come from the agent except by reason of the power of a contrary agent or from the defect of the proper agent.
Finally it is clear that in these three cases the efficient cause is only an accidental cause, but the difficulty arises from the fact that causes are said to be accidental in different ways.
It is accidental that a proper agent be defective, for example, that a man speaks poorly because of the presence of some impediment. The deficiency happens to a good thing which <per se> has the power to act.
So also it is accidental that matter be indisposed to properly receive the action of an agent. Lastly it is only by accident that the privation of a form takes place, for example, the destruction of wood or of a house by the force of a contrary agent, namely, fire. Per se this contrary agent tends to induce its proper form; fire produces something similar to itself, it produces fire, and it does not <per se> tend to the privation of an opposite form. This privation, however, follows necessarily. It is true that this is not the first but the second acceptation of the term "accidental cause," as explained by Aristotle.
Aristotle divides accidental causes as follows.
The division of quasi- <per accidens> and not contingently will appear obscure to many. It is difficult at first to conceive of a contrary agent producing a physical evil <per accidens> and of necessity; the terms "<per accidens>" and "necessarily" seem to be irreconcilable to those who do not clearly understand the difference between a cause that is absolutely <per accidens>, like chance, and an accidental cause that always produces the accidental effect. Such a cause is nevertheless a cause <per accidens> even though the accidental effect follows always and of necessity, because this cause is not <per se> ordered to this effect. Fire acts in a way similar to itself; <per se> it does not tend to the destruction of wood or of a house, but to the production of fire. The terms "<per accidens>" and "<of necessity>," at first sight irreconcilable, can be reconciled.
Doubt. With regard to a voluntary agent, is the accidental effect separated from the intention of the agent?" Sometimes the accidental effect is connected with the principal effect rarely and in few instances, and in this case when the agent intends the effect <per se> it is not necessary that the agent intend the accidental effect. But sometimes the accidental effect accompanies the principal effect at all times or in the majority of instances, and then the accidental effect cannot be said to be separate from the intention of the agent. If therefore the good intended by the will is joined to some evil in rare instances, the will can be excused from sin, as in the case of accidental homicide which occurs beyond the intention of the will. But if at all times or in most instances the evil is joined to the good which the will intends <per se>, it is not excused from sin, even though the will does not intend this evil <per se>. Even though the sinner does not will the evil in itself, yet he wills to fall into this evil rather than go without the connected good."
3. Thus good is the material cause and <per accidens> the efficient cause of evil. For this reason we say, for instance, of a conflagration or of a fractured bone, it was an accident.
The conclusion of the body of the article will appear clearer in the light of this principle, "The fact that a thing is deficient in its natural and proper disposition can arise only from some cause that draws it away from that disposition."
The evil of an action arising from the defect of the agent and the evil in a thing arising from the defect of the agent or from the defect of the matter in the final analysis arise from some cause that draws the thing or the agent away from its disposition. This disturbing cause is a cause <per accidens> because <per se> it tends to its proper effect; for example, fruits are dried up owing to an excessive influence from the sun, and on the other hand fruits do not ripen from an insufficient influence from the sun. Physical evil, as Leibnitz says, happens because of the interconcurrence of the laws of nature. But each of these laws is good. The evil follows accidentally, and it is the condition of a greater good according to the disposition of Providence. And while we deplore these accidental evils, we unconsciously confess that the things that happen ordinarily are well ordered by divine Providence.
Solution Of The Objections In The Article
First objection. Good is like a good tree. But a good tree cannot bear evil fruit. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.
Reply. I distinguish the major: a good tree is a figure of the will that is morally good, I concede; of the natural will that is physically good, I deny. I distinguish the minor: the good tree, or the will that is morally good, cannot bear evil fruit, I concede; the natural will that is physically good cannot bear evil fruit, I subdistinguish: <per se>, I concede; <per accidens>, I deny. Hence good can be the cause of evil <per accidens>.
Second objection. One of two contraries cannot be the cause of the other. But evil is contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.
Reply. One of two contraries cannot <per se> be the cause of the other, I concede; <per accidens>, I deny. Thus the goodness of fire can cause the evil of the wood's destruction or the burning of a house.
Third objection. An evil or deficient effect does not proceed except from a deficient cause. But a deficient cause is evil. Therefore evil comes only from evil.
Reply. I distinguish the major: in voluntary things, I concede; in physical things, I deny, because sometimes evil proceeds from the power of a contrary agent. Moreover, a deficient cause is not evil as cause but only as deficient.
In his reply to the third difficulty, St. Thomas points out that the defect of a voluntary action proceeds "from the fact that the will does not subject itself in act to its rule. This defect is not indeed a fault or guilt, but it is followed by guilt because the will operates with this defect or fault."
In his work, <De malo>, St. Thomas says: "The fact that the will does not in act attend to such a rule considered in itself is not evil and it is neither guilt nor penalty, because the soul is not bound nor can it attend to a rule of this kind always in act. But it takes on the first aspect of guilt when without actual consideration of the rule it proceeds to a particular election..... Man sins by the fact that he does not have a rule, or does not attend to one, and thus proceeds to making a choice. For this reason St. Augustine said that the will is the cause of sin inasmuch as it is deficient." And the will is deficient inasmuch as it recedes from a worthy good under the influence or attraction of some delectable unworthy good. Thus even in moral matters the major of the first argument of this article is verified: "The fact that anything departs from its natural and due disposition comes only from some cause that draws the thing away from its proper disposition." Hence evil always has some cause <per accidens> in the good.
The fifteenth objection in <De malo>. An accidental cause does not intend the effect that follows <per accidens>. But evil has only an accidental cause. Therefore no one who does evil sins.
Reply. An intelligent cause does not contemplate the accidental effect that rarely follows, I concede; the accidental effect that is always joined to the principal effect, I deny.
The seventeenth objection. Whatever follows accidentally happens in rare instances. But evil follows in many instances, as we read, "The number of fools is infinite." Therefore the cause of evil is <per se> and not <per accidens>.
Reply. A thing is said to follow <per accidens> not only if it follows in rare instances but because it follows, though not intended <per se>, even if it follows in the majority of instances. St. Thomas says: "The accidental thing does not always take place in rare cases, sometimes it follows in all cases or most cases, for example, the adulterer intends a certain sensible good to which an evil is always joined and he always falls into that evil..... The evil of guilt happens so often in the human race (and in it alone) because there are so many more ways to deviate from the middle than holding the middle path, as we read, 'the sensible goods are better known by many than the goods of the mind.'"
On a higher plane and with clearer distinction St. Thomas proposes this doctrine in a manner that seems to oppose the theory of optimism: "The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature occurs in most instances, and the defect from this good occurs in fewer instances. But the good that is above the common state of nature is found in fewer instances..... It is evident that many men have sufficient knowledge to govern their own lives....: but very few men attain to a profound knowledge of intelligible things."
This limitation of optimism is owing to the human composite and to original sin.
1. The lowest kind of intelligence has for its object the lowest of intelligible things, namely, the intelligible thing in sensible things, and thus this intelligence must be united with sensible things. First, therefore, we know sensible things and we live according to the senses, and many men are attracted rather to the good of the senses than to the good according to right reason.
2. "Some signs of original sin probably appear in the human race. Since God takes cognizance of human acts in such a way that He fixes a reward for good acts and penalties for evil acts,....we can certify the guilt from the penalty. It is evident that the human race suffers various kinds of penalties, both corporal and spiritual..... Among the spiritual penalties the greatest is the weakness of reason, and because of this penalty man has difficulty in knowing the truth, he easily falls into error, he cannot entirely overcome his bestial appetites, and he is often overwhelmed by these lower impulses. Someone might say that these defects are not penal, but natural defects arising necessarily from matter..... But if we study the matter carefully, we can conclude with sufficient probability that divine providence, which has conjoined congruous perfectibles to the particular perfections, united the higher nature (the soul) to the lower (the body) so that the soul would be dominant, and if any impediment should arise against this dominion from the defect of nature, God would have removed it by a special and supernatural act of beneficence."
Pascal said: "Without this mystery man would be more incomprehensible than this mystery is incomprehensible to man." The doctrine of original sin offers the solution to the puzzling problem of the coexistence in man of such great weakness and misery and such strong aspirations to the sublime. But, as St. Thomas says, "God permitted evil to happen that something better might come of it." Hence we read, "And where sin abounded, grace did more abound," and in blessing the paschal candle we chant, "O happy fault that merited so great a Redeemer!"
Indeed, according to revelation: "For if by one man's offense death reigned through one; much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ." Thus the motive of the Incarnation was formally a motive of mercy, for the reason behind mercy is the alleviation of misery. God predestined Christ to the glory of the Redeemer and permitted Adam's sin that Christ might be the Redeemer of the human race.
But while we clearly see the sensible existence of evil in the world, the existence of the concupiscence of the flesh and of the eyes, and the pride of life, we do not clearly understand the spiritual heights and the infinite value of the mystery of the redemptive Incarnation, and we do not appreciate the price of all the graces that flow invisibly from this mystery to the souls of all generations. "We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency may be of the power of God, and not of us,....that the life also of Jesus may be made manifest in our mortal flesh."
The solution of this problem, that God permits evil only for some greater good, is at once clear and obscure; it is clear in the abstract and in general but obscure in the concrete and in particular, because only in heaven shall we see this greater good because of which God permits evil. We are loved by God much more than we think, just as St. Anne, the mother of the Blessed Virgin Mary, did not understand the greatness of the blessing which her daughter had received. Grace is the seed of glory, and our trials and tribulations can obtain for us the eternal reward of glory.
But this solution of the problem of evil will not bring peace and quiet to anxious souls in this life without the influence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost and without the special inspiration of the gifts of understanding and wisdom, from which we obtain a quasi-experimental knowledge of the good things promised to those who believe. Hence St. Thomas says that these gifts are necessary for salvation.
It is true, therefore, that good is the efficient cause of evil only <per accidens>. And if this occurs frequently, it is only so in the human race because of the union of the soul with the body and because of original sin. Such is not the case with the angels. St. Thomas says that the multitude of angels is very great, like the multitude of the stars, and that more angels remained constant than sinned. In the angels there is only the intellectual nature; there is no attraction to sensible things, and there is no original sin in them. St. Thomas wrote these words in explanation of the passage, "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Thus the number of all the elect, if the angels are included, is greater, according to St. Thomas, than the number of the damned.
Second Article: Whether The Highest Good, Which Is God, Is The Cause Of Evil
State of the question. It seems that God is the cause of evil because:
1. We read in the Scriptures, "I am the Lord and there is none else: I
form the light, and create darkness, I make peace, and create evil" (that
is, the evil of penalty);
On the other hand, St. Augustine says: "God is not the author of evil (that is, of guilt), because He is not the cause of the tendency to non-being."
The conclusion of the article is in two parts: 1. God is not the cause of the evil that consists in defect of action, that is, the evil of guilt; 2. God is <per accidens> the cause of the physical evil of natural things and of the evil of penalty.
First conclusion. God is in no way the cause of the evil of guilt.
a) Proof from Scripture. We read, "The works of God are perfect, and all His ways are judgments: God is faithful and without any iniquity, He is just and right"; "Is there injustice with God? God forbid"; "Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God. For God is not a tempter of evils, and He tempteth no man"; "He that committeth sin is of the devil"; "For thou hatest none of the things which Thou hast made"; "But to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike"; "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me."
Against the Calvinists the Council of Trent declared: "If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to go his evil ways, but that God does the evil works as He does the good works, not only permissively but properly and <per se>, so that the treason of Judas and the calling of Paul are equally God's work, let him be anathema." Against the Predestinationists the Council of Carisiac declared: "When some are saved it is because of the gift of salvation; when some are lost it is because of those who are lost"; "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." And the Third Council of Valencia clearly affirmed against Scotus Eriugena that God is the author of penalties but not of guilt.
From these definitions it is clear that God is neither the direct nor the indirect cause of sin. He is not the direct cause of sin, by moral or physical movement to sin; nor indirectly, that is, by negligence, because of insufficient assistance, as the negligent pilot is the indirect cause of the shipwreck. This last point has been expressly defined by the Church against the Protestants and the Jansenists, who held that God is in some way the cause of sin because of insufficient assistance. In its definition, the Council of Trent quotes the words of St. Augustine: "God does not command the impossible, but when He commands He admonishes us to do what we can and to petition for that which we cannot do." We learn the same from the condemnation of the first proposition of Jansenius:" Some of God's precepts are impossible for just men who will and try (to fulfill them) with the powers that they now have: besides they lack the grace that would make these precepts possible of fulfillment."
St. Thomas explains the divine permission of sin by enumerating the various ways in which the term "permission" is understood. His enumeration may be reduced to the following synopsis.
(diagram page 505)
We see that permission is not used univocally in all these instances. In the last case the will of the one permitting intervenes to a much smaller degree than in the first, and the will to permit is the same as the will not to impede. Hence God is in no way the cause of sin.
b) Proof from reason. The evil which consists in the defect of the action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But God is the agent who is absolutely indefectible and never deficient. Therefore God can in no way be the cause of the evil of action or of guilt.
The major is clear from the preceding article, where it was shown that the evil of action does not have a cause <per se> but only <per accidens>, as coming from the defect of the agent, whether it be the principal agent, as weakness in walking, or the instrumental agent, as lameness on account of a curvature of the leg bone. In physical things, of course, this defect of the agent comes from some disturbing cause or from some impediment, that is, from some power of a contrary agent.
But in free agents the evil of a voluntary action comes only from the defect of the operator. "In voluntary things the defect of the action proceeds from a will deficient in act, inasmuch as the will does not subject itself in act to its rule. This defect is, however, not guilt, but guilt follows upon it because the will operates with this defect." That is to say that the non-consideration of the rule is only a negation before the agent operates, but it becomes privation and is called in consideration when the agent begins to operate without consideration of the rule. As St. Thomas says: "The will takes on the first aspect of guilt from the fact that the will proceeds to this kind of choice without actual consideration of the rule." Further, this inconsideration becomes at least virtually voluntary and culpable when a man in a state of alertness should and could consider the rule of right reason in his operation. God does not command the impossible. Therefore every venial sin is avoidable, although without a very special help all venial sins cannot be avoided continuously.
The minor is clear. God is absolutely indefectible, that is, He cannot be the author of a defect either directly or indirectly. Not directly, because He cannot move either morally or physically to sin as sin, that is, to something inordinate under the aspect of privation; not indirectly, that is, through neglect or carelessness, because divine negligence implies a contradiction. This is quite clear in the abstract and in general, although in concrete and particular cases it is difficult to explain the divine movement in the direction of sin.
Therefore, if God were to command the impossible, sin would be unavoidable, and then it would not be sin, nor could man be justly punished especially for all eternity; that would be the greatest injustice. For this reason Jansenius eventually arrived at the denial not only of mercy but also of divine justice.
Moreover, if by an impossible hypothesis God were to wish to be the cause of sin, He could not be because sin is outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, which is indefectible and cannot produce what is the privation of being and goodness but can produce only what has the nature of being and goodness. Thus when God moves toward the physical entity of sin He necessarily prescinds from the malice involved. Nothing is more exactly defined than the adequate object of a potency or power; as sight cannot see sounds, so God cannot be either the direct or the indirect cause of sin.
In another place St. Thomas explains this conclusion more clearly in two ways by distinguishing between direct and indirect causality.
1. God cannot be the direct cause of sin. To be the direct cause of sin is to incline one's own will or that of another to sin. But God cannot incline His will or that of another to sin. Therefore God cannot be the direct cause of sin.
The major is clear.
Proof of the minor. God inclines and converges all things to Himself as to their last end, for every agent acts for a proportionate end, and the order of actions corresponds to the order of ends. Hence God cannot be the direct cause of any sin, since every sin is a departure from the order to God as to an end.
This reason is in conformity with the reason given above in the article, whether God wills evils: "God cannot be author of the evil of guilt,....because the evil of guilt is directly opposed to the uncreated good; it is contrary to the fulfillment of the divine will." "Evil is never desired except <per accidens>, that is, when the good to which the evil is joined is desired more than the good that is deprived by the evil. But God wills no good more than His own goodness..... Hence God in no way wills the evil of guilt, which denies the order to the divine good."
To put it briefly: God, as the indefectible cause, cannot be the cause of the evil of guilt, because this evil denies the order to the divine good, which God wills above all things. Otherwise God would be a defective cause and He would depart from Himself, from truth and goodness, which is obviously impossible since God is essential goodness itself.
What, then, is the direct cause of sin? It is the sinner, inasmuch as he tends to an object out of harmony with the rules of morals; the sinner wills <per se> some changeable good and consequently he wills the inordination of his act.
2. God cannot be the indirect cause of sin. To be the indirect cause of sin is to refrain from preventing it when we can and should prevent it. But according to His wisdom and justice God is not bound to prevent the sins which He permits. Therefore, when God does not provide the help to avoid sin, He is not the indirect cause of the sin.
The major is certain; it is the definition of the indirect voluntarium; for example, the pilot is the indirect cause of the shipwreck when he neglects to guide the ship and is able and obliged to do so.
The minor is proved as follows: "The universal provider allows a certain defect to occur in some particular instance lest the good of the whole be impeded..... The corruption of one individual is the generation of another and so the species is preserved. Since God is the universal provider of all being, it pertains to His providence that He permit certain defects in particular things lest the perfect good of the universe be impeded. If all evils were to be impeded, the universe would lose many good things; it would lose the life of the lion, the patience of the martyrs, if animals would not be killed or if tyrants would not persecute."
Before we consider the second conclusion concerning physical evil, we reply to the objections to the first conclusion.
Solution Of The Objections
In the solution of these objections we must keep in mind the manner in which God moves toward the physical act of sin. These points should be carefully noted.
1. We presuppose that there is in God an eternal positive and effective decree with regard to the entity of sin, and a permissive decree with regard to the defect of sin proceeding solely from the deficient cause. Hence from eternity there was a twofold decree with regard to the sin of Christ's enemies at some determined hour.
2. The divine motion is previous, since God is the cause of the act of sin and not only of the sin as being. The cause always precedes the effect, at least by nature and causality; the will needs to be moved so that it can act, because the will is not its own action just as it is not its own being.
3. This divine motion is predeterminative, but not in the same way as the divine motion by which we are moved to a good act; in the case of evil the divine motion is predeterminative as executing the divine will, but for an evil act there is a twofold decree instead of a single decree: the positive decree with regard to the entity of the sin and the permissive decree with regard to the lack of moral rectitude, or with regard to the malice.
4. This divine motion in its execution follows upon, at least by nature if not in time, the moral or objectively defective motion, which as such is not from God but from the devil, from an evil man, or from concupiscence. On the other hand, the moral motion which is a prerequisite to a good act is from God, at least as from the first cause, because it is good.
Once this defective moral motion is posited and after the intervention of some inconsideration on the part of man, the physical influx of God begins to flow into the will itself and effects the entity of the act of the will, but it prescinds from the malice; the freedom remains as in other acts because God moves not only toward the act but also that the act be free.
5. God does not determine the material part of the sin before the creature has in some way determined itself to the formal part of the sin. As the universal provider, God moves only that will to sin which is in itself evilly disposed and which thus disposed needs to be moved. Thus Christ said to Judas: "That which thou dost, do quickly." That which on the part of God precedes the determination of the will to the formal part of sin is only the permission to sin, which is a penalty, not for the first sin but for the other sins.
6. The inconsideration, which is the beginning of the sin, is voluntary and culpable, at least virtually, inasmuch as a rational agent can and should consider the rule of right reason in his action, and if he does not consider it, he is culpable; this is the beginning of the sin. Finally, since the will is naturally inclined to the good, it does not turn to the evil or the apparent good without first virtually turning itself away from the true good, at least by not considering the law when it could and should. This predetermination to the act of sin is not something primary in Thomism; it is secondary, something consequent and merely philosophical.
First objection. (The second objection in the article.) This objection, which attempts to show that God is the direct, although not the immediate, cause of sin, is stated as follows: The effect of a second cause is referred to the first cause. But the evil of guilt is sometimes the effect of a second cause. Therefore the evil of guilt is referred to the first cause.
Reply. I distinguish the major: with regard to the entity and perfection, I concede; with regard to the effect, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as a defect, I concede; as being, I deny; for example, whatever there is of motion in lameness is caused by the motive power, but whatever there is of deformity is not of the motive power but from the curvature of the bone. That is to say, the divine motion prescinds from malice.
I insist. But God moves the will to the act as it issues from the will itself. But the act of sin as it issues from the will does not prescind from malice. Therefore God in moving to this act does not prescind from malice.
Reply. I distinguish the major: as the act issues effectively from the will, I concede; defectively, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as it issues from the will defectively, I concede; effectively, I deny.
I insist. The cause of anything is also the cause of that which essentially belongs to it. But some physical acts are essentially evil in a moral sense, as hatred of God. Therefore in moving toward these acts God cannot prescind from their malice.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the cause of anything in the physical order is also the cause of that which essentially belongs to it in the same order, I concede; in the moral order and outside the adequate object of its causality, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and the malice is in the physical order and is within the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, I deny; and the malice is in the moral order and outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, I concede.
Thomists commonly point out that nothing is more clearly delimited than the causality of a potency or power, which is so completely concerned with its object that it touches on nothing else, no matter how closely anything else may be conjoined to its object. Thus in the same apple three things, color, taste, and smell, are intimately connected, and yet sight takes in the color but not the taste and smell. Sight cannot see sounds. Indeed, a distinction of reason is sufficient to delimit a potency; thus the good and true are distinguished only by reason, for example, in the true goodness of virtue, and yet the true is known and the good is loved. The intellect touches the good under the aspect of truth but not under the aspect of the good. Similarly, in God the paternity is distinguished from the divine nature only by reason, and the divine nature alone is communicated to the Son, without the communication of the paternity. In sin, however, the act taken physically and the moral malice are much more distinct from each other; these things pertain to two different orders, and the malice is outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, for every agent acts in a manner at least analogically similar to itself, and between God and the malice of guilt there is not even an analogical similarity. Hence, even if God willed to be the cause of sin, He could not, just as a man who willed to see sound could not.
I insist. But the formal constituent of a sin of commission is a positive element, according to St. Thomas and many Thomists. But God causes whatever is positive in sin. Therefore God causes the formal constituent of a sin of commission.
Reply. I distinguish the major: it is a positive element under the aspect of defectible being, or as forming the basis of the inordination, I concede; under the aspect of effectible being, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: God causes whatever is positive under the aspect of effectible being, I concede; under the aspect of defectible being, I deny. Thus, as defectible being the sin does not come within the adequate object of the divine omnipotence.
I insist. Whatever causes a form, <per accidens> produces the annexed privation. But the privation of moral rectitude is annexed to the act of sin. Therefore God, causing the act of sin, <per accidens> produces the privation of rectitude.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if this privation follows from the very nature of this form, I concede; in this way God is the cause <per accidens> of the physical evil of penalty or of the death of an animal because He wills the life of the lion; but if the privation proceeds from a defective principle, I deny. In this latter instance the privation is not even <per accidens> from an indefectible principle.
Thus we say that the sinner himself is <per accidens> the cause of the malice of his act, inasmuch as he tends <per se> to some unworthy good; but God is not even <per accidens> the cause of this malice, because this malice is outside the adequate object of omnipotence.
Other objections attempt to prove that God is at least indirectly the cause of sin.
The same pilot is the cause of the safety of the ship and of the shipwreck. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore God is the cause of moral shipwreck, or sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major: inasmuch as the pilot is defective, or does not guide the ship when he can and should, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and God is deficient in doing what is necessary for salvation, I deny; and God is still indefectible, I concede.
I insist. But he who does not prevent a sin when he can do so is still the indirect cause of the sin. But God does not prevent sin when He is able. Therefore God is the indirect cause of sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major: when he can and should, I concede; when he can and is not obliged to do so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: God is able not to prevent, or permit, that a defectible agent fails, or sins, because of a greater good which is occasioned by a sin. Thus God is not obliged to prevent sin.
I insist. St. Thomas says: "If affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation, as Aristotle says; for example, the rising of the sun is the cause of the day, and the non-rising of the sun is the cause of darkness. But the conferring of grace is the cause of a salutary act. Therefore the non-conferring of grace, included in the permission of even the first sin, is the cause of the omission of the salutary act."
We see that St. Thomas was not ignorant of this objection with which Thomists have been always confronted in almost the same terms.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if we are dealing with one cause alone, as the sun rising or not rising, or the pilot watching or not watching, I concede; but if we are dealing with two causes of which one is indefectible and the other defectible, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and the omission of the salutary act proceeds from one and the same cause as that which confers grace, I deny; from another defectible and deficient cause, I concede.
I insist. He who denies grace apart from antecedent guilt is the indirect cause of sin. But God, by permitting the beginning of the first sin (for example, in a baptized person), denies grace apart from antecedent guilt. Therefore God is the indirect cause of the beginning of the first sin.
Reply. The reply is contained in St. Thomas' words concerning the principle, "mutual causes are causes in different genera," which is applied inversely in justification and the loss of grace by sin. I distinguish the major: apart from guilt antecedent by a priority of nature, I concede; by a priority of time, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: apart from guilt antecedent by a priority of time, I concede; by a priority of nature, I deny.
Explanation. The denial of grace is indeed a penalty, which can be inflicted only for guilt. Thus the denial of grace implies more than the simple divine permission of sin, which simply antecedes sin as a condition <sine qua non>. It is true that the permission of the second sin is a penalty for the first sin, as St. Thomas says, but the permission of the first sin, for example, in the angels, or in the innocent Adam, or in a baptized person, does not have the nature of penalty.
God does not deny grace except for some antecedent guilt, but this guilt can be antecedent by a priority not of time but of nature only, in the genus of material cause, or of a defectible and deficient cause.
This is illustrated by the principle proposed by St. Thomas, mutual causes are causes in different genera, without there being a vicious circle. Thus in the same instant, on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness, but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated the removal of darkness is first in the order of nature, although the two things are simultaneous. Since the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are considered on the part of God as justifying, the infusion of grace is prior to remission of guilt in the order of nature. But if these things are considered on the part of man who is justified, the converse is true: liberation from guilt (we do not say remission of guilt) is prior in the order of nature to the attainment of justifying grace (we do not say infusion of grace because this expression views the matter from the viewpoint of God and not from the viewpoint of man, who is justified).
Speaking absolutely, the infusion of grace is prior to the remission of guilt, because these things are predicated on the part of God.
On the other hand, the loss of grace and the commission of sin are predicated of man sinning, and absolutely speaking from the viewpoint of the material cause, or of man losing grace, it is true that the beginning of the first sin is prior to the denial of divine grace, that is at least initial guilt is absolutely prior to penalty. The only thing that precedes this beginning of the first sin is the divine permission, which is a condition <sine qua non> of the sin. The denial of grace implies more than the simple permission of sin, which is not a penalty especially in the case of the first sin.
I insist. The Council of Trent declared: "God does not desert by His grace those who are once justified unless He is first deserted by them."
Reply. This statement was made by St. Augustine, who nevertheless solved the problem of evil. The statement means that God does not withdraw habitual grace except for some antecedent sin. In the case of actual grace, however, there is a desertion properly so called, which is the denial of actual grace by God. But this is not true of the simple divine permission for the beginning of the first sin, because God is not bound to preserve even the just man from sin by a special and efficacious help which is not due to man. But God does not refuse sufficient grace by which, if man does not resist it, he can attain to good; but if man resists sufficient grace, God can justly deny him efficacious grace.
I insist. As the best friend, God should always give man efficacious grace to avoid sin. But God is the best friend of every man. Therefore God should always give all men efficacious grace to avoid sin.
Reply. I ask you to prove the major, namely, that God as Adam's best friend was bound to offer him at all times not only sufficient grace but also efficacious grace, that is, by preventing Adam's resistance to sufficient grace.
I insist. But sufficient grace is required for the fulfillment of the commandments. And God because of the abundance of His goodness owes it to Himself to give us more help than is required to make the commandments possible of fulfillment. Therefore because of the abundance of His goodness God owes it to Himself to give us more than sufficient grace, namely, efficacious grace.
Reply. I distinguish the minor: frequently for the human race and also for the just man, I concede; always unto the end, this I ask you to prove.
I insist. God owes it to Himself at all times to unite mercy and justice in all His works.
Reply. I distinguish: by abundant sufficient graces, by sermons, good examples, let it pass; by graces that are always efficacious, this I ask you to prove. Even when God punishes, His mercy is united to justice, because even in hell the punishment is less than condign.
I insist. He who does not preserve a man in good is the indirect cause of the sin of a man who needs this preservation. But, by permitting the beginning of the first sin, God does not preserve a man in good. Therefore God is the indirect cause of sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major: he who does not preserve a man in good when he is able and obliged to do so, I concede; when he is able but not obliged to do so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. God is not obliged to preserve all defectible things in good, otherwise defectible things would never fail, and preservation from sin would not have been a most special privilege for the Blessed Virgin, but it would be something most common. God actually gives more than justice demands because of the superabundance of His goodness; He does this even for each person frequently, but not always to the end, that is, He does not conduct each person to his last end.
If it is said that man needs to be preserved in good so that he might remain in the good, the reply is: that man requires and has a right to be preserved in good and that God owes it to Himself to preserve man in good, this I deny; that man requires this preservation without having the right to it, I concede. In himself man is defectible and from this it follows that he sometimes fails; he fails sometimes physically and without guilt, like the agents inferior to him, and sometimes he fails morally and voluntarily with guilt, and God is not obliged to prevent this guilt. If God were so bound, no sin would ever be committed and defectible things would never fail. To no one, not even to the elect, is owing the efficacious election to glory, otherwise all men would be saved.
St. Thomas expresses this thought in these words: "It happens that God does not extend to some that help to avoid sin which, if it were extended, would prevent them from sinning. But God does all this according to the order of justice and wisdom, since He Himself is justice and wisdom. Hence it cannot be imputed to God that someone sins, as if He were the cause of sin, just as the pilot is not the cause of the shipwreck because of the fact that he does not steer the ship unless when he withdraws his guidance he could and should be steering the ship." The pilot is blamed only for negligence, and divine negligence is a contradiction in terms. This objection is indeed difficult, but it is not cogent.
I insist. St. Thomas says: "Out of the abundance of His goodness God dispenses those things that are owing to some creature more generously than the importance of the thing demands."
Reply. This is often true, but God does not always lead every man to the last end, preserving him and elevating him above sin. We are here face to face with a profound mystery, indeed the mystery of iniquity is more obscure than the mystery of grace since it is obscure not only with regard to us but also in itself. But the apparent contradiction will be obviated if we keep clearly in mind the following two most certain principles:
1. "God does not command the impossible, but when He commands He admonishes you to do what you are able and to ask for what you cannot do." This principle was invoked against the Protestants by the Council of Trent.
2. In the article, "Whether God loves all things equally," St. Thomas formulated this principle: "Since the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things, one thing would not be better than another if God had not willed a greater good for one thing than for another." This is the principle of predilection as found in revelation: "For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will," "For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?"
These two principles were promulgated by the Council of Carisiac in the words of St. Prosper: "The omnipotent God wills all men without exception to be saved, even though all are not saved. The fact that some are saved is owing to the gift of Him who saves them; the fact that some are lost is owing to themselves."
Taken separately, these two principles are most certain according to revelation; even in the natural order they are evident. But their intimate reconciliation remains obscure, and no created intelligence by its own powers can make this reconciliation, because it would be necessary to see how the infinite mercy, the infinite justice, and supreme liberty are intimately reconciled in God. No one can see God in this way except in the light of glory. In the words of Bossuet: "In this state of captivity we must humble our intelligence before the divine mystery and admit these two graces, one that leaves our will inexcusable before God, the other that prevents us from glorying in ourselves."
Hence St. Paul says: "He that glorieth, may glory in the Lord"; "For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory. For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them."
An article could be written comparing false evidence with the obscurity of true faith to illustrate why so often, especially in this question of evil, the objections at first sight seem clearer than the replies. This matter might at least be considered in a chapter on faith as illumined by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The principal reason is that the objections are taken from the superficial appearances of reality, whereas the replies are taken from that highest reality which is with God and which is so profound for us because of our defectibility and therefore remains so obscure.
Indeed in this present problem there are two obscurities opposed to each other: the higher obscurity of the divine reality which is translucent and the lower obscurity of sin itself, which is itself the privation of light, truth, and goodness. Between these two opposing obscurities is the true clarity of these certain principles: "God does not command the impossible," and "no one would be better than another if he were not loved more by God." The reconciliation of these principles is a mystery, but the evidence of the principles themselves indicates that the objections are superficial and false. In the objections we always find some sophistic falsehood, and none of the objections is either cogent or necessary.
These objections are useful because they arouse in the just a desire to contemplate the mystery of the Deity on a plane above every distinct idea. Such contemplation when it proceeds from faith illumined by the supernatural gifts with a certain experimental knowledge of God remains obscure with a translucent obscurity of which St. John of the Cross spoke so eloquently.
Second conclusion. God wills and causes <per accidens> physical evil and the evil of penalty.
An agent that by its power <per se> produces some form as a consequence and quasi- <per accidens> causes the privation of the opposite form. But God wills and causes <per se> and principally the good of the universe, which requires defectible things that are sometimes deficient, and God wills and causes the order of justice, which requires that penalty be inflicted on sinners. Therefore God wills and causes as a consequence and quasi- <per accidens> physical evil and the evil of penalty.
It should be noted that St. Thomas bases this proof not only on efficient causality but also on the divine intellect and will, because whatever God causes <per accidens> He also wills in the same manner; from eternity God willed and foresaw whatever He would do even <per accidens> in these or other circumstances. We, however, sometimes produce <per accidens> certain evils which we do not will or foresee. Such is not the case with God.
St. Thomas returns to the proof which he had already given above in the article, "Whether the will of God is concerned with evil," where he says: "God wills the evil of natural defect or the evil of penalty by willing some good to which such evil is joined." But God can in no way will the evil of guilt, which negates the order to the divine good willed by God above all things.
Doubt. Is the following proposition true: "While evils are not good, nevertheless it is good that there be evils, because those things that are evil in themselves are ordered to some good"? If this proposition is true, then the following is also true: "It is good that there are sins."
St. Thomas replies in the negative: "Some say that, although God does not will evils, nevertheless He wills that evils should be and should come into being..... But this is not a correct statement, because evil is not <per se> ordered to good but only <per accidens>. The fact that some good ensues from a sin is beyond the intention of the sinner, just as it is beyond the intention of tyrants that the patience of martyrs is glorified in persecution." Hence we should say that <per accidens> and as a consequence God wills physical evil and the evil of penalty, and that He wills to permit sin by not preventing them and occasionally deriving some good from them. Only in this sense do we say, "O blessed fault which merited so great a Redeemer.!"
This entire article can be reduced to the following synopsis. God in no way wills or causes the evil of guilt, neither on the part of the end, because sin negates the order to the divine good loved by God above all things; nor on the part of the efficient cause, because sin is from a deficient voluntary agent, at least by inconsideration, and this defect cannot be predicated of the indefectible God. God wills physical evil and penalty <per accidens>, on the part of the end, because He wills the good of the universe and justice, and from this evils sometimes follow; on the part of the efficient cause, because these evils proceed from the power of the agent producing a form which entails the privation of the opposite form.
Third Article: Whether There Is One Supreme Evil Which Is The Cause Of All Evil
State of the question. This article is in direct opposition to the Manichaeans, Albigenses, and other heretics who taught a system of dualism. The title inquires directly about the efficient cause of evil. It was in the thirteenth century that the Albigenses were spreading their doctrines in southern France. In the beginning of his article St. Thomas collected the arguments that might be proposed in support of dualism.
First objection. In things we almost everywhere find contrariety; for example, life and death, good and evil, true and false, noble and base. Therefore two contrary principles must be postulated. The reply will be that contraries agree in being.
Second objection. If one of the contraries is in the nature of things, so also is the opposite. But the supreme good exists. Therefore supreme evil also exists. Reply: evil opposes that good which it negates, not that good in which it is.
Third objection. Grades of perfection are judged according as they approach the best or that which is good by essence. So also it should be with grades of evil with regard to the supreme evil. The reply will be that bad and worse are judged according as they recede from good, not as they approach the supreme evil.
Fourth objection. Evil by participation must eventually lead to evil by essence. Reply: there is no evil by participation, but beings that are deprived of some due good.
Fifth objection. Everything that is <per accidens> is ultimately reduced to that which is <per se>, and since evil exists in many instances, it must have a cause <per se>, namely, the supreme evil. The reply will be that, although evil occurs in many instances in the human race, it is not intended <per se>.
Sixth objection. The evil of an effect is traced to the evil in the cause, namely, a deficient cause. But there cannot be an infinite process, and we must eventually come to the first evil cause. The reply will be that evil is traced to some good cause from which the evil ensues <per accidens>.
Conclusion: there is not nor can there be a first principle of evil.
This proposition is of faith. (cf. Denz., nos. 234 ff.) St. Thomas' argument <sed contra> refers to the dogma of the creation, according to which God is the cause of all being.
The body of the article contains two parts: the first is strictly theological and proves the conclusion; the second is historical, explaining why the Manichaeans postulated two principles.
The conclusion is proved in three ways:
1. From the notion of good. Good and being are convertible. But the first evil principle would be evil in essence and in no way good. Therefore this first principle of evil would not be being and would not exist.
The proof of the major was given above. Every being as being in act is a certain perfection and a good desirable to itself, and thus every being strives to preserve its being. As matter is being in potency, so it is good in potency. Hence no being is said to be being inasmuch as it is evil but inasmuch as it lacks some being. And therefore evil exists only in the good as in a subject.
2. From the notion of good. If evil were integral being, or if it completely corrupted the good in which it is, it would destroy itself, as Aristotle pointed out, for evil cannot be except in a subject. But the supreme evil would be integral being.
3. From the notion of first principle. A first principle cannot be caused <per accidens> by another, nor can it be a mere accidental cause. But evil is caused <per accidens> by good, that is, by a defective agent or by a contrary agent, and evil can be a cause only <per accidens>, that is, by reason of an annexed good. Therefore the notion of evil is repugnant to the notion of a first principle. And therefore the dualistic position of Manichaeism involves contradictions on all sides.
In the second, historical part of the article St. Thomas explains how the Manichaeans arrived at this solution of this problem of evil. These heretics failed to consider the most universal cause of being as being, that is, the creative cause, and only considered particular efficient and final causes. They did not understand that what is harmful with regard to some particular being, as a viper with regard to man, may be useful with regard to the universal good of the entire universe. Nor were they able to rise above mutually contrary causes to the most universal cause.
In his reply to the fifth difficulty St. Thomas says that the corruptible beings in which there is an evil of nature are a small part of the universe. He reasoned in this way because he thought that the heavenly bodies were incorruptible, but today spectral analysis has shown the opposite to be true. At any rate, after the resurrection of the dead there will be no more corruption. In this reply he affirms that only in men does evil seem to be in the majority of instances, because there are more who follow the senses than follow reason.
This concludes the questions on evil: what evil is, its kinds, and its cause.
Appendix: The Trials Of The Just And Their Motives
In the Gospel our Lord said: "I am the true vine; and My Father is the husbandman. Every branch in Me, that beareth not fruit, He will take away; and every one that beareth fruit, He will purge it, that it may bring forth more fruit." Commenting on this, St. Thomas says: "In order that a vine may be more fruitful, the growers cut away the superfluous shoots. So it is in man. For when a man who is well disposed and united with God allows his affections to incline to other things, his power to do good is weakened and made less efficacious. Hence it is that God, in order that man may be more fruitful, often cuts away such obstacles and purges him, sending him trials and temptations, by which he becomes stronger. And therefore our Lord says, "He will purge it," even though the man is pure, because no one in this life is so pure than he cannot be made purer. St. John says: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." God tries a man "that he may bring forth more fruit," that is, increase in virtue, that being purer he may be more fruitful, as the Scripture says: "He that is just, let him be justified still; and he that is holy, let him be sanctified still"; The word of the truth of the Gospel "bringeth forth fruit and groweth"; "they shall go from virtue to virtue."
Thus the just man who is purified brings forth more fruit. St. Thomas explains: "He bears a threefold fruit in this life. The first is to abstain from sin..... The second is to give himself to works of holiness..... The third is to work for the sanctification of others. He brings forth a fourth fruit in eternal life." The reason for this efficacy is that the just man remains in Christ, who said, "without Me you can do nothing." This is the first reason for the trials of the just.
The second reason for these trials is that the just man is united with Christ, and by the same means as Christ used he cooperates in the salvation of others. St. Paul said: "And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ: yet so, if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us."
Commenting on the words, "yet so, if we suffer with Him," St. Thomas says: "Christ, who is the principal heir, came into the inheritance of glory by His sufferings. 'Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?' We cannot come into the possession of our inheritance by an easier way, and so we also must attain our inheritance by suffering. In the Acts of the Apostles we read, 'through many tribulations we must enter into the kingdom of God.' Hence he says, "yet so, if we suffer with Him, that is, suffering with Christ, we undergo the tribulations of this world that we may be glorified with Christ. 'For if we be dead with Him,....we shall also reign with Him.'"
