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QUESTION 109
In this question
there are ten articles, methodically arranged in progressive order,
beginning with the lesser actions for which grace is necessary (for
example, knowing some truth) and ending with the last supreme good work,
that is, final perseverance. (Cf. titles.) There are three parts, as
Cajetan observes at the beginning of article 7:

ARTICLE I.
WHETHER WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN KNOW ANY TRUTH
Statement of the
question. It seems that grace is required for knowing any truth
whatever, for it is said in II Cor. 35: “Not that we are sufficient to
think anything of ourselves as of ourselves.” And St. Augustine
maintained this answer in a certain prayer, but he himself retracted
later (Retract., I, 4), as is said in the argument to the contrary and
declared that it could be refuted thus: “Many who are not sinless know
many truths,” for example, those of geometry.
The first
conclusion is the following.
To know any truth, man requires at least natural help from God, but he
does not require a new supernatural illumination for it. The aforesaid
natural help is due to human nature as a whole, but not to any
individual.
Proof of the
first part. Since every created agent requires divine premotion in order
to pass from potency to act, “however perfect the nature of any corporal
or spiritual being, it cannot proceed to act unless moved by God.”
Proof of the
second part. Because many truths do not surpass the power proper to our
intellect, they are easily knowable naturally (cf. ad 1, ad 2, ad 3).
It should be
noted that the natural concurrence called here by St. Thomas “motion” (motio)
is not mere simultaneous cooperation.
Likewise, contrary to Suarez, the virtual act of the will cannot,
without divine motion, be reduced to a secondary act, for St. Thomas
said: “However . . . (cf. Suarez, Disp. met., disp. 29,
sect. I, no. 7, on virtual act). We reply: there is more in the
secondary act than in the virtual act, which in reality differs from the
action, nor is it its own action. Already in this first article it is
evident that St. Thomas withdraws nothing from divine motion.
The second
conclusion is the following. For attaining a knowledge of supernatural
truths, our intellect stands in need not only of the natural concurrence
of God, but of a special illumination, namely, the light of faith or the
light of prophecy and of a proportionate motion. The reason is that
these truths surpass the power proper to our intellect.
OBJECTIONS
Objection to
the first conclusion. Vasquez
presents several objections in the first place, he says:
The intellect,
indifferent to truth and falsehood, is determined by grace toward any
truth.
But our
intellect is indifferent to truth and falsehood.
Therefore
our intellect is determined by grace toward any truth.
Reply.
I distinguish the major: by grace, broadly speaking, granted; properly,
denied. Let the minor pass, although the intellect is not so indifferent
to truth and falsehood as not to incline naturally to truth. It is
called grace broadly since, for example, it is given to Aristotle rather
than to Epicurus.
I insist.
Grace properly speaking, is required in this case, at least after
original sin, according to the fideists, such as Bautin, Bonetti.
Grace, properly speaking, is required that the
wounded intellect may be healed.
But when it knows
any truth, our intellect is at least partially healed.
Therefore grace,
properly speaking, is required for knowing any truth.
Reply.
I distinguish the major: for knowing the whole body of natural truths, I
concede; for any one truth, I deny. The intellect would thus be not
merely darkened but extinct, were it incapable of knowing even the least
truth without healing grace. Let the minor pass. I distinguish the
conclusion in the same way as the major- I say transeat in regard
to the minor but I do not concede since the intellect is not properly
healed when it knows a truth of geometry but rather when it knows the
truth of natural religion.
Instance: But the
intellect is extinct or almost extinct, according to the Jansenists.
Ignorance is opposed
to knowledge as being a total deprivation.
But the wound of
ignorance is in the intellect, according to tradition.
Therefore.
Reply.
I distinguish the major: total ignorance, granted; partial ignorance,
denied. I contradistinguish the minor; explanation: the wound of
ignorance affects principally the practical intellect wherein prudence
resides; but there remains in the practical intellect a synderesis, and
the speculative intellect is less wounded, since it does not presuppose
rectitude of the appetites.
Objection to
the second conclusion.
Whatever does not surpass the object of our intellect can be known
without grace. The mysteries of faith do not surpass the object of our
intellect.
Therefore.
Reply.
I distinguish the major: a proportionate object, granted; an adequate
object, surpassing a proportionate object, denied. I contradistinguish
the minor.
I insist.
But the mysteries of faith do not surpass the proportionate object. That
which is known habitually to the senses does not surpass the
proportionate object.
But the mysteries
of faith are known habitually to the senses.
Therefore.
Reply.
I distinguish the major: whatever is so known without revelation,
granted; after revelation, I distinguish further: they do not surpass
the remotely proportionate object, granted; proximately proportionate,
denied.
I insist.
But at least, after external revelation, the mysteries of the faith do
not surpass the proximately proportionate object.
That which is
known by its species abstracted from the senses and through external
signs does not surpass the proximately proportionate object.
But the
mysteries of faith are thus known.
Therefore.
Reply.
I distinguish the major: if this is known from a human motive, granted;
and then it does not require supernatural grace; and contrariwise if it
is known from a supernatural motive, that is, on the authority of God
revealing in the order of grace (cf. below, Corollary 4).
I insist.
But man is made in the image of the Trinity. And he is naturally capable
of knowing this image.
Therefore.
Reply.