Therefore our Lord said: "If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow Me"; and, "he that taketh not up his cross, and followeth Me, is not worthy of Me." In his commentary St. Thomas says: "This was said because he who loves father and mother more than Me is not worthy of Me. So also he who loves himself more than Me is not worthy of Me, because God alone can completely satisfy man's affections..... Hence he who is not prepared to suffer death for the truth, and especially that cruelest death, the death of the cross, is not worthy of Me. Indeed a man should glory in the cross, as St. Paul said, 'God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.' He takes up the cross who mortifies his flesh, as we read again, 'And they that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences.' The cross is also borne in the heart when a man is contrite for his sins, as the Apostle says, 'Who is scandalized, and I am not on fire?'"
This was verified in the apostles. St. Paul wrote: "With Christ I am nailed to the cross. And I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me"; and, "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ." Commenting on these words, St. Thomas writes: "Behold, where the philosopher of this world is ashamed, the Apostle found a treasure. What appeared to be foolishness to the philosopher, became wisdom and glory for the Apostle, as said St. Augustine. Everyone glories in that by which he becomes great, for example, riches. The Apostle gloried in nothing except in Christ, especially in the cross of Christ, because in the cross are found all things about which men glory. Some men glory in the friendship of the great, but in the cross is the sign of divine friendship. Some glory in knowledge, but the Apostle found the most sublime science in the cross: 'For I judged not myself to know anything among you, but Jesus Christ, and Him crucified.' For in the cross is the perfection of the whole law and the complete art of living well. Some men glory in power, and St. Paul found the greatest power in the cross: 'For the word of the cross, to them indeed that perish, is foolishness; but to them that are saved, that is, to us, it is the power of God.' So the Apostle glories in the cross for the liberty he has received, for his acceptance into the heavenly kingdom, and for the victory over the devil and sin."
According to St. Thomas, therefore, the tribulations of the just are explained by two reasons: 1. that the just may be purified and bring forth more fruit; 2. that they may cooperate with Christ in the salvation of souls. Tribulation is the fire that tries the elect; in this fire evils are confounded because the temporal allurements are destroyed, but not the elect. The tribulations of the impious, however, are more grievous, because the impious do not have the love of God to support them.
Some philosophers have objected that this doctrine of the cross and of the trials of the just is not only above reason but contrary to reason.
To this we reply that this doctrine contains something that is entirely in agreement with good reason, namely, tribulation shows the absolute insufficiency of a life lived according to the senses and passions, as Spinoza explains in his Ethics. Man, he says, living according to the senses and his passions wants to be the center of all things, and he becomes the slave of all, he becomes a slave, and finds himself in contradiction with himself and with others. The tribulation which we find in the sensual life arouses the desire to live according to right reason, and there we find freedom. The sensual man becomes the slave of external circumstances, of his passions, and of other men. On a higher plane, the tribulations which we find in the rational, intellectual, and moral life, excite the desire of living according to the divine life.
The philosophy of pessimism, according to Spinoza, is the result of sensualism, whereas right reason rising above the senses disposes us to optimism, for the senses know nothing but particulars, but reason considers the good of the universe on account of which evils are permitted. But a higher optimism is found in the supernatural life, according to St. Paul, "To them that love God, all things work together unto good." Better than the ancient Greek philosophers, Christianity knows that perfect happiness is not found in this valley of tears but in the life to come.
On the other hand, he who does not wish to live supernaturally descends from the spiritual life to a merely intellectual life. There he is met with difficulties and if wishes to overcome them he must ascend. If he does not ascend, he descends to bitter pride and a sensual life. He who does not conquer is conquered; he who does not ascend, falls.
St. John Chrysostom enumerates these eight reasons for the trials of the just, taken from St. Paul.
1. The remedy against pride: "Lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me a sting of my flesh."
2. The remedy against vainglory: "Lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth from me"
3. That the virtue and power of God might shine forth in weak men: "Gladly therefore will I glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me."
4. That the patience of the just might be manifested in persecution and that the purity of their intentions might be made known, as in the case of Job.
5. That the just man might fix his thoughts on the life to come and his eternal reward when he sees that he has almost no reward in this life. Amid persecution and incessant contradictions, St. Paul wrote: "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable."
6. That those who mourn may have consolation when they see the tribulations of the saints and their steadfastness. In his Epistle to the Hebrews, St. Paul exhorts the Hebrews to remember the heroic examples of faith in adversity in the Old Testament.
7. That we might understand that the saints, whom we are to imitate, had natures like ours: "Elias was a man passible like unto us."
8. That we might distinguish the true evils and the true good from the false: "For whom the Lord loveth, He chastiseth; and He scourgeth every son whom He receiveth"; "We are reviled, and we bless; we are persecuted, and we suffer it..... We are made as the refuse of this world, the offscouring of all even until now."
By the word "angel" is understood a created substance, purely spiritual (in no way ordered to inform a body), and hence intellectual (but not rational). Thus the angel is subsistent and possesses a personality, for it is a substance that is complete, existing and operating <per se> and separately and of its own right (sui juris) and has dominion over its own actions.
First Article: The Existence Of The Angels
The existence of the angels was denied in ancient times by the Epicureans and the Sadducees, and in our time it is denied by atheists, rationalists, and liberal Protestants, who assert that the angels, mentioned in Sacred Scripture, are either divine inspirations or men sent by God to instruct other men.
The testimony of Scripture. a) The Old Testament teaches the existence of the angels, both good and bad. From the Old Testament it is also clear that the angels are intelligent creatures, that their number is great, that there is an order among them, and that the good angels under God's command assist and guard good men. On the other hand, the bad angels, with God's permission, attack men.
b) This doctrine of the Old Testament is confirmed by the New Testament. St. Paul enumerates the orders of angels, "whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers." He also mentions the bad angels.
Even if Pseudo-Dionysius had not written his De caelesti hierarchia, St. Thomas would have been able to write his treatise on the angels, relying on the testimony of Scripture and tradition.
Concerning the angels the Church teaches: 1. that they exist, that they were created but not from eternity, and that they are spiritual; 2. that they are not propagated; 3. that the devil was good when he was created.
Besides this, the ordinary magisterium of the Church has everywhere taught the doctrine of the guardian angels, and theologians consider this truth to be of faith. Finally, according to Suarez, it is of faith that the angels are not equal in dignity, as is clear from many texts, especially from St. Paul.
The teaching of all of the Fathers is that the angels are created by God, and endowed with intellect and free will. The absolute spirituality of the angels, however, is not clearly affirmed by all the Fathers prior to the fourth century. Without the angels the ascending series of creatures appears to be incomplete. After the twelfth century the theologians commonly teach that the angels are absolutely incorporeal, although Scotus thought that there was an incorporeal matter in the angels.
Second Article: The Teaching Of St. Thomas Compared With That Of Scotus And Suarez
1. St. Thomas affirms the absolute spirituality of the angels and therefore that there cannot be two angels of the same species, because the principle of individuation is matter marked by quantity. Scotus taught the opposite. As an eclectic, Suarez held with St. Thomas that the angels were absolutely spiritual, and with Scotus that there could be two angels of the same species.
2. For St. Thomas the proper object of the angel's intellect is the essence of the angel itself, whereas the proper object of our intellect is the essence of sensible things. Therefore, whereas the human idea is abstracted from sensible particulars, the angelic idea is not abstracted but is naturally impressed on the angel and it is at the same time universal and concrete, that is, it represents at the same time the species, for example, of a lion, and the individuals, both the actual and the past of which the angel has memory.
Hence the angelic ideas are participations in the divine ideas, according to which God is the cause of things. Therefore the angels do not have discursive but simply intuitive knowledge. They know not by composition and division, but they see the properties of things in the essence of things by one simple intuition. In the same way they see conclusions in the principles and means in the ends.
Therefore the angels cannot err with regard to the things that belong or do not belong naturally to things, but they can err about those things that are entirely contingent and free, such as, the secrets of the heart and future free acts.
Scotus, on the other hand, held that an angel, although it does not have senses, can receive ideas from sensible things. Scotus was unwilling to designate the proper and specific object of the angelic intellect, and he concluded therefore that the angel had discursive knowledge. With St. Thomas, Suarez admitted this innatism in the angels, and with Scotus he held that the angels could reason.
3. With regard to the will of the angels, St. Thomas admitted that in the angelic will there were certain necessary acts, such as the natural desire of happiness in general. Moreover, since nothing is willed unless first known as agreeable, the angel's free choice is always con formed to the ultimate practical judgment by which it is regulated, but the will executes this ultimate judgment, while it freely accepts it. Scotus, however, held that every act of the will is free and that a free choice could be not conformed to the ultimate practical judgment. Here we see evidence of Scotus' voluntarism.
Because of these viewpoints many differences arose between St. Thomas and Scotus about the angelic will.
According to St. Thomas, the angel loves by a natural love not only happiness in general but also God the author of its nature more than itself, and therefore probably the angel cannot sin directly and immediately against its natural law, which it sees intuitively inscribed on its own essence. When Satan sinned directly and immediately against the supernatural law, he sinned indirectly against the natural law
St. Thomas held that during the time of probation the angel could not sin venially but only mortally, because "the mind of the angel (which is simply intuitive) does not comprehend those things which are ordered to an end except as they are placed in the order to the end." The angel sees the means in the end as it sees conclusions in the principles. Thus the angel cannot turn itself away from the proper means to an end without turning away from its ultimate end and sinning mortally. Further, according to St. Thomas, because of the superiority of the angelic intellect the angel's free choice is immutable; it is a participation in the immutability of the divine choice. From this it follows that the angel's mortal sin is unforgivable, or that the angel wills irrevocably what it freely chooses with full and intuitive advertance, that is, a choice made not after successive consideration, like ours, but after a simultaneous consideration of all the things that pertain to the choice without any influence of the passions. Hence if someone would say to the devil after he had made his choice, "You did not consider this point," the devil could answer, "This also I considered." This explains the obstinacy of the devils, since before their choice they considered everything and then cannot change their choice. The only way that the devil could recall his decision would be by humility and obedience, and this the devil did not wish to do and does not wish to do.
Because of his voluntarism, Scotus held that the choice of the angels is not always in conformity with the final practical judgment, and that the devil's first mortal sin, as such, is not irrevocable or unforgivable. The demons, he thought, committed many sins before they became obstinate, and after each sin they could have returned to God. Hence the diabolical obstinacy is only extrinsic, that is, it is owing to the fact that after many sins God declared that He would no longer grant them the grace of conversion.
In his eclecticism Suarez held with St. Thomas that the angelic will did not have concupiscible and irascible parts, but with Scotus he held that, since the angel could reason, it could sin directly against the natural law and could also sin venially. He also thought that after the first mortal sin the angel could return to God, because the angel's choice need not be in conformity with the final practical judgment.
Finally Suarez thought that the devil's obstinacy was a consequence of that miserable state to which he saw himself condemned. St. Thomas would have replied that it is precisely damnation itself and the immutability of this state that must be explained, either intrinsically because of the intuitive mode of the knowledge that directs the choice, or extrinsically because God no longer offers the grace of conversion.
These three doctors teach that the angels were elevated to the order of grace, and that most probably they were created in grace. But there are certain differences in their teachings. St. Thomas denies that the angels could have sinned in the first instant. He held that their probation lasted for one instant. He denied that the angels received essential grace and glory because of the merits of Christ, because the merits of Christ are the merits of the Redeemer, and the angels were not redeemed. On these points Scotus, and Suarez to some extent, differ from the Angelic Doctor because of the principles mentioned above.
From this brief review it is apparent that St. Thomas is more definite in affirming the specific distinction between angels and men because of the proper and specific object of their intellects. He affirms that the angels are purely intellectual and intuitive spirits, not rational or discursive. He maintains intact the principle that nothing is willed unless first known as agreeable. All the differences with Scotus and Suarez flow from these two principles.
Third Article: The Creation And Substance Of The Angels Question 61, A. 2 And 3; Question 50
The angels were not created from eternity; they were probably created with corporeal creatures, because they are part of the universe, and no part is perfect separated from the whole. They were probably created in the empyrean heavens. They are a very great multitude, "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him (God), and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Their number exceeds the number of the species of material substances and is comparable to the number of the stars. A greater number of the more perfect things was created for the perfection of the universe. This principle refers to the more important parts of the universe which God produced without the intervention of secondary causes, the stars, the constellations, and the angels. It does not follow from this principle that there is more gold than silver, or more silver than lead in the universe.
They were created that they might attain eternal happiness and glorify God, and that they might assist and guard men and rule over corporeal creatures. This second reason is not an end but result of their superiority, since it is fitting that inferior beings be ruled by superior beings.
Fourth Article: The Angels Are Pure Spirits Without A Body Question 50, A. 1
The Scriptures never speak of the body of an angel, and frequently call the angels spirits. When spirit is predicated of intellectual creatures, it is used in opposition to body.
The Fourth Lateran Council declared: "At the same time in the beginning God established from nothing both creatures, the spiritual and corporeal, that is, the angelic and the mundane, and finally the human creature as a common creature constituted from spirit and body."
In this definition is clearly defined: 1. the existence of the angels; 2. their real distinction from corporeal creatures and from man, who is both spiritual and corporeal. This is equivalent to stating that the angels are incorporeal. This, however, is not properly defined but merely declared; what the Council was expressly defining was the unity of the first principle against the Manichaeans.
After the Fourth Lateran Council it was considered temerarious to attribute to the angels a body however subtle, and after the twelfth century theologians commonly taught that the angels were absolutely incorporeal.
St. Thomas shows that the perfection of the universe requires intellectual creatures, who are able to know God. "Since intellection is not an act of the body nor of any corporeal power, the union of a body is not part of the nature of the intellectual substance as such; it is an addition,....because it is imperfect, inasmuch as the object (of the corporeal being) is the lowest intelligible of sensible things. In any genus where something imperfect is found, it is fitting that the corresponding perfection in that genus pre-exist." Otherwise creation would be truncated and, as it were, mutilated.
As Cajetan points out, a more perfect creature can always be produced, but it is reasonable to infer that the perfection of the universe requires a purely intellectual creature as one genus of being.
Fifth Article: The Angels Are Absolutely Immaterial Question 50, A. 2
Avicebron held that matter was common to spirits and bodies because, as he said, there is something which they have in common. But the thing they have in common is nothing more than created essence as something capable of existence and limiting being. According to St. Thomas, it is impossible that a spiritual substance have any kind of matter. The operation of anything is after the manner of its substance, or operation follows being, or the mode of operation follows the mode of being. But intellection is an operation entirely immaterial, that is, intrinsically independent of matter, because it is specified of a universal object, by intelligible being, which abstracts from all matter. Thus the intellect is able to know the first principles of being, which are absolutely necessary and universal, above all contingent and particular being, and hence it can know the reasons for the being of things. Therefore a spiritual and intellectual substance is entirely immaterial.
Sixth Article: How The Angels Assume Bodies
Sometimes angels assume bodies, as the angels who appeared to Tobias and Abraham. In these instances the angels are accidentally united to such bodies, which they move but do not inform vitally.
Thus the angel said to Tobias: "I seemed to eat and to drink with you: but I use an invisible meat and drink, which cannot be seen by men."
Seventh Article: Whether The Angels Differ In Species Question 50, A. 4
The Church has defined nothing on this point, but from the various names used in Sacred Scripture it appears that there is a hierarchy of angels, for example, "Whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers," and in the Old Testament the angels are distinguished and subordinated into seraphim, cherubim, angels, and archangels. From this it is certain that the angels are not different only in number, which theologians commonly admit.
St. Thomas holds that all the angels differ in species; this is denied by Scotus. In agreement with St. Thomas, the Thomists generally admit that there cannot be two angels of the same species. The reason is that those things that are of the same species and differ in number are the same in form and different with regard to matter, since an act is not multiplied except by the potency in which it is received. Thus two perfectly similar drops of water are two by reason of the matter in which their specific forms are received. But the angels are not composed of matter and form. Therefore it is impossible that there be two angels of the same species. That is to say, according to many Thomists, that this is intrinsically impossible, or intrinsically repugnant, and not only extrinsically by reason of the end, as, for example, the annihilation of some blessed soul, which never happens but is still not intrinsically repugnant.
Confirmation. If whiteness were separated from matter, it would be unique. By a similar argument the unicity and infinity of God are apodictically proved, namely, because God, who is pure act, is not received in matter, or unreceived subsistent being.
In the question, "Concerning spiritual creatures" (a. 8), St. Thomas says: "If the angel is a simple form apart from matter, it is impossible to imagine that there are many angels in the same species." In another place he says: "We cannot understand that any separated form is anything but one of one species." He also shows that the separated human soul is individuated by the transcendental relation to its body, which will rise again, while the substance of the angel has no relation to a body which it is to inform. Hence there cannot be two angels of the same species. It is not enough to have recourse to the thisness (haecceitas) of the angel, as Scotus did, for the question arises, whence does it come that in the same species one nature is this as distinct from that. This difference can come only from matter.
The principle of numerical multiplication within the same species must be intrinsic and substantial. But Scotus implies that this can happen without matter marked by quantity or without a relation to such matter. Therefore in the angels, in which there is no matter, there can be no numerical multiplication. Nor can this multiplication be explained by some supernatural addition, since this would be extrinsic to the substance of the angel, which is supposed to be already constituted.
If God were to annihilate the archangel Michael and then create him again, he would be the same Michael with the same essence, the same existence once more produced and received in the same essence. Moreover, even if it were possible to have two angels of the same species successively (by annihilation and a second creation), it would not follow that there were two angels of the same species at the same time. The principle remains that an act cannot be multiplied except by the potency in which it is received.
According to St. Thomas, all angels differ in species according to the different grades of intellectual nature, according to intellectual power, and sometimes, like the birds, the angels have a stronger or weaker visual power. In the same way the seven colors of the rainbow and the seven notes in the scale are distinguished.
Eighth Article: Whether An Angel Is In A Place Question 52, A. 1
Since an angel is absolutely incorporeal and immaterial, it is not in a place according to its substance, that is, by quantitative contact, since it does not have quantity. But the angel is said equivocally to be in a place inasmuch as it locally moves some body by dynamic contact, or the contact of its power, that is, by a virtually transient operation. In this way our will, which is spiritual, moves the members of our body, but it is not in a place by quantitative contact (as when my hand touches the page), but by dynamic contact. Besides this, the human soul, as informing its body, is definitively in the place of the body and nowhere else.
First Article: Whether The Angels Intellection Is Its Substance
The reply is in the negative.
Indirect proof. The action of a thing differs more from the substance than the being of the thing for the operation follows the being. But the being of no creature is its substance; this is true only of God. Therefore a fortiori the intellection of the angel is not its substance.
Direct proof. 1. From the fact that action is the ultimate actuality of an agent. Action is the ultimate actuality of an operative power just as being is the ultimate actuality of an essence. But only pure act, namely, God, is His own ultimate actuality. Therefore only God, pure act, is His own action just as He is His own being.
The major is clear because the operative faculty is ordered to action, for example, the intellect is ordered to intellection as its ultimate perfection.
The minor is evident from the opposition between the word "to be" and the word "to have." Pure act not only has its own ultimate actuality, namely, its being and its action, but it is its own ultimate actuality.
2. From a consideration not only of action itself but also of intellection. If the intellection of the angel were its substance, it would be as subsistent as its substance. But subsisting intellection can be only one, it is unique (as, for instance, whiteness, if it subsisted). Therefore the substance of the angel would not be distinct from the substance of God or from the substance of the other angels.
Objection. That which is not pure act cannot indeed be every actuality but it can be some actuality with an admixture of potentiality. Therefore the reasoning is not valid.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that which is not pure act can be some actuality that is not ultimate, I concede; thus Michael is his own Michaelity; that which is not pure act can be ultimate actuality, I deny.
Action is the ultimate actuality in the order of operation just as being in the order of being. If the angel were its own action, this ultimate actuality in the angel would be unreceived and moreover as ultimate it would be irreceptive, and thus it would be pure act.
I insist. If Michael's intellection were subsistent, it would be unique in his species but not simply unique, for there could be other subsisting intellects. Therefore the difficulty remains.
Reply. I deny the antecedent. Such intellection would not be delimited, either by the subject in which it is received because it is not received, or by the object to which it is ordered because a substance cannot be specified by something extrinsic to itself. Therefore subsisting intellect cannot be unless it has its formal object in itself, that is, unless it is subsisting being itself at all times and of itself intellection in act.
I insist. But this subsisting intellect of Michael could be specified by itself as in divine intellection.
Reply. This I deny, because intellection must be specified by intelligible being as by its formal and adequate object. And if Michael's intellect were specified by itself, it would not be able to know anything except itself and that which could be known through itself, and hence it would not be able to know other substances except confusedly.
This reply of John of St. Thomas is taken from the following article. Without anticipating the following article, Cajetan replies as follows: If the intellection of the angel were of such great perfection that it would be a substance, it would be one, because it would identify in itself three absolutely simple perfections, namely, a spiritual nature, intellection, and subsistence in itself. These perfections, however, cannot be identified in anyone but God, and because of this these perfections are identified with the other absolutely simple perfections, with subsistent will, with love, mercy, and justice.
Objection. For living beings to live is to be, as Aristotle said. But to understand is to live. Therefore the intellection of the angel is its substantial being.
Reply. I distinguish the major: to live in actu primo is substantial being, I concede; to live in actu secundo, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: to understand is to live in actu secundo, I concede; to understand is to live in actu primo, I deny.
I insist. In us the acting intellect is its action, and yet it is not God. Therefore the angel can be its own action.
Reply. Our acting intellect is always in act and then it is its own action improperly, not essentially but concomitantly. Thus the sun is always actually giving light, but the sun is not essentially this action. In the same way the heart is always beating but it is not its own movement.
I insist. If the extremes are one, the middle is not really different from the extremes. But when the angel understands itself, the subject and the object are one, and the intellection is the middle. Therefore the intellection does not differ from the angel.
Reply. Let the major pass without comment. I deny the minor: intellection is not really a middle; it follows the union of the subject with an object that is intelligible in act, for intellection follows the union of the faculty with an impressed species. When the angel understands itself it does not require an impressed species, it requires only an expressed species because it is itself intelligible in act, but not understood in act.
Second Article: Whether The Intellection Of The Angel Is Its Being
The reply is in the negative, because its being is limited, whereas its intellection is infinite intentionally and extends to every intelligible being as its adequate object.
Third Article: Whether The Angels Intellective Faculty Is Its Essence
The reply is in the negative, because a faculty is understood with reference to the act, and because of the different acts there are different faculties which are essentially ordered to these acts. But the essence is ordered to being or existence, whereas the intellect is ordered to intellection, which in the angel is distinct from being since it presupposes being. In the same intellective faculty and within the same specific and adequate object there may be many acts of intellection, either simultaneous and subordinated or successive.
First Article: Whether The Angels Know All Things By Their Essence As God Does
The reply is in the negative, because only the essence of God as infinite comprehends all things in itself. Only God, in knowing Himself, knows all possible and actual things because this is the same as knowing what He is able to do and what He has done and does. The angel cannot do all things, and therefore its intelligence must be perfected by some species or representative likenesses of things.
Second Article: Whether The Angels Understand Through Species Taken From Things
St. Thomas invokes the authority of St. Augustine, who taught that sensible creatures were first produced by God as intelligible beings in the mind of the angels and then in the nature of things. St. Augustine came to this conclusion because of his Platonic philosophy, in which even our ideas are derived from a supersensible divine illumination.
St. Thomas shows why this innatism should be admitted in the case of the angels but not in man. His reasoning: operation follows being, and the mode of operation follows the mode of being. But the angel's mode of being is absolutely immaterial and independent of the body. Therefore the angel's mode of operation and of understanding is also without any acceptance from a body; it is by an intelligible influx from God the author of nature. On the other hand, the intellective soul would be united to a body without any reason if the soul did not obtain its intellective perfection from the body. Thus the imagination is the highest point of the lowest order of sensible knowledge, and our intellect is the lowest point of the highest order of intelligence. Hence the adage: the highest of the lower order touches on the lowest of the higher order, even though, absolutely speaking, there is a vast difference between the two. Here we see the subordination of beings and we conclude that man, a rational animal, is not a genus but a determined species, in the sense that there cannot be many species of rational animals. Rational animal implies the meeting point of the highest in the lowest order and the lowest in the highest order.
Objection. If from the instant of their creation the angels receive from God ideas of things, including those of individuals, the angels naturally know future contingents, which is against the opinion commonly held.
Reply. Actually these ideas represent only existences and they are suited to represent futures inasmuch as these futures are derived from the divine ideas and when they will be according to the divine will. Even God Himself does not know from eternity future contingents except as they are dependent on the decree of His will.
Third Article: Whether The Higher Angels Know By More Universal Species Than The Lower Angels
In other words: Does the perfection of the angel's knowledge depend on its universality? St. Thomas replies affirmatively.
He derives his first proof from the authority of Dionysius: "That which is divisively in inferior beings is united in superior beings."
Proof from reason <a priori>. The superior beings are those that are closer to and more like God. But God knows all things by one eternal intuitive act in His essence. Therefore among the superior intellects those are the higher which know by means of fewer and more universal species.
The <a posteriori> proof is confirmed in the saying: just a few words for the one who knows, that is, the man who knows does not need many words.
First objection. The universal is obtained by abstraction. But the angels do not abstract from things.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if the knowledge is obtained from individual things, I concede; if it is obtained from the divine ideas, I deny.
Second objection. Universal knowledge is confused. But the higher angels do not have the more confused knowledge.
Reply. I distinguish the major: universal knowledge on the part of the thing known, I concede; universal knowledge on the part of the means, I deny. That is, by these more universal and fewer ideas the higher angels know many things very distinctly and without confusion.
Scotus says that the perfection of the higher angels' knowledge consists in its clarity.
Reply. I distinguish: in an empiric and material clarity, I deny; in the clarity that comes from the higher and more universal principles, I concede.
Corollary. In the sciences the following principle of economy is to be observed: matters should be explained by few principles. That is, principles should not be multiplied without reason. Thus St. Thomas explains the principal questions about predestination with this principle: Since the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things, no one thing would be better than another if it were not loved more by God.
Fourth Article: Whether The Angels Naturally Know Future Contingent Beings And The Secrets Of Hearts (Q. 57, A. 3, 4)
The reply to the first question is in the negative. This is the common opinion and seems to be of faith because of the testimony of Sacred Scripture and of the Fathers. Special reference is made to the words, "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods." Thus prophecy is the proper sign of divinity and a motive of credibility, "amply demonstrating the infinite knowledge of God," just as a miracle "demonstrates His omnipotence," in the words of the Vatican Council.
Proof from reason. Future contingent beings cannot be known certainly by the angels either in their causes or in themselves; not in the created causes because these are contingent and indifferent; not in the uncreated cause, that is, in God's free decree, which is naturally inaccessible to every created intellect; not in themselves, for in this way future contingents are known only by God inasmuch as God's knowledge alone is measured by eternity, which embraces all time. Hence the angels cannot naturally know future contingent beings; unless at the most they may have some conjectural knowledge.
The reply to the second question is also in the negative because of the testimony of the Scriptures. The reason is that such secrets of the heart are not parts of the universe. As free they are not necessarily connected with our wills, and as immanent they are not connected with exterior beings. They have therefore no connection with the parts of the universe and thus are not properly parts of the universe. They belong to a higher order known only to God and if they are sacred secrets they belong properly to the kingdom of God. Such is the privileged character of the interior life, "hidden with Christ in God," which the angels cannot know naturally. St. John of the Cross emphasizes this point in his teaching that the demons cannot know the secrets of our hearts.
First Article: The Will And The Liberty Of The Angels
The angels have a will, which is the appetite following on intellection, as the inclination to the good intellectually known. Like the intellect, the will of the angels is a faculty distinct from their substance, and the angelic will is free, that is, it can choose one thing in preference to another. The angel's liberty of choice follows the intellect inasmuch as the intellect is able to judge the universal nature of good and this judgment remains undetermined with regard to an object here and now which is not good in every part. The angels do not have a sensitive appetite.
Second Article: The Angels Natural And Elective Love
In the angels the natural love is always right, and this love is an inclination conferred on the angel by the author of nature. The angels also have an elective love which is consequent on the natural love and is concerned with an object here and now that is not good in every part.
Like man, the angel naturally loves itself inasmuch as it desires some good for itself with its natural appetite. When the angel desires some good for itself by election it loves itself by elective love.
The angel loves itself by a natural love that is necessary with regard to the specification of that love because the angel cannot consider anything in itself (or in God the author of its nature) that would move it to a hatred of itself (or to hatred of God the author of its nature). Indeed, according to Bannez, Sylvius, Gonet, and Billuart, the angel loves itself necessarily even with regard to the exercise of that love just as it knows itself necessarily with regard to the exercise of that knowledge. This love is a property that flows from the angel's nature just as the movement of the heart flows from the nature of the animal.
Objection. But the bad angels desire non-being and therefore they do not necessarily love themselves.
Reply. They love non-being directly and by its very nature, this I deny; for this is impossible since the aspect of good is not present in non-being. They love non-being indirectly and by reason of something else, I concede; because they desire non-being in their torments and thus they desire non-being by reason of their self-love and not by reason of any hatred for themselves.
Third Article: Whether By Its Natural Love The Angel Loves God More Than Itself
We have treated of this question at great length in another place; here we will refer only to the essential points. This problem refers not only to the angel but also to man and analogically to every creature. St. Thomas shows that the fundamental natural inclination found in every creature is right and remains right, although it has been weakened in us by original sin and by our personal sins and must be perfected by infused charity. Thus we see in this article that grace does not destroy nature but perfects and elevates it. St. Thomas' reply in this article is therefore in the affirmative, and he offers the following proof.
Everything that naturally, according to its nature, belongs to another inclines more to that to which it belongs than to itself, as is true of any natural part, for example, the hand is inclined to the defense of the body even though the hand may suffer mutilation. But every creature naturally, according to its nature, belongs to God. Therefore every creature naturally inclines to the love of God, the author of its nature, more than to the love of itself.
If this were not so, the natural inclination would be perverse and would not be perfected by infused charity; indeed infused charity would destroy the natural inclination.
First doubt. Does this apply to the innate natural inclination or to the elicited natural inclination?
Reply. To both.
Second doubt. Is this natural love of God necessary or elective when it is elicited?
Reply. It is necessary at least with regard to its specification, because in God the author of nature nothing can be found to move the angel to the hatred of God.
Third doubt. Whether this natural love of God when it is elicited is necessary even with regard to its exercise?
Reply. Bannez, Gonet, and Billuart think that the affirmative is more probable, because the angel cannot desist from the consideration of itself or from the consideration of God, whom it knows in the mirror of its own essence. The love of itself and the love of God preserving its natural life are natural movements, just as in the animal the movement of the heart is, as it were, a natural property.
Fourth doubt. Does this natural love of God above all things exist in some way in all creatures?
Reply. It exists even in the stone, which tends to the center of the earth because of the cohesion of the universe and thus contributes to the good of the universe to manifest God's goodness. So the hen gathers her little ones under her wings to protect them from the hawk because it tends to the preservation of its species for the good of the universe, and it would sacrifice itself if it were necessary for the good of the species. The canticle, "All ye works of the Lord, bless the Lord," expresses the thought that every creature in its own way tends toward God, or to the good of the universe to manifest the goodness of God. There is here no pantheism; the creature is considered not as a part of God but as a part of the universe, which is ordered to the glorification of its author and to the manifestation of His goodness.
First objection. Natural love is based on natural union. But the angel is naturally united rather to itself than to God. Therefore the angel naturally loves itself more than God.
Reply. I distinguish the major: natural love is founded on a natural union and on a natural dependence on God, I concede; on a natural union without this dependence on God, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: the angel is more naturally united to itself and depends on God more than on itself, I concede; that the angel does not depend more on God than on itself, I deny.
I insist: in spite of this dependence the angel loves itself more naturally. Whoever loves anything naturally loves it inasmuch as it is good for itself. But in loving anything as good for itself the lover loves the object for its own self. Therefore whoever loves God naturally loves Him for the lover's sake and less than the lover himself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: whoever loves anything naturally loves it inasmuch as it is good for itself as the subject for which it is desired, I concede; loves it for itself as the permanent end, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: whoever loves something as a good for the lover, loves it for the sake of the object if it is a good subordinate to the lover, I concede; but if it is a good that is superior to the lover, I deny.
The angel desires God for itself but on account of God, its natural ultimate end. The end for whose sake a thing is desired and the subject for which a thing is desired are not the same. On the other hand, I desire a piece of fruit for myself and on account of myself because the fruit is inferior and subordinate to myself. When the angel, and man too, rightly loves God even naturally, it subordinates itself to God and does not subordinate God to itself.
Second objection. Nature reflects on itself and first tends to its own preservation. But nature would not be reflecting on itself if it tended to something other than itself. Therefore by its natural love the angel loves itself more.
Reply. I distinguish the major: nature reflects on itself not only with regard to its own individuality but rather with regard to the universal in itself as a part of the universe ordered to the good of the universe and for the manifestation of God's goodness, I concede; otherwise, I deny.
I insist. If this is true, the brute animals tend to some ethical good. As a matter of fact, however, they tend only to some pleasurable good or some useful good.
Reply. The brute animals tend to some ethical good not explicitly or consciously but implicitly and unconsciously, just as the hen that gathers its chicks under its wings loves its species more than itself.
I insist. The error of this thesis is apparent from the consequent incongruity, namely, that charity would be useless. The characteristic of charity is that by it one loves God more than oneself. But charity is not a natural but an infused love. Therefore by its natural love the angel does not love God more than itself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the characteristic of charity is loving God more than oneself as the author of grace, I concede; as the author of nature, I deny.
I insist. At any rate this thesis cannot explain the sin of the angels, since this natural love of God will perdure as long as the nature perdures. But the love of God does not remain in the sinning angel, which hates God. Therefore loving God as the author of its nature more than itself is not natural to the angel.
Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: the angel's love of God as the judge does not perdure, I concede; the angel's love of God as the author of nature does not perdure, I deny. For as a judge God commands the angel to do something that is displeasing to the angel, whereas God as the author of the angel's nature is the cause that preserves the life of the bad angel in a kind of physical manner, something like the physical premotion that we speak of in the spiritual order.
I insist. But a devil cannot at the same time be turned to God as the author of its nature and turned. away from God as the author of grace because a sin against God the author of grace is at the same time indirectly against God the author of nature.
Reply. A devil is turned away from God the author of grace and from God the author of the law of nature freely and morally; nevertheless the devil at the same time remains necessarily and physically turned to God the author of his nature in its physical aspect. This lamentable opposition in the devil pertains to his damnation.
How does man naturally love God more than himself? By an innate love and by an implicit elicited love; in this way man loves God under the aspect of happiness in general.
First Article: Whether The Good Angels Merited Their Happiness
Reply. The ultimate end must be obtained by merit. But happiness for the intellectual creature is the ultimate end that is not effected but (attained), which consists in the supernatural vision of God. Therefore the angels merited happiness.
When did they merit their happiness? Certainly before they attained it since merit has the nature of a road leading to an end. As St. Thomas remarks: "He who is already at the terminus is not moved toward that terminus, just as no one merits what he already has," and "Free will cannot be informed at the same time by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and perfect grace, which is the principle of fruition."
Second Article: Whether The Angels Merited In The First Instant
The question is whether the angels merited happiness in the first instant of creation, if they were created in the state of grace? What is angelic time? Is it continuous or discrete? Is it the measure of some movement? It is the measure of the succession of the thoughts and affections of the angels. One angelic instant may perdure as long as several hours and days of our time, just as the contemplation of the same object by the saints in an ecstasy lasts for several hours.
"In all the angels the first operation was good," because this first operation was under the special inspiration of God. But in this operation there was as yet no full merit because the angels were moved by God and they did not yet move themselves. Immediately after this some of them turned to God the author of grace with full merit, while others inflated by pride turned away from God the author of grace.
In this second instant why was one act in the angels sufficient for merit or demerit?
Reply. Because grace perfects nature according to the mode of the nature. It is a characteristic of the angelic nature that it acquires a natural perfection not discursively but immediately in one act. Therefore immediately after one fully meritorious act the angels attained supernatural happiness, which the devil would also have attained if he had not immediately placed the obstacle of sin.
Third Article: Whether The Angels Attained Grace And Glory According To The Quantity Of Their Natures
The affirmative reply seems the more reasonable because in the angel the movement of the will cannot be impeded or retarded by an inordinate passion, and when there is nothing to impede or retard it a nature. is moved according to its entire power. Hence it seems reasonable that the angels that have a better nature turned to God with more power and more effectively.
On this point we have a certain analogy with men. "This also occurs in men, because greater grace (habitual) and glory is given to men according to the intensity of their conversion to God." This does not imply any taint of Pelagianism with regard to the angels, because the angelic nature is not a disposition proportioned to a purely gratuitous gift of grace. Moreover, just as the grace is entirely from the will of God so also is the nature of the angel. "Therefore it seems that grace is given rather according to the degree of nature than because of works." In man, however, when he disposes himself under the influence of actual grace for habitual grace, this habitual grace is given not in proportion to his natural attempt but in proportion to the supernatural disposition which comes from prevenient grace.
First Article: Whether The Evil Of Guilt Can Be In The Angels (Q. 63, A. 1)
The affirmative reply is of faith, because many angels sinned; therefore they are able to sin.
That the angel can sin, St. Thomas proves as follows:
Only that will which is the rule of its own action is unable to depart from the proper rectitude. But only God's will is the rule of its own action because it has no superior end. Therefore any created will is able to sin.
Can the angels sin directly against the natural law, and could they have sinned if they had been created simply in the natural order? According to the more common opinion of the Thomists the negative reply is more probable.
1. Because at all times the angels see intuitively the natural law in their own essence, even with regard to singular instances, and therefore they cannot be in error, or be ignorant, or lack consideration about the natural law, consequently they cannot sin against the natural law.
2. Because the angel naturally and efficaciously loves God as the author of nature more than itself, and this love virtually contains the fulfillment of the entire natural law. This love remains in the devil to the extent that the devil loves God as the author of his physical life although he does not love God as the author of the moral law and as the judge.
Can the angel sin indirectly against the natural law?
Reply. He can by sinning directly against the supernatural law.
How can the angel sin against the supernatural law?
Reply. Because the angel knows the supernatural law not with intuitive evidence but in the obscurity of faith, and inasmuch as this law commanded something that could be displeasing to the proud angels.
Is every direct sin against the supernatural law indirectly against the natural law?
The reply is in the affirmative, because the natural law already commands that God is to be obeyed in whatever He commands.
Objection. Then the angels' elevation to the order of grace was the cause of their sin.
Reply. It was not the cause but the occasion, just as the redemptive Incarnation was an occasion of sin for the Jews.
Objection. But the angels could not have sinned even against the supernatural law.
Proof. Sin, or a defective choice, supposes an erroneous judgment. But there can be no error in the angels, at least not prior to sin, since they have no passions or any inordinate precipitation of the will.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the angels have no defective choice with regard to the object willed, I concede; with regard to the manner of tending toward the object good in itself, I deny.
What does this sin of the angels presuppose on the part of the intellect?.
Reply. A lack of consideration of the supernatural law to be observed here and now.
Is this lack of consideration a negation or a privation?
Reply. It is a privation since the angel begins to operate without consideration of the rule.
Was this lack of consideration voluntary?
Reply. It was at least indirectly voluntary inasmuch as the angel could have and should have considered the rule.
Was this lack of consideration more voluntary in the angel than in man?
Reply. Many Thomists say that this lack of consideration was interpretatively voluntary.
What is the meaning of interpretative in this connection?
Reply. It does not mean that the consent was such as would be given if there were sufficient attention; in this case it means something willed virtually or implicitly, by an implicit act rather than an explicit act. If it had been an explicit act, such as, "I do not wish to consider," this act of unwillingness would presuppose not only lack of consideration but also an error, which could not have been in the angels before sin.
How then did the angels sin?
Reply. They sinned by inordinately desiring their own excellence, or their natural happiness as derived from the power of their natures, and refusing the supernatural happiness that comes from the gratuitous gift of God, the supernatural happiness that they have in common with men, the happiness that is to be had by way of humility and obedience.
Were there two acts, one concerning natural happiness and the other concerning supernatural happiness?
Reply. There was but one act, preferring natural happiness to the other.
How could such stupidity enter the mind of the higher angels?
Reply. In the same way that some men prefer the study of mathematics or physics to the study of the Gospel.
Second Article: Whether The Angels Could Sin In The First Instant
Reply. They could not because in the first instant the angel operated under a special divine inspiration. Since nothing is willed unless first known, the first cognition was not from the application of the created will but from the special inspiration of God, and under this influence the creature does not sin. The angels sinned in the second instant, in which they fully deliberated. The third instant was the instant of damnation, in which there was no longer any demerit or possibility of merit.