I distinguish the minor: so far as man is the image of God, the author
of nature, granted; so far as he is the image of the Trinity, denied,
since the term of this relationship is of a higher order. Thus if
someone is given an image of an entirely unknown man, he cannot say
whose image it is. (For a correct treatment, cf. Salmanticenses, De
gratia, disp. III, dub. IV, no. 40, and Billuart, De gratia,
diss. III, a. 2). Thomists have drawn several corollaries from this
article, using more modern terminology.
Corollary 1.
Fallen man, without grace, with natural concurrence alone, is capable of
knowing certain natural truths, namely, the first speculative and
practical principles of reason and the conclusions which are easily
drawn from them. This is contrary to some ancient writers who do not
distinguish sufficiently between grace and natural concurrence; it is
also contrary to Vasquez who, following the ways of the nominalists,
disparaged the powers of reason excessively, as did Baius and the
Jansenists, Quesnel and the nineteenth-century fideists, such as Bautin
and Bonetty. With regard to this conclusion, cf. the following condemned
propositions.
Denz., no. 1022.
This one of Baius is condemned: “Those who consider, with Pelagius, the
text of the Apostle to the Romans (2:14): ‘The Gentiles, who have not
the (written) law, do by nature those things that are of the law,’
understand it to apply to the Gentiles who have not the grace of faith.”
For it is certainly contrary to Baius that, without grace, man by
natural reason can know the first precepts of the natural law: good
ought to be done, thou shalt not kill.
Denz., no. 1391.
This proposition of Quesnel is condemned: “All knowledge of God, even
natural, even in pagan philosophy, can come only from God, and without
grace it produces nothing but presumption, vanity, and opposition to God
Himself, in place of sentiments of adoration, gratitude, and love.” Thus
had spoken previously Luther and Calvin (I De Inst., chaps. 1 and
2), as if peripatetic philosophy had come from diabolic inspiration. The
natural reason of Aristotle was capable of discovering the theory of
potency and act, of the four causes, and this without any opposition to
God.
Denz., no. 1627. The
following may probably be attributed to Bautin: Although reason is
obscure and weak through original sin, there still remains in it enough
lucidity and power to lead us with certainty to (the knowledge of) the
existence of God, to the revelation made to the Jews by Moses and to the
Christians by our adorable God-man.”
The Vatican Council defined the following (Denz.,
no. 1806): “If anyone says that the one true God, our Creator and Lord,
cannot certainly be known by the light of natural human reason, let him
be anathema.” This is contrary to the traditionalists, Kant, and the
Positivists. Finally, in the oath against Modernism: “I acknowledge in
the first place and of a truth, that, by the light of natural reason
through the things which have been made, that is, through the visible
works of creation, God, the beginning and end of all things, can be
certainly known and even demonstrated.” Likewise in regard to miracles
confirming the Gospel it is similarly declared that they are “most
certain signs that the Christian religion is of divine origin . . . and
even in the present time especially adapted to the intelligence of all
men.”
Moreover, the
reason for this conclusion is the one given in the article, that is:
Every power
infused in created things is efficacious in respect to its own proper
effect.
But our intellect
is a power infused into us by God and, granted that it is darkened by
sin, yet it is not extinct.
Therefore it can
of itself, with natural concurrence, arrive at a knowledge of certain
natural truths.
Otherwise
intellectual power would be, in its own order, much more imperfect than
are the powers of bodies, of plants and animals,in respect to their own
objects, sight and hearing, for example.
As a matter of
fact, the natural concurrence required for the knowledge of any truth
may be called grace in the broad sense, inasmuch as it is not due to any
individual but to human nature in general; (cf.Ia, q. 21, a. I ad 3):
“It is due to any created thing that it should have that which is
ordained to it, as to a man that he have hands and that the other
animals serve him; and thus again God works justice when He gives to
anything that which is due to it by reason of its nature and condition.”
God owes it to Himself to give to the various kinds of plants and
animals and to humankind the natural concurrence enabling them to reach
their final end on account of which they were made. But, on the other
hand, it is not to be wondered at that what is deficient should
sometimes fail, and God is not bound to preventthese defects, since, if
He prevented them all, greater goods would not come about, and it is on
account of these many goods that He permits the defect. Hence, as our
intellect is defective, there is due to it, according to the laws of
ordinary providence, that it should atleast sometimes be moved toward
the truth and not always fall into error. But the fact that Aristotle,
for example, rather than another, let us say Epicurus, may be moved in
the direction of truth, this is not due to him; it is by a special
providence and benevolence, and in this sense such natural concurrence
is called “grace” broadly speaking. And it is proper to pray that one
may obtain this grace in the wide sense of the term.
Corollary 2.
Fallen man, without a special added grace, cannot, at least with any
moral power, know either collectively or even separately all natural
truths, speculative or speculative-practical, or, for still greater
reason, practical-practical; since for these last, as for prudence,
rectitude of the appetite is required.
Many hold, not
without probability, that without special grace man can know all natural
speculative truths, by physical power, since these truths do not exceed
the capacity of a man possessing a keen mind. But in the present
corollary it is a question of moral power, that is, such as may be
rendered active without very great difficulty. And it is certain that
this moral power is not given in regard to all the aforesaid kinds of
truth taken together. Rather, it was on this account that the Vatican
Council declared (Denz., no. 1786) revelation to be morally necessary
“so that those things concerning divine matters which are not of
themselves impenetrable to human reason may nevertheless, in the present
condition of the human race, be readily known by all with a firm
certainty and no admixture of error.” This is explained by St.Thomas (Ia,
q. I, a. I; IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 3 and 4; Contra Gentes, Bk.I,
chaps. 4 and 6; Bk. IV, Gentes, chap. 52). For the impediments
are manifold: the shortness of life, the weakness of the body, domestic
cares, the disorder of the passions, etc. It is clearly evident that,
with all these impediments, fallen man without grace has not the moral
power to attain to the knowledge of all natural truths together; nor
even, as a matter of fact to the separate knowledge of them: 1. Because
the wound of ignorance is in the intellect, preventing especially
thatease of understanding necessary to prudence, for prudence
presupposes rectitude of the appetite; 2. because many speculative
natural truths are very difficult, demanding long and rigorous study for
a certain and complete knowledge of them and therefore a constantly good
will, burning love of truth, a relish for contemplation, undisturbed
passions, a good disposition of the senses, leisure uninterrupted by
cares. All of this cannot be arrived at easily before regeneration by
healing grace; indeed even afterward a special grace is required for it.
Among natural
truths, according to Billuart, there are some so extremely difficult
that no man has thus far been able to attain a certain knowledge of
them, for example, the ebb and flow of the tides, the essence of light,
electricity, magnetism, the inner development of the embryo; similarly,
the inner nature of sensation, the active intellect and its functioning,
the intimate relationship between the last practical judgment and
choice, etc.; likewise the reconciling of the attributes of God as
naturally knowable, although the knowledge of the existence of God,
supreme Ruler, is easily arrived at by common sense from the order of
the universe.
Doubt.
Whether this special grace required for a knowledge of all these natural
truths is properly supernatural.
Reply.
It suffices that it is supernatural in respect to the manner of which is
supernatural in respect to its substance, because the knowledge of which
we are speaking is ontologically natural.
Corollary 3.
Supposing the existence of an external revelation, fallen man, with
natural, general concurrence alone and without a special added grace, is
able to know and enlarge on supernatural truths, from some human or
natural reason.
Thus the demons
believe naturally, by a faith not infused but acquired, on the evidence
of compelling miracles, as is demonstrated in IIa IIae, q. 5, a. 2. And
formal heretics retain certain supernatural truths, not from the
supernatural motive of divine revelation (otherwise they would believe
all that is revealed), but from a human motive,
that is, on the
bases of their own judgment and will; for example, because they consider
this faith to be honorable or useful to themselves, or because it seems
to them very foolish to deny certain things in the Gospel. The reason
for this is that, although a true supernatural is in itself entitatively
supernatural, yet, as depending upon a human or natural motive, it is
not formally supernatural.
Why? Because an
object, not as a thing, but by reason of object, is formally constituted
by the formal motive through which it is attained. Thus when a formal
heretic from a human motive and by human faith believes in the
Incarnation, while rejecting the Trinity; then the object believed, as a
thing, is supernatural, but, as an object, it is not supernatural.
Therefore it may thus be attained by the natural powers, and then the
supernatural truth is attained only materially because it is not
attained formally in its supernaturalness, as it is supernatural.
That a demon
should naturally believe the mysteries of faith is analogical, all
proportions being maintained, to a dog’s materially hearing human speech
as sound but not really hearing formally the intelligible meaning of
this same speech. Similarly, “the sensual man (for example, a heretic
retaining certain mysteries of faith) perceiveth not these things that
are of the Spirit of God; for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot
understand” (I Cor. 2:14); cf. also St. Thomas’ Commentary on this
Epistle. We might draw another comparison with the case of one who
listens to a symphony of Beethoven or Bach, possessed of the sense of
hearing but devoid of any musical sense; he
would not attain
to the spirit of the symphony (cf. our De revelatione, I, 478,
based on IIa IIae, q. 5, a. 3).
Corollary 4.
Man cannot believe supernatural truths from the supernatural motive of
divine revelation without a special interior grace, both in the
intellect and in the will.
This is contrary,
first, to the Pelagians, who say that external revelation is sufficient
for the assent of faith (cf. Denz., nos. 129 ff.) and, secondly, to the
Semi-Pelagians, who would have it that the beginning of faith comes from
us (cf. Denz., nos. 174 ff.; Council of Orange, c. 5, 6, 7); therein it
is declared that the inspiration and enlightenment of the Holy Spirit is
required in this matter (Denz., nos. 178-80).
These definitions
of the Church are based upon several texts of Sacred Scripture cited by
the Council of Orange, for example, Ephes. 2:8: “for by grace you are
saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of
God; not of works, that no man may glory.” This does not refer to
external revelation, for it is further said in the same Epistle (1:17
f.): “That . . . God . . . may give unto you the spirit of wisdom and of
revelation, in the knowledge of Him: the eyes of your heart enlightened,
that you may know what the hope is of his calling”; and (Acts 16:14): “
. . . Lydia . . . whose heart the Lord opened to attend to those things
which were said by Paul.”
Again, this
fourth corollary is opposed to Molina and many Molinists who declare
that fallen man can, without supernatural grace, believe supernatural
truths from a supernatural motive, but then he does not believe as is
necessary for salvation, for which grace is required. And therefore
Molina holds that the assent of faith is supernatural not in respect to
substance by virtue of its formal motive, but only in respect to mode,
by reason of the eliciting principle and by reason of its extrinsic end.
(Cf. Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 38, pp. 213 ff., and our
De revelatione, I, 489, where Molina and Father Ledochowski are
quoted.)