Third Article: Whether The Angels Could Have Sinned Venially
According to St. Thomas they could not have sinned venially. The reason is that the angelic intellect is not discursive; it sees conclusions in principles intuitively, and it beholds means as they are in the order to an end. Therefore in the angels there cannot be a deordination with regard to the means (venial sin) unless there is also a deordination with regard to the end.
Scotus and Suarez hold the contrary opinion, that the angels have discursive knowledge.
Fourth Article: The Obstinacy Of The Devils
It is of faith that the devils are in fact obstinate in evil. We read: "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels." The words of the Psalmist are referred to the bad angels: "The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually," that is, this pride always produces new effects.
St. Thomas, Scotus, and Suarez differ in their explanations of the obstinacy of the devils' will.
Scotus explains this obstinacy by an extrinsic cause alone, namely, because God denies the devils grace.
St. Thomas assigns also an intrinsic cause, namely, the connatural mode according to which the angel judges irrevocably and adheres to an end in such a way that its decision is inflexible.
Suarez explains that because of the angel's nature it is merely difficult to retract what the angel has once willed deliberately.
St. Thomas proves his opinion as follows: the appetitive faculty is in all things proportionate to the apprehending faculty, by which it is moved. But the angel apprehends immovably and intuitively those things that we apprehend discursively. This is particularly true when the angel judges something to be an end to be loved above all things. The angel sees intuitively and not successively all those things that pertain to the choice of a thing, and once the choice has been made the angel can say, "I have already considered everything." Therefore the will of the angel is affixed immovably to the end. St. Thomas remarks in this article that it was customary to say that man's free will was flexible with regard to opposites both before and after the choice, but that the angel's free will was flexible to the opposites before the choice but not after it.
Objection. But the angel remains free after the choice and is therefore not inflexible.
Reply. Liberty does not require the possibility of changing a proposition, for example, the most free decrees of God are immutable.
Objection. It appears then that free will is predicated univocally of God and of the angels.
Reply. The predication is only analogical, for in God alone is this immutability from eternity, and in God it is never in evil.
Objections Based On The Idea Of The Indifference Of Freedom After The Choice
Freedom excludes inflexibility and immutability. But after the choice the angel remains free. Therefore the angel is not immutable.
Reply. I distinguish: freedom excludes absolute immutability, I concede; hypothetic immutability, I deny. Thus God's free decrees are immutable. I concede the minor and distinguish the conclusion.
I insist. When the object remains indifferent the choice is mutable. But after the sin of the angel the object of its choice remains indifferent.
Reply. I distinguish the major: when the object remains indifferent the choice is mutable on the part of the object, I concede; on the part of the subject, that is, on the part of the angel's connatural mode of acting intuitively, I deny. I concede the minor, and distinguish the conclusion.
Objections Based On The Idea Of A Retracted Judgment
According to St. Thomas the devil sinned because of lack of consideration of a higher rule. But the devil can now give that consideration especially since he has learned through his misery. Therefore the devil can change his judgment.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the devil sinned from lack of consideration that was voluntary, I concede; he sinned from a lack of consideration arising out of ignorance, I deny.
The devil was not ignorant that in thus proudly refusing supernatural happiness he would bring on himself damnation. He was certainly more certain than we theologians that turning away from his final supernatural end was for him an unforgivable mortal sin which implied indirectly an aversion from his final natural end.
I insist. But it seems incredible that any intelligence would refuse supernatural happiness, especially when such refusal brought with it future damnation.
Reply. Nevertheless this is a characteristic of unbounded pride: to cling to one's own individual good and pride one's self on it rather than accept supernatural happiness from the goodness of another and to possess that happiness in common with men. The devil closed the eyes of his mind to the light of grace and haughtily refused to follow that light. Doellinger wished to defend the Church, but he wished to defend it in his own way and not under the direction of the Supreme Pontiff.
I insist. But the devil foresaw his damnation only speculatively; now he knows damnation experimentally and therefore because of this new experience he can change his judgment.
Reply. If the devil now practically understands his crime of pride as a moral evil that must be rejected, I concede; if he only speculatively understands this pride as an evil, I deny.
In order that the devil could practically understand his crime of pride as an evil that should be rejected he should also incline to humility, to obedience, and to prayer for mercy. But the devil's pride "ascends continually," not intensively, but by always producing new effects. The damned do not ask for pardon. For them there could be but one way to retract their judgment, namely, the way of humility and obedience, and they do not will to follow this way.
We find a similar state of mind in some of the apostates, in Lamennais and Loisy. They strove for an object that was apparently the object of magnanimity; they strove for excellence but they strove for it in the spirit of pride. Magnanimity is the well-ordered love of excellence; pride is the inordinate love of one's own excellence without subjection to God.
Objection. According to St. Thomas some remorse of conscience remains in the damned because of synteresis, and therefore it seems that they are able to change their judgment.
Reply. Such remorse of conscience does remain because of synteresis, but it is without the least attrition or hope, indeed it is the remorse of desperation, without the least veleity of true repentance.
For the damned, sin is a bitter thing but not because of any repentance. Although they still have synteresis and remorse of conscience, they do not have infused faith, hope, prudence, or fear of sin; their minds are overwhelmed by pride, of which it is said that it "ascendeth continually." The damned do not repent of their evil deeds because of the guilt; they rue their deeds only because of the punishment. More than this, they wish all others to be damned, because they are filled with unbounded hatred for all good things, and they are grieved by every good, by every deed done according to God's will, and especially by the happiness of the blessed.
I insist. But the damned still have a desire for happiness, at least for natural happiness, which they do not possess, because they are turned away not only from their final supernatural end but also from their natural end. Therefore because of this desire for happiness they are able to change their judgment.
Reply. In order to change their judgment practically they would have to follow the way of humility and obedience, but because of their unremitting pride they do not will to follow this road. They are therefore confirmed in evil. In the damned the desire for the happiness they have lost is filled with envy; indeed this is part of damnation. The damned persevere in the hatred of God, for although the devil naturally loves God as the author of his nature in its physical aspect, he hates God as the author of the law that commands obedience, he hates God as the judge, as the author of grace, because under these three aspects God commands something that displeases the devil.
Practically then the devil does not apprehend his crime of pride as a moral evil that must be rejected; only speculatively does he apprehend it as evil. At the same time pride rules him completely and in this pride the devil loves himself above all things with the bitterness of desperation and hatred of God.
How is man's obstinacy explained? Can we say with Cajetan that man is made immovable in good or evil by a meritorious or demeritorious act elicited in the first moment of non-being (<in primo non esse viae>), that is, in the first instant of the separation of the soul from the body? Some Thomists reject this idea, since it would not be man but a separated soul that would be meriting. Our Lord said, "The night cometh, when no man can work." In the final chapters of <Contra Gentes> St. Thomas explains that after the separation from the body the soul is no longer on the road to salvation (in via), since the body is for the perfection of the soul that the soul may reach its end, and the separated soul therefore is no longer on the road to its perfection, and that final merit or demerit is rendered definitive by the soul's separation from the body.
The higher angels illuminate the lower angels. According to St. Thomas, to illuminate is not only to make manifest a truth, which may be done by simple speech even when an inferior being speaks to a superior being, but to manifest a truth with authority, referring the truth to higher principles and to the first truth, that is, arranging truths so that another will understand them more clearly than he would be able to do by his own powers. This the higher angels are able to do because they possess more universal species which represent greater areas of the intelligible world in a more simple manner. Thus the higher angels have a higher understanding of truth and are able to explain their more perfect concepts.
The higher angels, however, cannot infuse a new light of nature or grace as God does. The higher angels, like a teacher, propose the object and illuminate an inferior angel by shedding their higher light on the object proposed. A human teacher, in proposing a demonstrative middle to his pupils, objectively supports the thinking of his pupils without infusing a new light. A higher angel can a fortiori do this because it is of a higher species with regard to a lower angel. The higher angel therefore not only strengthens the lower angel's intellect in the degree of knowledge but it also elevates the lower angel to a more perfect manner of intellection. The angel that is illuminated, as well as a man who is illuminated by an angel, is to some extent elevated to the mode of intellection of the superior being, and thus attains to something that is <per se> unknown to him, something beyond the light of his own intellect. Such is not the case with a pupil illuminated by a human teacher who makes manifest only what is <per accidens> unknown.
The higher angels illuminate the lower angels about all those things which pertain to the state of nature, the state of grace, and accidental glory, since good is essentially diffusive of itself.
The devils direct the manifestation of truth to their own iniquity, and therefore they do not illuminate but rather darken the truth.
Hierarchy is a multitude ordered and arranged under a leader, and it is said to be one inasmuch as the multitude is able to perceive the government of the leader in one and the same way. The mode of cognition and illumination in the angels, however, is threefold. Some angels draw the light of truth immediately from God, as ministers sitting beside the king; others draw the light of truth from the more universal created causes, as senators and governors of provinces; others draw this light from particular causes, as presiding officers of particular cities. In the first hierarchy there are three orders: seraphim, cherubim, and thrones; in the second, there are dominations, virtues, and powers; in the third, there are principalities, archangels, and angels. These orders are named according to their properties and duties. In the fallen angels, since these retain their natures, a subordination remains, not because of any friendship between them, but because of their common wickedness, and to be pre-eminent in evil is to be more miserable.
First Article: The Guardianship Of The Angels
That men are under the guardianship of the angels is of faith: "For He hath given His angels charge over thee: to keep thee in all thy ways." Christ Himself commanded that children should not be scandalized because "their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father."
The. testimony of tradition is confirmed by the institution of the feast of the Guardian Angels. The theological reason for the guardianship of the angels is that God usually governs the lower beings through the higher. Besides this, man is a pilgrim and there are many dangers along the way, both interior and exterior. Just as protection is given a man on a dangerous road, so God gives every man a guardian during this life. When a man arrives at the end of his journey he will not have a guardian angel but an angel who will rule with him. It is certain that each of the faithful has his own guardian angel. It is also commonly held that sinners and infidels have guardian angels so that these sinners may do less harm. It is also very probable that an angel is specially deputed to assist every priest celebrating Mass.
Second Article: The Duties Of Guardian Angels
The guardian angels illuminate the intellect not by infusing species but by adapting truths to our understanding, by representing truths by likenesses of sensible things, by suggesting good thoughts, and they excite the will to good by admonition and persuasion. They supply occasions for good and remove occasions for evil; they offer our prayers and sacrifices to God; they ward off exterior evils, they help us in worldly affairs, they do battle with evil spirits, they inflict remedial penalties, they help us particularly in the hour of death, and lead our souls to heaven or purgatory. We in turn owe them reverence, loyalty, and confidence.
Art. 1. Men are attacked by the devils, who try to impede the progress of men because of envy. By reason of their pride the devils assume the appearance of the divine majesty. But the order of these attacks on men is from God, who wills to make use of evils in order that good may come of them.
The devils attack men: 1. by instigating them to sin (with God's permission), 2. in order to punish men, and in this way they are sent by God as was the evil spirit that punished Achab the King of Israel. But those who are tempted are always assisted by God by His own power and through the good angels. All this is ordered to the glory of the elect.
Art. 2. To tempt others is a characteristic of the devil, and whenever the devil tempts others he does it to harm them by precipitating them into sin. Although the devil cannot move the will, he can to some extent affect man's lower powers by which the will is inclined, although it is not compelled.
Art. 3. All sins are not to be attributed to the temptation of the devil; some sins arise from the concupiscence of the flesh or of the eyes, or from our own pride.
Art. 4. The devils can seduce men, not by true miracles, but by cunning and deception.
With regard to spiritualism the Holy Office has decreed (1917) as follows: "It is not lawful to be present at any spiritualistic seances or conferences, with or without a so-called medium, with or without hypnotism, even under the guise of piety, for the purpose of interrogating souls or spirits, of hearing replies, or even of observing such things with the tacit or expressed protestation of having nothing to do with evil spirits."
All these assaults by the devil are permitted for the glory of the elect. Christ has already obtained a perfect victory over the devils, over sin and death, on Calvary and by His resurrection.
As a beginning we present what is of faith concerning corporeal creatures according to Sacred Scriptures and the declarations of the Church.
The biblical narrative. What is the literary character of the first three chapters of Genesis, in which the creation of corporeal creatures and of man is described? This question was considered by the Biblical Commission, and on June 30, 1909, the Commission issued a decree on the historical character of the first chapters of Genesis.
From this decree we arrive at the following conclusion: In the first three chapters of Genesis the constitution of things and the complete order of creation is not described in a scientific manner; these chapters present a historical-popular narrative adapted to the understanding of the people of the time.
In accordance with the response of the Biblical Commission, this thesis is explained as follows.
1. The first three chapters of Genesis are historical since "they contain the narrative of things that actually happened, and this narrative corresponds to objective reality and historical truth."
As the decree says: a) This is clear from the style and historical form of the Book of Genesis, for if the events related in Genesis about the sons of Adam, Noah and his sons, of Abraham, Isaac, Esau, of Jacob and his sons are historical, as all admit, why should that part of the book which deals with the first origin of things be considered a fable? b) It is clear from the peculiar connection between these three chapters themselves and between them and the following chapters. In this narrative the origin of the entire human race is connected with the origin of the Jewish people, which is explained in the following chapters. c) It is clear from the frequent testimony of both the Old Testament and the New Testament and from the almost unanimous opinion of the Fathers, in which the events related in the first chapters of Genesis are cited as historical. Moreover, this historical sense was traditional among the Israelites and was always held by the Church.
2. However, this historical narrative is not scientific but popular, "for in writing the first chapter of Genesis it was not the intention of the inspired writer to teach the inner constitution of visible things or to present the complete order of creation in a scientific manner but to give to the people of his time a popular presentation, in the language of the time, adapted to the understanding of the time." St. Thomas said: "Moses adapted himself to the uneducated people and spoke of what appeared to the senses."
The inspired writer, therefore, had no intention of teaching the sciences of physics, astronomy, geology, or biology; he was simply teaching truths necessary for salvation. For example, the nature of the firmament, or the heavens, is not given in scientific terms; the author merely affirms that the firmament was created by God. In order to discover what is properly revealed in this narrative we must carefully determine what is formally embraced by the word "is" in the revealed proposition. What, for instance, is revealed in the following sentences? "And God said: Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters: and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament, and it was so. And God called the firmament, Heaven." Is this a revelation that the firmament is something solid? No. Because the verb "is" does not refer to the solid. What is revealed is that the heavens (which the ancients thought was a solid firmament) were created by God. The verb "is" formally refers to what was created by God and not to the adjective "firm." The proposition, "the heavens are a solid firmament," is not a revealed proposition.
In the biblical narrative we need to determine what the author wished to teach and to avoid confusing the phrasing with the proposition itself. The proposition formally contains the subject, the verb "is," and the predicate, for example, the heavens were created by God. The phrasing frequently contains modifications to describe the subject as it was conceived by the ancients, for example, the heavens, which the ancients understood to be something solid, were created by God. As the Biblical Commission says: "Not every word and phrase found in the aforesaid chapters must always and necessarily be accepted in its proper sense." Similarly, these chapters of Genesis do not deal with the nature of light, geological strata, or biological laws in a scientific manner. Nor did the author of Genesis intend to give the complete order of creation; he merely spoke of things that were better known to the people. He does not always follow a chronological order, for example, we cannot infer from Genesis that light preceded the formation of the sun, although we are told that light was made on the first day and the "lights in the firmament of heaven" were made on the fourth day.
First doubt. About what facts must the literal historical sense not be called into doubt?
Reply. "In particular about the facts that refer to the foundation of the Christian religion, such as, among others, the creation of all things by God in the beginning of time; the special creation of man; the formation of the first woman out of man; the unity of the human race; the original happiness of our first parents in the state of justice, integrity, and immortality; the precept given by God to test man's obedience; the transgression of the divine commandment prompted by the devil under the guise of the serpent; the fall of our first parents from that primal state of innocence; and the promise of the future Redeemer."
Second doubt. "Presupposing this literal and historical sense, can an allegorical and prophetic interpretation be given wisely and fruitfully to certain passages of these chapters?" The Biblical Commission answered in the affirmative. In this the Commission followed the precedent of many of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and of the Church itself.
St. Augustine and the Alexandrian school held that the whole universe had been created in one instant and that Moses had distinguished between six days merely to give his narrative a logical plan. Others have held that Moses presented in logical order six prophetic visions in which the creation of the world was revealed. This latter theory is admissible if these visions are held to contain a popular historical description of the works of God. According to St. Thomas, the Mosaic narrative logically distinguishes between a threefold operation, namely, that of creation, of distinction, and of ornamentation. This does not militate against the popular-historical character of the narrative.
Third doubt. Whether in this distinction of six days the word "Yom" (day) can be taken in its proper sense, as a natural day, or in an improper sense, as a period of time?
Following the reply of the Biblical Commission, exegetes are permitted to dispute freely on this point.
The Concordists hold that the six days represent six periods of indefinite duration, as philology allows and as paleontology requires. Thus, according to the Concordists, the geological phases are in accord with the Mosaic narrative, at least in broad outline. But many scholars question whether this agreement can be supported today. No need exists to establish a positive harmony between the Mosaic narrative and the natural sciences since there is no proof that Moses wished to follow a chronological order.
In the words of St. Thomas: "In questions of this kind two things must be observed. First, the truth of Scripture must be maintained inviolate. Secondly, since Sacred Scripture may be explained in many ways, no one should hold so tenaciously to a particular interpretation that if it turned out that what he thought was the true sense of the Scriptures was certainly wrong he would nevertheless assert his own interpretation, so that the Scriptures would not be exposed to ridicule by infidels and the infidels themselves kept from believing in the Scriptures."
We should note the important truths that are defended in questions 65 to 74: God created all things, visible and invisible; the divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things; the corporeal forms which bodies have in their original production were produced immediately by God; matter was never without a substantial form, otherwise being would be in act without act, which is a contradiction; time began with movement, of which it is the measure. The ancients thought that the heavenly bodies were incorruptible and that they were not composed of the same matter as sublunary bodies. Spectral analysis, however, has shown that the same chemical combinations exist in the stars as in terrestrial bodies. Modern scientists, however, admit the existence of the ether, which appears to be incorruptible.
Transformism And The Origin Of Life
State of the question. The question of the origin of life and of the different species of living things is one of the most important of those that pertain to the creation of corporeal things. The modern theory of transformism was scarcely mentioned among the ancient philosophers, although St. Thomas sometimes spoke of the hypothesis of the appearance of new species. This problem is in some way connected with the old question of universals: whether the universals are fundamentally in individual beings according to their unchangeable nature.
Transformism may be either absolute or moderate.
Absolute transformism holds that matter is uncaused, that it exists of itself from eternity, and that from it by successive transformations have issued different living beings, that is, vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life. (Huxley and Darwin.)
Moderate transformism holds that matter is not uncaused but is created by God, that it is not eternal, that the first living beings were created by God, and that God intervened in a special way to produce sensitive life, in the formation of the human body and in the creation of the spiritual soul. This moderate transformism refers to the production of various species of plants and animals which derive by successive transformations from the first living beings. Some of those who hold a moderate transformism think that all plants and animals come from different species created by God; others think that all plants came from one species and all animals came from one species of animal. Those who support the theory of transformism are not agreed on the definition of species; what one calls species another may call a variation.
Absolute transformism. This theory manifestly contradicts faith and reason inasmuch as it denies all intervention by God. It is directly opposed to the dogma of creation ("In the beginning God created heaven and earth"), since it teaches that matter has no cause and is eternal. This theory is opposed to all the proofs for the existence of God, and it implies that more is produced by less, the more perfect by the imperfect. This is at the same time against the principle of contradiction or identity, against the principle of the reason of being, the principle of efficient causality, and the principle of finality. It implies an ascending evolution, in which something more perfect appears without any reason, without any efficient cause, without an end, and without order. This theory destroys all intelligibility of things, as we have explained at length on another occasion. Such an evolution of species would be entirely fortuitous, without any preconceived idea or finality, and no reason is supplied for the wonderful subordination and coordination of things in nature.
In even the most ancient species, as we know from fossils, the organs are adapted to an end, coordinated with one another, and subordinated to the preservation of the individual and the species. All this cannot be attributed to chance; it presupposes an intelligent cause. Chance is a cause <per accidens>, a cause that is accidentally connected with a cause <per se>, and therefore an accidental cause cannot be the first cause of the order in things, for then order would come from the privation of order, and intelligibility would come from unintelligibility. What would be more absurd than to say that the intellects of the great doctors and the charity of the saints derived from a blind and material fate? The greater cannot be produced by the lesser. Hence absolute transformism substitutes the most patent absurdity for the mystery of creation.
This refutation of absolute transformism is confirmed by experience, which shows that every living thing comes from another living being and that there is no spontaneous generation. Pasteur and Tyndall demonstrated that no living beings are generated where all ova and seed have been destroyed. Such bacteria as are said to be generated in the atmosphere do not come from inanimate matter but from ova existing in the atmosphere. Huxley himself admitted Pasteur's conclusions.
St. Thomas held that certain animal life was generated by putrefaction under the influence of the sun. His explanation was as follows: "A heavenly body, since it is a moving thing that is moved, has the nature of an instrument which acts with the power of the principal agent; and therefore it can cause life by virtue of its mover, which is a living substance." St. Thomas never admitted that the more perfect being can be produced by the less perfect.
Moderate transformism. This theory does not oppose the teaching of faith. The words of Genesis ("And God said: Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind") show that there was some difference among the species that God created, but they do not assert that all species were immediately created by God. St. Thomas himself said: "If certain new species should appear, these have existed previously in certain active forces; in this way what is generated by animal putrefaction is produced by the power of the stars and the elements," that is, "by the power of the mover (of the stars), which is a living substance." Thus St. Thomas maintains inviolate the principle of causality, according to which the more perfect cannot be produced by a less perfect being as a fully sufficient cause.
Lastly, it is difficult to say where true variation begins and where species leaves off in the ontological sense. Generally interfecundation is held to be the sign of membership in the same species. If it is pointed out that the horse and the ass generate the mule, it should be remembered that the mule is sterile, that is, it does not propagate a species. Here we have confirmation of the principle that operation follows being, and the mode of operation follows the mode of being; from this it follows that every animal generates offspring similar to itself in species. Ontological species therefore are immutable. But it is difficult to say when two animals belong to the same species properly so called or to two similar species. We do not have a clear enough understanding of the specific difference between living sensible beings; their specific forms are deeply immersed in matter and hardly intelligible to us. We know them only in a descriptive manner, empirically.
But when we come to man, we clearly understand his specific difference because it is not immersed in matter. Man's reason or rationality is a form of intellectuality, and intelligence is distinctly intelligible to itself because it is essentially ordered to the cognition of intelligible being itself and the reasons for the being of things.
It is clear, then, that the human soul cannot be educed from the potency of matter; on the other hand the specific form of plants and animals is educed from matter by way of generation.
In its consideration of the nature of man theology treats only of I man's soul, and of his body only with regard to the relationship of the body to the soul. Therefore St. Thomas considers the human soul in its essence, in its union with the body, and then he considers the faculties of the soul. In this treatise he considers acts of the intellective faculty, leaving the acts and habits of the appetitive faculty to moral theology. Finally St. Thomas considers the first production of man and the state of the first man.
Today many of the questions of the first part of this treatise are dealt with in rational psychology, and therefore we select only the more important questions that pertain to dogmatic theology and present them in two sections.
I. The human soul. 1. The spirituality and immortality of the human soul (q. 75). 2. The union of the soul with the body (q. 76). 3. The faculties of the soul (q. 77-83). 4. The manner in which the soul knows itself (q. 87). 5. The separated soul (q. 89).
II. The first production of man (q. 90-102). 1. The origin of man. 2. The elevation of man to the supernatural state. 3. The fall of man.
The theological character of this treatise. St. Thomas does not here follow the ascending order of the philosophical treatise <De anima>. The philosopher ascends progressively from sensible things to the spiritual and the divine, from vegetative life to sensitive life and then to the intellective life, whose acts reveal the spirituality and immortality of the soul. Theology, on the other hand, having God in His intimate life as its proper object, first considers man as God's creature. Therefore, after the treatise on God, on creation in general, on the angels, theology treats of the human soul. This begins with the soul's spirituality and immortality, proceeding then to the soul's union with the body, the soul's faculties and acts, the separated soul, the production of the first man, and the state of the first man.
Besides this, in these questions St. Thomas follows the doctrinal method, which is a departure from the methods of the Averroistic philosophers and the Augustinian theologians, who preceded him.
Averroes held that the human intellect was the lowest of the intellects, but that it was an immaterial form, eternal, separate from individuals, and numerically one. In his view this human intelligence was at the same time the intellectus agens and the intellectus possibilis, and human reason was impersonal but it illumined individual souls. Hence Averroes denied the personal immortality of individual souls and their liberty. This doctrine was taught in the thirteenth century by the Latin Averroists, Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, against whom St. Thomas wrote his treatise, <De unitate intellectus> contra averroistas.
On the other hand, the Augustinian theologians who preceded St. Thomas, among them Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, admitted a plurality of substantial forms in man and held that there was spiritual matter in the human soul. They insisted on this conclusion because the intellective soul is independent of the body and because they were unable to explain the natural unity of the human composite.
In opposition to these mutually opposing theories, St. Thomas sought to prove that the rational soul is purely spiritual, without any matter, that it is therefore incorruptible, but that it is nevertheless the one and only form of the human body, intrinsically independent of matter in its intellective and voluntary operations, and therefore after its separation from the body it is individuated in its being by its natural relation to one body rather than to another.
Scotus and Suarez, however, sought to retain certain propositions taught by the older, pre-Thomistic Scholasticism.
The Spirituality And Immortality Of The Soul: Question 75
The spirituality of the soul is often affirmed in Sacred Scripture. 1. God is said to have formed the body of Adam from the slime of the earth, and into this body He breathed the breath of life, that is, the soul, which is spiritual since man was made to the image of God, who is a spirit. 2. Those things predicated of the sheol presuppose the immortality of the soul, as does also the resurrection of certain human beings. 3. The spirituality and immortality of the soul are expressly stated in the prophetical and sapiential books, and in the Books of the Machabees. 4. In the New Testament the human soul is said to be entirely distinct from the body, immortal, and capable of eternal life: "Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell"; "For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?"
The Fathers frequently affirm the spirituality and immortality of the soul; in general their teaching is that the soul is incorporeal, immortal, and created by God.
The Fourth Council of the Lateran declared that the human creature "is constituted of a spirit and a body."
As Denzinger notes at the end of his systematic index, the Church has declared that the human soul is not generated by the parents, that the intellective soul is not evolved from the sensitive soul, that the soul is substance, not numerically one in all but one in each individual, that it is created by God from nothing, that it does not pre-exist, is not a part of the divine substance, and is immortal.
St. Thomas proves the spirituality of the soul from reason as follows: "It is clear that whatever is received in another is received after the manner of that in which it is received; thus whatever is known is known according to the form it has in the one who knows. The intellective soul, however, knows a thing in its absolute nature, for example, a stone, which is known absolutely as a stone. In the intellective soul the form of the stone is absolute according to its formal nature. Therefore the intellective soul is an absolute form, not something composed of matter and form. If the intellective soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received in it as individuals, and the soul would know only the individual, as is the case with the sensitive powers, which receive the forms of things in a corporeal organ."
This demonstration becomes clearer the more our knowledge abstracts from matter. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes three degrees of abstraction. In the first degree our intellect abstracts only from individual matter, knowing, for example, not this mineral, this plant, or this animal, but the nature of the mineral, plant, or animal and the reason underlying their functions. In the second degree our intellect abstracts from sensible matter, or from all sensible qualities and considers the nature of the triangle, circle, sphere, or of numbers, and deduces the necessary and universal laws of their properties, which thus become intelligible and not merely imaginable. Now it becomes clear that the idea of the circle is not only a composite image or the average of individual circles, but expresses the nature of the circle which is verified either in the small, or large, or average circle, and this nature contains the reason for the properties of the circle, which thus become truly intelligible, whereas the image of the circle contains only the sensible phenomena without any intelligibility. Finally in the third degree of abstraction our intellect abstracts from all matter and attains to intelligible being, which is not accessible to the senses or to the imagination, either as a sensible property (color, sound, etc.) or as something sensible in common (as size, figure), but is accessible only to the intellect. Such reasons for the being of things as well as the properties of being, namely, one, true, and good, can also be attributed to pure spirits.
Only the intellect, not the senses or the imagination, can know the intelligible being of things and the first necessary and universal principles of being; the senses and the imagination know only the sensible qualities of things and the individual, not the absolutely necessary and universal principles of contradiction, identity, the nature of being, efficient causality, finality, etc., by which all things gradually become intelligible and by which we demonstrate the existence of the first cause and the first intelligence, which orders all things.
In this third degree of abstraction our intellect knows itself as essentially related to the immaterial, and therefore it must itself be immaterial. Its object is not color or sound or the different sensible phenomena, but the intelligible being of things, and therefore all its concepts presuppose the most universal concept of being. So also in all its judgments the verb is reduced to the verb "is," which is, as it were, the soul of the judgment, and every ratiocination assigns the reason for the being of the conclusion.
Our intellect is therefore essentially related to intelligible being and to the absolutely necessary and universal principles of being because of the abstraction from all matter, and therefore our intellect itself is immaterial. Consequently the intellective soul also is entirely immaterial and intrinsically independent of the organism, since operation follows being and the mode of operation follows the mode of being.
This is the principal proof for the spirituality of the soul, which St. Thomas adopted from Aristotle.
The imagination cannot attain to the knowledge of a necessary and universal principle, for example, the principle of causality, nor to the first principle of ethics, that the moral good (transcending the sensible, delectable, or useful good) is to be done and evil is to be avoided. In this, man is essentially superior to even the higher animals.
This argument is corroborated by several subordinate arguments.
1. The spirituality of the soul is also proved by the fact that it is able to know the nature of all bodies. "When a thing is able to know other things, it is fitting that it have nothing of these things in its nature, because that which might be in it naturally would impede the knowledge of the other things, just as the tongue that is infected with a bitter taste finds all things bitter."
Much has been written about the validity of this argument. If it is offered independently from the preceding argument, it is rather difficult, but it is comparatively simple as a confirmation of the preceding argument. These two arguments are taken from direct intellection.
2. The spirituality of the soul is also proved from reflex intellection. "The action of no body is reflected back on the agent; as was shown in Physica (Bk. VII, chap. I); no body is moved by itself except with respect to a part, so that one part of the body moves and another is moved. Our intellect, however, acting on itself reflects back on itself by complete reflection, it understands itself not only with regard to a part but with regard to its totality. Therefore it is not a body." In other words, the intellective soul is entirely devoid of integrating parts and extension.
Moreover, as St. Thomas says: "Our intellect reflects on its own act, not only inasmuch as it knows its act but also inasmuch as it knows its relation to the thing (the extramental thing that is known), which is something that cannot be known unless the nature of the act itself is known together with the nature of the intellect itself." Thus our intellect knows itself as ordered to the cognition of truth, just as the feet are ordered to walking and wings are ordered to flying. But the cognition of truth is not something corporeal like walking; it is spiritual, revealing the spirituality of the soul.
3. Through the intellect the soul conceives immaterial and spiritual things, among these the eternal, infinite, holy God, the first cause of all being; it conceives even revealed mysteries, which entirely transcend the capabilities of the sensitive faculties, such as the infinite value of the Redemption and of the love of the Son of God, dying on the cross.
4. The spirituality of the soul is confirmed by the object of the will, inasmuch as the will follows the intellect. Our will, specified by the universal good as known by the intellect, is ordered not only to the delectable or useful sensible good but also to the moral, or reasonable, or spiritual good, according to the various virtues of temperance, fortitude, justice, and equity. We know from experience that, while the same material goods, the same house, the same field, cannot be possessed entirely at the same time by many persons, the same spiritual goods, such as the same truth or the same virtue, can be possessed entirely and at the same time by many persons, as St. Augustine and St. Thomas frequently point out. Lastly, our souls by their natural desires are attracted more to spiritual objects than to corporeal things; indeed the soul naturally is drawn to God the author of nature, the principle of truth, of goodness, and of beauty, who is to be loved above all things and even more than ourselves.
5. Further confirmation is had from human freedom inasmuch as our will, specified by the universal good, remains free with regard "to every object that is not good in every respect." This reveals the universal scope and immeasurable depth of our will, which cannot be filled except by the clear vision of God.
6. In man we find a moral conscience, which threatens him when he is about to do wrong and torments him with remorse if he commits the wrong. Only an immaterial and spiritual nature is capable of such a conscience. Moral laws are not imposed on blind matter.
From all this we conclude that, although the human soul is dependent on the senses for the presentation of its proper object, which is the intelligible being of sensible things, it is not dependent on an organism in its specific operation, or in its being (since operation follows being, and the mode of operation follows the mode of being), or in its production, that is, the soul is not educed from matter.
Therefore, as we shall see in the next chapter, the human soul and the body unite in the one being of man in such a way that the soul does not depend on the body in being but communicates its being to the body.
The incorruptibility of the soul follows from the spirituality of the soul, or its intrinsic independence of matter. Every simple and subsisting form (that is, immaterial and intrinsically independent of matter) is incorruptible <per se> and <per accidens>. But the human soul is not only simple, like the soul of the animal, it is also subsisting and intrinsically independent of matter. Therefore it cannot be corrupted either <per se> (because of its simplicity) or <per accidens> when the composite is corrupted (because of its intrinsic independence of matter both in being and in its specific operation).
By God's absolute power, of course, the soul can be annihilated, since annihilation is not repugnant and since the soul needs to be preserved by God. But by His power as directed by His wisdom God does not annihilate a creature which is both <per se> and <per accidens> incorruptible according to the laws established by God Himself. God does not annihilate the soul even miraculously or by an extraordinary use of His power, because, from the viewpoint of the end, there is no motive for such action; such an action is not good in itself, nor can it be directed to a greater good. On the other hand God can permit sin for a greater good, namely, for the manifestation of mercy and justice. The soul, therefore, is immortal by its very nature.
We see from this, in opposition to Scotus, that the immortality of the human soul is not only known by faith but can also be demonstrated by natural reason.
St. Thomas adds the following argument: "In cognitive beings desire follows knowledge. The senses know being only under the aspect of the here and now, but the intellect understands being absolutely and as it is in all time. Hence every being that possesses an intellect naturally desires to be at all times. A natural desire cannot be futile. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible."
The brute animal does not desire to be always but only here and now, for example, at the moment when it is threatened with death, because the animal does not know being absolutely in all time. Man himself does not naturally desire the immortality of his body, which is naturally mortal, but the soul of man, which knows being absolutely as in all time, naturally desires to be always, and this is a sign that the soul is naturally immortal. This desire of the soul is not a conditional and inefficacious desire, like the desire for the beatific vision, which is essentially supernatural and gratuitous; this desire is for the natural being of the soul to be preserved continually.
Finally, from the fact that the human soul is spiritual it follows that it is not in the potency of matter like the soul of the animal, nor can it be produced by generation. It can be produced only by God by creation from nothing, that is, from no pre-existing subject. That which operates independently of matter also exists and becomes, or rather is produced, independently of matter. Hence we find among the twenty-four propositions approved by the Sacred Congregation of Studies (1914): "Intellectuality necessarily follows immateriality, and the degree of intellectuality depends on the degree of remoteness from matter" (no. 18).
The human intelligence, therefore, is the lowest of all the intelligences, and correspondingly its proportionate object is the lowest intelligible being, namely, that of sensible things, in which as in a mirror the human intelligence knows higher things.
This an article of faith that the intellective soul is <per se> and essentially the form of the body. This truth was defined by the Council of Vienne (1311-12): "We define that if anyone shall presume to assert, defend, or hold that the rational or intellective soul is not <per se> and essentially the form of the human body, he shall be considered a heretic." In these words the Council of Vienne condemned the error of Olivi, who taught that the rational soul informed the body not <per se> but that it did so through the vegetative and sensitive faculties.
This definition states three things. 1. The human soul is the form of the human body, or the soul is substantially united to the body as form to matter, not like a mover to a thing that is moved, but constituting one nature with the body. 2. This union is <per se> and not through another, not through the mediation of a sensitive or vegetative principle, but directly and immediately through the soul. 3. The union is essential, that is, by the essence of the soul and not through some faculty, or consciousness of operation, or some accidental influx, so that the essence of the soul is the radical principle of the vegetative and sensitive operations together with the body with which it is united.
Among the condemned propositions of Rosmini we find: "The union of the soul and the body properly consists in an immanent perception by which the subject, comprehending an idea, affirms the sensible part, after having comprehended its own essence in the idea."
In a declaration against the false doctrine of A. Guenther, Pius IX said: "The rational soul is the true form of the body, <per se> and immediate."
Cardinal Zigliara concludes: "The fathers of the Council of Vienne used the word 'form' in its strict scholastic sense," which was the sense commonly accepted by those to whom the Council addressed itself. The Council, however, as Zigliara points out, did not wish to condemn Scotus' thesis which admits the form of corporeity besides the rational soul. Hence the Council did not define that the rational soul was the only form of the human body, but rather that it is the substantial form and the principle of the vegetative and sensitive life of the human body.
Corollary. Hence, as Vacant points out, it cannot be admitted that there are several souls in man, as the Gnostics, Manichaeans, Apollinaris, and Guenther said. We must hold that the intellective soul is the only soul in man and the principle of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life of man, even though it has not been defined that it is the only form. Indeed, Palmieri was able to make a defense for his atomism, according to which the rational soul is still the principle of even vegetative life.
St. Thomas, however, proves from reason that the rational soul is not only the form of the human body and the only soul in man but also that it is the only form because if any other substantial form existed beforehand it would follow that the soul was only accidentally united to the body.
St. Thomas wrote: "That by which anything is primarily operated is the form to which the operation is attributed..... But it is evident that that by which the body lives primarily is the soul....For it is the soul by which we are nourished, feel, move in place, and by which also we primarily think..... For it is the same man who perceives that he thinks and feels; and feeling cannot take place without the body..... If the intellect is not united to Socrates' body, except as the mover of the body, Socrates would not be absolutely one, and consequently he would not be a simple being."
Nevertheless the rational soul is not immersed in matter, for as St. Thomas says: "The more noble a form is the more it dominates the corporeal matter and the less it is immersed in it, and the more it excels the matter by its operation and power." "The soul communicates that being in which it subsists to the corporeal matter..... For this reason, when the body is destroyed, the soul retains its own being, which is not true of other forms."
The intellective principle is multiplied as the human bodies are multiplied; otherwise Socrates and Plato would be one intelligence. "If there were but one intellect in all men, the variety of phantasms found in this man and that could not cause the variety of intellectual operations of this or that man." When it is separated from its body the soul remains individuated, because it preserves its natural relation to this particular body rather than to another.
Nor are there other souls in man, because then man would not be simply one, "for nothing is simply one except by one form." "The intellective soul contains the sensitive soul of the animal and the nutritive soul of the plants, just as the pentagon contains the tetragon."
Nor is the form of corporeity in man distinct from the intellective soul "because the substantial form confers being absolutely. If besides the intellective soul some other substantial form existed beforehand in matter by which the subject of the soul would be in act, it would follow that the soul would not confer being absolutely and that consequently it would not be the substantial form." This was the opinion held by Thomists at all times in opposition to Scotus and his followers. "That which is <per se> one, namely, one nature, does not come into being out of two acts but out of potency and act. This was Cajetan's conclusion from the words of Aristotle himself.
Finally, it is fitting that the intellective soul be united to a proper body for the purpose of sensation to become a human body, because "the intellective soul is the lowest grade of intellectual substances," and therefore its proportionate object is the lowest intelligible being of sensible things, knowable through the senses. "Hence it is proper that the intellective soul have not only the power of intellection but also the power of sensation. The action of the senses, however, does not take place without a corporeal instrument. It is proper, therefore, that the intellective soul be united to a body which can be a proper organ for the senses."
Thus man is a microcosm in which there is the being of the stone, life as we find it in plants and animals, and intellection as it is in the angels. And in man we see the highest degree of the lowest form of life, namely the highest degree of sensitive life as found in the imagination, and at the same time the lowest degree of the highest kind of life, namely, the lowest degree of intellection. The human species appears, therefore, as a unique species, that is, there cannot be several ontologically distinct species of rational animals. In this one species the highest degree of the lowest life unites with the lowest degree of the highest life, while an immeasurable distance remains between sensitive and intellective life.
Solution Of The Objections
The principal objection against the doctrine that the intellective soul is the only form of the body is the following. An intellective power cannot be the form of a body. But an intellective substance is more noble than its power. Therefore an intellective substance cannot be the form of a body.
St. Thomas replied: "The human soul is not a form immersed in corporeal matter, or completely comprehended by matter, because of the perfection of the soul, and therefore there is nothing to prohibit some power of the soul from being the act of the body, although the soul by its essence is the form of the body."
In other words, the intellective soul is the form of the body inasmuch as it is eminently and formally vegetative and sensitive, or inasmuch as the intellective soul does for the human body what the sensitive soul does for the animal and what the vegetative soul does for plants. In this manner the intellective soul is virtually multiple.