This question has
been treated at length and fully by the Salmanticenses in their
Commentary on our article, De gratia, disp. III, dub. III, and I
have quoted their principal texts in De revelatione, I, 494, 496,
showing that therein they are in accord with all Thomists from Capreolus
to the present day (pp. 458-514). Their conclusions, here cited, ought
to be read. The argument put forth against Molina and his disciples is
found in IIa IIae, q. 6, a. I, “Whether faith is infused in man by God”:
“For, since man, assenting to the things which are of faith, is raised
above his nature, it is necessary that this be instilled into him by a
supernatural principle impelling him interiorly through grace,” for an
act is specified by its formal object (objectum formale quo et quod);
if, therefore, the latter is supernatural, the act specified by it is
essentially supernatural and cannot be elicited without grace. Further,
St. Thomas affirms this to be true even of faith lacking form (informus),
that is, faith without charity (IIa IIae, q. 6, a. 2); even faith
lacking form is a gift of God, since it is said to lack form on account
of a defect of extrinsic form, and not on account of a defect in the
specific nature of infused faith itself, for it has the same specifying
formal object.
Thus Billuart
comments on our article: “the formally supernatural object as such
cannot be attained except by a supernatural act. This upsets the basic
assertion of Molina, who maintains that the assent to faith from the
motive of divine revelation is natural in respect to its substance, and
supernatural in respect to its mode. . . . This opinion does not seem to
us sufficiently removed from the error of the Semi-Pelagians.”
(Likewise, the Salmanticenses, loc. cit.)
Confirmation.
The Council of Orange (c. 5,6,7; Denz., nos. 178-80) defined grace to be
necessary for the initial step toward faith and for the belief necessary
to salvation.
But to believe on
account of the formal supernatural motive of infused faith itself is
already to believe in the way necessary to salvation; what more formal
belief can then be required?
Therefore, to
believe on account of this supernatural motive is impossible without
grace.
Many
difficulties would arise from any other opinion.
1. An act cannot
be specified by an eliciting principle, for this eliciting principle
itself requires specifying, and it is specified by the act toward which
it tends, as the act is specified by its object. Otherwise specification
would come from the rear rather than from thefront, as if the way from
the College “Angelicum” to the Vatican were specified by the terminus
from which, and not by the terminus toward which.
2. An act of
faith would be no more supernatural than an act of acquired temperance
ordered by charity to a supernatural end; it would be less supernatural
than an act of infused temperance, as referred to by St. Thomas (Ia IIae,
q. 63, a. 4). This supernatural in respect to mode is the supernatural
almost as applied from without, like gold applied over silver for those
who cannot afford to buy pure gold jewelry: it is “plated,” “veneered.”
3. What Molina
says of the act of theological faith, could equally be said of the act
of hope, and even of the act of charity, for the substance of which
natural good will would sufice, and the supernatural mode would be added
to make it what is required for salvation. But then the charity of the
viator thus specified by a formal object naturally attainable
would not be the same as the charity of the blessed, which must be, like
the beatific vision, essentially supernatural. Hence charity would be
something different in heaven from what it is now, contrary to the words
of St. Paul, “charity never falleth away” (I Cor. 13:8). Thus even
Suarez vigorously opposes Molina in this matter. There would be
innumerable other consequences as indicated in De revelatione, I,
511-14.
We cannot
therefore admit the following two theses of Cardinal Billot on the
subject as put forward in his book, De virtutibus infusis (71,
87, 88): “Supernatural formality, causing acts to be proportioned to the
condition of objects conformable to themselves, does not proceed from
the object in that it performs in respect to us the office of an object,
nor, namely, either from the material object which is believed, hoped,
or loved, or from the formal object on account of which it is believed,
hoped, or loved, but solely from the principle of grace by which the
operative faculty is elevated.” “Supernatural habits are not necessarily
distinguished from natural habits according to their objects” (p. 84).
In opposition to
our thesis, cf. the objections in De revelatione, I, 504-11. The
principal one is the following.
The demons
believe (Jas. 2), and they believe without grace. But they believe from
the motive of divine revelation. Therefore grace is not necessary to
believe from a motive of divine revelation.
Reply.
I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: that the demons believe
formally from the motive of divine revelation according as it is
supernatural in respect to substance in itself and on that account, I
deny; that they believe materially on the evidence of the signs of
revelation, I grant; to this evidence their faith is ultimately
reducible. (Cf. IIa IIae, q. 5, a. 2 ad I, 3.) They believe, says
St.Thomas, as it were under constraint from the evidence of miracles,
for it would be exceedingly stupid for them to reject this evidence.
They therefore attain to God the author of nature and of miracles, but
not really to God the author of grace, nor to revelation as it proceeds
from God the author of grace. On the contrary, revelation as proceeding
from God, the author of grace, specifies infused faith which is of a
higher species than would be a faith, supernatural in respect to mode,
based upon the revelation of God, author of nature. (Cf. Salmanticenses
quoted in De revelatione, I, 496,471.)
ARTICLE II.
WHETHER MAN CAN WILL TO DO ANY
GOOD WITHOUT GRACE
State of the
question. It seems that man
can do some good without grace: 1. for his acts are in his power, since
he is ruler of his acts; 2. for everyone can do better that which
pertains to him by nature than that which is beyond him by nature; but
man can sin by himself, which is acting beyond and even against nature;
therefore with even greater reason can he do good of himself. This
objection raises the question whether not sinning, or persevering in
good, is itself a gift of God; whether of two men, equally tempted and
equally assisted, it can happen that one sins and the other does not. 3.