This teaching is sometimes misunderstood to mean that the intellective soul is virtually sensitive and vegetative. On the contrary, according to the interpretation of Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and John of St. Thomas, the intellective soul is eminently and formally vegetative and sensitive. It is God alone who virtually possesses vegetative and sensitive life, as He possesses other mixed perfections which He can produce, and God cannot be the form of the human body.
The intellective soul contains vegetative and sensitive life eminently and formally, just as God in the sublimity of the Deity formally contains the absolutely perfect perfections, such as being, intellection, love. The soul therefore can be the form of the human body, but this would be impossible if the soul were only virtually and not formally vegetative and sensitive.
But, as in God the absolutely perfect perfections are only virtually distinct, so the sensitive, vegetative, and corporeal forms are only virtually distinct in the intellective soul. This is the clear teaching of St. Thomas. Some have caused confusion on this point by saying that the vegetative and sensitive parts are only virtually in the soul because St. Thomas said that the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative parts are only virtually distinct. The term "virtually" refers to "distinguish" and not to the verb "is," as when we speak of the absolutely perfect perfections in God.
Moreover, it would be repugnant for the soul to be the immediate principle of such diverse operations as those of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life, but it is not repugnant that the soul produce these operations through the mediation of various subordinate faculties. No created substance, not even the angel, is immediately operative; it cannot understand except through the intellective faculty, nor can it will except through the will. The created essence is ordered to being, but the operative faculties are ordered to operations and are specified by the formal object of these operations.
The twofold principle for the solution of the objections against this traditional doctrine is: the intellective soul is the form of the body, and yet it is in no way immersed in matter. This teaching is well stated as the sixteenth of the Thomistic propositions approved by the Sacred Congregation of Studies (1914): "This same rational soul is united to the body in such a way that it is the only substantial form of the body, and through this form man is man, animal, living, a body, substance, and being. This form therefore confers on man every essential degree of perfection; besides this the soul confers on the body the act of being by which it itself is." For the Thomists this proposition is certain according to the principles that refer to the distinction between potency and act, and between essence and being. Suarez, on the contrary, who conceived these principles otherwise, held that it was only probable that the rational soul is the only form of the body. Denying the real distinction between created essence and being, he said that the substantial being of man cannot be one, but that there is a twofold being just as there are two parts in the essence of man, namely, matter and form. As in the question of creation, so here also Suarez differs considerably from St. Thomas.
From St. Thomas' principles concerning the distinction between potency and act it follows that the human soul and body unite in the one being of man in such a way that the soul does not depend on the body for being, but communicates its being to the body; and after the separation from the body, the soul can again communicate its being to the body, as happens in the resurrection of the dead. From the same principles it follows that there is one being in Christ, namely, the being of the Word, communicated to the human nature, which does not subsist except in the Word.
This doctrine of the spirituality and personal immortality of the soul shows how St. Thomas Christianized that Aristotelianism which the Averroists interpreted in a pantheistic sense. We see this likewise in the question of free creation from nothing. In these two questions the holy doctor shows how the principles supporting the preambles of faith are demonstrated and explained by the Aristotelian teaching on potency and act.
The questions in the <Summa theologica> from seventy-seven to eighty-three, treating of the distinction and subordination of the faculties of the soul, are governed by the principle that "the faculties, acts, and habits are specified by the formal object to which they are essentially ordered, that is, by the formal object which they touch on immediately and by the formal motive under which they attain their object." More briefly: the relative is specified by the absolute to which it is essentially ordered. In his work, De tribus principiis doctrinae S. Thomae, A. Reginaldus enunciates this principle as the third. The other two principles are: being is transcendental and analogical, and God is pure act. Indeed this third principle illumines all psychology and ethics, as well as all moral theology and the theological treatises on the angels and man.
From this principle it follows first that the faculties are really distinguished from the soul, because as the soul is ordered to its own being the faculties are ordered to operation, and operation presupposes being and is distinct from it. Moreover, no creature is immediately operative; to operate it requires an operative faculty. Hence the human soul, like the angel, cannot understand except through the intellective faculty, nor can it will except through the will. When we speak in this way it is not because of the usages of language but because the very nature of things requires it. As the essence of the soul is the real capacity for existence, so the intellect is the real capacity for knowing truth, and the will is the capacity for willing what is proposed as good. Hence by reason of this principle the faculties of the soul are really distinct from each other according to their formal objects.
Only in God are essence, existence, intellect, intellection, will, and love identified without any real distinction. Even in the angel there is a real distinction between essence and being, between the essence and the faculties, between the faculties themselves, between the intellect and successive intellections, and between the will and successive volitions. Such is also the case with the human soul.
Instead of a real distinction Scotus introduced his formal-actual distinction derived from the nature of the thing as a middle between the real distinction and the distinction of reason. To this the Thomists reply that either this new distinction is antecedent to the consideration of our minds, and then it is real, or it is not antecedent to the consideration of the mind, and then it is a distinction of reason based on the nature of the thing, that is, a virtual distinction.
Suarez, an eclectic in these questions as in others, sought a middle way between St. Thomas and Scotus by saying that the distinction between the soul and its faculties is not certain but only probable. Here again it is evident that Suarez did not understand the distinction between potency and act as St. Thomas did.
From this same principle, that the faculties are specified by their formal object, we learn of the distinction and the immeasurable distance between the intellect and the sensitive faculties. These latter, no matter how perfect they may be, never attain to anything but sensible being, that is, sensible and imaginable phenomena; they do not penetrate to intelligible being, to the reasons for the being of things, or to the universal and necessary principles of contradiction, causality, finality. Nor do they attain to the first principle of ethics: Good is to be done and evil is to be avoided. This immeasurable distance between the intellect and the sensitive faculties is the foundation for the proof of the spirituality of the soul.
For the same reason the will, the rational appetite, is distinguished from the sensible appetite, both irascible and concupiscible. For the will, directed by the intellect, is specified by the universal good, which is known only by the intellect, whereas the sensitive appetite, which is immediately directed by the cognitive sensitive faculties, is specified not by the universal good but by the sensible, delectable, and useful good. Therefore the sensitive appetite, as such, cannot will the rational or moral good which is the object of virtue. However, under the direction of prudence, the virtues of temperance and fortitude, which are in the sensitive appetite disciplined and regulated by reason, are specified by the moral good as demanding preservation in circumstances of enjoyment or attack.
This profound distinction between the will and sensibility is not acknowledged by many modern psychologists, particularly after J. J. Rousseau.
From what we have said it follows that the sensitive faculties are in the human composite as in their immediate subject as well as in the particular animated organ, whereas the intellect and the will, which are intrinsically independent of the organism, are not in the human composite but in the soul alone as in their immediate subject.
The definition of liberty. From this doctrine on the intellect and the will is derived what St. Thomas teaches about liberty. We have explained and defended this teaching on another occasion. Here we wish to point out the difference between the Thomistic definition of liberty and the definition proposed by Molina. According to Molina "that agent is said to be free which, when all the requirements are present for acting, is able to act or not act." What is the meaning of the words, "when all the requirements for acting are present"? They include not only those things that are prerequisite in time but also by the simple priority of nature and causality, such as actual grace received in the same instant in which the salutary act is elicited and the ultimate practical judgment is placed. Moreover, Molina's definition means not only that under the influence of efficacious grace liberty retains the ability to resist although it actually never resists, but that grace is not efficacious in itself but only that our consent is foreseen by scientia media prior to the divine decree.
According to the Thomists, Molina's definition is not sound because it does not take into consideration the object by which the free act is specified and in this way neglects the principle that acts are specified by their formal objects.
But if we take this specifying object into consideration, we must say with St. Thomas: "If an object is proposed to the will that is not good from every viewpoint, the will is not necessarily drawn to it." In other words, the Thomists say: "Liberty is that dominating indifference of the will with regard to an object proposed by reason as not good in every way."
The essence of liberty consists in the dominating indifference of the will with regard to every object proposed by the reason as good here and now under one aspect and not good under some other aspect. We are concerned first with the indifference of the exercise of the will with regard to willing or not willing this object. This indifference is potential in the free faculty and actual in the free act. For while the will actually wills this object and while it is determined to willing the object, it still wills it freely with a dominating indifference that is now not potential but actual. In God, however, who is most free there is no potential or passive indifference but only an active and actual indifference. Liberty therefore arises from the disproportion that exists between the will specified by the universal good and the will specified by some particular good, some good under one aspect and not good or insufficient under another aspect.
The Thomists add that even by His absolute power God cannot force the will to will a particular object proposed with indifference of the judgment. Why? Because it implies a contradiction for the will necessarily to will an object proposed by the intellect as indifferent, that is, good under one aspect and not under another, or an object that is absolutely out of proportion to the unlimited capability of our will specified by the universal good.
The relation of choice to the final practical judgment. From the foregoing is derived the twenty-first of the twenty-four propositions approved by the Sacred Congregation of Studies: "The will does not precede but follows the intellect, and the will necessarily desires that which is presented to it as good in every way and thus satisfying the (rational) appetite. But the will freely chooses among several goods that are proposed as desirable to the changeable judgment. The choice therefore allows the final practical judgment, and the will effects that which is final." The choice follows freely upon the final practical judgment by which it is directed, and the will does that which is final by accepting the direction of the judgment. But the will is able to apply the intellect to another consideration which would lead to the opposite practical judgment. Here we see the influence that the intellect and the will have on each other; it is, as it were, the marriage of the intellect and will. Thus the consent of the will does whatever accepted practical judgment remains as final.
This intellectual direction is necessary because the will itself is blind, and nothing is willed unless first known as acceptable. This is an application of the principle that causes are causes with regard to each other but in different genera of causes. The intellect directs with respect to the specification of the act, and the will applies the intellect with respect to the exercise of its act, and it applies the intellect to a certain consideration as it is inclined to it.
Scotus and Suarez however held that it was not necessary that the choice be directed immediately by the final practical judgment. According to Suarez, the will is able to choose one of two equal or unequal goods even though the intellect does not propose it to us as better here and now. To this the Thomists reply that nothing is willed here and now unless it is first known as more acceptable to us here and now; each one judges according to his actual inclination, which however does not force us and can be removed.
The intellect and the will are not coordinated; the will is subordinated to the direction of the intellect in such a way however that the final practical judgment about an object that is not good under every aspect is free and not compelling. This is the indifference of the judgment which is followed by the dominating indifference of the will.
In questions eighty-four to eighty-eight of the first part of the <Summa theologica>, St. Thomas treats only of the acts and habits of the intellective part of the soul, because the acts and habits of the appetitive part are considered in moral theology and because the operations of the sensitive part do not directly pertain to theology. St. Thomas asks: 1. how the soul joined to the body understands corporeal things (q. 84); by what means it knows them (q. 85); what it understands in them (q. 86); 2. how the soul knows itself and the things that are in itself (q. 87); 3. how the soul knows the things that are above, that is, immaterial substances (q. 88).
It should be noted particularly that for St. Thomas the adequate object of our intellect, as intellect, is intelligible being in the entire extent of being. Hence we are able to know God naturally as the first cause, and supernaturally we can be elevated to the direct vision of the divine essence, which is not outside the full extent of being.
But the proper or proportionate object of the human intellect, as human, is the essence of sensible things, since the lowest intelligible being of sensible things, knowable by means of the senses, corresponds to the lowest intellect. Hence our intellect is united to the senses. Hence also we know God and spiritual substances naturally only by analogy, in the mirror of sensible things. In the state of union with the body our souls do not know spiritual things directly as does the angel, and therefore it conceives spiritual being as immaterial, and this is a sign that the soul first knows the nature of material things, such as the nature of stones, plants, and animals.
In particular it is asked whether the soul as united to the body knows itself through its essence. In <De veritate> St. Thomas examines the arguments pro and con at great length, and in the <Summa theologica> he proceeds in a simpler way and says: "Whatever is knowable is knowable as it is in act..... For sight does not perceive the colored thing in potency but only in act. And so it is with the intellect..... Thus it is that we do not know prime matter except in its relation to the form. Hence in immaterial substances, just as each one is in act by its essence so each one is intelligible by its essence..... God, who is pure act and from whom all things proceed, not only knows Himself but all things through His essence. The essence of the angel is in the genus of intelligible being as it is act, but not pure act..... Hence the angel knows itself through its essence, but the angel does not know everything through its essence; it knows some things through their representations. The position of the human intellect in the scale of intelligible beings is that of a being in potency, similar to the position of prime matter in the scale of sensible being, and therefore the human intellect is called possibilis. Considered in its essence, therefore, the human intellect is a cognitive potency. Of itself it has the power of intellection but it does not have the power of being known except when it is in act. But because it is connatural for our intellect in its present state to be concerned with material and sensible things, it follows that our intellect knows itself inasmuch as it is in act by means of the species abstracted from sensible things by the light of the intellectus agens, which is the act of these intelligible beings, and through the mediation of these intelligible species the intellectus possibilis understands. Our intellect therefore knows itself not through its essence but by its act.
This happens in two ways. First, in the particular when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellective soul from the fact that he perceives that he understands. Secondly, in the universal when we study the human mind through the act of the intellect. But it is true that the efficacy of this knowledge, by which we understand the nature of the soul, is based on the light which our intellect derives from divine truth, in which the natures of all things are contained.
St. Thomas therefore arrives at the same conclusion that he reached in the <De veritate>: "Hence our mind cannot understand itself in the sense that it understands itself directly or immediately." If the soul knew itself immediately through its own essence, its spirituality would be fully evident to the soul, and there would be no materialists, just as there are no materialists among the angels. But when the soul is separated from the body, in the exact instant of the separation when the soul is no longer existing in the body, the soul will know itself through itself.
In question 89 St. Thomas asks how the separated soul knows. The subjects of purgatory, heaven, and hell are treated in the treatise on the Last Things. Here we consider: 1. the subsistence of the separated soul; 2. its knowledge; 3. its unchangeable will, either in good or bad.
First Article: The Subsistence Of The Separated Soul
The subsistence of the soul separated from the body is demonstrated by this principle: Every simple form that is intrinsically independent of matter (in its operation, its being, and in its production) subsists independently of matter and perdures after separation from the body. But the human soul is a simple form and is intrinsically independent of matter. Therefore the human soul subsists after the dissolution of its body.
The Averroists object that since the human soul is individuated by matter, or by its body, when it is separated from the. body it is no longer individuated, and hence nothing subsists except one soul for all men. Others went on to say that if the soul of St. Peter is saved, my soul is also saved, because after separation from the body my soul is not distinct from the soul of St. Peter.
Replying to the Averroists St. Thomas said that, just as the human soul has an essential (or transcendental) relation to the body of a man and not to that of a lion, so this human soul has an essential (or transcendental) relation to this particular body. And this relation remains in the soul even though the terminus of the relation no longer exists, and thus the separated soul remains individuated. If this relation were predicamental or accidental, like paternity, it would disappear with its terminus. But such is not the case with a non-accidental relation, which is founded directly on the very substance of the soul. In the same way the essential relation of the faculty of sight reaches out to a colored object even though all colored things should be destroyed. The individuation of the rational soul therefore depends on the body in its becoming but not in its being, and thus there can be no question of metempsychosis. The human soul cannot inform the body of a brute animal, nor can the soul of Socrates inform Plato's body; each soul preserves its relation to its body and in this way remains individuated.
If the human soul were united only accidentally to the body, this particular soul would have only an accidental relation to this particular body, and this relation would disappear when the terminus is destroyed, that is, when the body is dissolved. But this is not true since the human soul is united to the body by its very nature, and together with the body the soul constitutes a being that is one <per se>, that is, one nature. Thus St. Thomas is always faithful to the principle of economy, according to which a question should not be explained by many principles if it can be explained by fewer principles. In this treatise, as in others, all the conclusions are deduced from a few exalted principles, and this makes for a greater unification of our science.
From the foregoing it follows that it is more perfect for the rational soul to be united to the body than to be separated from it, for this lowest intellect has for its proportionate object the lowest intelligible being, placed in the shadows of sensible being, and in order to know this kind of being the soul needs the senses, and therefore the body, which exists on account of the soul. Thus, <per se> the body is useful for the soul, although at times it may be a hindrance. The state of separation from the body, therefore, is preternatural for the soul; and the soul naturally desires to reinform its body, all of which is in full accord with the dogma of the general resurrection. The separated soul, however, cannot at will reassume its body, because it is the form of the body not by an action that is dependent on its will, but it is the form of the body by its nature. Operation follows being, and the soul does not have power over its own being; the being of both soul and body are under the power of God alone, and God alone can revive the body and He alone as the author of life can restore life to a corpse.
Second Article: The Knowledge Of The Separated Soul
The guiding principle in this entire question is still that the human intellect is the lowest of the intellects although it is purely spiritual.
It is certain that the sensitive operations of the internal and external senses do not remain in the separated soul; indeed the sensitive faculties are only radically in the soul. As they are in the soul they are not in act since they are in act only in the human composite. Similarly the habits of the sensitive faculties (for example, the habitual recollections of the sensitive memory) remain in the separated soul only radically.
On the other hand, the separated soul retains its higher faculties, which are purely spiritual, namely, the intellect and the will, as well as the habits of these faculties, both those that are acquired, as the sciences and virtues, and those that are infused, such as faith, hope, charity, prudence, religion, justice, penance, etc. Similarly the separated soul retains the acts of these superior faculties and their habits. The exercise of these faculties is, however, impeded to some extent because after separation the soul is without the cooperation of the imagination and the sensitive memory, which is helpful in the knowledge that is obtained from the species abstracted from sensible things.
Theologians commonly hold that the separated soul receives from God certain infused species in the instant of separation to overcome this impediment. These species are similar, although of a lower kind, to the angels' species, and are used by the soul without the assistance of the imagination. This procedure has an analogy in the case of an aging theologian. Because of his failing sight he can no longer peruse theological periodicals or new books on theology but he now becomes a man of prayer and enjoys more abundant inspirations from the Holy Ghost to enable him to arrive at a more profound understanding of theology. The separated soul, therefore, understands according to the mode of other spiritual substances that are separated from matter.
That the state of the separated soul is preternatural is evident from the fact that these infused ideas, although inferior to those of the angels, are too sublime for the capacity of the human intellect, which is the weakest of all intellects. The state of the separated soul is somewhat like that of a student uninitiated in the science of metaphysics who finds the lectures far above his comprehension; the newcomer in metaphysics prefers conventional argument based on common sense.
A twofold difficulty attends cognition by the separated soul: when it seeks to make use of acquired ideas it lacks the helpful cooperation of the imagination, and when it seeks to use infused ideas it finds them too sublime for its capabilities. But for this twofold difficulty some compensation is derived from the fact that the separated soul sees itself intuitively. Hence it clearly sees its own spirituality, immortality, and liberty, and in the reflection of its own essence it knows God the author of nature with perfect certitude. Thus the greatest philosophical problems are solved in a higher light. St. Thomas says, "to some degree the separated soul is freer in its intellection."
The separated souls also naturally know each other perfectly although less perfectly than the angels, "and the separated soul knows the angels through divinely imprinted likenesses which, however, fail to be perfect representations because the nature of the human soul is inferior to the angel."
St. Thomas shows that separated souls know individual things through infused species; but they do not know all of them as do the angels, only "those to which they are in some way determined either by previous knowledge, by some affection, by some natural relation, or by divine ordination, because everything that is received is received according to the mode of the recipient." Local distance does not impede the soul's knowledge of individuals, because this knowledge is derived from infused ideas and does not depend on the senses or on local distance.
Do the separated souls know what is happening here on earth? St. Thomas replies: "According to their natural knowledge the souls of the dead do not know what is happening here on earth. The reason is that the separated soul knows individual things inasmuch as it is determined to them by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection or by divine ordination. But the souls of the dead, by divine ordination and by the mode of their being, are segregated from intercourse with the living and joined in intercourse with spiritual substances, which are separated from the body. Hence they are ignorant of the things that happen among us."
It is probable, however, that the souls of the blessed know all that is happening here on earth. They are equal to the angels, and, as St. Augustine says, the angels are not ignorant of what is happening among us. "But because the souls of the saints are most perfectly in accord with divine justice, they are not saddened nor do they interest themselves in the affairs of the living except when the disposition of divine justice requires it."
St. Thomas also points out that "the souls of the dead (in purgatory) can be solicitous about the living, even though they are ignorant about the condition of the living, just as we are solicitous about the dead, offering our suffrages for them, although we are ignorant about their (particular) state. The souls of the dead cannot know through themselves what the living are doing, but they may have this knowledge either through the souls of those who join them from here below, or through the angels, or through the revelation of the spirit of God."
The duration of the separated soul that is not yet in the bliss of heaven is twofold, namely, aeviternity and discrete time. Aeviternity is the measure of their immobile substance and their immobile knowledge of themselves and of God, as well as of their immobile love, which results from this knowledge. Thus aeviternity does not imply the change of succession; it is simultaneously whole, but it is still not eternity, because it has beginning, at least in fact, and because it is compatible with before and after, that is, it has discrete time annexed to it.
In the separated souls and in the angels discrete time is the measure of successive thoughts and affections; each thought perdures for one spiritual instant, and the following thought is measured by another spiritual instant. Thus discrete time is the measure of the succession of the thoughts and affections of these souls and of the angels just as continuous time is the measure of continuous motion, for example, of the apparent movement of the sun. It should be noted that one spiritual instant, which is the measure of one thought, can last for several hours or days of solar time, as, for example, even here on earth a person in ecstasy may be absorbed for several hours in one and the same contemplation. The duration of that contemplation is one spiritual instant for that person.
The souls of the blessed in heaven have another duration, namely, participated eternity, which is the one stationary now of eternity by which the beatific vision and beatific love are measured, since these two acts last for eternity without interruption. We have then four kinds of duration; these may be represented symbolically by a pyramid or perhaps better by a cone whose apex represents eternity. The base represents continuous or solar time; half way up a conic section parallel to the base represents aeviternity, and on this section a polygon is drawn to represent the discrete time of the successive thoughts of those beings that are in aeviternity.
Third Article: The Immutable Will Of Separated Souls
According to the teaching of faith, a soul separated from the body enters into the particular judgment immediately after death, and then God "renders to every man according to his works."
The Second Council of Lyons declared that "soon after death" the souls of men either enter heaven, or go down to hell, or are placed in purgatory. This presupposes a particular judgment. Benedict XII on two occasions makes use of this formula, "soon after death according to their different merits," which likewise presupposes a particular judgment. This truth, taught by faith, is expressed in various ways in Holy Scripture: "For it is easy before God in the day of death to reward every one according to his ways..... And in the end of a man is the disclosing of his works." "And as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment." "I must work the works of Him that sent me, whilst it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work." Hence retribution follows immediately on death. Patristic tradition also supports this teaching that the soul is subjected to the particular judgment when it leaves the body.
Out of this particular judgment the elect receive the certainty of salvation and confirmation in grace even though they must first pass through purgatory; the rest receive the certainty of perdition.
How can we explain the immobility of the separated soul from the instant of separation from the body without the beatific vision for all souls, even those that are not among the elect?
Scotus and Suarez teach that this immobility is only extrinsic, inasmuch as God no longer offers the grace of conversion to the souls that leave the body in the state of sin, and inasmuch as He grants the souls in purgatory a special protection that wards off sin, both mortal and venial, so that these souls do not recede any farther from heavenly bliss.
St. Thomas and the Thomists assign an intrinsic reason, namely, by the fact that the soul is separated from the body it becomes subject to the normal conditions of intellectual life of a pure spiritual creature. St. Thomas says: "The apprehension of the angel differs from the apprehension of man in this, that the angel apprehends immovably through the intellect just as we apprehend first principles, with which the intellect is concerned. Man (in this life), however, apprehends movably through reason, proceeding from one thing to another, since for him the way is open to proceed to both opposites. Hence the will of man (in this life) adheres to a thing movably, being in a position to abandon one thing and adhere to the contrary. The will of the angel, however, adheres fixedly and immovably. And therefore, if we consider the angel's will before it adheres to a thing, it is able to adhere freely to one thing or to the opposite in those matters which it does not will naturally, but after it has adhered to a thing it adheres to it immovably. Hence we say customarily,....the free will of the angel is flexible with regard to either opposite before the choice is made but not after."
This follows from the purely intuitive mode of cognition as contrasted with the abstractive and successive mode of cognition. The intellect that knows by abstraction sees the various aspects of the decision to be made at the end of the deliberation only successively and therefore it is able to change its free judgment and its voluntary choice. On the other hand, the intellect that knows in a purely intuitive manner sees all the aspects, both for and against, of the decision to be made not successively but at one time, and afterward it does not change its final practical judgment or its voluntary choice. If some one were to say to the intuitive intellect, "You did not consider this aspect," it would reply, "I considered even this aspect." Hence for the devil there is no way to return except the road of humility and obedience, which the devil did not accept and does not now accept.
This immutability of choice in created spirits is a participation in the immutability of the divine choice, which remains most free even though it is entirely immutable since from eternity God considered everything that was to be considered. And the separated soul is like the angels in their mode of knowledge.
Doubt. In the very instant of separation from the body is a final merit possible for those souls that remained in mortal sin in the final moment of their union with the body?
Cajetan takes the affirmative view. He said: "The soul becomes obstinate by the first act that it elicits in the state of separation; at this point the soul merits not as here on earth but as in its terminus." This instant is the first moment when it is no longer in via, the first instant of its separation from the body. Immediately before this, time is divisible in infinity.
Other Thomists reject this solution as contrary to Scripture and tradition and to the teaching of St. Thomas in the <Contra Gentes>: "As soon as the soul is separated from the body it receives the reward or punishment for what it has done while in the body." There is therefore no possibility of final meriting in the separated soul by which it can repair the sin in which it perdured to the last moment of its union with the body.
The Salmanticenses declared: "This manner of speaking (proposed by Cajetan) is commonly rejected because of the testimony of Scripture, which expressly says that men can gain merit or demerit only before death and not in death. This is the sense of the words, 'I must work....whilst it is day; the night cometh, when no man can work.' Moreover, if in this first instant after the separation of the soul from the body a final meriting is possible, it would also be possible that the souls that were in the state of grace in the last moment of union with the body could lose their merits, which no one is willing to admit, as Suarez says."
In rejecting Cajetan's opinion, Ferrariensis points out that there is an element of truth in it, "While in the instant of separation the soul has an immutable apprehension and in that instant begins to be obstinate, nevertheless it does not in that instant merit or lose merit, as some say, because merit and demerit are not gained by the soul alone but by the composite, that is, by man. In that instant (of separation) man is not in being; this is the first instant of his non-being, the first instant in which the soul is separated and obstinate (or confirmed in good). Man does not continue so that he can merit." Hence, Ferrariensis concludes, the obstinacy in man is caused inchoatively by the mutable apprehension of some end while here on earth, and the obstinacy is completed by the immutable apprehension existing in the soul while it is separated.
The element of truth in the inadmissible opinion of Cajetan is that in the first instant of separation from the body the merit or demerit of the last moment of union with the body becomes definitive because of the mode of consideration, not only extrinsically, as Scotus and Suarez thought, inasmuch as God no longer grants the grace of conversion.
St. Thomas' solution therefore appears to be between and above the opposing opinions of Scotus and Cajetan. In the words of Ferrariensis, "In man obstinacy is caused inchoatively by the mutable apprehension of some end while here on earth, and the obstinacy is completed by the immutable apprehension existing in the soul while it is separated."
Objection. The immutability of the free will of the separated soul is not sufficiently explained by the separation from the body because this separation is too extrinsic with regard to the free will; nor is it explained by the immobile apprehension of the intellect, unless we admit with Cajetan that in man, as in the angel, the final free choice is elicited in the first instant of the separation and depends on that immobile apprehension, which considers everything that is to be considered.
Reply. Obstinacy, as Ferrariensis says, is caused inchoatively by the mobile apprehension of an end here on earth and is completed by the subsequent immobile apprehension. If we give careful consideration to the reason offered by St. Thomas, this is sufficient to explain the immobility of the disposition of the will of the separated soul. St. Thomas says: "According to the kind of individual, such will be the end, that is, each one makes a practical judgment about an end according to his own inclination..... (Therefore) when the disposition remains by which something is desired as a final end, the desire of that end cannot be moved, because the final end is desired above all things. Hence a person cannot be withdrawn from the desire of an ultimate end by something more desirable. This is the major of the argument; the minor follows. The soul, however, is in a mutable state as long as it is united to the body. Thus the transitory disposition of a passion can be removed; even the disposition of a habit can be removed, and a vice can be eradicated. Since the body serves the soul in its proper operations, it was given to the soul that the soul, existing in the body, might be perfected in its movement to perfection. The conclusion is as follows: When therefore the soul is separated from the body it is not in the state of movement to the end, but now it quiesces in the attained end. The will then will be immobile with regard to the desire of the ultimate end, because that disposition by which this or that is desired as the ultimate end will remain immobile."
That is to say that while the internal disposition by which something is desired as the ultimate end remains, this desire is immutable. But when the soul is separated from the body this disposition in the soul remains immovable, because the soul no longer apprehends mutably as when it was in the body but immutably like a pure spirit. Hence the final merit or demerit here on earth, while the soul was united to the body, becomes definitive by reason of the soul's intuitive manner of consideration, and not only extrinsically, inasmuch as God no longer grants the grace of conversion. The obstinate soul then cannot return to God except on the road of humility and obedience, and the soul does not will to take this road. The obstinate soul should not be regarded as desirous of returning to God if God were to grant the grace of conversion but rather as not willing the way of conversion by humility and obedience. Hence it is generally said of the damned that they do not repent of the evil they have committed because of the guilt but because of the penalty. The damned are grieved because the will of God is fulfilled and they desire that all souls be damned because they are saddened by every good, especially by the happiness of the blessed, because of their profound and perfect hatred.
The souls in purgatory after the particular judgment, which takes place in the instant the soul is separated from the body, possess the certitude of salvation and are confirmed in grace. Hence we refer to them as the holy souls. This confirmation in grace prior to the beatific vision is explained by St. Thomas and the Thomists not only by God's special protection which wards off sin, as Suarez taught, but by the fact that the separated soul accepts the normal conditions of the intellectual life of a purely spiritual being, which apprehends immutably by its intellect and adheres immutably to the final end even though this end is not yet clearly seen. After this, when in the light of glory the final end, which is God in His infinite goodness, is clearly seen, the love the soul has for God is no longer free but above freedom. It is at the same time spontaneous and necessary, like the love that God has for Himself, and then the soul is no longer able in any way to turn itself away from God or to interrupt the act of loving God or the act of beatific vision. "It is impossible that anyone beholding the divine essence would wish to not see it..... The vision of the divine essence fills the soul with all good things since it unites the soul with the font of all goodness."
Thus the immutability of the separated soul, in good or evil, is explained not only extrinsically but also intrinsically by the soul's manner of immutably considering the final end.
These final three chapters treat of man's origin, man's elevation to the supernatural order, and man's fall. The present chapter considers the question of man's origin.
First Article: The Creation Of Our First Parents
State of the question. The materialists and positivists try to explain the origin of man, with regard to body and soul, by the natural laws of evolution without any intervention from God the first cause. This theory proposed by Huxley and Darwin, called absolute transformism, is, as we have shown earlier in considering the production of the corporeal creature, in open contradiction to both faith and reason. According to it more is produced by less, and the more perfect comes from the less perfect in opposition to the principle of causality. Be, sides this, the order of the world and the finality of beings demands that there be a first intelligent cause and that this cause should intervene in the production of matter, of vegetative life, of sensitive life, and of intellective life. Mitigated transformism admits all this, but many of its supporters do not admit God's special intervention in the formation of man's body to make it fit for supersensitive life, as if natural evolution were sufficient to account for the formation of man's body.
The Catholic teaching. The direct creation of the soul from nothing is a dogma of faith according to the universal teaching of the Church; and according to the common teaching of the Fathers and theologians the body of the first man was formed by a special action of God directly from the slime of the earth without any transformation of species. On June 30, 1909, the Biblical Commission declared that the literal sense of the first three chapters of the Book of Genesis cannot be called into doubt With regard "to the peculiar creation of man and the formation of the first woman from the first man."
Sacred Scripture tells US: "And God created man to His own image: to the image of God He created him: male and female He created them"; "And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth: and breathed into his face the breath of life"; "He took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it. And the Lord God built the rib which he took from Adam into a woman" (Gen. 2:21 f.). The Hebrew text conveys the same sense. The obvious meaning is that Adam's body was formed directly from the slime of the earth, not through succeeding periods by the transformation of species, and that the body of Eve was formed from Adam's rib. Moreover, the words "breathed into his face the breath of life" refer to direct action by God, without the interposition of the progressive evolution of plants and animals. Hence Leroy, Bonomelli, and Zahn, who defend the opposite opinion as probable, are not on firm ground.
The Fathers and theologians, with the exception of Origen, Cajetan, and a few others, are almost unanimous in their interpretation of the teaching of the Bible on the formation of the bodies of our first parents.
Confirmation of reason. Between man and the animals close to him, such as the ape, we find essential differences not only with respect to the soul but also with respect to the body. Beings that are essentially so diverse cannot come from the same parent. Physically, the apes are equipped with four hands (quadrumanual), whereas man has only two, and because of this men and apes do not walk in the same way. We also find a great difference in the facial angle of men and apes; similarly the brain is differently evolved in man and ape. Man enjoys the faculty of speech for the clear and distinct expression not only of sensations and emotions but also of ideas and judgments; the ape lacks this faculty. Above all things, man alone of all animals possesses reason, he knows necessary and universal principles, the ideas of being, truth, goodness, justice, moral beauty, religion, and holiness, which are manifestly above the senses. Animals know only the individual and they are incapable of intellectual, moral, and religious life.
For these reasons many transformists today admit that man did not come from the ape, but that both descended from some remote common parent. Such a common parent, however, left no trace in the geological strata.
It does not seem absolutely repugnant that God should infuse into an animal organism the power by which it might gradually be changed into the human organism. But that is a purely gratuitous hypothesis, destitute of any basis in fact, and contrary to the literal sense of the biblical narrative.
St. Thomas shows that the human body was produced directly by God and admirably equipped to serve the rational soul and its operations, that is, the human body is excellently equipped for sensitive life, which in turn serves the intellectual life. Although man lacks horns, claws, and the furry covering of the animal, he has in their stead reason and hands. So also man's posture is erect with face uplifted to consider all things; the animal is inclined to the earth as if its only concern were the quest for food.
St. Thomas also points out why man is said "to be made to the image of God." Man is the true image of God by reason of his intellectual nature. He was made by God Himself in the image of God's intellectual life and thus he is able to know and love God as God knows and loves Himself. This image is, of course, imperfect; only the Son of God is the perfect image of the eternal Father. Properly speaking, irrational creatures are not made to the image of God, for although they resemble God in their being or in living, they are not like God in intellection. More perfectly than man, the angels are images of God.
God's image can be seen in man in three ways: 1. inasmuch as man possesses the ability to know God; 2. inasmuch as man knows and loves God supernaturally by faith and charity; 3. inasmuch as man perfectly knows and loves God in the light of glory and in the charity of heaven.
When some of the Fathers say that the image of God is destroyed is man by sin, they are referring to the image that was produced in the re-creation of grace.
Lastly, man is an image of God even with regard to the Trinity of persons, inasmuch as man in understanding himself produces a word and by loving himself produces love, and this image is enhanced in man when by knowing God he produces a word and by loving this word produces love.
Second Article: The Unity Of The Human Race
State of the question. In opposition to the Scriptures and tradition, the Preadamites, led by Isaac de la Peyrere (1655), denied the unity of the human race and taught that some men existed before Adam, and that Adam was the father of the Jews but not of the Gentiles. The Coadamites held that many human families existed contemporaneously with Adam.
The revealed doctrine. According to Holy Scripture the entire human race had its origin in the one protoparent, Adam. This truth is an article of faith.
We are speaking here of our earth and of the human race that is on this earth. If some indulge in the hypothesis that there are rational creatures on the stars or planets, or that other men existed on our earth before Adam and were extinct before his creation, many theologians hold that such gratuitous assumptions do not affect the teaching of faith.
According to Genesis no men existed when Adam was created: "And there was not a man to till the earth..... But for Adam there was not found a helper like himself." Eve is called the mother of all the living; and Adam is called the father of the human race.
St. Paul says: "And hath made of one, all mankind, to dwell upon the whole face of the earth"; "Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned." That is: all men are born with the stain of original sin because all derive the same nature infected with sin from the same head.
This is the common teaching of the Fathers, especially of Lactantius, St. Ephrem, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine.
Confirmation by reason. We find various signs of specific identity in all men of whatever race or color. As Quatrefages points out, we find the same anatomical structure, the same physiological functions, the same laws of generation, unlimited fecundity in the marriages contracted between various races of men, the same faculty of speech, the same power of reasoning, and the same moral and religious sense. Differences in color, brain capacity, facial angles, or idiom, are not substantial but only accidental, as ethnographers admit.
From paleontology and geology we now know that man is much older than was thought formerly, but there is still a great difference of opinion about the precise epoch when man appeared on earth. On this point the Scriptures are silent, and the Church has made no declaration.
Third Article: The Production Of The Human Soul
State of the question. With regard to the body the human race is propagated by generation. But what is the origin of the intellective soul of the infant? Some say that the soul emanates from God; others like the Origenists and Priscillianists, teach the pre-existence of human souls, or that the human soul is a spirit <per se> and that God created all souls in the beginning. According to the traducianists, the human soul is produced from the substance of the parents; according to some from the corporeal semen, according to others directly from the souls of the parents. This latter theory is called generationism, taught by Tertullian. At one time St. Augustine inclined to this theory. In our day Frohschammer held that the soul is created by the parents by a special power given them by God; Rosmini held that the sensitive soul is created by the parents and that this soul by the illumination of being later becomes intellective.
The Catholic doctrine, called creationism, is that human souls are created by God when they are infused in the body. Peter Lombard said: "The Catholic Church teaches that souls are infused in the bodies and are created in the infusing." St. Thomas, in presenting three opinions: generationism, pre-existentianism, and creationism, said: "The first two were condemned by the judgment of the Church and the third was approved." Other Scholastics use similar language.
Sacred Scripture supplies the basis for this teaching: "And the dust return into its earth, from whence it was, and the spirit return to God, who gave it."
The Fathers in general hold the doctrine of creationism. Their teaching is that the soul does not exist prior to the body, that it is not educed by generation, but that it is created by God.
The Church condemned as heretical the teaching that the soul is produced by the parents from the seed, as well as the doctrine that "the human soul of the son is propagated from the soul of his father." Origen's teaching of the pre-existence of the soul was condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople (553): "If anyone shall assert the fabulous pre-existence of souls, let him be anathema." Finally Frohschammer's opinion was condemned by Pope Pius IX on December 11, 1862, and Rosmini's teaching was condemned by Pope Leo XIII.
Taking these declarations together we see that the human soul is not derived from the substance of God, is not generated by the parents, does not evolve from a sensitive soul to an intellective one, but is created by God from nothing, not prior to the formation of the body but when it is infused into the body. The Church has also declared that the human soul is a substance, that it is not one in all individuals, but one in each individual, and that it is not naturally good or evil.
Proof from reason. I The soul is not a part of the divine substance. Some have advanced the theory that God is a certain corporeal light and that a part of that light is the soul bound to the body. This is impossible because God is pure act and purely spiritual, having no diversity in Himself, and therefore there is nothing in Him from which the soul could be produced as from a material cause. God cannot be a material cause to be perfected, nor an informing and participated formal cause; He is only an extrinsic cause, that is, an efficient and final cause.
2. The soul cannot come from the human seed. "It is impossible that the active power that is in matter can extend its activity to produce an immaterial effect. It is obvious that the intellective principle in man is a principle that transcends matter, for it has an operation in which the body does not communicate." In other words, the human soul is intrinsically independent of the organism in its specific operation, and therefore in its being, and also in its own production.
3. The soul of the infant cannot come from the souls of the parents by emanation because the soul is a simple substance, without parts, from which nothing can be taken. Nor can the soul come from the parents by creation because the creative power belongs to God alone.
4. The soul of the infant therefore is directly created by God from nothing, that is, from no presupposed being, at the time it is infused. The parents are not even the instrumental cause of this special creation; they only dispose the matter of the embryo to receive the spiritual soul. The ultimate disposition is produced in the instant when the soul is created and infused, and this ultimate disposition is from God. But the parents are rightly said to generate a human being because from their own substance they produce the body of the infant disposed in such a way (the penultimate disposition) that by virtue of a law of nature the creation and infusion of the soul necessarily follow. The parents are said to generate a human being because in this way by generation they transmit human nature.
Nor can it be admitted that intellective souls were created at the beginning of the world and that the soul is accidentally united to the body as a punishment for some fault. As St. Thomas says: "From this it would follow that man constituted by such a union would be a being <per accidens>, or that the soul is the man, which is false. That the human soul is not the same in nature as the angels is seen from the fact that they have different modes of intellection." The human soul has the lowest kind of intellection, corresponding to the lowest kind of intelligible being, namely, that which is in the shadow of sensible things.