Just as our intellect can, of itself, know truth, so our will can, of
itself, will the good.
This question
concerns: 1. a morally or ethically good work in the natural order (such
as proceeds from the dictates of right reason and is not vitiated by any
circumstances) so that it is not a sin; and 2. good works conducive to
salvation, such as are ordained to a supernatural end, not indeed always
as meritorious acts presupposing habitual grace, but as salutary acts
disposing to justification and presupposing actual grace.
Reply.
In respect to these two problems, certain truths are articles of faith.
1. It is of faith that not all the works of infidels or sinners are sins
(against Wyclif, Denz., no. 606; John Hus, no. 642, Baius, nos. 1008,
1027 ff .; Quesnel, nos. 1351, 1372, 1388) Therefore without the grace
of faith a man can do some morally or ethically good works. 2. It is of
faith that supernatural good cannot be effected by fallen man without
grace. Cf. Council of Orange (Denz., no. 174), can. 6, 7, 9, 11, 12-20,
22; and Council of Quierzy (Denz., no. 317), c. 2. These two articles of
faith are based on many passages in Holy Scripture.
1. Holy Scripture
does indeed praise certain works of infidels and testifies that they
were rewarded by God; for example, it praises the kind-heartedness of
the Egyptian midwives who did not wish to kill the children of the
Hebrews in conformity with the iniquitous command of Pharaoh (Exod.,
chap. I); the hospitality of Rahab the harlot, who refused to betray the
men sent by Josue (Josue, chap. 2), is also praised; likewise God gave
the land of Egypt to King Nabuchodonosor, that he might wage a
successful war against the inhabitants of Tyre, according to the command
of God (Ezech. 29:20). St. Augustine says (De civ. Dei, Bk. V,
chap. 15) that God granted a vast empire to the Romans as a temporal
reward of their virtues and good works. But God neither praises nor
rewards sins, but rather punishes. Therefore. Similarly it is said in
Romans (2:14): “The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those
things that are of the law”; in other words, they do at least some good
works, as St. Augustine shows (De spiritu et littera, chap. 27).
2. The other
proposition of faith, that supernatural good works cannot be performed
by fallen man without grace, is also based on many texts from Scripture
cited by the Council of Orange: “A man cannot receive anything, unless
it be given him from heaven” (John 3:27). “This is the work of God, that
you believe in Him whom He hath sent” (John 6:29). “Without Me you can
do nothing” (John 15:5). “I am the vine; you the branches” (ibid.).
“It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that
showeth mercy” (Rom. 9:16). “It is God who worketh in you, both to will
and to accomplish, according to His good will” (Phil. 2:13). “What hast
thou that thou hast not received?” (I Cor. 4:7.) “No man can say the
Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost” (I Cor. 12:3). “Not that we are
sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves: but our
sufficiency is from God” (II Cor. 3 5 ). “Every best gift, and every
perfect gift, is from above, coming down from the Father of lights”
(Jas. 1:17). There are innumerable texts from St. Augustine; for
example, the one quoted in the Sed contra. In the body of the
article are found four conclusions, which should be consulted in the
text itself.
1. To accomplish
any good whatever, man, in any state, requires the general concurrence
of God, whether in the state of incorrupt or of corrupt nature (or even
in the state of pure nature of which St. Thomas does not speak here, but
the possibility of which he admits, as stated in II Sent., d. 31,
q. I, a. 2 ad 3, and Ia, q. 95, a. I). The reason for this is that every
creature, since it neither exists nor acts of itself, is in potency
regarding action, and needs to be moved from without that it may act, as
said in article I. This efficacious concurrence toward a naturally
virtuous good is due, as we have said, to human nature in general, not
to any individual, in whom God may permit sin.
2. In the state
of integral nature, man did not require special added grace, except for
performing supernatural works, not, that is, for morally good works
commensurate with nature. For nature was then in a perfect state and
needed only general concurrence, which is, of course, to be understood
in the sense of a concurrence which is prior and efficacious in itself,
not in the sense accepted by Molina.
3. In the state
of fallen nature man requires supernatural grace not only to perform a
supernatural work, but to observe the whole natural law (as will be made
more evident later in article 5).
4. Fallen man can
do some morally good work in the natural order with general concurrence
alone, for example, build houses, plant vineyards, and other things of
this kind; and he can do this on account of a duly virtuous end, so that
this act may be ethically good from the standpoint of its object, its
end, and all its circumstances; for instance, that a man build a home
for the good of his family, that is, in such a way that there is no sin
involved. This is particularly evident from the fact that, for St.
Thomas, there are no indifferent acts in regard to an individual (Ia
IIae, q. 18, a. 9; cf. above, Ia IIae, 65, a. 2): “Acquired virtues,
according as they are operative of good ordained to an end which does
not exceed the natural faculty of man, can be deprived of charity,” but
they are so on the part of the subject in the circumstance of his
disposition, not in the circumstance of a virtue difficult to set in
motion, nor closely connected actually.
Thus not all the
works of infidels and sinners are sins. The reason is that, since human
nature “is not totally corrupted” by sin so as to be entirely deprived
of natural good, therefore it can, through the power which remains,
easily do some morally good works with general concurrence, just as a
sick man may have some power of movement in himself, although he is not
able to move perfectly unless he is cured.
REFUTATION OF OBJECTIONS
(cf. De veritate, q. 24, a. 14)
First
objection. That is in the
power of a man of which he is master. But a man is master of his acts.