First Article: What Is Meant By The Supernatural
This subject is treated at length in another place. Here we will consider only the essentials.
According to the nominal definition, supernatural denotes that which is above nature. The term "nature" commonly has two meanings: it means either the essence of a thing considered as the root of the specific activity (in this sense we speak of the nature of gold, of silver, of a man), or the complexus of all things in the universe as they are interdependent according to certain laws. Supernatural therefore commonly means that which is above nature taken collectively, that is, what is above the laws of nature. Hence a supernatural effect is one that cannot be produced according to the laws of nature, and a supernatural truth is one that cannot be known according to the natural laws of our intellect.
For the Catholic Church, as we see from her definitions, the supernatural is that which is above every created nature, as exceeding the powers and exigencies of every created nature, although it does not exceed the passive and perfectible capacity of our nature, nor is it incongruous to our nature.
Moreover, according to the Church, supernaturalness is at least twofold: 1. the supernaturalness of miracles, which exceed the efficient powers (or causality) and exigencies of any created nature, but do not exceed the cognitive powers of man's nature; 2. the supernaturalness of mysteries strictly so called, and the supernaturalness of grace and glory, which exceed not only the efficient powers and exigencies of any created nature but the cognitive and appetitive powers of any created intellectual nature as well.
Hence the supernatural is that which exceeds the properties (the powers and exigencies) of nature and is able to perfect nature gratuitously. The relative supernatural is that which exceeds the properties of only some particular created nature, but not of all created nature, for example, that which is natural and specific for an angel is relatively supernatural for man. Such would be the cunning and tricks of the devils, which are imitations of miracles. The absolute supernatural is that which exceeds the properties of all created and creatable nature, namely, that which exceeds the powers and exigencies of every created nature.
How is the absolutely supernatural divided? According to the Church, as we said above, supernaturalness is at least twofold: a) the supernaturalness of the miracle, which exceeds the efficient powers and exigencies of every created nature but does not exceed the cognitive powers of human nature; b) the supernaturalness of mysteries strictly so called and of the life of grace and glory, which exceeds not only the powers and exigencies of every created nature but also the cognitive powers, and consequently exceeds also the appetitive powers and the natural merit of every created intellectual nature. We see this distinction in the miracle of resurrection, in which natural life is supernaturally restored to a corpse, but in which there is no restoration of life that is essentially and intrinsically supernatural.
To explain this distinction the Thomists point out that the absolutely supernatural is that which exceeds the powers and exigencies of every created nature. But this transcendency can be founded only on the intrinsic formal cause of the thing that is called supernatural, and then the thing is substantially (or entitatively or intrinsically) supernatural, or on causes extrinsic to the thing that is said to be supernatural, and then the thing is supernatural with regard to mode. This transcendency cannot be founded on the material cause since the material cause is the subject in which the supernatural forms are received, namely, the soul and its faculties.
With regard to the formal cause, a being is said to be supernatural as to essence or substance, whether it be the uncreated supernatural, namely, God, the Trinity, the person of the Word subsisting in the human nature of Christ, or a created supernatural being by reason of the specifying formal object, such as the light of glory, habitual grace, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and actual graces of this order.
With regard to the efficient cause, a being is said to be supernatural as to the mode of its production, namely, a miracle. But miracles are divided into those that are supernatural as to the substance, for example, the glorification of the body, which can in no way be effected by nature, and those that are supernatural with regard to the subject in which they happen, for example, a resurrection that is not glorious, since nature can produce life but not in the dead, and those that are supernatural as to mode, for example, the sudden cure of a fever, since a fever can be cured by nature or by science but this cannot be done suddenly.
We should try to avoid the confusion arising from the terms "supernatural as to substance" and "miraculous as to substance," since in the first term "substance" means formal and intrinsic, but in the second it means efficient and extrinsic. With regard to the preternatural privileges of the state of innocence, it should be noted that the preservation or immunity from death implies a miracle of the same order as a resurrection that is not glorious, for just as nature cannot restore life to a corpse so it cannot permanently preserve man's body from death.
With regard to the final cause, a being is said to be supernatural as to the mode of its ordering, for example, the act of natural acquired temperance directed to a supernatural end, that is, to life eternal, under the influence of charity. This act of acquired temperance differs essentially from the act of infused temperance, which is supernatural as to substance and essence by reason of the specifying formal object.
This classic division may be presented as follows:
Supernatural knowledge can be either supernatural as to substance, as the act
of infused faith, or supernatural as to mode, and this latter, like miracles,
has three divisions:
(diagram page 619)
the absolutely supernatural
What is the natural order? In general, order is the disposition of things with regard to before and after in relation to some principle. The natural order therefore is the disposition of the various created natures with regard to before and after in relation to God as the author and end of these natures. This natural order comprises, on the part of the efficient cause, creation, conservation, and the divine cooperation necessary for the natural acts of creatures. In the case of man the natural final end is the possession of God, not in the beatific vision, but as known discursively through reason and loved naturally above all things.
What is the supernatural order? It is the fitting disposition of those things that exceed the properties of created nature in relation to God as He is their author and end. We must distinguish between the essentially supernatural order, which is purely supernatural, from that which is only effectively supernatural, as for example, a miracle, and which is often referred to as preternatural.
For man the essentially supernatural order is constituted by the following:
God, therefore, can be considered in two ways:
First corollary. That which is only effectively supernatural (as a miracle) can be produced by God as the author and lord of nature, but not that which is supernatural as to substance or essence.
Second corollary. No opposition, but rather harmony exists between the order of nature and the order of grace because both have their origin in the same immutable font of truth, God the best and greatest being. "Thus," says St. Thomas, "faith presupposes natural knowledge just as grace presupposes nature, and perfection presupposes the perfectible."
Second Article: The Different States Of Human Nature In Relation To Grace
This question is generally considered at the beginning of the treatise on grace. We present here the principal truths relating to this matter.
Theologians commonly distinguish several states of nature.
1. By the state of pure nature is meant nature itself with its intrinsic principles and those that follow or are due nature, but without grace and the preternatural gifts. In this state man would have a natural end, the natural means to attain this end, helps of a natural order sufficient for all and efficacious for some. He would also have the natural law, but he would be subject to ignorance, concupiscence, infirmities, and death.
2. The state of integral nature, besides including the perfections of pure nature, consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul by reason of the immunity from infirmities and death and in the perfect subjection of the sensitive appetite to reason because of the immunity from concupiscence and ignorance. Nature is said to be integral when there is no division between its parts or any defection from its perfection. Integrity is a certain perfection of nature in the natural order which, though it does not elevate the nature to the supernatural order of grace, is still gratuitous and preternatural. In Adam, however, this state of integrity was joined with his elevation to the order of grace.
3. The state of holiness and original justice is that in which grace and the preternatural gifts of integrity are conferred together; it is the state in which Adam existed <de facto.>
4. The state of unredeemed fallen nature is that in which human nature was, by Adam's sin, despoiled of sanctifying grace, and the infused virtues together with the gift of integrity, the state that bears the four wounds of ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite, and weakness in the irascible appetite.
5. The state of redeemed nature is that in which we now find the just man redeemed by Christ, endowed with sanctifying grace, the infused virtues, and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, but without the gift of integrity in the present life. Human nature will not be completely repaired until it is in glory, when it will again receive the gift of integrity in the resurrection from the dead.
Third Article: Whether Our First Parents Were Constituted In The State Of Holiness And Justice, And Whether This State Was Supernatural
State of the question. The supporters of naturalism deny the existence of truly supernatural grace in Adam; among these are the Pelagians, and in modern times the Unitarians, the liberal Protestants, the positivists, and also the Modernists, who speak of a principle of religious immanence because of which even the Christian religion is not above the exigencies of our nature and which, according to some, is merely a development of a germ seated in our nature. Naturalism also denies original sin and therefore, especially in its pantheistic form, it exaggerates the powers of nature to such an extent that nothing is beyond the capacity or powers of human nature. This is a form of absolute optimism.
Pseudo-supernaturalism, on the other hand, has a pessimistic bent and exaggerates the consequences of original sin and also succeeds in confusing the orders of grace and nature. It holds that grace and the gifts conferred in the state of innocence are essentials of human nature (Luther), or were owing to nature (Baius and Jansenius), or that they were complements of human nature (Calvin).
With regard to the terminology used in this question it should be noted that, while the word "natural" means the same as "original," it has been used in an improper sense to designate a truly supernatural gift connected with man's origin. For example, some of the Fathers have called the original holiness given to Adam when he was created natural; similarly, the gift of integrity, which perfects nature in the natural order, has been called natural although it is gratuitous. This improper use of terms should be avoided because of the danger of confusion.
The Catholic doctrine is above these extreme and mutually opposed positions of naturalism and pseudo-supernaturalism. The Church teaches that our first parents were constituted in the state of holiness and justice and that this state was entirely gratuitous and supernatural. The Council of Trent declared, "If anyone does not confess that Adam the first man....lost that holiness and justice in which he was constituted, let him be anathema," and "that he lost (this state) for himself alone and not for us, let him be anathema."
These two propositions of Baius were condemned: "The sublimation and exaltation of human nature to fellowship with the divine nature was owing to the integrity of the first condition and therefore it should be considered natural and not supernatural"; "The integrity of the primary creation was not an undeserved exaltation of human nature but its natural condition."
From these declarations it follows that the first man was created without sin, that he had free will, that he was endowed with the supernatural gifts of integrity and immortality; it follows too that God could have created man without supernatural grace, such a man as is born now. To preserve his primitive state man needed grace, and his merits were not purely human and natural.
This doctrine is revealed in Sacred Scripture. From the Old Testament it is
In the New Testament, however, when men are justified by sanctifying grace they are said to be regenerated, renewed, and restored to the state of the first man, who therefore was created and constituted in the same grace. Lastly, the grace we receive is truly supernatural, for by it "we are made partakers of the divine nature," adopted sons of God, and enabled to see God as He is. Therefore Adam too was created in the same supernatural grace.
This truth is confirmed in tradition. De Journel has collected the important texts in which it is expressly stated that prior to the Fall our first parents were endowed with gifts beyond the requirements of nature, such as original justice, immunity from concupiscence, freedom from the necessity of dying, and brilliant knowledge, and that they lived a most happy life.
This doctrine is proved by theological reason, as St. Thomas shows. According to the Scriptures, "God made man right," that is, just, for in the Scriptures the righteous are called just. This righteousness or justice in which man was created consisted in this: that reason was subjected to God, by reason of the immunity from concupiscence the lower powers were subject to reason, and because of the immunity from pain and death the body was subject to the soul. St. Augustine explains that the first subjection was the cause of the second and the third, and that these were not natural otherwise they would have remained after sin. Hence the first subjection was not natural but gratuitous, because the effect cannot be greater than the cause.
Nor can it be said that this first subjection referred only to the higher part of the gift of integrity, since it is called holiness and justice, in which the just are now regenerated by a truly supernatural grace. This will be made clearer in the following article, when we treat of the gift of integrity and the twofold subjection which this integrity implies and of the threefold harmony of the state of original justice.
Besides this, it seems repugnant that the entire human race should be deprived of the perfection necessary to attain its natural end by the sin of one man. Hence this perfection was not owing to nature but was supernatural, as defined by the Church.
Corollary. As St. Thomas shows, Adam consequently had all the virtues in the state of innocence, that is, all the virtues by which reason is ordered to God and by which the lower powers are disposed according to the rule of reason. For sanctifying grace, in which the first man was created, is the root of all virtues, which flow from it as properties from the essence; and by these infused virtues our first parents were elevated to elicit supernatural acts and, with the help of actual grace, to merit their last end. The Holy Trinity dwelt in their souls and they received the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are derived from charity. As St. Augustine said of the angels, "For them God at the same time established their nature and granted grace."
Fourth Article: The Gift Of Integrity
State of the question. Besides sanctifying grace our first parents received the gift of integrity, by which they were perfected beyond the requirements of the order of nature. This gift of integrity comprises four preternatural gifts, namely, with regard to the body immunity from death and pain and some dominion over animals and the forces of nature, and with regard to the soul immunity from concupiscence and ignorance. We shall consider these four gifts separately with regard both to their essence and to their gratuitousness, beginning with those that are more certain according to revelation, that is, with the immunity from death and pain and then ascending to the higher gifts, for if God made the body of the first man perfect, He certainly also perfected his soul. Gradually we shall see the threefold harmony found in the state of original justice, namely, the threefold subjection of the soul to God by grace, of the lower powers to the soul illumined by faith and to the will elevated by charity, and of the body to the soul. We shall also see, as St. Augustine and St. Thomas have shown, how the two other subordinations depend on the higher harmony between God and the soul, and how, when the first is destroyed by sin, the other two also are lost.
By a privilege our first parents were constituted immune from death. Although they were naturally mortal, they. were immune from the necessity of dying, that is, they would be preserved from death if they remained in grace and after the period of their probation they would have entered alive into heavenly bliss, as would also their posterity.
This doctrine is of faith according to various councils. The Council of Trent declared that the first man had incurred "the anger and indignation of God and consequently that death which God had threatened."
Sacred Scripture explicitly affirms the existence of this gift. We read that the death of the body is the punishment for sin: "For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death"; "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the earth, out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return." We read further: "For God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him. But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world." Finally, the New Testament frequently affirms that death is the penalty for sin. Sacred Scripture emphasizes this privilege more than the other privileges since its loss is more keenly felt by all, and thus this privilege throws light on the other privileges.
Tradition also unanimously affirms that our first parents were immune from the necessity of dying. St. Augustine says of the first man: "He was therefore mortal because of the condition of his animal body, but he was immortal through the beneficence of the Creator."
St. Thomas explains the congruity and gratuity of this gift as follows: As long as the soul remained perfectly subject to God "it was fitting that in the beginning a power should be given the soul by which the body could be preserved better than the nature of corporeal matter." As a material composite the body was by nature mortal, like the bodies of the animals; death would follow naturally either from some extrinsic cause or by age or natural corruption. Hence corporeal immortality was gratuitous and not owing to the nature of the body. Hence St. Thomas says: "His (Adam's) body was not indissoluble by some force of immortality existing in him, but there was in the soul a certain supernatural power, divinely given, by which the soul was able to preserve the body from all corruption as long as the soul remained subject to God."
Perpetual preservation from bodily death was a miracle like the resurrection of the body, by which the natural life of the body is supernaturally restored; nature can of course produce life by generation but it cannot preserve the body, in itself corruptible, from death. This immunity from death, however, was not as perfect as in the glorified body, for Adam still required nourishment, which the glorified body does not need.
The gratuity of this gift is more explicitly affirmed in the condemnation of many of Baius' propositions.
By a privilege our first parents were immune from pain and the miseries of this life. This teaching is generally regarded as theologically certain.
We find it expressed in Sacred Scripture, according to which our first parents enjoyed an abundance of good things in the terrestrial paradise, were active without becoming weary, ruled over animals and inferior beings, and were untouched by all those sorrows that are explained as the penalty of sin. Moreover, immortality presupposes the immunity from the pain and disease that dispose to death.
This teaching is affirmed by tradition.
The congruity of this doctrine is explained by St. Thomas as follows: Man's body, since it is a material composite, is by its nature passible and mortal, like the bodies of brute animals, but as long as the soul remained subject to God "divine providence protected his body so that nothing unforeseen should occur to harm it."
According to St. Thomas it is sufficiently clear from the first chapter of Genesis that the first man had dominion over all animals, not only with regard to right and power but also with regard to the exercise and use of that power, so that he was able to command them and they would obey. As less perfect beings, all animals are naturally subject to man. But now, after sin, the exercise and use of this dominion has been greatly weakened, and man is able to rule over only a few animals, and these obey only with difficulty.
By a special privilege our first parents were immune from inordinate concupiscence. This is theologically certain. The Council of Trent declared that the Apostle often calls concupiscence sin, because "it comes from sin and inclines to sin," but that concupiscence is not truly and properly a sin in those who are reborn.
Sacred Scripture tells us that our first parents did not blush before the Fall, but afterward they were aware of their nakedness because of their disobedience.
The Fathers of the Church, especially St. John Chrysostom, St. Augustine, and St. Cyril of Alexandria, explain these passages from Holy Scripture as follows: Before the Fall our first parents were immune from concupiscence and from the tumult of inordinate passions.
St. Thomas explains the congruity and gratuitousness in these words: "As long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to it, as Augustine says. It is clear however that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural, otherwise this subjection would have remained after man sinned." The gratuitousness of this gift is made more manifest by the fact that "reason is influenced by the political dominion of the irascible and concupiscible parts, because the sensitive appetite has its own nature and is therefore able to resist the command of reason. The sensitive appetite is moved not only by the knowledge that is under the direction of universal reason but also by the imagination and the senses. Hence we have the experience that the irascible and concupiscible parts oppose reason because we feel and imagine something delectable, which reason forbids, or something unpleasant, which reason commands."
Hence it is a privilege if man is preserved from the inordinate movements of sensibility.
By a special privilege our first parents were immune from ignorance. This too is theologically certain.
State of the question. Ignorance is the privation of that knowledge that one should have in view of his age and state in life. From the preceding article it is clear that Adam had infused faith and the necessary supernatural knowledge to attain his supernatural end. We now ask whether he had natural knowledge proportionate to his state for the perfect government of himself and for the easy instruction of his children. In other words, did he have, as one created in adult age and as the head of the human race, adequate natural knowledge, acquired not by experience and study but infused <per accidens>, although such knowledge is <per se> acquirable? That he had such knowledge is commonly admitted.
From its mode of speaking, Sacred Scripture indicates that Adam was created not as an infant but as an adult, and therefore with a formed intellect. We read, "And the Lord God....brought them (all the animals and birds) to Adam to see what he would call them: for whatsoever Adam called any living creature the same is its name. And Adam called all the beasts by their names." At least, therefore, Adam had sufficient knowledge to distinguish the various animals and give them a fitting name. He did not, however, acquire this knowledge gradually by experience; it was therefore infused.
Similarly Adam knew the meanings of the parts of speech, the proper meaning of noun, verb, and adjective, and thus he had rather advanced knowledge not only of grammar but also of philosophy if he was able to make the distinction between the meaning of the verb "to be" and "to have," and so he could understand that God alone is His own being and subsisting being itself, whereas a creature, no matter how perfect, had being but was not its own being. He would also have had a rather advanced knowledge if he understood the meaning, the necessity, and universality of the first principles of reason and being, namely, the principles of contradiction, efficient causality, and finality, by which the human mind naturally ascends to the knowledge of the supreme cause and the ultimate end.
Finally, as the head of the human race, and living in familiar friendship with God, as the biblical narrative tells us, he should have had a certain knowledge of moral and religious matters in order to impart the necessary instruction to his children. Sacred Scripture tells us, "He gave them counsel,....and a heart to devise: and He filled them with the knowledge of understanding. He created in them the science of the spirit, He filled their heart with wisdom, and showed them both good and evil. He set his eye upon their hearts to show them the greatness of His works, that they might praise the name which He hath sanctified: and glory in His wondrous acts."
Tradition affirms the truth that Adam's knowledge was of the highest order.
St. Thomas explains the congruity and gratuitousness of this gift in this way: "Since the first things were established by God not only so that they might exist in themselves but that they might be the principles for other things, they were produced in such a perfect state that they might be the principles for other things. Therefore the first man was established in a perfect state with regard to his body....and with regard to his soul, so that he would be able immediately to instruct and rule..... The first man received such knowledge of supernatural things as was necessary to govern the human race in that perfect state." This knowledge was beyond what was owing to nature. But Adam did not see God or the angels in their essences, nor did he know future contingents or the secrets of hearts.
St. Thomas says further: "The righteousness of that first state was not compatible with any deception in the intellect," and "the seduction (or deception) of the woman, even though it preceded the sin in deed, nevertheless followed the sin of internal elation" which the woman conceived immediately after hearing the words of the serpent. Further, if the innocent Adam was created so perfect with regard to his body as to be preserved from death, it is all the more true that he was created perfect with regard to his intellect.
According to St. Thomas, Adam foreknew the incarnation of God, although he did not know he was to sin; he had a more excellent knowledge of God and the angels than we have; his knowledge was midway between our knowledge and that of the blessed. In his knowledge Adam needed the phantasm.
Conclusion. With regard to the gratuitousness of these four privileges of the state of innocence we can easily understand why the following propositions of Baius were condemned: "The integrity of the first creation was not an undeserved exaltation of human nature but its natural condition"; "God could not have created such a human being in the beginning as is now born." This second proposition was condemned in Baius' sense, that is, a human being without grace and the gift of integrity. By this the Church affirms that God could have created a man without grace and the gift of integrity, that is, with some ignorance, concupiscence, certain weaknesses, and subject to death.
Corollary. A state of nature, without grace, without the gift of integrity, and without sin, is therefore possible. This follows from the condemnation of Baius' propositions. Theological reason supports this conclusion, as Billuart explained at great length. St. Thomas explains, "In the beginning, when God made man, He could also have made another man out of the slime of the earth, leaving him in the condition of his nature, so that he would be passible and mortal, knowing the war of concupiscence against reason; and in this man there would be no derogation of human nature, because these things follow from the principles of his nature." God was not obliged to give man anything more, because grace and the preternatural gifts are not owing to man.
The Augustinians Noris and Berti were akin to Baius when they said that the state of pure nature is possible by God's absolute power but not God's power as ordered by wisdom and goodness. If this were true, the grace given our first parents was due them from the Creator in propriety. This teaching has not been condemned by the Church, but it seems to approach too closely to Baius' doctrine.
We conclude with St. Thomas: "If anyone considers this matter carefully, he can at least probably conclude that if there is a divine providence that adapts suitable perfectibles to each of the perfections, God joined the higher nature of the soul to the lower nature of the body that the soul might rule the body, and, if some obstacle to this rule should arise from the defect of nature, it would be removed by God's special and supernatural beneficence."
Fifth Article: The Condition Of The Offspring In The State Of Innocence
With regard to the body, children born in the state of innocence would enjoy perfect subjection of the body to the soul and they would be equipped for the acts suitable to childhood, because their parents would transmit human nature as they had received it.
With regard to the soul, if men persevered in the state of innocence, would they be born with original justice and sanctifying grace even though neither the soul nor grace are carried over by generation?
St. Thomas replies by quoting these words of St. Anselm: "If man did not sin, those whom he generated would be just at the same time that they received a rational soul."
St. Thomas explains: "I reply by saying that man naturally generates a being similar to himself in species. Hence in the case of whatever accidental things follow upon the nature of the species it is necessary that the children resemble their parents, unless some error take place in the operations of nature, which would not have happened in the state of innocence. In particular accidents however, it is not necessary that the children be like the parents. But original justice, in which the first man was established, was an accident belonging to the nature of the species, not indeed caused by the principles of the species but as a certain gift divinely conferred on the entire nature. This is clear when we recall that opposites belong to the same genus. But original sin, which is the opposite of that original justice, is said to be the sin of the nature, and hence is carried on by the parents to the offspring. Because of this the children were like the parents with regard to original justice."
"In replying to the second objection, in which some say that the children were not born with gratuitous justice (grace), which is the principle of meriting, but only with original justice: since the root of original justice, in whose righteousness man was created, consists in the supernatural subjection of reason to God, which makes man pleasing by grace, it is necessary to say that if the children are born in original justice, they are also born in grace, as we said above about the first man, who was established in grace. But this did not make it a natural grace, because it was not transmitted by virtue of the seed but was conferred on man as soon as he received a rational soul, just as, when the body is disposed, God infuses the rational soul, which similarly is not passed on by the parents."
In the state of innocence men were not confirmed in grace when they were born, because the children at the time of their birth had no more in the way of perfection than their parents. Children born in the state of innocence were not perfect in knowledge, but in time they easily acquired perfect knowledge.
Sixth Article: Whether Sanctifying Grace Was A Gift Of Nature Or A Personal Gift In Adam
Some modern writers hold that in Adam sanctifying grace was not an endowment of nature but purely a personal gift. They admit that the gift, of original justice was an "accident of nature," to be transmitted with nature itself by generation, but they say that sanctifying grace has no intrinsic connection with original justice and was only the efficient cause or a condition <sine qua non> of original justice. From this it would follow that sanctifying grace was not transmitted with the nature and original justice by generation but that God immediately granted this grace to the person when he was generated, because of the disposition of the integrity of human nature. Finally, it would be inferred from this that original sin is not the privation of sanctifying grace but only the privation of integrity of nature.
Indeed, according to these writers, this doctrine is found not only in the works of many Scholastics who before the time of St. Thomas held that Adam received sanctifying grace after his creation and in view of his personal disposition, but these writers say that this is the definitive teaching of St. Thomas himself as found in the Theological Summa.
We shall inquire first whether this thesis is true according to the obvious sense of the Church's definitions, and secondly whether it is the teaching of St. Thomas.
1. The Church's Teaching On The Gift Of Original Justice And On Original Sin
1. The Council of Trent declared: "If anyone shall assert that Adam's sin injured himself alone and not his posterity, and that Adam forfeited for himself alone and not for us also the holiness and justice which he had lost; or that the sin of disobedience transmitted to the whole human race only death and the punishment of the body but not the sin which is the death of the soul, let him be anathema, because he contradicts the Apostle, who said, 'Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.'"
The words "holiness and justice which he had lost" clearly indicate not only integrity of nature but also sanctifying grace, and therefore we may construct the following argument against the aforesaid thesis.
Adam lost for himself and for us "holiness and justice," that is, sanctifying grace and not merely the integrity of nature. But what he lost for himself and for us he had not received purely as a personal gift. Therefore Adam received sanctifying grace not only as a personal gift but also as a hereditary gift of nature.
If it should be objected that Adam lost the integrity of nature directly for us and indirectly lost sanctifying grace, this would no longer be the obvious meaning of the Council, for the obvious meaning is that which is understood apart from any implied distinction. Indeed what the Council primarily proposes as received for us and lost for us is holiness itself, which in the accepted language of the Church most certainly means more than the integrity of nature, and specifically, means sanctifying grace. Hence the doctrine that holds that grace in Adam was a gift of nature is at least more conformable to the declarations of the Council of Trent than the other.
2. A similar argument may be drawn from the definition of original sin given by the Council. The Council of Trent declared that original sin is the "death of the soul." But in the language of the Church the "death of the soul" is essentially the privation of the spiritual life of grace. Therefore original sin is the privation of original justice, since sanctifying grace is intrinsically related to this justice.
In the thesis which we are opposing, original sin cannot be called the death of the soul except dispositively, for in that thesis original sin is only the privation of the integrity of nature and the disposition for the privation of sanctifying grace. But this is not the obvious sense of the Council. According to the fathers of the Council, the holiness which Adam lost for himself and for us was grace, and original sin is transmitted in generation with human nature and without God's grace.
3. This doctrine is confirmed by the Church's teaching about the principal effect of baptism. By baptism original sin is remitted. But baptism directly and immediately confers grace but it does not restore the integrity of nature. Therefore if original sin consisted formally in the privation of the gift of integrity, it would not be forgiven in baptism, because concupiscence remains in those who are reborn in baptism.
If it should be said that the gift of integrity is restored with regard to the subjection of the mind to God through the healing effect of grace, we reply that even in the will of the baptized person the good is still difficult and the inclination to evil remains, and this was not true of man in the state of integral nature. Here again this thesis departs from the obvious sense of the Council of Trent.
4. In the schema of the Vatican Council we read: "Under anathema we proscribe the heretical doctrine of those who have dared to say that in Adam's posterity original sin is not truly and properly a sin unless by actual consent they approve this sin by sinning, or who deny that the privation of sanctifying grace belongs to the nature of original sin, which grace our first parent lost for himself and his posterity by voluntary sin." Later on the Council explained as follows: "It is not said that this privation of grace is the essence itself of original sin,....but that it pertains to the nature or original sin, which is still true as long as it is not denied that this privation is necessarily connected with original sin." This explanation was added in view of the opinion of certain ancient Scholastics, which was not rejected as erroneous. But according to the obvious sense of the Council of Trent the Vatican Council declared, "Adam....by his voluntary sin lost grace not only as it was personal to himself but as it was to be derived from God's institution by all of his posterity. That which is said to pertain to the nature of original sin is not only the negative lack of sanctifying grace but the privation of grace, that is, the lack of holiness, which according to God's ordination was to be in all of Adam's posterity, since in the beginning it elevated the whole human race in its root and in its head to the supernatural order of grace; now however Adam's descendants are deprived of this grace."
This is saying equivalently that in the innocent Adam sanctifying grace was not only a personal gift but a gift to human nature to be transmitted with that nature, and this grace Adam lost for himself and for his posterity, as the Council of Trent has declared.
Otherwise Catholic theologians of almost every school who at least since the time of Baius taught this doctrine would have been in error about the very definition of original sin and original justice. This would be hard to admit, but this is precisely what is affirmed in the defense of the aforesaid thesis.
2. The Doctrine Of St. Thomas On This Matter
St. Thomas was certainly not ignorant of the second canon of the Council of Orange, in which original sin is called the death of the soul, that is, the privation of the spiritual life of grace. He must also have read similar expressions in the works of St. Augustine, when St. Augustine explained that prior to baptism there is in concupiscence the guilt of sin, although concupiscence is not in itself culpable, nor does it remain culpable in the baptized. Nor was St. Thomas unaware of the teaching of St. Anselm, who wrote: "(Adam) lost that grace which he had been able to preserve for those who were to descend from him," "he lost that grace which he had always been able to preserve for his descendants." "Because therefore, having been placed in the high position of such a great grace, he of his own will abandoned the good things which he had received to be preserved for himself and them (his posterity), and thus his children lost what the father might have given them by preserving it and what he abandoned by not preserving it."
Some of the aforesaid writers think that St. Anselm is here speaking of grace in the broadest sense, inasmuch as creation itself is a certain grace. From the context, however, it is clear enough that St. Anselm is speaking of grace in the proper sense and of preternatural gifts.
St. Thomas' definitive doctrine on this question is found not in the Commentary on the <Sentences>, but in the works that he wrote toward the end of his life, especially in the Theological Summa. The opinion St. Thomas gives in the Commentary on the <Sentences> was regarded by himself as less probable, and later he receded from it more and more. No clear text to support it can be found in the Theological Summa; indeed in the work <De malo> many opposing passages can be found.
In the Commentary on the <Sentences> St. Thomas does present the opinion that in the innocent Adam sanctifying grace was only a personal gift and not a gift to human nature, but even then he considered the opposite opinion probable, and later in the Theological Summa he defends only this opposite opinion.
In the Commentary on the <Sentences> St. Thomas asks, Whether in the state of innocence children are born in grace? The holy doctor then presents two opinions: "Some say that the first man was created with only natural gifts and not with gratuitous gifts, and from this it seems that for such justice some preparation by personal acts would be required. Hence according to this view such grace would be a personal property belonging to the soul, and thus it would be in no way transmitted, except as an aptitude. Others, however, say that man was created in grace, and according to this view it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and hence grace would be infused at the same time that human nature was transmitted."
In the Commentary on the <Sentences> St. Thomas defends this second opinion as more probable: "This however is more probable: since man was created with integral natural gifts, which could not have been given without a purpose, turning to God in the first instant of his creation, man obtained grace, and this opinion should be supported."
In the Theological Summa St. Thomas speaks more confidently: "Some say that the first man was not created in grace..... But as others say, he was established in grace, and this seems to be required by that righteousness of man's first state in which God made him, according to the words, 'God made man right.' This righteousness consisted in the fact that reason was subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason, and the body was subject to the soul. The first subjection is the cause of the second and the third. As long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason, as St. Augustine said. It is clear, however, that this subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural..... Hence it is also clear that that first subjection of reason to God was not only according to nature but according to the supernatural gift of grace, for the effect cannot be more powerful than the cause."
As St. Thomas' teaching developed, the corollary of the opinion referred to earlier became more firmly established: "Others say that man was created in grace, and from this it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and hence grace would be infused at the same time as human nature was transmitted."
In the Theological Summa, considering the same question, whether men were born with justice, he says, "Original justice, however, in which the first man was established, was an accident of the nature of the species; not as if it were caused by the principles of the species but only as a gift divinely conferred on the whole nature." "In reply to the second difficulty, in which some say that children were not born with gratuitous justice, which is the principle of meriting, but with original justice: since the root of original justice, in whose righteousness man was created, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which by grace makes man pleasing to God, it is necessary to say that, if children were born in original justice, they were also born with grace, just as we said above that the first man was established with grace."
Nor can it be said, according to St. Thomas' definitive teaching, that sanctifying grace was the extrinsic root of original justice.
In <De malo> St. Thomas says, "Original justice includes grace gratum faciens." In the same work, replying to the objection: "But the divine vision is not owing to one who has original justice, since he is able not to have grace. Therefore the perpetual lack of the divine vision does not correspond to original sin," St. Thomas replied: "In reply to the thirteenth difficulty I say that this reasoning is in accord with those who say that grace gratum faciens is not included in the idea of original justice. This I believe to be false, because, since original justice consists primordially in the subjection of the human mind to God, which subjection cannot be permanent without grace, therefore original justice cannot be without grace."
Hence, according to St. Thomas grace gratum faciens is included in the idea of original justice. But what is included in the idea of a thing is not an extrinsic efficient cause, otherwise God would be included in the idea of the creature. Nor is this grace merely an extrinsic condition <sine qua non>, because the subjection of the mind to God "cannot be permanent without grace." Thus grace and charity, which flows from grace, are more than conditions <sine qua non> of this primordial subjection because they positively influence it. This habitual primordial subjection is the formal effect of infused charity.
Moreover, according to this text, original justice implies the subjection of the mind to God as the author of grace, because from the integrity of nature with proportionate natural helps alone there results the efficacious love of God as the author of nature. If therefore the subjection of the mind to God required for original justice "cannot be permanent without grace," it must be a subjection of the mind to God as the author of grace and not of nature alone.
This conclusion reached in <De malo> is the same as that found in the Theological Summa: "Since the root of original justice, in whose righteousness man was created, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which by grace makes man pleasing to God, as we said above, it is necessary to say that if children were born in original justice, they were also born in grace, just as we said above that man was established in grace." Because, as he had said earlier, "man was created in grace, and according to this view it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and hence grace would be infused at the same time as human nature was transmitted."
Nor can it be said that sanctifying grace in the innocent Adam was only the intrinsic root of original justice, as infused faith is the root of sacred theology, which is acquired by human study. St. Thomas says: "Original justice belonged primordially to the essence of the soul, for it was a divine gift conferred on human nature, which refers rather to the essence than to the potencies of the soul. The potencies seem to belong rather to the person inasmuch as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence the potencies are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are personal sins." If therefore "original justice belonged primordially to the essence of the soul," there was nothing primordially besides the entitative habit of sanctifying grace. For there were not in the essence of the soul two entitative habits, namely, the habit of the integrity of nature and the habit of sanctifying grace, just as there are not two distinct habits of healing habitual grace and elevating habitual grace.
Nor is the aforesaid opinion supported by the fact that St. Thomas frequently said that grace gratum faciens is the root of original justice. A root is not necessarily extrinsic, for example, the root of a tree is a part of the tree. Moreover, as the essence of the soul is the root of the faculties, so sanctifying grace is the root of the infused virtues, and a fortiori sanctifying grace, which is included in original justice, is the root of original justice, inasmuch as "original justice belonged primordially to the essence of the soul," and consisted in the threefold subjection of the mind to God, of the lower powers to reason, and of the body to the soul (by the privilege of immunity from pain and death).
This was Cajetan's understanding of the word "root." Cajetan also remarked: "According to him (St. Thomas), grace gratum faciens belongs to the idea of original justice."
Capreolus pointed out against Durandus: "Grace gratum faciens alone was not original justice, which included something more than grace; baptism restores this grace but not those other things that belong to this kind of justice. Hence baptism does not restore original justice completely but only a part of it."
Ferrariensis wrote: "From this we can see that original justice included grace as its root because, just as the subjection of the body and the lower powers was supernatural through original justice, which was a grace gratis data, so the subjection of reason to God had to be supernatural, through grace gratum faciens, whose function it is to subject the soul supernaturally."
We see, therefore, that there are no texts, at least no clear texts in the Theological Summa, to support the contention that the aforesaid opinion represents the definitive doctrine of St. Thomas. Indeed there are many contrary texts. Perhaps for this reason one of the recent exponents of this theory cited no texts from the Theological Summa, but instead injected his theory of adoption, according to which sanctifying grace can only be personal and not a gift to human nature to be transmitted with that nature.
This theory, however, is without any foundation. When a rich man adopts a poor man he can give him a hereditary title of nobility. Why cannot God do the same for Adam and in him elevate the human race to the order of grace, as the Vatican Council declared, "God in the beginning elevated the whole human race in its head to the supernatural order of grace"? This is what St. Thomas said: "Others say that man was created in grace, and according to this view it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and when human nature is transmitted grace is transmitted at the same time." At that time St. Thomas held this view to be the more probable and in his later works he defended it more and more.
Objection may be made that St. Thomas wrote: "The first sin of the first man not only deprived the sinner of his own personal good, namely, grace and the proper order of the soul, but also of the good that belonged to the common nature." From this and similar passages it seems at first that in the innocent Adam sanctifying grace was only a personal gift. But if we study these texts carefully we see that sanctifying grace was a personal gift as conferred on a person, but not to one single person alone, but to that person as a part and the head of the community which is the human race. This is clear from what St. Thomas says in <De malo> when he asks, whether any sin is contracted by origin: "We must say absolutely that sin is transmitted from the first parents to his posterity by origin. In support of this we must consider that an individual man can be considered in two ways. In the first place a man is a certain single person; in the second place he is part of a group (collegium). Thus the entire multitude of men receiving human nature from the first parent should be considered as one group, or as the one body of one man, and in this multitude each man, even Adam himself, can be considered as one individual person or as a member of this multitude, which by natural origin is derived from one man. To the first man at the time of his creation God gave a certain supernatural gift, original justice, by which the reason was made subject to God, the lower powers were subjected to the reason, and the body was made subject to the soul. This gift, however, was not given to the first man as a single person alone but as the principle of all human nature, which was to be derived from him through origin by his posterity. Having received this gift, the first man, when he sinned voluntarily, lost it under the same aspect as that under which he had received it, namely, for himself and for all his posterity."
From all this it is sufficiently clear that sanctifying grace was, according to St. Thomas and also according to reason, not merely a personal gift to the innocent Adam, but an endowment of nature, since "original justice includes grace gratum faciens."
First Article: The Sin Of Our First Parents
State of the question. We suppose that a sin is a defection from the order to a right end, something contrary to the rule of reason, of nature, and the eternal law. sin, however, is not predicated univocally of mortal and venial sin; mortal sin turns away from the final end; venial sin maintains the order to the final end but turns to means that are not ordered to the end. Besides this, sin can be considered either in act or in habit. In the latter sense it is a disordered habit remaining in the soul until the sin is remitted. Thus after an actual mortal sin a man remains turned away from his final end. Hence habitual mortal sin is a state of sin consisting in the privation of sanctifying grace caused by a gravely culpable turning to creatures.
Adam's sin and its consequences for the human race are denied by the rationalists and liberal Protestants, according to whom the biblical narrative of Adam's Fall is merely allegorical and mythical. The rationalists object because of the disproportion between the eating of the forbidden fruit and the penalty inflicted, as described in the Book of Genesis.
The Catholic doctrine was defined by the Council of Trent: "If anyone does not confess that the first man Adam, when he transgressed the commandment of God in paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted, and by the offense of such transgression incurred the anger and indignation of God, and therefore death, with which God had threatened him, and with death captivity under the power of him who from then on held the empire of death, that is, the devil, and that the whole Adam by the offense of this transgression was changed for the worse in body and soul, let him be anathema."
With regard to Adam's sin the Biblical Commission teaches that the literal historical sense of Genesis cannot be doubted, especially with regard to the facts narrated in those chapters "which refer to the foundations of the Christian religion, such as, among others, the original happiness of our first parents in the state of justice, integrity, and immortality, the commandment given by God to man to test his obedience, the transgression of that divine commandment with the persuasion of the devil under the guise of a serpent, the eviction of our first parents from that primeval state of innocence, and the promise of the future Redeemer."
Sacred Scripture affirms the existence of this grave commandment and its violation: "And He commanded him, saying:....but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death..... And the woman....took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave to her husband who did eat."
From these words it is clear that our first parents sinned gravely, because of the purpose of the commandment, namely, the testing of their obedience, because of the grave punishment, namely, the loss of grace and their privileges, because of the consequences of the sin for the human race, and because of the perfection of this first state in which it was most easy to avoid sin.
The gravity of this sin is asserted in other places in Scripture: "From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die"; "But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world"; "For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just."
The Fathers, in explaining these texts, commonly assert that when our first parents committed this grave sin they lost their pristine justice, that death is the effect of Adam's sin, that by his sin Adam lost the preternatural gifts but retained free will, and that Adam's sin passed on to all men.