Therefore it is
in the power of a man to do good.
Reply.
I distinguish the major: without the concurrence of God, denied; with
the concurrence of God, granted. I grant the minor. I distinguish the
conclusion in the same way as the major. (Read St. Thomas’ answer.)
Second
objection. Everyone can do
better that which pertains to him by nature than that which is beyond
his nature. But man can sin of himself, which is beyond nature.
Therefore man can do good of himself. (See a similar objection in De
veritate, q. 24, a. 14, objections 3 and 4, also objection 2 and the
body of the article toward the end.) Likewise some say that of two men,
tempted in the same way and equally assisted, it may be that one
perseveres in attrition or in an easy, imperfect prayer, whereas the
other, on the contrary, sins by not continuing this easy act.
St. Thomas’ reply
to objection 2 is as follows: “Every created thing needs to be preserved
in the goodness proper to its nature by something else (that is, by
God), for of itself it can fall away from goodness. At least, he who
does not sin is divinely preserved in the goodness proper to his nature,
while God does not preserve the other, but, on the contrary, permits sin
in him; therefore they are not equally assisted. However, nature is not
completely corrupt; it is able to do some good but with the help of God,
which is due to nature in general, but not indeed to this individual.
Therefore, as Augustine says, we ought to thank God inasmuch as we avoid
sins which were possible to us, for the very fact of not sinning is a
good coming from God; it is, in other words, being preserved in
goodness.
In reply to the
third objection it is noted that “human nature is more corrupted by sin
in regard to its appetite for the good than in regard to its knowledge
of the truth.” This is because original sin first causes an aversion of
the will directly from the final supernatural end, and indirectly from
the final natural end; and consequently a disorder in the sensitive
appetite tending toward sensible goods, not according to the dictates of
right reason.
Doubt.
How is this general concurrence, necessary for fallen man to accomplish
any moral good, to be understood?
Reply.
The Molinists understand it as a natural, general, indifferent
concurrence which the will, through its own volition, directs toward the
good. But the Thomists reply that in that case God, by moving one as far
as the exercise of the will is concerned, would be no more the author of
a good work than of a bad one (contrary to the Council of Trent, Denz.,
no. 816).
Therefore they insist upon a prevenient, determining, and effective
concurrence enabling a man to do good rather than evil. The early
Thomists called this a special concurrence, a since it is not due to
this or that individual; but later Thomists call it a general
concurrence, because it is, in a certain sense, due to human nature,
even in its fallen state, for nature is not totally corrupt or confirmed
in evil, but only weakened. However, it is not due to one individual
rather than to another, and from this aspect it is special.
In the same way
various texts from Scripture, the councils, the Fathers, and St. Thomas,
which seem to be contradictory, are reconciled. For example: “No one has
anything of himself but sin and lying,” says the Council of Orange (can.
22). That is to say, no one tells the truth with honest intent without
at least the natural assistance of God, which is a grace, broadly
speaking, with respect to this man on whom it is bestowed rather than on
another; otherwise it would have the meaning which Baius gives to it
when he says: “Man’s free will, without the grace and help of God, is of
no use except to commit sin.” Baius means not only natural assistance,
or grace broadly speaking, but grace in the proper sense, which comes
from Christ, hence sanctifying grace and charity.
ARTICLE III.
WHETHER MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE
ALL THINGS WITHOUT GRACE, BY HIS
MERELY NATURAL POWER
We are especially
concerned, in this article, with the love of God, author of nature,
above all things, although there is still a reference in the reply to
the first objection to the love of God, author of grace, which proceeds
from infused charity. St. Thomas had already dealt with this subject (Ia,
4.60, a.5) in respect to the angels, and later (IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 3),
where he distinguishes more explicitly between natural and supernatural
love of God. (Likewise on I Cor., XIII, lect. 4; De virtutibus,
q. 2, a. 2 ad 16; q. 4, a. I ad 9; Quodl. I, q. 4, a. 3.)
In the statement
of the question he sets down the objections to the possibility of a
natural love of God above all things. Later, Baius and Jansen again
voice the same objections. This natural love of God above all things
seems impossible: 1. because loving God above all things is proper to
the act of infused charity; 2. since no creature can rise
above itself, it
cannot naturally love God more than itself; 3. because, grace would be
added to no purpose. Let us examine: 1. the doctrine of St. Thomas; 2.
its confirmation by the condemnation of Baius and Quesnel; 3. the
controversy of modern theologians on this subject.
I. THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS
This teaching
can be reduced to three conclusions treating of
1. the love of God, author of nature, above all
things in the state of integral nature.
2. the love of
God, author of nature, above all things in the state of corrupt nature.
3. the
supernatural love of God, author of grace, above all things.
We shall see
later, in reference to a particular problem, whether man in the state of
pure nature would be able to love God, author of nature, above all
things. This question is not solved by the Sed contra, because in
it the expression “by merely natural powers” does not refer to pure
nature but to integral nature. The article itself should be read.
Conclusion 1.
In the state of integral nature, man did not require an added gift of
grace to love God, the author of nature, above all things efficaciously;
he required only the help of God moving him to it, or natural
concurrence. This is proved as above, in regard to the angels, that is,
in forms.
Loving God, the
author of nature, above all things is natural to man and to every
creature, even irrational, in its own way; for, as the good of the part
is for the sake of the good of the whole, every particular thing
naturally loves its own good on account of the common good of the whole
universe, which is God.
But man in the
state of integral nature could have performed, by virtue of his nature,
the good which was natural to him.
Therefore man in
the state of integral nature could, by virtue of his nature without any
added grace, efficaciously love God the author of nature above all
things.
The major is
explained above (Ia, 60, a. 5) and later (IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 3).
According to Ia, 60, a. 5: “The natural inclination in those things
which are without reason throws some light upon the natural inclination
in the will of the intellectual nature. But in natural things,
everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally
and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs than toward
itself. For we observe that a (natural) part endangers itself naturally
for the preservation of the whole, as the hand exposes itself without
any deliberation to receive a blow for the safeguarding of the whole
body. And since reason imitates nature, we find an imitation of this
manner of acting in regard to political virtues. For it is the integral
nature; corrupt nature; part of a virtuous citizen to expose himself to
the danger of death for the safety of the whole nation. And if a man
were a natural part of this state, this inclination would be natural to
him. Since, therefore, the universal good is God Himself, and angels and
men and all creatures are encompassed by this goodness, and since every
creature naturally by its very being belongs to God, it follows that
even by a natural love angels and men love God in greater measure and
more fundamentally than they do themselves. Otherwise, if they naturally
loved themselves more than God, it would follow that natural love was
perverse and would not be perfected by charity but rather destroyed.”
These last words imply that in the state of pure nature man would be
able to love God naturally above all things, otherwise natural love
would be perverse; but we shall see in the second conclusion that this
is not so in the state of fallen nature on account of its wounds.
The major of the
present argument is entirely fundamental and a most beautiful concept.
It is thus explained (Ia, q. 60, a. 5 ad I): “Every (natural) part
naturally loves the whole more than itself. And every individual member
naturally loves the good of its species more than its own individual
good.” Hence onanism, preventing fertility, is a crime against nature,
against the good of the species. A good Thomist, then, loves and defends
the doctrine of St. Thomas more than his personal opinions. However, in
the exposition of this major the excess of pantheism must be avoided,
for then the creature would love God more than self naturally in such a
way that sin would be impossible. This impossibility of sinning only
follows confirmation in goodness, and especially the beatific vision.
The contrary
excess would be a pessimism arising from dualism, which would lead to
Manichaeism, that is, the doctrine of two principles. As Father
Rousselot demonstrates in his thesis, “Pour l’histoire du problème de
l’amour au Moyen Age,”
there are various theories
between these two mutually opposing excesses. There is already,
therefore, in our nature an inclination to love God, the author of
nature, more than ourselves.
Conclusion 2.
In the state of fallen nature, in order to love God, the author of
nature, above all things efficaciously, man requires the help of grace
restoring nature. (Cf. the end of the article’s conclusion.) The proof
given in the words of St. Thomas is as follows: “because, on account of
the corruption of nature, the will adheres to a private good, unless
cured by the grace of God.” In other words, unless cured by grace, man
does not refer to God, efficaciously loved as an end, his love of self
and of all other things; thus, unless cured by grace, man does not love
God more than himself with a natural love. And inasmuch as this
disordered inclination is perverse, it is called an inordinate love of
self, self-love, or egoism. By original sin, man’s will is directly
averse to his final supernatural end and indirectly to his final natural
end. For every sin against the supernatural law and end is indirectly
against the natural law which prescribes that God is to be obeyed,
whatever He commands. Hence fallen man is averse to God as his final end
even naturally.
Conclusion 3.
Man in any state requires the help of special grace to love God, the
author of grace, with an infused, supernatural love (cf. ad I). This is
of faith, contrary to Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism (Council of
Orange, can. 17, 25; Denz., nos. 190, 198; Council of Trent, Sess. VI,
can. 3; Denz. no. 813). It was declared that “if anyone should say that,
without a prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost and His assistance,
man can believe, hope, love, or repent in such a way that the grace of
justification would be conferred on him, let him be anathema.” This
definition of faith is based on the texts of Sacred Scripture quoted at
the Council of Orange as follows: “The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us (Rom. 5:5). “No man
can say the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost” (I Cor. 12:3). “The fruit
of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace” (Gal. 5:22). “Peace be to the
brethren and charity with faith, from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus
Christ” (Ephes. 6:23). “Dearly beloved, let us love one another, for
charity is of God. And everyone that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth
God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God: for God is charity” (I John
4:7 f.); that is, he does not know, as it were, experimentally, with an
affective knowledge. Baius and Quesnel said that he does not know in any
way.
In regard to the
explanation of this third conclusion, see the reply to the first
objection, which was quoted against Baius. St. Thomas says: “Nature
loves God above all things since God is the beginning and end of natural
good; charity, however, loves God since He is the object of
(supernatural) beatitude and since man has a certain spiritual
fellowship (by grace) with God.” From which is to be intimated what man
would be capable of even in the state of pure nature. Cf. IIa IIae, q.
26, a. 3, where it is declared that: “We can receive a two-fold good
from God, the good of nature and the good of grace. Moreover, natural
love is based upon the communication of natural goods made to us by
God. . . . Hence this is much more truly evident in the friendship of
charity, which is based upon the communication of the gifts of grace.”