Theological proof. St. Thomas proves that the sin of our first parents was the sin of pride, because they inordinately desired to be like God in the knowledge of good and evil and wished to govern themselves by reason alone instead of obeying the divine commandments received by faith. Thus disobedience arises from pride. And although this sin was not more grave than all others according to species, "it took on the greatest gravity because of the perfection of the state of the persons who committed the sin." Thus the Scriptures say frequently that "pride is the beginning of all sin."
St. Thomas points out in the same place that at that time the sensitive appetite was completely subjected to the reason and the will. Therefore this inordination could have its beginning only in the will, by an inordinate desire of one's own excellence. At the same time there was in Eve curiosity and disloyalty and in Adam an inordinate love for his wife. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the eating of the forbidden fruit was entirely secondary, and therefore the objection of the rationalists about the disproportion between the sin and the punishment is without basis.
It is commonly admitted that our first parents obtained salvation by penance, according to the words: "She (wisdom) preserved him, that was first formed by God the father of the world, when he was created alone. And she brought him out of his sin, and gave him power to govern all things." Indeed, the Greek Church celebrates the feast of Adam and Eve on the Sunday before Christmas.
Second Article: The Existence Of Original Sin And Its Effects On Adam's Posterity
State of the question. Those who attempt to explain all the evils of this life as the effects of an evil principle, like the Gnostics and Manichaeans, indirectly deny the existence of original sin. In early times Theodore of Mopsuestia, Rufinus, and the Pelagians directly denied original sin; in the Middle Ages, Abelard and the Albigenses took the same position; in modern times the Socinians, the Unitarians, and the liberal Protestants also denied original sin, teaching that Adam injured only himself and not the entire human race, except inasmuch as he gave a bad example. The rationalists and pantheists deny original sin a fortiori as something absurd. The Modernists say that the doctrine about original sin is merely a theory invented by St. Augustine.
Luther and the early Protestants, on the other hand, exaggerated the consequences of original sin when they said that "free will is merely a name, and when man does what he wishes he sins mortally."
The Catholic doctrine is stated by the Council of Trent: "If anyone shall say that by his transgression Adam injured only himself and not his progeny, and that the holiness and justice which he received from God and which he lost, was lost only for himself and not also for us; or that the guilt of that sin of disobedience transmitted merely death and the punishments of the body to the human race but not the sin, which is the death of the soul, let him be anathema, since he contradicts the Apostle, who said, 'By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.'"
Moreover it has been defined that original sin is transmitted not by imitation but by propagation or generation from the seed of Adam; that it is a true sin, bringing with it the privation of sanctifying grace and the gift of integrity, that it is proper to each individual, although it is not personal, that it is found in infants, in Christians as well as infidels, that it is voluntary, not by the habitual will of the infant, but by reason of its origin from the will of the first man, the head of the human race, that it differs from actual sin by reason of the consent, and by reason of the penalty, which in the case of original sin is only the lack of the vision of God, but in a manner different from that in the other damned souls, since non-baptized infants are indeed condemned (to the penalty of loss) but do not actually hate God, nor do they suffer the punishment of fire. Original sin is remitted in the baptism of regeneration, which must be received at least in desire.
This doctrine may be summed up as follows: All men naturally born of Adam, with the exception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, by their conception contract some sin, which is correctly called original sin or "the sin of nature," and which brings with it the privation of sanctifying grace and the gift of integrity. Prior to the Council of Trent, this doctrine was formulated in the Council of Milevum (416) and the Second Council of Orange.
Sacred Scripture. The testimony is found as early as the beginning of the Old Testament and more explicitly in the New Testament. From the Book of Genesis it is clear that the fall of our first parents injured all their posterity; all men lost the friendship of God, the gifts of immortality and immunity from pain and concupiscence. Besides, the promise of the Redemption included all of Adam's posterity and therefore presupposed that all men had fallen in their first parents. The words, "Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed?" have been understood in Jewish and Christian tradition as referring to the sin contracted in conception. The words, "For behold I was conceived in iniquities: and in sins did my mother conceive me," without the aid of tradition do not prove the existence of original sin, because it may be said that they refer to concupiscence, which, according to the Council of Trent, may be called sin in an improper sense.
The entire Old Testament announces the promised Redeemer and thus supposes the fall of the human race. We read, "From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die," since in some way the sin of our first parents came down to us. Finally, according to the Fathers, circumcision remitted original sin.
This doctrine is more explicitly revealed in the New Testament. Of Christ it is said, "For He shall save His people from their sins," and "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world." Christ said: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." No one is able to be spiritually reborn unless he has been spiritually dead by a common habitual sin, because infants are not capable of actual sin. "We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest," that is, from birth, and therefore not by actual sin but by a sin contracted in conception. This is the sense in which many understand this text.
The doctrine of original sin is more explicitly expressed by St. Paul: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom (or because) all have sinned"; "For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just." As St. Augustine explained against the Pelagians, St. Paul is here affirming that all men have died because all have sinned through Adam or in him, just as all are vivified in Christ. This sin is truly a sin and not merely that concupiscence which remains in the baptized, because it is opposed to justice and grace and leads "unto condemnation." St. Paul is not speaking of actual sin, because this sin is also "in them who have not sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam." Hence it is a sin committed by Adam alone, the head of the human race, a sin which passed on to all his posterity not by imitation but by propagation as the Council of Trent declared. Here we see the parallel between Christ and Adam, who as the head of the human race was the "form of the future."
Objection. We read, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father."
Reply. This refers to the punishment due a father, which should not be inflicted on an innocent son, while original sin is transmitted. to us and is in each of us together with the privation of the preternatural gifts of nature.
Tradition. During the first four centuries, before the rise of Pelagianism, the belief in original sin was expressed by the Church's universal practice of baptizing infants for the remission of sin and to drive out the devil; hence the exorcisms in baptism. De Journel quotes Hermas: "Before a man bore the name of the son of God, he was dead; but when he received the seal, he cast off mortality and resumed life. The seal therefore is water; the dead descend into the water and ascend from it alive." St. Irenaeus, also in the second century, said, "We have indeed offended God in the first Adam by not obeying His precept, but in the second Adam we were reconciled, being made obedient unto death." Similar testimony comes from St. Justin, Theophilus of Antioch; in the third century from St. Cyprian, Origen, and Tertullian; and in the fourth century from St. Basil, Didymus, St. Ambrose, and St. John Chrysostom. Mary is called the new Eve, who cooperated in the mystery of the Redemption as the first Eve cooperated in the fall of the human race.
Lastly, St. Augustine defended the existence of original sin against Pelagianism, basing his arguments on Sacred Scripture and reason. The Pelagian denial of original sin was condemned by the Councils of Carthage and Ephesus and by St. Celestine.
Theological proof. Reason alone, from the miseries of this life, which affect even infants, cannot prove the existence of original sin, which remains a mystery in the proper sense, just as the elevation of the human race to the life of grace is a mystery, for God could have created man in the state of pure nature, in which he would not be immune from pain, death, ignorance, and concupiscence. These miseries, therefore, are only a probable sign of the existence of original sin, as St. Thomas said.
After revelation, however, especially as it is expressed in the Epistle to the Romans, St. Thomas was able to explain by an analogy how the first sin of our first parents is transmitted by origin to their posterity: "All men who are born of Adam can be regarded as one man inasmuch as they are one in nature, which they have received from their first parent, just as in society all the men of one community are considered one body, and the whole community is considered one man..... Thus many men are derived from Adam as the several members of one body. The action of one bodily member, such as the hand, is not voluntary by the will of the hand but by the will of the soul which moves the member..... Thus also the inordination which is in this man generated from Adam is not voluntary by his will but by the will of the first parent who moves by the movement of generation all the men who are derived from him by origin..... Therefore original sin is not the sin of this particular person except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from the first parent. Hence it is called the sin of nature."
In his reply to the first difficulty, St. Thomas says, "The sin is derived by origin from the father to the son."
In the reply to the second difficulty, he says: "Human nature is transmitted by virtue of the seed and together with it the infection of nature." Thus Adam's first sin (not his other sins) is passed on to this posterity, that is, to all men, who all therefore need redemption. The force of this argument, as Cajetan explains, is in the analogical proportion between our will and our members on the one hand, and the will of Adam and other men, who are as it were his members, since they proceed by generation from him as from the head of human nature, which was once elevated and then despoiled of its supernatural gifts.
This is not a proof of the mystery by reason; that is impossible. But from this reasoning we have some insight into the mystery, according to the words of St. Paul to the Romans, "both from an analogy of those things that we know naturally, and from the connection between the mysteries and their relation to man's final end," as the Vatican Council said. Thus light is thrown on the mystery of original sin from its relationship to the mystery of the Redemption, for God did not permit such a great offense except for the greater good of the redemptive Incarnation, that is, in order that grace might superabound.
Some theologians, among them Salmeron, Toletus, Lugo, the school of Wurzburg, teach that Adam's sin was morally committed by his posterity through the moral inclusion of our wills in the will of our first parent. This has not been proved nor does it appear admissible. Original sin is not an act but a sinful state that directly affects the nature and only indirectly the person. Adam accepted for himself and his posterity holiness and justice as a gift to human nature, or as an accident to nature, and he lost it for himself and for us, as the Council of Trent declared.
Nor can it be admitted that a compact existed between God and Adam whereby his sin should be transmitted to his posterity. We have no indication that such a pact was made, nor was Adam's consent necessary that his sin be transmitted to his posterity.
Adam, therefore, was not only the physical head of the human race by whom the life of the body was transmitted, but he was also the head of elevated nature. Under this aspect Adam was the moral head of the human race for, if he had not sinned, he would have communicated human nature together with the gifts of nature when he communicated natural life, as St. Thomas explains: "Children would have been born with grace..... But the grace would not have been transfused by virtue of the seed but it would have been conferred on a man as soon as he had a rational soul, just as the rational soul is infused by God as soon as the body is disposed to receive it." Now, however, after Adam's sin, original sin, which is opposed to that original justice, is called the sin of nature, and hence is transmitted by the parents to their children.
Third Article: The Nature Of Original Sin
State of the question. The early Protestants said that original sin consists in a vehement concupiscence which extinguishes free will. Baius and the Jansenists taught a similar doctrine with some qualifications; according to them free will is so weakened that it is necessarily drawn to earthly pleasures unless it is strengthened by efficacious grace.
Shortly before the Council of Trent, Catharinus and Albert Pighius, in their opposition to the Protestants went to the extreme opposite. They said that original sin was formally the actual sin of Adam extrinsically imputed to his posterity, and that the privation of grace did not belong to the essence of original sin but was simply the penalty for original sin.
The Catholic doctrine was stated by the Council of Trent, which defined as follows: "In baptism all that has the true and proper nature of sin is taken away" and "there remains in those baptized concupiscence....left for the struggle..... The holy Synod declares that this concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes called sin, the Catholic Church has never understood to be truly and properly a sin in those who are reborn, but that it is from sin and inclines to sin. If anyone should believe otherwise, let him be anathema." Hence original sin does not consist in concupiscence, which is called sin in an improper sense.
On the other hand, according to the Council of Trent, original sin implies the privation of sanctifying grace (hence it is remitted by baptism), death is a consequence of original sin, and free will is not destroyed although it is weakened. The Council of Trent did not, however, determine in what the essence of original sin consisted, nor did it condemn the theory of Catharinus and Pighius. Their theory, however, can hardly be reconciled with the Catholic doctrine, for that which is extrinsically imputed cannot be said to be properly in each individual as "transmitted by propagation," nor is it remitted by baptism.
The Schema of the Vatican Council proscribes the heretical doctrine of those "who have dared to say that original sin is not truly and properly a sin in Adam's posterity except in those individuals who have approved this sin by their actual consent; or those who deny that the privation of sanctifying grace, which our first parent by sinning voluntarily lost for himself and his posterity, belongs to the nature of original sin." This council adopted the following canon: "If anyone shall say that original sin is formally concupiscence itself or some physical or substantial disease of human nature, and deny that the privation of sanctifying grace belongs to the nature of original sin, let him be anathema."
Various opinions of the doctors. According to St. Augustine, original sin consists in the disordered habitual concupiscence found in the soul despoiled of grace because of Adam's sin. According to him this concupiscence has two things: the guilt of sin, which is remitted by baptism, and the penalty of sin, which remains in those who are baptized. We see, therefore, a great difference between St. Augustine's opinion and the Protestant error.
According to St. Anselm, original sin consists in the privation of original justice or of the rectitude of the will. "Because of his disobedience Adam was denuded of proper justice and because of this all are children of wrath." "All men were, as it were, causally or materially in the seed of Adam."
Attempting to reconcile St. Augustine's opinion with that of St. Anselm, St. Thomas held that original sin is materially in concupiscence and that it is formally the privation of original justice.
St. Thomas asks the question: Whether original sin is concupiscence? His argument is as follows: "I reply by saying that everything takes its species from its form. It was said above (in the preceding article) that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Hence it follows that what is formal in original sin is taken from the cause of original sin. (This is the major of the argument.) The causes of opposite things, however, are opposite. The cause of original sin therefore must be considered together with the cause of original justice."
"The whole ordination of original justice, however, consists in the fact that the will of man is subject to God. This subjection is found primarily and principally in the will, whose function it is to move the other parts to their end. Hence from the aversion of the will from God there followed the inordination in all the other powers of the soul. Hence the privation of that original justice by which the will is subject to God is the formal element in original sin, and every other inordination in the powers of the soul is the material element in original sin..... Thus original sin is materially in concupiscence, and formally original sin consists in the lack of original justice."
This argument may be stated briefly as follows: "The formal constituent of a thing is the root of the other things that pertain to it But the privation of original justice which implies the subjection of the will to God is the root of the inordination of the lower powers and of the penalties that pertain to original sin. Thus when grace was removed, the rebellion of the flesh followed. Therefore the formal constituent of original sin is the privation of original justice with its subjection of the mind to God, and therefore it is essentially the death of the soul, as the Second Council of Orange declared." This argument is based on causality.
When St. Thomas says that "original sin is materially in concupiscence," he most probably means to use the term materially in an improper sense, as many commentators have noted. Shortly before this he uses the expression "like some kind of material." In his <De malo> he says "quasi-material." Properly speaking, the material is presupposed for the formal; concupiscence, however, is not presupposed prior to the privation of original justice but follows it as an effect; as St. Thomas himself says, concupiscence "is a consequence of original sin," inasmuch as the rebellion of the flesh follows the termination of the will's subjection to God. Later on (q. 85, a. 3) St. Thomas enumerates concupiscence as one of the wounds or consequences of original sin.
From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century many theologians held that the essence of original sin consisted in the privation of sanctifying grace alone, and no more mention was made of concupiscence as the quasi-material element.
More recently Bittremieux and Kors held that the formal element of original sin is the privation of original justice or natural integrity, and that this privation necessarily implies as a consequence the privation of sanctifying grace since, as they say, original justice originates from sanctifying grace. In the preceding chapter we have examined this opinion and we have seen that it is not in accord with St. Thomas' teaching in the Theological Summa.
Hence for many Thomists the formal element of original sin is the privation of sanctifying grace itself, which is the intrinsic root and the intrinsic formal cause of original justice. Such is the teaching of the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, Pegues, Hugon, Billot, and Michel.
This more common teaching is truly in accord with the passages from St. Thomas cited above, such as, "the supernatural subjection of reason to God takes place through grace gratum faciens."
Hence the formal element of original sin is the privation of sanctifying grace, by which we are turned away from God our supernatural end, and in us it is the effect of a voluntary and culpable act committed by Adam our head. Original sin, therefore, is not an act but a sinful state which directly infects our nature and indirectly infects the person. For in Adam grace was a gift to nature, and Adam lost this grace for himself and for us. Now there is transmitted to us a nature deprived of the gift of grace which by the positive ordination of God ought to be in us. All this is derived from the principle explained earlier that Adam was the head of an elevated nature and, if he had not sinned, "men would be born with grace."
Confirmation. 1. This traditional opinion is confirmed by the effect of baptism. As pointed out by Soto, original sin ought to consist in the privation of that which is restored by baptism, for this sin is entirely remitted by baptism. But that which baptism confers is sanctifying grace. Therefore original sin consists formally in the privation of grace.
2. Original sin, called by the councils the "death of the soul," belongs to the genus of habitual sin, not actual sin. But habitual mortal sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace, and it is voluntary by the will of the particular person. Therefore original sin consists in the privation of the same grace, as voluntary by the will of the head of the human race.
Corollaries. It should be remembered that guilt precedes the penalty, and therefore the aforesaid privation of nature is prior to us by the voluntary will of the head of the human race, prior to the deprivation of the preserving help of grace. For God deserts no one except those who desert Him, nor does He take away original justice except for the reason that Adam wished to deprive himself and us of it.
In its formal aspect original sin is the habitual turning away from the ultimate supernatural end as voluntary by the will of the head of the human race. In its formal aspect original sin cannot be more in one than in another because the privation of original justice is equal in all. Concupiscence, however, may be stronger in one than in another because of the constitution of the body.
Original sin is primarily in the essence of the soul, rather than in the powers of the soul, because it is transmitted by generation, and the terminus of generation is man, whose soul is the substantial form. Sanctifying grace, too, is in the essence of the soul as is also the privation of sanctifying grace.
Original sin first infects the will, among the powers of the soul, and then passes to the lower powers, which are infected in special ways, inasmuch as original sin is transmitted by generation.
Fourth Article: The Consequences Of Original Sin
1. By original sin man was despoiled of the gratuitous gifts. This doctrine is of faith. Man lost sanctifying grace and the annexed gifts. This privation of grace as the habitual aversion from God and as voluntary by the will of the head of the human race has the nature of guilt, but when it is inflicted by God it is a penalty.
Man lost also the four preternatural gifts that belong to integrity: immunity from death, from pain, from concupiscence, and from ignorance. He was reduced to the servitude of the devil and sin, from which he cannot be freed except by grace.
2. Man was wounded in his natural endowments, although he preserved his nature and the nature of his faculties. The Second Council of Orange and the Council of Trent say that "in body and soul man was changed for the worse"; and the Council of Trent adds that his "free will was weakened and deformed in its exercise."
St. Thomas and theologians in general enumerate four wounds of the soul: "Inasmuch as reason was deprived of its order to truth we have the wound of ignorance; inasmuch as the will was deprived of the order to good we have the wound of malice; inasmuch as the irascible appetite was deprived of its order to the difficult we have the wound of weakness; inasmuch as concupiscence was deprived of the order to the delectable moderated by reason we have the wound of concupiscence."
Doubt. Whether man is weaker to accomplish moral good of the natural order in the state of unredeemed fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature. In other words, does the wounding of nature consist only in the loss of the gratuitous gifts, or does it include the weakening of the natural powers?
There are three principal opinions.
1. Some theologians hold that the powers of fallen man have been intrinsically reduced by his positive habit of being inclined to changeable goods. Such is the opinion of Henry of Ghent, Gabriel Biel, and certain ancient writers. The Jansenists held an exaggerated form of this opinion.
2. Others hold that man's powers for moral good have in no way been diminished. This view is held by Suarez, Bellarmine, and by the theologians of the Society of Jesus, among them, Mazzella, Palmieri, and Pesch.
3. Others teach that the natural powers of fallen man have been weakened, not intrinsically,—but extrinsically, because of the placing of an obstacle. This is the opinion of Thomists in general: Alvarez, Lemos, John of St. Thomas, Contenson, the Salmanticenses, Goudin, Billuart, Gonet in his Clypeus, in which he amended what he had taught earlier in his Manual, St. Alphonsus, and Tanquerey.
This last opinion seems to be more in accord with the doctrine of St. Thomas; the first opinion sins by excess, and the second by defect. St. Thomas proposes the question, whether sin diminishes the good of nature. He replies by explaining the words of Venerable Bede, "Man was despoiled of the gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural powers." "The good of nature," St. Thomas says, "is threefold. First, the principles of nature, by which are constituted the nature itself and the properties caused by these principles, such as the powers of the soul. Secondly, because man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as we said above, the inclination to virtue is itself a certain good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, which was given to the whole human race in the first man, can be called a good of nature."
"The first good of nature is not lost nor is it diminished by sin. The third good of nature is completely lost by the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin." Following this, St. Thomas treats of the four wounds "inflicted on all human nature by the sin of the first man."
What is the extrinsic impediment which diminishes the powers of the soul? Many Thomists reply as follows: The faculties of the soul and its properties, like the essence of the soul itself, do not admit of reduction or increase, because they are entirely spiritual and therefore incorruptible and unalterable. They cannot therefore suffer intrinsic diminution. But in the state of fallen nature man is born habitually and directly averse to God his supernatural end, and indirectly averse to God his ultimate natural end, since every sin that is directly opposed to the supernatural law is indirectly opposed to the natural law, commanding us to obey God in everything. When Adam sinned, he turned all his posterity away from God the author of nature.
In the state of pure nature this aversion would not have existed because there had been no sin and man would have been born capable of positive conversion to God and of aversion to God. Hence in the state of pure nature man would have been more capable of turning to God than the man who is born with an aversion to God. This aversion is a wounding of the will, which, as St. Thomas says, "is deprived of the order to good." Thus we see how man's free will is "weakened in its powers and inclined (to evil)," in the words of the Council of Trent. From this follows the wound of ignorance, particularly in the practical intellect, because everyone arrives at a practical judgment according to his inclination. If this inclination is not right, the intellect is inclined to error. Similarly the wounds of weakness and concupiscence follow in the sensitive appetite, because the higher faculties are not strong enough to direct the sensitive appetite as they should. Hence fallen man is compared to man in the state of pure nature not only as a stripped man to a naked man but as a wounded man to a healthy man.
We are now better able to solve the objections against original sin. 1. Original sin is not repugnant to divine justice, because it is the privation of grace and the preternatural gifts, which were not owing to our nature. The just God could grant these gratuitous gifts to the human race on the condition that Adam, the head of elevated nature, should not sin and not forfeit these gratuitous gifts for himself and for us.
2. Original sin is not repugnant to God's wisdom or goodness. As St. Thomas explains, "Nothing prohibits human nature from being brought to something higher after sin. God permits sin and evil that He may elicit something better. Hence it is said, 'Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.'" And in the blessing of the paschal candle the Church chants, "O happy fault, that merited so great a Redeemer.!"
God could not permit evil except for some greater good, but we cannot say <a priori> for what good God permitted original sin. After the Incarnation took place, however, it is sufficiently clear that God permitted the abundance of sin that grace might more abound. He permitted this universal evil in the human race so that He might give us something better and more efficacious for salvation through the redemptive Incarnation. Christ, the head of the Church, infinitely excels Adam. The Blessed virgin Mary is incomparably more perfect than Eve, and the Eucharistic sacrifice offered in every church immeasurably exceeds the divine worship offered in the terrestrial paradise.
Once the existence of original sin has been admitted, we can more easily explain the present condition of the human race. This doctrine solves the enigma of the coexistence in man of such great frailty and misery and such strong aspirations for the sublime. "Some signs appear," says St. Thomas, "of original sin in the human race." In Pascal's words, "Without this mystery man is more incomprehensible than the mystery is to man." From experience, therefore, man is able to know his profound need for the Redemption that would elevate him again to the life of grace, which is the seed of eternal life.
1 Adversus Praxeam, chap. 31
2 De Trinitate, Bk. VIII.
3 Contra Arianos
4 Contra Eunomium
5 V orationes theologicae
6 Contra Eunomium
7 De Trinitate
8 De Trinitate
9 De S. Trinitate
10 De Trinitate
11 De fide Trinitatis
12 De Trinitate
13 De Trinitate
14 De unitate Trinitatis
15 Dogmatik, De SS. Trin., in fine
16 De Regnon, Etudes de theologie positive sur la Trinite
17 Origines du dogme de la Trinite (Paris: Beauchesne, 1910, 1927).
18 Martinus Jugie, A. A., De processione Spiritus Sancti
19 cf. the treatises on the Trinity by Billot, Billuart, Delatte, Diekamp, Franzelin, Hugon, Janssens, John of St. Thomas, Jungmann, Lepicier, Pesch, Salmanticenses, Suarez, Tanquerey, Van Noort, and Van der Meersch; the articles, "Processions divines," "Relations et personnes divines," "Pere," "Fils de Dieu," "Filioque," "Esprit Saint," in Dict. theol. cath.
20 cf. Scheeben, De Trinitate, no. 1086
21 Ia, q. 39, a. 1
22 Denz., no. 2026
23 Summa, Ia, q. 32, a. 2 ad 3
24 ibid., q. 19, a. 2
25 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 3
26 Summa, Ia, q. 1, a. 6
27 ibid., IIIa, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2; q. 23, a. 2 ad 3. Garrigou-Lagrange, "La grace est-elle une participation de la Deite telle qu'elle est en soi?" Revue thomiste, July, 1936, pp. 470-86.
28 Rom. 8 29
29 Summa, IIa, q. 99, n. 1, a. 1
30 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 1.
31 Ethica, Bk. X, chap. 7
32 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 5
33 John 15:15
34 Summa, IIa IIae, q. 28, a. 1, 3, 4
35 Col. 2:2.
36 Denz., no. 1021.
37 Rom. 8:29; cf. Summa, IIIa, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2; q. 23, a. 2 ad 3.
38 Summa, Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3
39 I Cor. 2:6-9
40 Denz., Index systematicus, n. V, a, b.
41 Denz., nos. 428, 432
42 ibid., nos. 281, 431, 523, 703
43 ibid., no. 428
44 ibid., no. 691
45 ibid., no. 279
46 Summa, Ia, q. 13, a. 12
47 Page 96
48 Catechismum Conc. Trid. ad parochos, Part I, chap. 4, no. 3; chap. 2, no. 14
49 cf. Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes, I, 127 f., 179 f., 313, 406; II, 22; III, 107
50 Denz., Damnatio Sabellianismi, nos. 48, 60, 85, 231, 271, 705.
51 cf. Mainage, Les principes de la theosophie
53 Denz., no. 54
54 Tixeront, op. cit., II, 67-76
55 For the principal declarations against Arius and the Arians, cf. Denz., nos. 54, 57, 61, 223, 271, 708, 1460
56 Denz., nos. 74, 85, also 58, 62, 85, 223, 271, 705, 1461
57 Hurter, Nomenclator 3, I, 466, no. 2
58 St. Anselm, De fide Trinitatis, PL, CLVIII, 259-84.
59 Summa, Ia, q. 28, a. 2.
60 Denz., no. 389.
61 Summa, Ia, q. 28, a. 2
62 Denz., no. 432
63 ibid., no. 703
64 ibid., no. 1655
65 ibid., nos. 2022 f., 2026, 2054
66 Lib. de persona et de duabus naturis
67 cf. St. Basil, Epist. 38, 1, 3, 4; PG, XXXII, 325 f.
68 cf. Leontius, Contra Nestorium et Eutichet, PG, LXXXVI, 1280 f.
69 Summa, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, 2; IIIa, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3; Quaestiones disp., De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, 4
70 Summa, IIa IIae, q. 2, a. . 2
71 cf. Tanquerey, Herve, and Scheeben
72 cf. P. F. Ceuppens, Theologia biblica (Rome, 1938); Mysterium SS. Trinitatis in A. T., pp. 1-53; Mysterium SS. Trinitatis in N. T., in Synopticis, pp. 54-97; in Actibus Apostolorum, pp. 98-110 apud S. Paulum, pp. 111-54 apud S. Joannem, pp. 154-244
73 Ceuppens, op. cit., p. 57
75 For the authenticity of this text in this controversy, cf. Ceuppens, op. cit., pp. 60 f. cf. Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinite (1927), I, 600. Loisy was forced to admit: "L'emploi de cette formule est atteste dans la Didache, VII, 1, et l'on peut croire qu'elle etait universellement recue dans les Eglises au commencement du IIe siecle" (Les EvangiIes Synoptiques, II, 751).
76 Denz., no. 2198
77 Harnack says 78-83 or even 60-70. cf. Die Apostelgeschichte (1908), p. 221
78 cf. the commentaries of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Maldonatus, Calmes, and Voste, Studia Joannea (Rome, 1930), pp. 29-100; Lebreton, op. cit. (6th ed., 1927).
79 cf. Knabenbauer, Calmes, Sales
80 cf. Ceuppens, op. cit., pp. 95-97, 108-10, 147, 166, 228
81 ibid., p. 97
82 ibid., p. 109
83 ibid., p. 150
84 Lebreton, op. cit., p. 423: "Malgre la proximite du nom neutre to pneuma, S. Jean se sert toujours du pronom masculin ekeinos pour designer le Saint Esprit..... Il perd de vue le terme grammatical qu'il a choisi, et ne voit que la personne qu'il decrit."
85 Summa, IIIa, q. 10, a. 2 ad 1.
86 Denz-, no. 248
87 cf. the testimonies of the Fathers in Petavius, Bk. II, chap. 7; Lebreton, op. cit., pp. 441 f.; Lagrange, Revue biblique (1896), p. 387: "Le mystere de la Trinite n'est pas expressement indique, mais il donne la meilleure explication de cette tournure de ce pluriel, surtout de: nus ex nobis."
88 Roman Breviary, second response, Quinquagesima Sunday
89 cf. Ceuppens, De prophetiis messianicis in A. Test. (Rome, 1935), pp. 135f., 145 f., 163 f., 235 f.; Theologia biblica SS. Trinitatis (1938), pp. 16-42
90 Ceuppens, De prophetiis messianicis, pp. 135 f., 145 f.
91 Mark 12:36; Matt. 22:44; Luke 20:42 f
92 Ceuppens, De prophetiis messianicis, pp. 163 f.
93 St. Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm. II, 6
94 St. Thomas, Commentarium in Psalmum II, 5; Commentarium in Matt. XXII, 43, with reference to psalm 109.
95 Ceuppens, op. cit., pp. 235 f.; see also Condamin, Feldmann, Hoonacker, Lagrange, Desnoyers
96 Lebreton, op. cit., pp. 110 f.; Contra Gentes, IV, 8
97 Lebreton, op. cit., p. 118
98 Summa, IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 3.
99 ibid., a. 8
100 ibid., Ia, q. 34, a. 1. ad 1. cf. such commentators on St. Thomas as Gotti, Billuart, and Hugon. cf. also Dict. de theol. cath., articles "Pere," "Fils de Dieu," "Filioque," "Esprit Saint, Divinite," "Procession divine," "Relations et personnes divines."
101 Adversus Praxeam, chap. 26
102 Contra haereses, I, x, 1
103 Denz., nos. 1 f., 13 f.
104 Eph. 1:1-14
105 Ed. Funk
106 Ed. Duchesne, I, 129
107 Nos. 24, 26.
108 Ad Eph., IX, 1; ad Magnesios, XIII, 1.
109 Contra Noetum, 8
110 Tertullian, Adversus Praxeam, chaps. 2, 13
111 Origen, In Joannem, II, 6; XXXII, 18, PG, XIV, 132, 821.
112 St. Thomas, In Prologum Ev. sec. Joannem, on the first verse
113 Origen, Selecta in psalmos, hom. XIII, 134; In Matt., XIV, 7; In Epistolam ad Hebraeos, PG, XIV, 1308, quoted by Tanquerey, Synopsis major, p. 383.
114 Denz-, nos. 48-51
115 ibid., no. 54
116 St. Athanasius, Adversus Arianos rationes; cf. Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., nos. 675 f., 753, 760 f.
117 St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos, I, 16, 39; II, 69; I Epist. ad Serapion, 17 (Tixeront, Hist. dogm., II, 67-96).
118 Marin Sola, Evolution homogene du dogme catholique, I, no. 202
119 St. Robert Bellarmine, De Verbo Dei, III, 10.
120 I, Ep. ad Serapionem, 17. Denz., nos. 74, 86
121 cf. de Regnon, S.J., Etudes de theologie positive sur la Sainte Trinite (1892-98) Part I, 251, II; P. Jugie, Theologia dogmatica Christianorum orientalium, III, 221 f.; A. d'Ales, De Trinitate; Penido, Role de l'analogie en theol. dogm. (1931), p. 295, Galtier, De Trinitate, p. 164, n. 1
122 St. Athanasius, Adversus Arianos, III, 35 ff.
123 ibid., 35 f.; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, I, 8.
124 Summa, Ia, q. 39, a. 8
125 De Trinitate. Bks. IX, X.
126 Summa, Ia, q. 27, a. 2.
127 ibid., a. 4.
128 Denz., nos. 77 ff., 254, 281, 284, 421, 428.
129 ibid., no. 703; cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, chap. 4, n. 5
130 Summa, Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3
131 cf. below, question 37, article 2.
132 De Regnon, op. cit., II, 235-332, 308 f., 313
133 Summa Ia, q. 5, a. 2
134 Richard, De Trinitate, III, PL, CXCVI, 916 f.
135 St. Gregory the Great, Hom. 17.
136 Richard, loc. cit.
137 Summa, Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2; De veritate, q. 10, a. 4; De potentia, q. 8, a. 3
138 De Regnon, op. cit., II, 287
139 ibid., II, 326
140 Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica, Ia, q. 42, m. 1; De Regnon, op. cit., II, 373 f.
141 Alexander of Hales, op. cit., Ia, q. 42, m. 2
142 De Regnon, op. cit., II, 382
143 Peter Bles, PL, CCVII, 933
144 William of Auxerre, Summa, I, chap. 2
145 St. Bonaventure, I Sent., dist. 10, a. 1, q. I; cf. Rousselot, Pour l'histoire du probleme de l'amour au Moyen-Age, p. 65.
146 Summa, Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2; De veritate, q. 10, a. 4; De pot., q. 8, a. 3
147 St. Bonaventure, op. cit., Ia, dist. 9, a. 1, q. I; De Regnon, op. cit., II, 457
148 De Regnon, op. cit., II, 461, 467 f., 493, 506
149 St. Bonaventure, op. cit., Ia, dist. 9, a. 1, q. I; De Regnon, op. cit., II, 507
150 Summa, Ia, q. 5, a. 4 ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4 ad 1.
151 ibid., IIIa, q. 1, a. 1
152 ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 2.
153 ibid., IIIa, q. 73, a. 5 ad 3.
154 ibid., Ia, q. 27, a. 5 ad 2; Ia, q. 27, a. 1 ad 2.
155 cf. especially q. 27, a. 1. ad 2.
156. De potentia, q. 10, a. 1. and Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. II.
157 Contra Arianos, 1, 21-28
158 De Trinitate, V, 4
160 Cf. a. 2 ad 2
161 Cf. a. 5 ad 2.
162 Cf. q. 42, a. 2, 4, 6
163 D'Ales, De Deo Trino (1934), p. 183.
164 Lagrange, Evangile selon Saint Jean (1927), p. clxxxi; l'Evangile de Jesus Christ, p. 634; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 14, 16, 17; PL, XLII, 1069-79; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. theol., 4, PG, XXXVI, 129; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, 19; PG, LXXV, 314: "St. John calls the Son the Word and he gives Him this more appropriate name because it best expresses His essence"; and In Joannem, I, 5; PG, LXXV, 82: "The Word is called wisdom because it is of the mind and in the mind intimately and without any separation." St. Basil, Homil. in Prol. Joannis, PG, XXXI, 475: "What was in the beginning? He says the Word..... Why the Word? So that it would be clear that He proceeded from the mind." Cf. Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theologicus, no. 161: "The Word is the proper name of the Son," no. 163, "The Son proceeds from the Father by intellectual generation"; see also the references to the Greek and Latin Fathers, especially St. Theophilus of Antioch, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, St. Hippolytus, St. Dionysius of Alexandria, St. Athanasius, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 23, and In Joannem, 14, 7. Cf. also E;. Cayre, Precis de patrologie, 1, 629-31, 658.
165 Heb. 1:3
166 Summa, Ia, q. 12, a. 2.
167 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. II, no. 3
168 Denz., nos. 3, 19 f., 54, 275 f.
169 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. II
170 Cf. below, q. 33, a. 2 ad 4
171 Cf. III Sent. d. 8, 1, 6; dist. 3, q. 2, a. 1, c. 5; Quodl., VIII, a. 5 ad 3
172 Quodl., loc. cit.
173 John of St. Thomas, De Trinitate, XII, a. 6, no. 15
174 Summa, a. 1. ad 2; a. 2
175 Ep. 174
176 John of St. Thomas, loc. cit., no. 45
177 Summa, Ia, q. 42, a. 4 ad 2.
178 De potentia, q. 3, a. 1 ad 17.
179 Q. 41, a. 1.
180 Summa, Ia, q. 41, a. 1 ad 2.
181 M. T. L. Penido, in Ephemerides theol. Lovaniensis (May, 1938), pp. 338 f.
182 Irenaeus Chevalier, O.P., in Divus Thomas (Piacenza, January, 1938), pp. 63-68.
183 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 ad 7.
184 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 19
185 A. D'Ales, De Deo Trino (1934), p. 183
186 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 19
187 Denz., no. 432
188 Ibid., nos. 86, 691.
189 Summa, Ia, q. 40, a. 4; q. 41, a. 3 ad 5.
190 ibid., q. 41, a. 5
191 Ibid., Ia, q. 33, a. 1 ad 2
192 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 1.
193 Denz., no 432
194 Summa, la, q. 13, a. 1-5.
195 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. II
196 Summa Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3
197 Ibid., q. 37, a. 1
198 Ibid., q. 34, 37, 40, 41
199 A. Michel, "Relations et personnes divines" in Dict. theol. cath.
200 Question 29, art. 4.
201 Council of Florence; cf. Denz., no. 703
202 St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 7, a. 9.
203 Categ., chap. 5; Met., V, 15.
204 Categ., chap. 5
205 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 14
206 De potentia, q. 7, a. 9 ad 7
207 Every accident inheres at least aptitudinally in the subject. This aptitude remains in the Eucharistic accidents, which are without any subject. According to the laws of nature, however, an accident is also actually in the subject. Miraculously this is not verified in the Eucharistic accidents.
208 Summa, IIIa, q. 2, a. 7.
209 Denz., nos. 40, 60, 85, 231, 271
210 Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theologicus, no. 178, where a collection of references to the Greek and Latin Fathers will be found
211 Orat. 30, no. 16; Journel, no. 990
212 Journel, Index theologicus, no. 178
213 See especially De Trinitate, V, 6.
214 Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes (8th ed.; 1924), II, 365 f.
215 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, V, vi, 16; ibid., VII, xxiv; De civitate Dei, XI, x, 1. 18 Denz., nos. 278, 280, 281. Similarly in the Council of Reims (1148), Denz., no. 389; the Fourth Lateran Council, Denz., no. 432; the Council of Florence, Denz., no. 703.
216 Denz., no. 703
217 Cf. Harduin, Concil. Collectio, IX, 203
218 Ibid., IX, 339. Cf. St. Anselm, De proc. Spir. Sancti, chap. 2
219 St. Thomas, I Sent., 26, 33; Contra Gentes, IV, 14; De potentia, q. 2, a. 6; q. 8, a. 1
220 Boetius, De Trin., chap. 6. Cf. art. 3 below
221 St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 2, a. 2 and 5
222 Ibid., q. 7, a. 9 ad 7.
223 Denz., no. 390
224 Ibid., no. 391
225 Summa, Ia, q. 13, a. 12; q. 3, a. 3.
226 Denz, no. 431
227 Ibid., no. 523
228 Summa, Ia, q. 3, a. 6.
229 Billot. th. 8
230 St. Thomas, Summa, Ia, q. 28, a. 1; De potentia, q. 7, a. 9, no. 7.
231 Summa, Ia, q. 28, a. 2
232 Summa, IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 ad 3
233 De mysterio Sanctissimae Trinitatis, Bk. IV, chap. 3.
234 Cf. a. 3 ad 2, 3 below
235 Loc. cit.
236 Cf. Cajetan, Ia, q. 39, a. 1, no. 8
237 Ibid., no. 7
238 Summa, Ia, q. 27, a. 2 ad 3; q. 28, a. 2 ad 3
239 Cajetan, op. cit., Ia, q. 39, a. 1
240 Ibid., Ia, q. 39, a. 1, no. 7.
241 Ibid., no. 8.
242 Summa, IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 ad 3; De potentia, q. 8, a. 2 ad 11; q. 9, a. 5 ad 10
243 Summa, IIIa, q. 17, a. 2.
244 Exod. 3:14
245 St. Augustine, De Trin., V, 8
246 Summa, Ia, q. 42, a. 4 ad 2.
247 De potentia, q. 2, a. 5.
248 Summa, Ia, q. 28, a. 2
249 Cf. Bossuet, "Dieu n'est pas plus grand pour avoir cree l'univers."
250 Cajetan on Ia, q. 19, a. 2, no. 3
251 Cajetan, IIIa, q. 1, a. 1, no. 6
252 Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, p. 500
253 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk. VI, chap. 8; Bk. VIII, chap. 1
254 Cf. below, p. 170
255 Denz., no. 703
256 Harduin, Conciliorum Collectio, IX, 203.
257 Ibid., IX, 339. For earlier councils, cf. Eleventh Council of Toledo and Fourth Council of the Lateran, Denz., 39, 231, 281, 523 f
258 St. Anselm, De process. Spiritus Sancti, chap. 2 (Migne, PL, 158, 288).
259 De Trinitate, V, XV
260 Cf. Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theologicus, no. 148. Many references to the texts of the Greek and Latin Fathers quoted in this work will be found here
261 De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 ad 4.
262 The term "opposition" often causes equivocations. Thus the rationalists say that reason and Christian faith are opposed, by which they mean that Christian faith is against reason. Actually faith is above reason, and a mutual relation exists between faith and reason, as the Vatican Council explains. Cf. Denz., nos. 1795, 1800
263 Cajetan, Ia, q. 39, a. 1, no. 7.
264 St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 5 ad 4
265 St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 2, a. 5
266 Cf. Disp. metaph., Dist., X, 3, 14
267 Suarez, De Trinitate, Bk. IV, chap. 3, no. 7
268 Summa, IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 ad 3
269 Suarez, De myst. SS. Trinitatis, Bk. III, chap. 5. For a criticism of Suarez' position, see L. Billot, S.J., Th. VIII, Epilogus, and N. del Prado, O.P., De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae (1911), pp. 529-44.
270 Del Prado, O.P., ibid., p. 540
271 See below, the recapitulation of this question
272 It is true that relation may refer to quality, as for instance in the relation of similarity. But in God quality is reduced to the divine essence, which is numerically the same in the three persons
273 Summa, Ia, q. 30, a. 2 ad 1.
274 Ibid., q. 36, a. 3 ad 2
275 Ibid., q. 42, a. 1. ad 4
276 Del Prado, op. cit., p. 543
277 St Thomas, Posterior Analytics, Bk. II.
278 Aristotle, De categoriis, chap. 2
279 St. Thomas, Post. Analyt., Bk. II, chaps. 12 f.
280 St. Thomas frequently points this out as, for example, in Contra Gentes, Bk. II chap. 52: "In every substance besides God the substance itself, or that which is, is different from the existence. -" Thus personality is that by which something is what it is, namely, a suppositum with a rational nature, whereas existence is that by which a thing exists
281 Scotus, in III Sent., 1, q. 1, nos. 5 f
282 Suarez, Disp. met., disp. 34, sect. 1, 2, 4, etc.; De Incarnatione, disp. XI, sect. 3.
283 Cajetan, on IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, nos. 8 f.; cf. Capreolus, III Sent., V, q. 3, a. 3, no. 2
284 L. Billot, De Verbo Incarnato (5th ed.), q. 2, pp. 75, 84, 137, 140.
285 Summa, IIIa, q. 2, a. 2.
286 Contra Gentes, Bk. 11, chap. 52.
287 Summa, IIIa q. 17, a. 2 ad 1.
288 Cajetan, on IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, no. 8.
289 Objection. One per se does not result from one or more acts. But the suppositum is one per se. Therefore it cannot be constituted by three acts, namely, essence, subsistence, and existence.
Reply. One nature does not result from several acts, this I concede; one suppositum does not result from several acts, this I deny. The suppositum is indeed per se subsisting, but the created suppositum and its existence are not one per se, and they are not one nature, since the existence does not pertain to the nature but is only a contingent predicate. Moreover, in Christ there are one suppositum and two natures.
290 "Person adds something over and above the individuated nature, as an act of the nature, but not as a substantial form or an accident, but in the manner that the being of an actual existence is said to be the act of the essence by which it exists and by which the suppositum is what it is..... The suppositum is the same as the individual having being per se." Capreolus, loc. cit.
291 Summa, Ia, q. 39, a. 3 ad 4.
292 St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4; cf. I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2 ad 4: "The term 'person' is imposed by the personal propriety, which is the form signified and determined by the terminal being."
293 Summa, IIIa, q. 4, a. 2.
294 Ibid., q. 17, a. 2 ad. 1
295 Ibid., ad 3.
296 St. Thomas, Quodl., II, q. 2, a. 4.
297 Cf. Revue thomiste, March 1933, "La personnalite, ce qu'elle est formellement," Garrigou-Lagrange
298 Summa, IIIa, q. 77, a. 2.
299 Ibid., q. 2, a. 2.
300 Ibid., q. 77, a. 2.
301 Ibid., Ia, q. 29, a. 3. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, 2.
302 An ontological personality, therefore, is that by which a thinking subject is a subject; a psychological personality is that by which this subject is conscious of itself; a moral personality is that by which this subject is of its own right (sui juris). The intellectual personality is manifested in its courage, nobility, and universality of judgment; the moral personality appears in the degree that the interrelated virtues which constitute character are able to prevail over the physical temperament. The religious personality manifests itself in the degree that a man is intimately united to God
303 Cf. De Regnon, op. cit., I, 227.
304 Denz., nos. 115, 216
305 [diagram page 159]
The correlation of abstract and concrete terms is as follows:
Concrete Terms / Abstract Terms
person / personality
suppositum / subsistence
subsisting in itself / existence of the substance
inhering / existence of the accident
Cf. Post. Analyt., Bk. I, chap. 4, lect. 10
306 Cf. Fourth Lateran Council.
307 Boethius, De Trin., chap. 6, in sed contra. Cf. Eleventh Council of Toledo (675), Denz., no. 278
308 Denz., no. 280
309 Ibid., no. 703; cf. Petau, De Trinitate, IV
310 Summa, q. 27
311 St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 4
312 Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3
313 Summa, Ia, q. 3, a. 2
314 Denz., no. 428
315 Ibid., no. 703
316 Summa, Ia, q. 40, a. 2
317 Ibid., a. 4
318 St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 21, q. 2
319 Contra Gentes, Bk IV, chap. 14; De potentia, q. 9, a. 5 ad 15.
320 Summa, Ia, q. 29, a. 2 ad 2
321 Summa, Ia, q. 42, a. 4 ad 3
322 Objection In a most simple being no real distinction can be found. But God is most simple being. Therefore in God there is no real distinction.
Reply. I distinguish the major: in a most simple being there is no real distinction between parts, this I concede; between real relations, this I deny; and in the same sense I distinguish the conclusion. As St. Thomas says in his reply to the fourth difficulty: "In created things one is a part of two, two is a part of three, as one man of two men and two men of three, and here the human nature is multiplied. But it is not so with God because the Father is as much as the whole Trinity.," The Deity is not multiplied in the three persons just as the surface is not multiplied in the three angles of the triangle; thus the three angles are not more than one angle alone.
323 A difficult objection arises. Because of the infinite goodness of the Father He communicates Himself infinitely in producing a divine person. But the infinite goodness is also in the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost also produces a divine person, namely, a fourth person, and this fourth person produces another, and so on to infinity.
Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: the infinite goodness in the Holy Ghost is numerically the same as the infinite goodness in the Father, which was adequately communicated after the manner of enunciation and of love, this I concede; that there is in the Holy Ghost another infinite goodness to be communicated as it was in the Father, this I deny. In the same way I distinguish the conclusion. The reader is referred to St. Thomas' reply to the fourth difficulty. This objection is shown to be neither necessary or cogent.
324 Summa, Ia, a. 11, a. 1, ad 1
325 Ibid., and a. 2 ad 4
326 Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 382-415
327 Cf. the Councils of Toledo and the Lateran, Denz., nos. 280, 296, 432
328 Denz., no. 280
329 Ia, q. 39, a. 1, no. 8
330 Cf. the chapter "Damnamus," Denz., no. 432
331 Epist. I, PG, XXXVII, 179
332 Cf. below, q. 36, a. 2 ad. 1
333 Theologia christiana, I, 5
334 Cf. Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile Vatican, I, 130
335 Denz., no. 1915
336 Pesch, Dogmatica, p. 274
337 Denz., nos. 1655, 1915 f.
338 Epist. 79
339 Pesch, op. cit., 1.
340 Or. Catech. III; St. Athanasius, Ep. ad Serapionem, I, no. 18; Rouet de Journel, Enchir. patr., index theol., no. 150.
341 Denz., nos. 1795 ff.
342 Ibid., no. 1816
343 Ibid., nos. 1655, 1915
344 Ibid., no. 1915.
345 Ibid., no. 1916
346 Pesch, op. cit., p. 256.
347 Guenther also, in defining personality as the consciousness of oneself, had to admit two personalities in Christ, for in Christ were the divine consciousness and the human consciousness
348 Summa, Ia, q. 1, a. 6; q. 12, a. 4 and 12
349 Denz., no. 1816
350 Ibid., no. 428
351 Summa Ia, q. 19, a. 3.
352 Cf. Billuart, Cursus theol., De Trinitate, diss. prooem, a. 5.
353 In Boetium De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3.
354 Billuart, loc. cit.
355 Summa, Ia, q. 12, a. 2.
356 Ibid., Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2.
357 Ibid., q. 14, a. 4
358 Denz., no. 1915
359 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 8
360 Cf, Garrigou-Lagrange, "La possibilite de la vision beatifique peut-elle se demonstrer?" Revue Thom., December, 1933, pp. 669-89
361 De veritate, q. 14, a. 1
362 Summa, IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 4, 5
363 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV. chaps. 10, 14.
364 Denz., no. 703
365 Summa, Ia, q. 28, a. 3 ad 1
366 Ibid., q. 27, a. 2; q. 33, a. 1. corp. and ad 3
367 Metaphysica, V, 1.
368 In the Contra Gentes St. Thomas mentions and solves many objections. See chaps. 10 and 14. See also St. Robert Bellarmine, De Christo, I, I, and John of St. Thomas, De Trinitate, disp. 12, a. 12 ad 3 and 4.
369 Summa, Ia, q. 3, a. 3 ad 1; q. 13, a. 1.
370 Ibid., q. 33, a. 4
371 Ibid., q. 40, a. 1 ad. 1.
372 Ibid., q. 33, a. 4.
373 Denz., no. 86 and frequently thereafter, nos. 277, 428, 460, 691, etc. Cf. Summa, Ia, q. 36, a. 4.
374 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. II
375 Summa, Ia, q. 27, a. 1 ad 2.
376 Denz., no. 703
377 De Trinitate, IV, 20, quoted in the sed contra
378 Metaphysica, V, 1.
379 Cf. below, q. 42, a. 3
380 Cf. a. 4 ad 2
381 Denz., nos. 3, 19, 39, 275, 345 ff.
382 lbid., nos. 703 ff.
383 March 9, 1897
384 Denz., no. 70
385 Ibid., no. 214
386 Ibid., no. 255
387 Ibid., no. 283
388 Summa, Ia, q. 85, a. 2 in c., ad 2 and 3.
389 Ibid., q. 55, a. 3
390 Ibid., q. 12, a. 7
391 Ibid., a. 9
392 Ibid., a. 1
393 John 1:18
394 Wisd. 7:26
395 II Cor. 4:4
396 Col. 1:15
397 Heb. 1:3.
398 Col. 1:15.
399 Heb. 1:3
400 Cf. Summa, Ia. q. 35 a. 2 ad 1, 2
401 Bossuet, Elevations sur les mysteres, VII, VIII, IX, X.
402 Matt. 12:28
403 Matt. 28:19; John 14:16 f.; 15:11, 26; 16:7, 8, 13, 14; Luke 12:10; Acts 15:28; 20:28; 13:12; Rom. 8:9-11; 6:19; Eph. 4:30; I Cor. 2:10ff.; 3:16; 6:19f.; II Cor. 13:13.
404 Summa, Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 3; q-28, a. 4.
405 Thus it is more certain that we have infused faith than that we have infused charity, from which would follow the certitude that we are in the state of grace. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 5 ad 2
406 Summa, Ia, q. 28, a. 4.
407 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 4.
408 Cf. Cajetan on Ia, q. 27, a. 3, nos. 5, 6
409 Summa, Ia, q. 82, a. 3.
410 Ibid., Ia, q. 18, a. 3. See also Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 485f
411 Cf. Cajetan on Ia, q. 27, a. 3, nos. 5, 6
412 Denz., nos. 277, 345
413 Ibid., no: 691
414 Ibid., nos. 83, 86 (the Nicene Creed); 277, 345, 428 (Fourth Lateran Council); no. 460 (Second Council of Lyons); no. 703 (Council of Florence); no. 994 (the Tridentine profession of faith); no. 1084 (the profession of faith prescribed for the Greeks by Gregory XIII in 1575).
415 Ibid., no. 3035
416 Ibid., no. 460 (Council of Lyons).
417 Ibid., no. 691 (Council of Florence).
418 Ibid., no. 704 (Council of Florence).
419 John 15:26
420 Matt. 10:20
421 John 14:16
422 Ibid., 14:26
423 Ibid., 15:26
424 Ibid., 16:7.
425 Summa, Ia, q. 43, a. 1
426 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, 20
427 St. Thomas, Commentarium in Joan., 15:26, 16:7.
428 John 16:13 ff.
429 St. Thomas, Commentarium in Joan., XVI, 14
430 Gal. 4:6.
431 St. Thomas, Commentarium in Epist. ad Gal., IV, 6
432 Rom. 8:9
433 John 15:26
434 Acts 16:7
435 St. Augustine, In Joannem, 99, 6, 7.
436 Cf. Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theologicus, no. 168: The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and is also the Spirit of the Son, no. 169: He is called the image of the Son; no. 170: He proceeds from the Father through the Son; no. 171: He proceeds from the Father and the Son. References are also given here to the principal texts of the Greek and Latin Fathers.
Cf. also Tixeront, Hist. de dogma, IV, 518-26; A. d'Ales, S.J., De Deo Trino (1934), VII, VIII, and the index, which treats of Photius; M. Jugie, Theologia dogmatica Christianorum orientalium (1926), I, 154-79
437 Ad Serapion, epist., III, 1.
438 De Incarnatione, 9
439 Oratio, 31, no. 2.
440 Thesaurus, assert. 34, PG, LXXV, 585. Cf. also A. A. Cayre, Precis de patrologie (1930), "Le mode de procession du Saint Esprit," point de vue oriental: I, 202 (Origen), 341 (St. Athanasius), 352 (St. Hilary), 426 (the Cappadocians), 531 (St. Ambrose); point de vue occidental: i, 241 (Novatian), 426 (St. Epiphanius), 658 (St. Augustine), Precisions ulterieurs: II, 304 (St. Maximus), 332 (St. John Damascene), 374 (the addition of the Filioque to the creed), 375 f. (the error of Photius), 397 (St. Anselm), 547 (St. Thomas), 684 (review of the entire controversy).
441 Denz., no. 691
442 PL, LVIII, 219
443 Denz-, no. 428
444 Ibid., no. 691. See also the definitions of the Church against the errors of Photius and the Photians at the beginning of this article
445 St. Thomas treats this question in several places: I Sent. II, 1; Summa, Ia. q. 36, a. 2 ad 3; Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chaps. 24, 25; De potentia, q. 10, a. 4, 5; Opusculum contra errores Graecorum, II, chaps. 27-32; Compendium theol., chap. 49; Contra Graecos, Armenos, chap. 4; In Joannem, chap. 15, lect. 6; chap. 16, lect. 4.
446 Summa, Ia, q. 36, a. 2
447 Ibid., q. 82, a. 3 ad 2; cf. also, Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 3 ad 2.
448 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 6.
449 Ibid., Ia, q. 47, a. 2
450 Denz., no. 703
451 John 16:15
452 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 24
453 John 16:14
454 Denz., no. 86 (note).
455 Ibid., nos. 460, 691
456 De fide orthodoxa, I, chap. II
457 Cf. Gotti; Petavius, De Trinitate, VII, chap. 17
458 A. d'Ales, De Deo Trino, p. 162; index," St. John Damascene."
459 Card. Bessarion, Liber de processione Spiritus Sancti (PG, CLXI, 1389-1472), explains the opinion of St. John Damascene as not being at variance with the Latin tradition. Cf. Dict. de theol. cathol., "Jean Damascene," where a passage of De haeres. (PG, XCV, 780) is quoted: "The Father is like the spring, the Son like the stream, and the Holy Ghost like the sea. The Father is like the root, the Son like the branch, and the Holy Ghost like the flower, and in these three there is the same essence. The Father is like the sun, the Son is the ray, and the Holy Ghost is the color or brightness."
460 Chap. 18
461 De Trinitate, XII
462 St. Augustine, In Joannem, 39
463 Contra Eunomium
464 De processione Spiritus Sancti, chap. 3
465 Denz., nos. 691, 703
466 De Trinitate, 12
467 De Trinitate, V, chap. 14, no. 21.
468 Contra Eunomium, II, 33 f. (PG, XXIX, 649-52).
469 De Spiritu Sancto, I, II, 120 (PL, XVI, 733, 739); cf. D'Ales, De Deo Trino, pp. 158, 163.
470 Denz-, no. 460
471 Ibid., nos. 691, 704
472 Rom. 8:26
473 Summa, Ia IIae, q. III, a. 2
474 Rom. 8:26.
475 In Hom. Pentecostes, 30
476 Roman Breviary, Hymn for Vespers on Pentecost
477 Denz., no. 277
478 Cf. De Regnon, op. cit., IV, 352
479 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 19; Cajetan, on Ia, q. 27, a. 3, nos. 5, 6
480 Cajetan, on Ia, q. 27, a. 3, no. 6.
481 Summa, Ia, q. 82, a. 3
482 Cant. 4:9
483 Phil. 3:12
484 Acts 9:3.
485 Summa, Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 5. Cf. ibid., a. 3; III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1. ad 4
486 Summa, Ia, q. 85, a. 2.
487 De Trinitate, VI, chap. 5.
488 Roman Breviary, Hymn for Vespers on Pentecost
489 Roman Missal, Mass for Pentecost
490 Roman Missal, Preparation for Mass
491 Cf. De Regnon, op. cit., IV, 470
492 II Pet. 1:4
493 In Joannem, II, 6.
494 De Spiritu Sancto, chaps. 11, 22
495 Cf. St. Athanasius, Ad Serapionem, III, 3
496 Rom. 5:5. Cf. De Regnon, op. cit., IV, 485, 555
497 Cf. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio, 34, no. 12
498 John 4:10, 14
499 Ibid., 7:37 ff. Cf. St. Thomas, In Joannem, IV, 10 ff.; VII, 37 ff.
500 Rom. 5:5.
501 Cf. De Regnon, op. cit-, IV, 397
502 Jer, 2:13
503 Encyclical Providentissimus, on the study of Sacred Scripture
504 Isa. 11:2.
506 Ibid., 43:11
507 Joel 2:28 f.
508 Acts 2:15-18
509 Ps 35 10
510 Ibid., 148:18.
511 Ibid., 45:5
512 John 14:16
513 Ibid., 20:22; Acts 2:38; Luke 11:13
514 Cf. infra, q. 43, a. 2
515 cf Ia IIae, q. 69, a. 2; in Mathhaeum, v, 3
516 Isa. 9:6.
517 John 3:16.
518 De Trinitate, IV, chap. 20
519 Cf. Summa Theol., q. 37, a. 1
520 Cf. ibid., q. 43
521 John 7:37 ff.
522 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 22
523 Cf. Summa Theol., q. 43, a. 7
524 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 180, a. 6.
525 Denz., no. 432.
526 De Trinitate, VII, 6
527 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 52, no. 1
528 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 28, a. 2; q. 29, a. 4.
529 Cf. ibid., q. 29, a. 4
530 Ibid., q. 28, a. 2
531 Billuart, De Deo uno, II, 3.
532 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 465 f
533 Cajetan, Commentarium, in q. 39, a. 1
534 Blessed Angela of Folgino, Liber ejus visionum et instructionum, chap. 25
535 Eleventh Council of Toledo (675), Denz., no. 275
536 Denz., no. 432
537 De Regnon, op. cit., IV, 386
538 I Cor. 1:24
539 John 14:23
540 I Cor. 1:24
541 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 32, a. 1.
542 Ibid., q. 93, a. 1, 5, where St. Thomas explains the text of Genesis (1:26), "Let Us make man to Our image and likeness."
543 In Epist. ad Innocentem II, 199
544 Denz., no. 368
545 Loc. cit
546 Rom. 11:36.
547 Denz., no. 1
548 Ibid., no. 54
549 Ibid., no. 86; also in the Tridentine Creed. Denz., no. 994
550 Rom. 11:36
551 Cf Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on the Holy Ghost, Divinum illud munus, May 9, 1897
552 Cf. De Regnon, op. cit., II, 494
553 De Trinitate, V, chap. 4, 5.
554 Ps. 2:7.
555 Acts 13:33; Heb. 1:5; 5:5.
556 John 15:26
557 Ibid., 8:42.
558 Cf. above, q. 27
559 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 45, a. 2 ad 2
560 With regard to the consequent will, the antecedent will is so called inasmuch as it is founded on the first consideration of good taken absolutely and not on the second consideration of the same good to be produced here and now. For example, for the merchant caught in a storm it is a good thing to save his goods taken absolutely, but here and now it may be a good thing to throw his goods overboard. The good does not exist except here and now and hence is not affected by the antecedent will as distinct from the consequent will
561 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 6 ad 1
562 De Synodis, I, 25
563 In the argument sed contra
564 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 3
565 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 4
566 Cf. Cajetan, op. cit
567 Rom. 8:32.
568 John 1:18
569 Cajetan, Commentary on IIIa, q. 4, a. 2
570 This text ought to be quoted in support of Cajetan's doctrine on personality; cf. ibid
571 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 50, a. 4. Cf. the Commentary of John of St. Thomas and of Gonet, De unitate intellectus (ed. Lethielleux, 1875), p. 465.
572 Fourth Lateran Council, chap. "Firmiter."
573 Phil. 2:6
574 Aristotle, in V Metaphysica, chap. 6
575 I John 1:1.
576 Apoc. 22:13
577 Denz., no. 428.
578 Ps. 2:7
579 Cf. above, q. 27, a. 2
580 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 10, a. 4
581 Cf. ibid., q. 62, a. 4.
582 Cf. ibid., q. 33, a. 1. ad 3
583 Cf. above, q. 13, a. 8
584 Denz., no. 432
585 John 14:28
586 Phil. 2:6
587 St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 2, a. 5.
588 John 14:10.
589 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VI, last chapter.
590 Cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "Circumincession" (A. Chollet).
591 John 5:19.
593 Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 598-605.
594 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 6 ad. 1.
595 Ibid., IIa IIae, q. 188, a. 6.
596 Mark 9:36; Luke 9:48.
597 Luke 24:49.
598 John 3:17
599 ibid., 5:37.
600 ibid., 8:16
601 ibid., 14:26
602 ibid., 16:7; cf. John 17
603 Gal. 4:4; Eph. 3:17; I Cor. 2:12; Rom. 8:3; I John 4:9-14; I Pet. 1:12
604 Eleventh Council of Toledo (675), Denz., 675
605 Denz., no. 13
606 ibid., 799
607 ibid., 83
608 The encyclical Divinum illud munus, May 9, 1897
609 Among St. Thomas' commentators, consult especially John of St. Thomas, on Ia, q. 43, and Gonet, Clypeus, tractatus De Trinitate.
610 Cf. in particular John 3:17; 8:16; 14:26; and the Eleventh Council of Toledo, Denz., no. 277
611 John 1:9.
612 ibid., 3:17
613 ibid., 8:42
614 St. Thomas, Commentarium in Joan
615 Gal. 4:4
616 Commentarium, a. 1, no. 12
617 ibid., nos. 3, 4
618 De Trinitate, II, chap. 5
619 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 43, a. 2 ad 3.
620 In the Commentarium in Sent., I, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, St. Thomas is less clear
621 John 8:42
622 ibid., 16:28.
623 De Trinitate, II, chap 5
624 On this point we follow John of St. Thomas, who seems to have penetrated deeply into the teaching of St. Thomas. Cf. P. Gardeil, C. P., La structure de lame et l'experience mystique (1927), II, 6-60; Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., L'amour de Dieu et la croix de Jesus (1929), I, 163-206; P. Galtier, S.J., L'habitation en nous des trois Personnes (1928).
625 Matt. 3:16
626 Ps. 138:7.
627 Acts 17:28.
628 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 8, a. 3
629 Wisd. 1:4.
630 John 14:23.
631 I John 4:16
632 Rom. 5:5
633 I Cor. 3:16
634 ibid., 6:19 f
635 John 4:21-24
636 I Cor. 6:20
637 Cf. Froget, De l'habitation du S. Esprit dans les ames justes (1900, 3rd ed.), p. 97; Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., pp. 290, 871, 2040, 2126.
638 Cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., pp. 1011, 1144, 1216, 1228, 1468, 2107, 2109, 2115, 2193, 2286
639 De Spiritu Sancto, chap. 9, nos. 22 f.; chap. 18, no. 47
640 Dialog. VII
641 De Spiritu Sancto, I, chaps. 5, 6
642 De fide et symbolo, chap. 9.
643 Creed of St. Epiphanius, Denz., 13.
644 Council of Trent, Denz., no. 799. Cf. Eph. 1:13; also above, q. 38
645 May 9, 1897
646 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 8, a. 3
648 This is to say: the three divine persons dwell in the soul of the just man, but the indwelling is appropriated to the Holy Ghost; appropriation is nothing more than predicating something of a person as peculiar to him.
649 Here the traditional doctrine of the seven gifts is given, following St. Augustine and St. Thomas
650 John 14:23
651 Peter Lombard was refuted on this point by St. Thomas; cf. Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 2
652 Denz., no. 799
653 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 8.
654 ibid., IIIa, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2
655 Leo XIII, op. cit.
657 Cf. above, a. 1, 2
658 Commentarium in I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3.
659 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2.
660 ibid., Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 1.
661 St. Thomas, Commentarium in Ep. ad Rom. 8:16
662 Luke 24:32
663 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 43, a. 3, no. 10
664 ibid., IIa IIae, q. 45, a. 2
665 I Cor. 6:17. Cf. Dionysius, De div. nom., chap. 2.
666 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 8, a. 3, 4; q. 45, a. 5.
667 Vasquez, Com. in Iam, q. 43, a. 3
668 Suarez, De Trinitate, XII, chap. 5.
669 John 14:23.
670 Rom. 5:5.
671 I Cor. 3:16
672 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 43, a. 3 ad. 1.
673 ibid., q. 8, a. 3 ad 4
674 John of St. Thomas, Com. in Iam, q. 43, no. 3
675 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 1.
676 In Iam, q. 43, a. 3, dub. V, nos. 96, 99
677 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 43, a. 3.
678 P. Gardeil, op. cit., II, 6-60
679 Rom. 8:16
680 I John 2:27
681 John 14:17
682 Apoc. 2:17
683 I John 4:8.
684 St. Thomas, Com. in I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3
685 St. Thomas, Com. in Ep. ad Rom. 8:16.
686 Luke 24:33.
687 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 5
688 Apoc. 2:17
689 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 45, a. 2
690 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chaps. 21 f.
691 John 14:23
693 Cf. the reply to the fourth objection
694 Denz., no. 86
695 Denz., no. 1783
696 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 508-18
697 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 3.
698 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. II
699 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 27, a. 1 ad 2; q. 42, a. 2, 4, 6.
700 ibid., q. 27, a. 1 ad 2
701 ibid., IIIa, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2.
702 Rom. 8:29; cf. Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 3, a. 8
703 I John 1:3; cf. Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 23, a. 2 ad 3.
704 Matt. 5:48; cf. Commentarium In Joannem, III
705 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2
706 John 17:11, 21
707 Denz, no. 703
708 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 33, a. 3.
709 ibid., IIIa, q. 23, a. 5 ad 2.
710 ibid., a. 2 ad 3.
711 John 17:21
712 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 4
713 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 15
714 Gen. 1:1.
715 Exod. 20:11
716 Isa. 44:24
717 Ps. 145:6.
718 John 1:3
719 Rom. 11:36
720 Acts 17:24
721 Denz., nos. 54, 86. Fourth Lateran Council
722 Denz., nos. 428, 461, 706, 1782, 1801, 1805
723 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 6, 8
724 ibid., a. 6
725 ibid., q. 2, a. 3
726 ibid., q. 3, a. 7
727 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 15, 1, 2; De potentia, chap. 3, a. 5; Summa Theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 5
728 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 75, a. 4; VII Metaphysica, lect. 9, 10
729 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 4.
730 De potentia, a. 3, a. 5
731 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 7
732 Cf. Vatican Council, Denz., no. 1782
733 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 6
734 ibid., q. 15, a. 2
735 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 84
736 Cf. infra, q. 45, a. 1.
737 St. Augustine, Confessiones, Bk. XII, chap. 7
738 Cf. infra, reply to third objection
739 Gen. 1:1.
740 Cf. in II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1. (about 1253).
741 De potentia, q. 3, a. 5 (about 1260).
742 In VIII Physic., lect. 2 (about 1264).
743 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 45, a. 5
744 ibid., q. 15, a. 3 ad 3.
745 Cf. VII and VIII Metaphysica
746 Cf. VII Metaphysica, lect, 9, 10; ad 2um; Summa Theol., Ia, q. 84, a. 1. ad 2.
747 Cf. above, Ia, q. 15
748 ibid., Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 2
749 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 15, a. 2.
750 De div. nom., chap. 5
751 Cf. XII Metaphysica, chap. 7
752 Prov. 16:4.
753 Cf. above, q. 6, a. 1
754 Cf. II Metaphysica, Bk. I, chap. 2
755 Cf. XII Metaphysica, chap. 7
756 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 60, a. 5.
757 Cf. ad 4; Ia, q. 19, a. 2 ad 2
758 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 10, a. 1
759 Prov. 16:4
760 Cf. ad. 1
761 Ps. 105:1
762 Gen. 1:1
763 cf. Wellhausen, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israel (Berlin, 1883), p. 321.
764 Amos 4:13; Jer. 10:12-17; Isa. chaps. 40-56
765 Ps. 32:6, 9; 103; 113:3; 135:5-10
766 Prov. 8:22-32; Eccles. 39:30-39
767 II Mach 7:28
768 Exod. 3:13, 15; 6:2 f.
769 John 1:3
770 Acts 4:24; 14:14.
771 Rom. 11:36
772 I Cor. 8:6
773 Col 1:16f
774 Isa. 41:4; 48:12; Apoc. 1:8
775 Wisd. 11:18
776 Cf. Hermas, Mand., I, I; Ep. ad Diogn., VII, 2; Aristides, Apol. I; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haeres., II, XXX, 9; xxiv, 3; R. de Journel, op. cit., nos. 85, 98, 110, 205, 207
777 Cf. R. de Journel, op. cit., nos. 154, 161, 171, 178, 267
778 Cf. ibid., nos. 85, 179, 199, 275, 323, 328
779 Cf. ibid., Index theol., nos. 188 f
780 Cf. Dict. theol. cath., "Creation," Epoque patristique
781 St. Augustine, De Gen. ad litt., Bk. IX, chap. 15
782 St. Augustine, Confessiones, Bk. XII, chap. 8
783 Cf. Dict. theol. cath., "Creation."
784 Cf. Fourth Lateran Council, Denz., no. 428; Council of Florence, Denz., no. 706; Vatican Council, Denz., nos. 1782 f.
785 Denz., no. 203
786 ibid., nos. 501 ff.
787 ibid., no. 1665
788 ibid., no. 1905
789 ibid., nos. 1803 f
790 ibid., nos. 34, 232, 1665 1804
791 ibid., nos. 374 f.; cf. Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, a. 21 f
792 H. Bergson, L'evolution creatrice (1907), pp. 10, 270, 341 f
793 Cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 44, a. 2
794 Gen. 1:1.
795 Aristotle. II Post. Analyt
796 Denz., no. 480
797 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 17-20.
798 Cousin, Introd. a l'hist. de la phil. (4th ed.), p. 10
799 Cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 90., a. 1: whether the human soul is of the substance of God; Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 84. Cousin's teaching revives the doctrine of emanatism condemned by the Vatican Council, Denz., no. 1783: "If anyone shall say that finite things emanate from the divine substance, or that the divine substance by its manifestation and evolution becomes all things,....let him be anathema." God does not act by a necessity of nature for then He would cause something infinite in being. Nor can He produce anything except by the determination of His will and intellect. And God produces freely, not by generation but by creation
800 Rom. 11:36
801 Cf. first article of the preceding question
802 Cf. a. 5 ad 3
803 Cf. preceding article ad 2
804 Cf. Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 2, a. 7
805 III Phys., chap. 3
807 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 35.
808 Gen. 1:3.
809 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, a. 7.
810 St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 3 ad 3: "This relation is an accident and considered in its being, as it inheres in a subject, it is posterior to the thing created, just as an accident is posterior to the subject in intellect and nature, even though it is not such an accident as is caused by the principle of the subject. But, considered according to its nature, inasmuch as it is engendered by the action of the agent, it is in some sense prior to the subject."
811 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 44, a. 1. ad 1
812 cf. third objection
813 St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 ad 5
814 Gen. 1:2
815 Aristotle, Met. VII, chap. 1
816 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 90, a. 2
817 ibid., Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 9.
818 ibid., Ia, q. 44, a. 1
819 Suarez, Disp. Met., 20, sect. 1.
820 cf. Del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae (1911), pp. 199, 203
821 Peter Lombard, IV Sent., d. 5
822 Heb. 3:4
823 Denz., no. 428
824 cf. Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theol., no. 190; St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Augustine, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. John Damascene.
825 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 44, a. 2
826 Aristotle, Met., V, chap. 2
827 ibid., XII, chap. 7
828 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 104, a. 1
829 cf. Aristotle, Post. Analyt. I, lect. 10: the four ways of predication per se: 1. definition; 2. property; 3. per se subsisting; 4. the proper cause with reference to the proper effect
830 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 104, a. 1
831 St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3; IV, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3
832 Denz., no. 428
833 De civitate Dei, Bk. XIII, chap. 24
834 Molina, Vasquez, and Suarez consider this argument only probable.
835 Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 75, a. 8.
837 ibid., Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 9.
838 De div. nom., Bk. II, chap. 1
839 Wisd. 1:7; John 1:3.
840 Col. 1:16
841 Heb. 1:10
842 Denz., nos. 19, 48, 77, 79, 281, 284, 421, 428, 461, 691, 703
843 ibid., no. 428
844 ibid., no. 254
845 ibid., nos. 281, 284, 429
846 ibid., nos. 703 f
847 ibid., no. 704
848 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 32, a. 1
849 ibid., q. 4, a. 3.
850 Ibid., q. 33, a. 3 ad 1
851 Matt. 11:25.
852 Ps. 2:7.
853 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 39, a. 8.
854 ibid., q. 118, a. 1. ff.
855 ibid., q. 25, a. 5; q. 47, a. 3
856 ibid., q. 22, a. 2
857 ibid., q. 48 f.
858 cf. Revue thomiste (1897), the series of articles by P. Sertillanges: "La prevue de l'existence de Dieu et l'eternite du monde"
859 Denz., no. 428
860 Ibid., no. 1783
861 ibid., nos. 501 ff.
862 Gen. 1:1
863 Gen. 1:1
864 Prov. 8:22 ff.
865 John 17:5, 24
866 Eph. 1:4
867 St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Chrysostom, St. John Damascene, St. Ambrose, St. Hilary
868 Summa Theol., Ia. q. 61, a. 3.
869 Ibid., q. 19, a. 3, 4
870 Ibid., q. 23, a. 5 ad 3
871 Denz., no. 1783
872 ibid., no. 1805
873 Aristotle, I Topicorum, chap. 9.
874 Physica, VIII
876 cf. replies to ninth and tenth difficulties
877 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 6.
878 ibid., a. 8
879 ibid., Ia, q. 45, a. 2
880 Ibid., q. 19, a. 3
881 De civitate Dei, Bk. X, chap. 31
882 De potentia, q. 3, a. 14 ad 8
883 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 38
884 Physica, Bk. III, chap. 8
885 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 7, a. 4
886 Physica, loc. cit.
887 De aeternitate mundi (written 1264).
888 cf. Quodl., 12, q. 2. We have explained this at length in Dieu, son existence et sa nature (7th edition) no. 78 ff.
889 De civitate Dei, Bk. XI, chap. 6.
890 Matt. 6:11
891 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 54, a. 1, 2, 3
892 Aristotle, Metaphysica Bk. II, chap. 1
893 cf. St. Thomas, In I Metaph., lect. 9
894 cf. De potentia, q. 3, a. 16
895 Gen. 1:1-7.
896 Col. 1:6
897 Wisd. 11:21
898 De potentia, q. 3, a. 16
899 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 4
900 De potentia, loc. cit
901 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 25, a. 5
902 ibid., q. 19, a. 3, 4
903 Ibid., q. 15, a. 2
904 De potentia, loc. cit
905 Eccles 33:7 f.
906 Dan. 3:57
907 cf. Phedr., Time., De republica, X
908 Gen. 1:31
909 De civitate Dei, Bk. II, chap. 23
910 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 25, a. 3
911 ibid., q. 60, a. 5 ad 3
912 Aristotle, Metaphysica, Bk. VIII, chap. 3
913 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 21, a. 1
914 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chaps. 28 f.
915 This third article is found in the codex of Monte Cassino as published in the Leonine edition
916 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 45; Bk. III, chap. 97
917 Rom. 13:1.
918 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 105, a. 5. 919 ibid
920 cf. reply to the first difficulty
921 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 6.
922 cf. p, Janet, Les causes finales, p. 497
923 John 1:10
924 Aristotle, Metaphysica, Bk. XII, chap. 10
925 Aristotle, De caelo et mundo. St. Thomas says: "An explanation or reason for a thing may be given in two ways. In the first place an explanation may be given to prove adequately some theory, as when in the natural sciences an adequate reason is given to prove that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. In the second place an explanation may be given which does not adequately prove the theory but which shows that certain effects are congruous to the established theory as when in astronomy the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is established because according to this theory certain phenomena of the heavenly movements can be explained. This theory is not adequate proof because it may be that these phenomena can be explained by some other theory" (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 32, a. 1. ad 2).
926 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 22, a. 1. ad. 2
927 On these questions about the divine governance, cf. the Commentarium of Dominic Bannez
928 Wisd. 14:3
929 cf. reply to the first difficulty
930 Prov. 16:4.
931 Deut. 26:19
932 Denz., no. 1805
933 ibid., no. 1783
934 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 2
935 I Cor. 83
936 cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, Bk. XII, chap. 10
937 cf. Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 1. ad 2
938 Rom. 2:14
939 Prov. 11:14
940 Enchiridion, chap. 11.
941 I Cor. 9:9
942 Ecclus. 15:14
943 Wisd. 8:1.
944 Heb. 4:13
945 Eccles. 9:11
946 ibid., 11:5
947 ibid., 12:13 f
948 Esther 13 9.
949 Heb. 1:3
950 Acts 17:28
951 Rom. 11:36.
952 Col. 1:17
953 Super Gen. ad litt., Bk. VIII, chap. 12
954 St. Thomas offers examples from the ancient physics, according to which light belonged essentially to the sun; we now know that the sun is only one among innumerable similar stars. But there are other examples: heat is not only necessary to produce the expansion of metals but to maintain that expansion. Similarly, the good proposed by the cognitive faculty is not only necessary to excite the desire for it but also to maintain that desire
955 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 8, a. 1.
956 Thus St. Thomas excels his commentators. Not only does he beget us intellectually but he also preserves us in his teaching, while the professor who transmitted to us the teaching of St. Thomas was only the cause of our formation with regard to the becoming, not directly with regard to the being. cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 117, a. 1: "Whether one man can teach another. The teacher is the cause of knowledge in the learner, since he reduces the learner from potency to act..... Every teacher, teaching on the basis of what the pupil knows' leads him to the knowledge of the things he did not know." But great geniuses, like St. Augustine and St. Thomas, not only propose the subject matter in a methodical way, but they also strengthen the intellect of the student since they had such a deep understanding of higher principles and of the things that are virtually contained in these principles. Thus they are in a way like the illuminating angels. cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 106, a. 1.
957 cf. Aristotle, Post. Analyt., Bk. I, chap. 4, lect. 10
958 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 106-14, on the illumination of the angels, etc.
959 Ps. 134:6.
960 "Dieu n'est pas plus grand pour avoir cree l'universe."
961 Eccles. 3:14
962 H. Poincare, La science et l'hypothese, 112-19; cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, son existence et sa nature (7th edition), pp. 774-79
963 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 8
964 Gen. 2:7.
965 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 110, a. 2. The same universality is required in a cause to produce a thing as to change it directly without the mediation of an inferior effect. Thus the imagination, which cannot produce an intellectual judgment, cannot directly change an intellectual judgment directly; it can do so only through the mediation of another phantasm. God alone can produce matter, which can be produced only by creation from nothing since it is the ultimate subject of change. Therefore God alone can directly move matter to a form without any previous accidental dispositions for example, God alone can change water directly into wine, whereas nature does it progressively by the fermentation of the grape
966 cf. ibid., a. 3, 4
967 Phil. 2:13
968 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 8
969 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 4.
970 Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 8.
971 ibid., Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 4
972 Isa. 21:12
973 Acts 17:28
974 I Cor- 12:6
975 cf, reply to the third difficulty
976 cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chap. 67; De potentia, q. 3, a. 7.
977 ibid., ad 7
978 Molina, Concordia (Paris, 1876), p. 152.
979 op. cit., p. 158
980 Disp. met., XXII, sect. 2, no. 51; sect. 3, sect. 12.
981 For false miracles and portents caused by demons, cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 110, 114. cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione, chap. 19, a. 2, on the possibility of miracles.
982 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 15
983 ibid., q. 5, 6
984 cf. Denz., nos. 58, 62, 85, 223, 271, 705, 1461
985 cf. Enneades, I, 8, 3; III, 6, 7, 14f
986 cf. De civitate Dei, Bk. IX, chap. 10; Bk. X, chap. 29; Bk. XIV, chaps. 3, 5 f.
987 cf. De natura boni, PL, XLII, 18
988 cf. Enchiridion, PL, XL, 10-12
989 Ibid., col. II
990 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, a. 3 ad 1.
991 cf St. Thomas, Expositio in Dionysium de divinis nominibus, chap. 4, lect. 13-22
992 ibid., lect. 13
993 ibid., lect. 17
994 ibid., lect. 18
995 ibid., lect. 20
996 Ibid., lect. 21
998 cf. Renouvier, Histoire et solution des probl. metaphysiques, p. 164.
999 cf. Montaigne, Essais, II, 12, "Notre bienetre n'est que la privation d'etre mal." cf. Cicero, De finibus, I, II.
1000 On the other hand some philosophers denied the existence of evil, whether moral or physical. Thus Socrates and Plato, when they reduced virtue to the knowledge of good, reduced moral evil to ignorance or error, as if malice did not properly exist.
The Stoics held that death, sickness, and poverty are indifferent things and not evil. In his determinism, Spinoza denied the existence of both moral good and moral evil. He reduced moral evil to foolishness and held that the fool is not obliged to observe the law of reason, of which he is ignorant.
So also with regard to the distinction between moral good and moral evil, contradictory opinions have been proposed. Some have denied the distinction by confusing the real good with the apparent good. In antiquity as well as in modern times the hedonists and utilitarians have reduced the honorable good to that which is delightful or useful. Luther did the same thing in his theory of extrinsic justification by fiducial faith without good works; for Luther the just man was still unjust. Similar theories were held by the quietists, who denied the necessity of asceticism, by Rousseau, many of the Romanticists, and by the revolutionaries, who idealized violence and destruction.
On the other hand, those who defend what they call order against violence admit an absolute distinction between good and evil, but sometimes order for them represents not only the order based on the nature of things but also that traditional order which suits their purposes, and in this way they shut their eyes to the needs of the poor.
1001 St. Thomas, De malo. q. 1, a. 1
1002 The good and being are convertible, that is, every good is being, and every being is good, at least to the being itself inasmuch as every being strives to conserve its being. Thus good is a property of being just as risibility or the faculty of laughing is a property of man; these things are convertible since every man is risible and every risible being is a man.
1003 cf. De praedicamentis, chap. 10.
1004 cf. Metaphysica, Bk. V, chap. 10.
1005 ibid. See the index under Opposita and Privatio
1006 St. Thomas, De mendacio, Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 110, a. 3 ad 4
1007 cf. De malo, q. 1, a 1 ad 14
1008 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 35. a. 1.
1010 ibid., a. 6
1011 cf. Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Massoulie, and Gonet
1012 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 47, a. 1.
1013 ibid., ad 3.
1014 ibid., q. 25, a. 6
1015 ibid., q. 47, a. 2
1016 St. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 11
1017 Col. 1 24.
1018 Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3
1019 The Imitation of Christ, Bk. II, chap. 12
1020 II Cor. 4:16f
1021 Matt. 5:31
1022 I Cor. 7.
1023 cf. other passages in St. Thomas' works indicated in the Tabula aurea under permissio. cf. below, Ia, q. 49, a. 3 ad 5
1024 Isa. 5 20
1025 St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 14
1026 Denz., no. 2058
1027 Ibid., no. 1701
1028 Isa. 5:20
1029 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1. ad. 2
1030 cf. the beginning of the treatise on grace: The states of nature with regard to grace and original sin
1031 St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 12
1032 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1
1035 ibid., ad 2, 3
1036 ibid., ad 1.
1037 St. Thomas, De malo, q. 2, a. 12
1039 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3
1040 St. Thomas, De malo, loc. cit
1041 ibid., a. 2, a. 9, II f
1042 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2, 3.
1043 Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 586 ff.
1044 John 9:2
1045 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87.
1046 De malo, q. 1, a. 4.
1048 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 4
1049 Tob. 2:12
1050 Ibid., 12:13
1051 John 9:3; cf Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 6, 7, 8; Commentarium in Job, chaps. 4, 6, 8; De malo, q. 5, a. 4
1052 On the trials Of the just, cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Job, chaps. 4, 6, 8; De malo, q. 5, a. 4; Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 7, 8.
1053 St. Thomas, De malo, q. 1, a. 4
1054 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, a. 6 ad 1.
1056 De malo, q. 1, a. 4 ad 12
1057 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 19, a. 1.
1058 Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 9
1059 ibid., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 3 ad 3.
1060 Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 1; q. 80, a. 1. ad 3; cf. Cajetan's commentary on this passage; Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3; q. 57, a. 1
1061 ibid., Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3
1062 ibid., IIa IIae, q. 27, a. 3
1063 cf. Cajetan, commentary on the following question, a. 3, no. 4.
1064 Summa Theol. IIIa, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3
1065 Ibid., IIa IIae, q. 19, a. 1
1066 ibid., the following question, 49, a. 3
1067 cf. Opera Platonis (ed. Didot), I, 342-46. "It is worse to do injustice than to receive it, and to flee punishment than to submit to it," I, 346
1068 St. Thomas on Dionysius, De div. nom., chap. 4, lect. 22
1069 St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, Bk. 1, chap. 9.
1070 cf. De malo, q. 2, a. 3. St. Thomas gives these three reasons why evil cannot have a cause per se.
1. since everything that is desirable has the nature of good, evil cannot be intended per se; that which is not intended per se is an effect per accidens. Thus no one does any evil without intending some good, at least a sensible good.
2. Because every agent acts in a manner similar to itself and thus tends to produce per se a good similar to itself. Thus fire produces fire, heat produces heat, but the conflagration follows per accidens.
3. Because every cause per se has a certain and definite order to its effect, and that which results according to this order is not evil. Thus the weight of bodies is good for the cohesion of the universe, although per accidens it may happen that someone falls from a roof.
1071 Aristotle, Metaphysica, Bk. V, chap. 2, lect. 3.
1072 St. Thomas, De malo, q. 1, a. 3 ad 14
1073 ibid., q. 1, a. 3 ad 15
1074 "It happens that the evil which is a defective good is the cause of evil; but this is so because the first cause of evil is not evil but good. Therefore there are two ways in which evil is caused by the good. The first way is when the good is the cause of evil inasmuch as it is defective; the second way is inasmuch as the good is a cause per accidens, or when it produces an opposite form" (De malo, q. 1, a. 3).
1075 Ibid., q. 1, a. 3
1077 ibid., ad 10, 14 f.
1078 Eccles. 1:15.
1079 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, a. 49, a. 3 ad 5; q. 63, a. 9 ad I; Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 2 ad 3; de malo, q. 1, a. 5 ad 16; and the references under malum, no. 37 in the Tabula aurea.
1080 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 23, a. 7 ad 3
1081 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52
1082 Bossuet, Sermon pour la profession de Mad. de la Valliere.
1083 Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3
1084 Rom. 5:20
1085 Ibid., 5:17
1086 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 1
1087 II Cor. 4:7, 11
1088 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 68
1089 ibid., Ia, q. 50, a. 3
1090 ibid., q. 63, a. 9
1091 Dan. 7:10
1092 Isa. 45:6 f.
1093 St. Augustine, Liber octoginta trium quaest., q. 21
1094 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 1
1095 Deut. 32:4
1096 Rom. 9:14
1097 Jas. 1:13
1098 I John 3:8
1099 Wisd. 9 25
1100 ibid., 14:9
1101 Osee 13 9
1102 Denz., no. 816
1103 ibid., nos. 316, 318
1104 ibid., no. 322
1105 ibid., no. 804
1106 St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, chap. 43
1107 Denz., no. 1092. 1108 cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Matt., V, 31
1109 St. Thomas, De malo, q. 1, a. 3.
1110 cf. replies to second and third difficulties in this article
1111 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 1
1112 Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 9; cf. De malo, q. 1, a. 5
1113 Summa Theol., Ia. q. 19, a. 9.
1114 ibid., Ia, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3
1115 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 2
1116 John 13:27
1117 cf. third objection of this article
1118 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2
1119 St. Thomas, Sent., I, d. 40, q. 4, a. 2, no. 3
1120 "It must be said that the effect does not follow unless all the causes concur; by the defect of one a negation of the effect follows. I say therefore that the cause of grace as active is God, and as receiving is the soul itself, after the manner of subject and matter..... It is not necessary that every defect occur on the part of the agent; it may occur on the part of the recipient, and such is the ease in this proposition" (Liber Sententiarum, I, d. 40, q. 4, a. 2 ad 3).
1121 Summa Theol. Ia, q. 47, a. 3, 4
1122 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 8 ad 1
1123 Denz., no. 804
1124 St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 26, no. 29
1125 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 21, a. 4
1127 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 1.
1128 Ibid., Ia, q. 21, a. 4.
1129 St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 43, no. 50
1130 Denz., no. 804
1131 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 20, a. 3
1132 Phil. 2:13
1133 I Cor. 4:7
1134 Denz., no. 318
1135 "Il faut captiver nos intelligences devant l'obscurite divine du mystere de la grace, et admettre deux graces, dont l'une (la suffisante) laisse notre volente sans excuse devant Dieu, et dont l'autre (l'efficace) ne lui permet pas de se glorifier en elle-meme." Bossuet, OEuvres completes (Paris, 1845), I, 643
1136 I Cor. 1:31
1137 Eph. 2:8 ff.
1138 St. John of the Cross, The Dark Night, II, chap. 17 f
1139 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 9
1140 Ibid., ad 1
1141 Ibid., q. 5, a. 3; q. 48, a. 3.
1142 Ibid., q. 48, a. 3
1143 Aristotle, Ethica, Bk. IV, chap. 5
1144 cf. St. Thomas, Supplementum, q. 82, 86, 91.
1145 cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Joan., XV, 2; in Matt., X, 38; in Job; see also Tabula aurea, under tribulationes. St. Gregory, in Job; St. John Chrysostom, Homilia 1
1146 John 15:1 f
1147 Ibid., 1:8
1148 Apoc. 22:11
1149 Col. 1:6
1150 Ps. 83:8
1151 Rom. 8:17f
1152 Luke 24:26
1153 Acts 14:21
1154 II Tim. 2:11 f.
1155 Luke 9:23
1156 Matt. 10:38.
1157 Gal. 4:14
1158 Ibid., 5:24
1159 II Cor. 11:29
1160 Gal. 2:19 f.
1161 Ibid., 6:14.
1162 I Cor. 2:2
1163 Ibid., 1:18.
1164 cf. II Thess.; Heb. 10
1165 cf. St. Thomas' Commentarium in Job, chaps. I, 4, 7, 21
1166 cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Ps. 36
1167 cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Job, chap. 21
1168 Rom. 8:28
1169 II Cor. 12:7
1170 Ibid., 12:6
1171 Ibid., 12:9
1172 Tob 2:3
1173 I Cor. 15:19
1174 Heb. chap. 11.
1175 Jas. 5:17
1176 Heb. 12:6
1177 I Cor. 4:12 f.; cf. St. John Chrysostom, Consolationes ad Stagir., III
1178 cf. Gen. 2:1; 3:24; 28:12; 32:1; Exod. 22:34; 33:2; Deut. 32:18; Ps. 77:49; 105:37; Job 1:6; 2:7; Zach. 3:1; Eccles. 5:5; Tob. 3:8; 6:8; 8:3; 12:15; Isa. 6:2; 37:36; III Kings 19:5; Dan. 3:49; 7:10; 9:21; 10:1; II Mach. 10:29.
1179 Dan. 10:13
1180 Ps, 23 8; Tob
1181 Deut. 32:17; Ps. 105:37; Tob. 3:8; 6:14.
1182 Luke 1:11, 26; 2:13; Matt. 1:20; 2:13, 19; 4:11; 18:10; 24:31; 26:53; 28:1-7; 13:41, 49; Luke 20:36; Acts 5:19; 8:26; 12:7-15, 23; 27:23
1183 Col. 1:16
1184 II Cor. 4:4; 11:14; Heb. 1:4-7, 14
1185 Denz., no. 428
1186 Ibid., no. 533
1187 Ibid., no. 237. The principal definition by the Fourth Lateran Council, cf. Denz., no. 428
1188 Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theol., nos. 198-210
1189 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 60, a. 5
1190 ibid., q. 63, a. 1 ad 3; De malo, q. 16, a. 3
1191 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 4.
1192 Ibid., Ia, q. 62, a. 4, 5; q. 63, a. 5, 6; q. 64, a. 2
1193 cf Fourth Lateran Council, Denz., no. 428
1194 Dan. 7:10; Apoc. 5
1195 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 50, a. 3
1196 Tob. 12:19; Luke 24:37 ff.
1197 Denz., nos. 428, 1783 (Vatican Council).
1198 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 51, a. 1
1199 Tob 12:19; cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 51, a. 3
1200 Col. 1:16
1201 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 7, a. 1, 2; q. 11, a. 3, 4.
1202 Ibid., q. 75, a. 7
1203 Ibid., q. 76, a. 2 ad 1
1204 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 76, a. 5
1205 De cael. hier., chap. 12
1206 It should be noted that the divine ideas are neither infused nor acquired species; they are the divine essence as imitable by creatures and as the terminus of the relation of imitability of creatures to the divine essence. cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 15, a. 2
1207 Ibid., q. 20, a. 3
1208 cf. Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theologicus, no. 202
1209 Isa. 41:23
1210 Denz., no. 1790
1211 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 14, a. 13
1212 III Kings 8:39; Jer. 17:10; cf. Journel, loc. cit
1213 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 60, a. 2
1214 Ibid., a. 3.
1215 Garrigou-Lagrange, L'Amour de Dieu et la croix de Jesus, "Le probleme de l'amour pur," I, 61-150
1216 If it should be said that it is not the hand that exposes itself to defend the body but the body that exposes the hand, we may reply that this is indeed true, but that it is nevertheless according to the natural tendency of the hand, which loves the whole of which it is a part more than itself. As St. Thomas says: "The end of the agent and the patient is one and the same. although the mode is different. What the agent tends to imprint and what the patient tends to receive is one and the same" (Summa Theol. Ia, q. 44, a. 4
1217 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 3.
1218 Among those who deny is Ferrariensis
1219 Dan. 3:57-90
1220 Summa theol, Ia, q. 62, a. 5
1221 Ibid., q. 63, a. 6
1222 Ibid., a. 6 ad 1.
1223 Ibid., ad 2
1224 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 63, a. 3.
1225 Ibid., a. 5, 6
1226 Ibid., IIa IIae, q. 89, a. 4.
1227 Ibid., Ia, q. 64, a. 2; De veritate, q. 24, a. 10, 11.
1228 Matt. 25:41
1229 Ps. 73:23
1230 cf. Tabula aurea, under "remorsus."
1231 This comprehension of the devil is said to be quasi-speculative even though it proceeds from synteresis and deals with guilt as individual, because this comprehension does not lead to a practical judgment in the proper sense since it is clouded over and suppressed by another contrary practical judgment which is in conformity to the devil's all-pervading pride
1232 John 9:4.
1233 cf. below in the treatise on man, the chapter on the separated soul.
1234 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 109, a. 3
1235 cf. Isa. 6; Ezech. 1; Col. I; Eph. 1.
1236 Ps. 90:11
1237 Matt. 18:10. For the testimony of the Fathers, cf. Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist., Index theol., nos. 209 f.
1238 cf. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, III, 1.
1239 Eph. 6:12.
1240 III Kings, chap. 22
1241 I Thess. 3:5
1242 For diabolical possession and obsession, cf. Rituale Romanum.
1243 Denz., no. 2182
1244 Denz., nos. 2121-28
1245 Ibid., 2127
1246 Ibid., nos. 2121 f.
1247 Ibid., no. 2127
1248 Ibid., no. 2122
1249 The Scriptures often praise God's work of creation: Gen. 14:19; Isa. 42:5; 45:18; Prov. 3:19; 8:22; Wisd. 9:9; Ps. 32:9; 111:5; II Mach. 7:28; and Adam's formation and fall are mentioned in Wisd. 10:1 f.
1250 Denz., no. 2127
1251 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 67, a. 4; q. 70, a. 1 at 3
1252 Gen. 1:6ff
1253 Denz., no. 2125
1254 cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 70, a. 1. ad 3; Sent. II, dist. XII, q. 1 ad 2; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litt., II, q. 22; Leo XIII, Encyclical Providentissimus
1255 Denz., no. 2123
1256 Ibid., no. 2126.
1257 cf. Rouet de Journel, Ench. patrist. Index theol., nos. 211-15: St. Augustine's doctrine on the creation of the world. According to St. Augustine God created all things at the same time; He implanted seminal reasons in creatures; the days in Genesis are different from natural days; caution is to be exercised in interpreting the first chapters of Genesis
1258 Denz., no. 2128
1259 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 68, a. 1.
1260 Ibid., q. 66, a. 1. With many of the Fathers we can admit a prior amorphous state of matters as long as we understand that this is not a state of absolute amorphousness
1261 Ibid., q. 73, a. 1 ad 3; q. 115, a. 2. "Whether there are any seminal reasons in corporeal matter."
1262 Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione I, 233-76.
1263 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 70, a. 3 ad 3.
1264 Ibid., q. 73, a. 1 ad 3; q. 115, a. 2
1265 cf. Dict. apol., art. "Transformism."
1266 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 118, a. 1, 2.
1267 Averroes, De anima, III, 165.
1268 Gen. 2:7; 15: 15; 25: 8; 35: 28
1269 Ezech. 37:10
1270 Wisd. 9:15; 3:1-4; 5:16; Prov. 12:28; 14:32; Eccles. 12:7; Ecclus. 3:19ff
1271 II Mach. 7:23; 6:26; 12:43-46
1272 Matt. 10:28.
1273 I Cor. 2:11
1274 Rouet de Journel, op. cit., Index theol., nos. 216 f
1275 Denz., no. 428; cf. ibid., nos. 255, 1783.
1276 Ibid., nos. 2 ff., 16, 40, 86, 738
1277 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 75, a. 5; cf. ibid., IIa IIae, q. 8, a. 1
1278 Post. Analyt., II, final chap., lect. 20.
1279 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 75, a. 2
1280 The argument was presented in this way by St. Thomas against the Averroists who always based their arguments directly on the text of Aristotle
1281 Pascal, speaking of the three orders (of bodies, spirits, and charity), in a celebrated passage of his Les Pensees, says: "Tous les corps, le firmament, les etoiles, la terre et ses royaumes, ne valent pas le moindre des esprits; car il connait tout cela, et soi et les corps, rien."
1282 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 49, no. 7
1283 St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 9
1284 cf. Plato, Convivium; Summa Theol., Ia, q. 60, a. 5; IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 3
1285 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2
1286 cf. ibid.
1287 cf. ibid., Ia, q. 75, a. 6
1288 cf. ibid
1289 Ibid., q. 118, a. 2
1290 Denz., no. 481; cf. Fifth Council of the Lateran, Denz., nos. 738, 1655, 1911, 1914.
1291 Denz., no. 1914
1292 Ibid., no. 1655
1293 cf. Card. Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis (1878), no. 136; Liberatore, S.J., De composito humano (1865).
1294 Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 246
1295 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 76, a. 1
1298 Ibid., a. 2
1299 Ibid., a. 3
1301 Ibid., a. 4
1302 Ibid., a. 5.
1303 Ibid., a. 1 ad 4
1304 Ibid, q. 54, a. 1, a, 3.
1305 Disp. met. XIII, sect. 13 f.
1306 cf. Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2
1307 cf. Cajetan's profound commentary on Ia, q. 75, 76, in which he defends this doctrine against Scotus
1308 cf. Disp. met., XIV, sect. 5
1309 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 77, a. 4, 5; q. 79
1310 Ibid., q. 80, a. 2
1311 Ibid., q. 77, a. 5.
1312 Ibid., q. 83; Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 1, 2, 3, 4.
1313 cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 508 ff.
1314 Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. II.
1315 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2.
1316 cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 5
1317 Disp. met., XIX, sect. 6
1318 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 83, a. 1 ad 5
1319 cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 559 79
1320 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 12, a. 1
1321 Ibid., q. 76, a. 1.
1322 St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 10, a. 8
1323 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 87, a. 1
1324 Ibid., q. 84, a. 7; q. 86, a. 4 ad 2
1325 De veritate, q. 10, a. 8
1326 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 76, a. 2 ad 2; Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 80
1327 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 118, a. 3.
1328 Ibid., q. 76, a. 5
1329 Ibid., q. 89, a. 1; q. 1 18, a. 3
1330 cf. Supplementum, q. 75
1331 De potentia, q. 6, a. 7 ad 4
1332 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 89, a. 1; De veritate, q. 24, a. 11
1333 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 89, a2
1336 Ibid., a. 4.
1337 Ibid., a. 8; So also St. Augustine and St. Gregory, quoted by St. Thomas
1339 Ibid., ad 1
1340 Summa Theol., q. 10, a. 4 ff.
1341 Rom. 2:6
1342 Denz., no. 464
1343 Denz., nos. 530 f
1344 Ecclus. 11:28f
1345 Heb. 9:27
1346 John 9:4
1347 Thus Lactantius, St. Hilary, St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, St. Jerome, St. Augustine; cf Rouet de Journel, Ench. Patrist., nos. 646, 886, 956, 1200, 1880
1348 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chaps. 94f.; Summa Theol., Ia, q. 64, a. 2. De veritate, q. 24, a. 11; cf. Dict. theol. cath., article, "Mort."
1349 St. Thomas says: "After the state of this life the separated soul does not understand by receiving from the senses, nor is it in act with regard to the sensitive appetitive powers; and so the separate soul is made like the angels both with regard to the manner of intellection and the indivisibility of the appetite, which were the causes of obstinacy in the sinning angels. Hence obstinacy takes place in the separated soul for the same reason" (De veritate, q. 24, a. 11).
1350 Summa theol, Ia, q. 64, a. 2.
1351 Commentarium on Ia, q. 64, a. 2, no. 18
1352 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chaps. 91-95
1353 John 9:4
1354 cf. Salmanticenses, De gratia, De merito, disp. I, dub. IV, no. 36.
1355 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 95.
1356 Commentarium, on IIIa, q. 50, a. 6, no. 3
1357 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chaps. 91-95; De veritate, q. 24, a. 11.
1358 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 95
1359 cf. St. Thomas, Tabula aurea, "damnatio."
1360 Denz., no. 779
1361 cf. Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 4; q. 10, a. 2
1362 Summa Theol. Ia, q. 90-102; Ia IIae, q. 81 ff.
1363 Thus Mivart and some others; cf. Guibert and Chinchole, Les origines (Paris, 1923); Dict. de la Bible et supplement, art. "Adam"; Dict. apol., art. "Homme et Transformisme"; Dict. theol. cath., art. "Adam et justice originelle."
1364 Denz., nos. 428, 1783, 1801
1365 Ibid., no. 2123
1366 Gen. 1:27
1367 Ibid., 2:7
1368 Ibid., 2:21 f cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol. nos. 225 f. for texts from St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, Aphraates, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Augustine
1369 cf. De Quatrefages, L'espece humaine (1878); Dict. Apol., art. "Transformisme."
1370 cf. Dict. de la Bible, Supplement, art. "Adam et la Bible
1371 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 91, a. 1, 2, 3
1372 Ibid., q. 93; Gen. 1:26
1373 ibid., a. 6, 7, 8
1374 cf. Dict. theol., art. "Isaac de Ia Peyrere"
1375 Gen. 2:5, 20
1376 Ibid., 3:20
1377 Wisd. 10:1
1378 Acts 17:26.
1379 Rom. 5:12
1380 cf, Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., no. 227
1381 Quatrefages, op- cit
1382 Dict. apol., art. "Homme"; Goury, L'origine et revolution de l'homme
1383 Peter Lombard, Sent., II, disp. 18, no. 8.
1384 St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 9
1385 Eccles. 12:7
1386 cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., nos. 222 ff. for texts from Lactantius, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Hilary, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and St. Cyril of Alexandria
1387 Denz., no. 170
1388 Ibid., no. 533
1389 ibid no. 203
1390 Ibid., no. 1910
1391 Ibid., nos. 285, 295.
1392 Ibid., no. 738
1393 Ibid., no. 338
1394 Ibid. nos. 236, 642
1395 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 90 a. 1, 4; q. 118, a. 2.
1396 ibid., q. 3, a. 8
1397 Ibid., q. 118, a. 2
1398 Ibid., q. 45, a. 5
1399 Ibid., q. 118, a. 2
1400 Ibid., q. 75, a. 4
1401 Ibid., q. 118, a. 3.
1402 Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione, I, 191-218
1403 Cf Vatican Council: Denz., nos. 1790, 1795 ff., 1803 ff., 1808, 1816, 1818; cf. also 176 f., 1021, 1926, 1928, 2103.
1404 cf. John of St. Thomas, De gratia, disp. XX, a. 1; Salmanticenses, De gratia, disp. III, no. 24; Suarez, De gratia, II, chap. 4
1405 St. Thomas, Metaphysica, V, lect. 13.
1406 Denz., nos. 1034, 1173, 1926, 1928
1407 Ibid., no. 1797; Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, a. 2 ad 1.
1408 cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, praeambula, a. 1
1409 cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52
1410 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 97, a. 1, 3
1411 Ibid., q. 95, a. 1
1412 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 83, 85
1413 Ibid., IIIa, a. 69, a. 1-6
1414 Denz. . nos. 2074, 2103
1415 Ibid., no. 788; cf. ibid., nos. 316, 793
1416 Ibid., nos. 1021, 1026
1417 Ibid., nos. 1008, 1023 ff., 1385, 1516
1418 Denz., nos. 1008, 1024
1419 Ibid., nos. 192, 1026.
1420 Ibid., nos. 1021, 1023f., 1079
1421 To be understood in the sense in which Baius' proposition was condemned, namely, "In the beginning God could not have created a man such as is now born," that is, without grace and the gift of integrity. cf. Denz., nos. 1055, 1516
1422 Denz., nos. 192. 1001 ff.
1423 Ibid., nos. 1001 ff., 1007, 1009, 1384
1424 cf. Gen. 2:18-24; 3:8.
1425 Gen. 1:26
1426 cf. Rom. 3:24 f.; Eph. 4:23; II Cor. 5:18 f.; Col. 1:13 f.
1427 cf. I John 3:1ff.; I Cor. 2:6-12; II Pet 1:4.
1428 Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., 229-34: a collection of texts from St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, St. Jerome, St. Augustine. St. Irenaeus says that Adam "by disobedience lost that holiness which he had received from the Spirit" (Adv. haeres. III, xxiii, 5); St. Augustine says: "How can we therefore be said to be renewed if we do not receive that which the first man lost, in whom all die?....We receive justice from which man fell by sin" (De Gen. ad litt., VI, 24, 35). cf. Denz., no. 105 (Council of Carthage); nos. 175, 192 (Second Council of Orange).
1429 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 95, a. 1
1430 Eccles. 7:30.
1431 cf. Cant. 1:3; Ps. 7:11; 32:1
1432 De civitate Dei, Bk. XIII, chap. 13
1433 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 95, a. 2, 3.
1434 cf. Ibid., a. 4
1435 cf. De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 9; Summa Theol., Ia, q. 94, a. 1-4.
1436 cf. Denz., nos; 101, 175
1437 Ibid., no. 788; cf. declarations against Baius on the gratuity of this gift, ibid., nos. 1000, 1078, and the Synod of Pistoia, ibid., no. 1517
1438 Gen. 2:16.
1439 Ibid., 3:19
1440 Wisd. 2:23 f
1441 Rom. 5:12-17
1442 cf, Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., 231 for texts from St. Theophilus of Antioch, St. Cyprian, St. Methodius, St. Athanasius, St. Hilary, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Augustine
1443 St. Augustine, De Gen. ad litt., Bk. VI, chap. 25, no. 36
1444 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 97, a. 1.
1445 Denz., nos. 1021, 1026, 1055; cf. Dict. theol., art. "Baius."
1446 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 97, a. 2
1447 Gen. 2:8, 15; 1:26; Eccles. 17 3 f
1448 Gen. 3:19 1449 48 St. Augustine in particular explains this gift, De civitate Dei, Bk. XIV, chap. 26. cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ep. ad Rom., V, 18; Rouet de Journel, op. cit., nos. 1762, 1962, 2013, 2122
1450 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 97, a. 2 ad 4
1451 Ibid., q. 96, a. 1
1452 Denz., no. 792
1453 Rom. 6:12
1454 Gen. 2:25; 3:7, 11
1455 Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., no. 230
1456 De civitate Dei, Bk. XIII, chap. 13
1457 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 95, a. 1
1458 Ibid., q. 81, a. 3 ad 2.
1459 Ibid., q. 94, a. 3, 4.
1460 Gen. 2:19f
1461 Ecclus. 17:1-8.
1462 cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., Index theol., no. 232 for texts from St. Augustine, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. John Damascene
1463 Summa Theol., Ia. a. 94. a. 3
1464 Ibid., a. 4
1465 Ibid., a. 4 ad 1
1467 Denz., nos. 1026, 1055
1468 Ibid., nos. 1021, 1023 f., 1079, 1055, 1516
1469 Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a. 2.
1470 St. Thomas, Sent. II, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3
1471 cf. Billuart, loc. cit
1472 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52
1473 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 100, a. 1; St. Anselm, De conceptu virg., chap. 10.
1474 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 100, a. 2
1475 Ibid., q. 101, a. 1, 2.
1476 cf. Kors, O.P., La Justice primitive et le peche originel d'apres S. Thomas, Bibliotheque thomiste, Kain 1922, p. 139; Bittremieux, "La distinction entre la justice originelle et la grace sanctifiante d'apres S Thomas d'Aquin," Revue thomiste April-June, 1921; Michel, "La grace sanctifiante et la justice originelle," Revue thomiste, 1922, p. 424; Jos. van der Meersch, "De distinctione inter justitiam originalem et gratiam sanctificantem," Collationes Brugenses, XXII; P. E. Hugon, O.P., "De gratia primi hominis," Angelicum, 1927, pp. 361-81; Dict. theol. cath., "Justice originelle."
1477 Rom. 5:12; Denz., no. 789.
1478 Loc. cit.; cf. Council of Orange, Denz., no. 175
1479 cf. Acta Concil. Trid., Stephen Ehses, pp. 118-218; 208.
1480 cf. Council of Trent, Sess. V, chap. 5; Denz., no. 792
1481 Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 69, a. 4 ad 3.
1482 Vatican Council, Collectio Lacensis, VII, 517
1483 Ibid., 549
1485 cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 139.
1486 cf. Denz., no. 175: "If anyone shall assert that Adam's transgression harmed himself alone and not his progeny, or say that only the death of the body, which is the penalty of sin, and not the sin, which is the death of the soul, was transmitted to the whole human race by one man, he does an injury to God by contradicting the Apostle, who said, 'By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned' (Rom. 5:12)."
1487 De conceptu virginali, chap. 10
1488 Ibid., chap. 23.
1489 cf. Kors, op. cit
1490 St. Anselm, op. cit., chap. 10; PL, CLVIII, 444
1491 St. Thomas, Sent., II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3
1492 Ibid., d. 29, q. 1, a. 2.
1493 Eccles 7:30
1494 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 95, a. 1.
1495 St. Thomas, Sent., II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3.
1496 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 95, a. 1.
1497 Ibid., Ia, q. 100, a. 1
1498 De malo, IV, a. 4, a. 2 ad 1.
1499 Ibid., q. 5, a. 1 ad 13; q. 4, a. 6 ad 4.
1500 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 3.
1501 cf. Jos. van der Meersch, op. cit., p. 9.
1502 De malo, q. 5, a. 1 ad 13
1503 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 95. a. 1
1504 Ibid., q. 100, a. 1 ad 2
1505 St. Thomas, Sent., II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3
1506 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 83, a. 2 ad 2
1508 Cajetan, In Iam IIae, q. 83, a. 2 ad 2.
1509 Ibid., q. 109, a. 2, no. 9.
1510 Capreolus, In Sent., d. XXXI, a. 3.
1511 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52.
1512 Kors, op. cit., p. 126
1513 Vatican Council, Collectio Lacensis, VII, 549
1514 St. Thomas, Sent., II, d. 20, q. a, a. 3
1515 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52
1516 Bittremieux, art. cit., Revue thomiste, April-June, 1921, p. 127
1517 De malo, q. 4, a. 2 ad I; Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 81, a. 2; q. 85, a. 3.
1518 cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 63, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 21, a. 1, 2.
1519 cf. ibid., Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 1 ad 1.
1520 Denz., no. 788; cf. Dict. theol. cath., "Peche originel, dans l'Ecriture, chez les Peres et les theologiens. Les a, affirmations de l'Eglise en face du naturalisme contemporain," col. 275-606; J. B. Frey, "L'etat originel et la chute de l'homme d'apres les juives au temps de Jesus-Christ," in Revue de Sc. phil. et theol. (1911), pp. 507-45; F. Prat, La theol. de S. Paul (7th ed.), pp. 252-64; M. J. Lagrange, Ep. aux Rom. (1916), pp. 104-13
1521 Denz., no. 2123
1522 Gen. 2:17; 3:6
1523 Ecclus. 25:33
1524 Wisd. 2:24.
1525 Rom. 5:19; cf. I Cor. 15:21 ff.; I Tim. 2:1, f.; John 8:44; Apoc. 12:9.
1526 cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., Index theol., nos. 298-302, for many passages from the Latin and Greek Fathers; also following article on the existence of original sin in Adam's posterity
1527 Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 163, a. 1. ff.
1528 Ibid., a. 3; cf. Bossuet, Elevations sur les mysteres, 6e semaine, 5e elevation
1529 Ecclus. 10:15; Tob. 4:14
1530 Wisd. 10:1 f.
1531 Denz., no. 776; cf. Council of Trent, Denz., no. 815; for Baius' teaching, ibid., no. 1065; for Jansenism, ibid., no. 1298
1532 Denz., no. 789; Rom. 5:12; cf. Card. Billot, De personali et originali peccato (4th ed., 1910), pp. 160 ff.
1533 Denz., nos. 711, 790 f., 795
1534 Ibid., nos. 101, 174f., 795.
1535 Ibid., nos. 790, 795.
1536 Ibid., no. 532
1537 Ibid., nos. 102, 410, 532, 753, 791
1538 Ibid., no. 534
1539 Ibid., no. 1048
1540 Ibid., no. 1047
1541 Ibid., no. 410
1543 Ibid., nos. 321, 410, 464, 693
1544 Ibid., no. 1049
1545 Ibid., nos. 1526, 3049
1546 Ibid., nos. 101 f., 329, 348, 790 f., 3026
1547 Ibid., nos. 388, 413
1548 Ibid., no. 102
1549 Ibid., no. 175.
1550 Gen. 3:14-24
1551 John 14:4.
1552 Ps. 50:7
1553 Denz., no. 792
1554 Ecclus. 25:33
1555 Gen. 17:14; Rom. 4:11; cf. Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 70; Dict. theol. cath., art., "Circumcision." St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, Bk. XVI, chap. 27. Many modern exegetes see in circumcision only a sign of a compact or of friendship between God and Israel. But we read in the Scriptures, Abraham "received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith....; that he might be the father of all them that believe, being circumcised, that unto them also it may be reputed to justice" (Rom. 4:11). Thus, as St. Thomas says, "grace was conferred in circumcision, not by virtue of circumcision, but by virtue of the passion of Christ, whose sign was circumcision" (Summa theol-, IIIa, q. 70, a. 4).
1556 Matt. 1:21
1557 John 1:29
1558 Ibid., 3:5
1559 cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Ep. ad Ephesios, 2:3
1560 cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Ep. ad Romanos, 5:12.
1561 According to the Latin Fathers and many Catholic doctors, the Greek is translated in quo, that is, in Adam; according to the Greek Fathers and some recent writers the rendering is eo quod or "because." From the context the meaning is still that sin and death were transmitted to us through Adam, especially from v. 12 and v. 19. cf. Bossuet, Defense de la tradition et des SS. Peres, VII, chap. 12-20.
1562 Rom. 5:19
1563 Rom. 5:12, 16, 18f
1564 Ibid., v. 14
1565 Denz., no. 790
1566 cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Ep. ad Romanos, 5:12-20, for solution of the Pelagian objections; cf. also M. 1. Lagrange, Epitre aux Romains (1916), pp. 104-13 F. Prat, La theologie de S. Paul, I, 253 ff.; Dict. theol. cath., art. "Peche originel", 1. M. Voste, Studia paulina (1928), pp. 75, 84.
1567 Ezech. 18:20; Deut. 24:16
1568 Rouet de Journel, op. cit., Index theol., nos. 302 ff.; ibid., no. 92
1569 St. Irenaeus, Adversus heres., V, xiii, 3; Journel, op. cit., no. 255
1570 Rouet de Journel, op. cit., no. 140.
1571 Ibid., no. 183
1572 Ibid., nos. 146, 286
1573 Ibid., nos. 967, 1077, 1291
1574 Ibid., nos. 1184 ff.
1575 cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "Le peche originel," col. 353: "S. Jean Chrysostom proclame la necessite absolue du bapteme pour avoir art d l'heritage Celeste"; cf. De poenitentia, hom. I, 4, PL, XLIX, 282 ff.
1576 cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., no. 1899 (Contra Julianum, II, chap. 10; VI, 67f.; Contra Julianum op. imp., 1, 27, 29, 49; II, 87, 119; V, 48, 64; VI, 36; De civitate Dei, XXII, chap. 22, 1-3).
1577 Denz., nos. 101 f.
1578 Ibid., no. 126
1579 Ibid., nos. 129-42
1580 St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52
1581 Rom. 5:12-21
1582 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1.
1583 Ibid., cf. Dict. theol. cath., "Peche originel," col. 478
1584 Rom. 5:12-21
1585 Denz., no. 1796
1586 cf. Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3.
1587 Ibid., Ia, q. 100, a. 1.
1588 Denz., no. 789; cf. Card. Billot, De peccato originali
1589 cf. P. E. Hugon, Tract. theologici (1926), I, 808-18
1590 Summa Theol., la, q. 100, a. 1
1591 Ibid.; thus Adam was the head of elevated nature by some divine decree and therefore, if Adam had not sinned, he would have transmitted to us original justice; if he sinned he would transmit to us the privation of this justice. It is not necessary that Adam should have consented to this decree. He knew the decree, and that was sufficient. His knowledge of moral and religious matters certainly included something as important as this both to himself and the whole human race. In the same way a man who loses his fortune and his hereditary title knows he is losing these things for himself and for his children. Hence original sin is voluntary only with regard to Adam's will inasmuch as he was the head of elevated nature, and the sin passes on to his posterity, not as a demerit, but as a consequence transmitted to nature Under this aspect, therefore, original sin is the least of all sins because it has the least amount of voluntarium.
1592 Denz., nos. 776, 792
1593 Ibid., nos. 1065, 1298
1594 Ibid., no. 792
1595 Ibid., nos. 788, 793
1596 Ibid., no. 793
1597 Ibid., no. 790
1598 cf. Acta Concilii Vaticani, Collectio Lacensis, VII, 517, 549
1599 cf. St. Augustine, De nuptiis et conceptione, Bk. I, chap. 24, no. 27; chap. 26, no. 29; Journel, op. cit., nos. 1872 f., 1877; De peccat, meritis et remiss., II, chap. 28, no. 46; Journel, op. cit., no. 1726
1600 cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "Augustin," cols. 2933, 2935 f.; Tixeront, Hist. dogm., II, 463 ff.
1601 St. Anselm, De conceptu virginali, chaps. 23, 27
1602 Ibid., chap 23
1603 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 82. a. 3.
1605 St. Thomas, De malo, q. 4, a. 2.
1606 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 83, a. 2 ad 4.
1607 cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "Justice originelle."
1608 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 95, a. 1; q. 100, a. 1 ad 2
1609 St. Thomas, De malo, q. 4, a. 1.
1610 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 100, a. 1. ad 2.
1611 D. Soto, De natura et gratia, I, 5.
1612 cf. Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 82, a. 4
1613 Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 83, a. 2
1614 Ibid., a. 3 f
1615 cf. ibid., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1-4
1616 Denz., no. 174
1617 Ibid., no. 788
1618 Ibid., no. 793
1619 Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 3
1620 Ibid., a. 1; q. 63, a. 1
1621 Ibid, q. 85, a. 3
1623 cf, Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a. 3
1624 Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3
1625 St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, Bk. IV chap. 52
1626 cf. Pensees; Bossuet, Sermon pour la profession de Aladame de la Valliere
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