Again in the reply to the second objection: “Any part loves the good of
the whole according as it is becoming to itself, not however in such a
way as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather so as to
refer itself to the good of the whole.” And in reply to the third
objection: “We love God more with a love of friendship than with a love
of concupiscence, for the good of God is in se greater than the good
which we can share by enjoying Him.” And thus, absolutely, man loves God
more in charity than himself. And he loves the God who is to be seen
more than the beatific vision or the created joy following upon this
vision. Thus, it may be said (IIa IIae, q. 17, a. 6 ad 3): “Charity
(inasmuch as it surpasses hope) properly causes a tending toward God,
uniting the affections of a man with God, so that man does not live for
himself but for God.” This is pure love properly understood, that is,
above hope; but not excluding hope, as the Quietists would have it.
Doubt.
Whether in the state of pure nature man would be able to love God the
author of nature, above all things, with a natural love.
Reply.
Thomists generally reply in the affirmative.
1. On account of
the universality of the principle invoked by St. Thomas (Ia, q. 60, a.
5, and in the present article): “Every creature according to its being
as such, is of God, and therefore it loves God with a natural love more
than self.” This principle is valid for any natural state in which there
is no disorder. But in the state of pure nature there would be no
disorder.
2. In Quodl.,
I, a.8, St. Thomas enunciates the principle of our article in a very
comprehensive way, so that it would be valid for any natural state in
which there is no perversion.
3. Since it is
said (Ia, q. 60, a. 5) that, “if (man) were to love himself naturally
more than God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and
that it would not be perfected by charity but destroyed.” But this
natural love would not be perverse in the state of pure nature.
Therefore.
4. Since man in
the state of pure nature would not be born, as now, habitually averse to
his final supernatural end directly and to his final natural end, but
the possibility of conversion or aversion.
Corollary.
Man has less powers in the state of fallen nature for naturally doing
what is morally good than he would have in the state of pure nature.
This is contested by several authors of the Society of Jesus.
II.CONFIRMATION OF THIS DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS FROM
THE CONDEMNATION OF
BAIUS (cf. Denz., nos.1034, 1036, 1038) AND QUESNEL (Denz.,nos. 1394-95)
The entire solution may be reduced to
the following:

Hence it must be firmly maintained that
the natural love of God above all things is the supreme precept of the
natural law, and with still greater reason does this hold in the
supernatural order, as it was already formulated in Deut. 6:5: “Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart”; but there it was
proclaimed as a law of thesupernatural order as well, as also in Matt.
22:27, Mark 12:30, Luke 10:27. But the natural law is neither abolished
by sin nor given by grace, since it is naturally stamped upon creatures.
III. CONTROVERSIES AMONG MODERN THEOLOGIANS ON THIS SUBJECT
The controversy
is twofold, first on natural love and secondly on supernatural love. The
first problem is whether fallen man can, without repairing grace, love
God the author of nature above all things with a love that is
affectively efficacious. (Cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. III, a.
3.) The second problem is whether the act of the love of God, author of
grace, considered substantially, is impossible without grace.
Molina denies this. First of all the terminology
must be explained as follows:

1. It is
certainly true that without grace there can be: a) an innate love or
natural inclination to love God above all things; this is the faculty of
the will itself; b) a necessary, elicited love of God vaguely loved in
happiness in general, which all desire; in this case God is not loved
above all things, since He is not considered as distinct from all other
goods; c) a free inefficacious love, or simple complacency in the
goodness of God, not going so far as to adopt means of pleasing God nor
of withdrawing from mortal sin, for which natural concurrence would be
adequate. Thus many poets have written beautiful poems on the goodness
and wisdom of God, ruler of the world, but without the intention of
reforming their voluptuous lives.
2. We
shall see in the following article that effectively efficacious love, at
least absolutely, or the practice of all the commands of the natural law
which are gravely obligatory, cannot now be possessed without a special
healing grace.
3. The
controversy, therefore, concerns affectively efficacious love, by which
God, author of nature, distinctly known, is loved with esteem above all
things, with the intention of pleasing Him in all things and of
withdrawing from mortal sins against the natural law.
Thomists maintain
that this affectively efficacious love cannot exist in fallen man
without healing grace.
And in this regard they differ especially from Molina, who teaches that
fallen man can, by his natural powers, thus love God, the author of
nature, with an affectively efficacious love, and even, after having
been instructed in the teaching of faith, can, likewise by his natural
powers, love God as author of grace substantially, although not in
respect to supernaturalness of mode, which is bestowed by charity.
Molina adds to this that the affectively efficacious natural love of
God, author of nature, is not meritorious of grace (that would be Semi-Pelagianism)
but, on account of the covenant between God and Christ the Redeemer, if
man thus does what in him lies through his natural powers, God will not
refuse sanctifying grace.
With still greater reason, for Molina, if anyone imbued with the
doctrine of faith undertakes an act, natural substantially, of
affectively efficacious love of God, author of grace, God infuses
charity, and this love become supernatural in respect to mode and thus
available for salvation. Scotus, Gabriel, and certain others are cited
as holding the same opinion.
Against the first
of these teachings of Molina on the possibility of an affectively
efficacious love of God, author of nature, above all things without
grace, Thomists declare that: 1. This doctrine does not seem to preserve
sufficiently the sense of the words of the Council of Orange (can. 25;
Denz., no. 199): “We must believe that by the sin of the first man free
will was so inclined and weakened that no one subsequently is able
either to love God as he ought, . . . or to do for the sake of God what
is good, unless the grace of mercy anticipates him.” The Molinists reply
that the Council says, “as he ought with regard to salvation,” and hence
refers only to supernatural love. To this the
Thomists answer
that the Council is not referring to supernatural love alone, since it
repeats that the impotence to love God above all things arises not from
the supernaturalness of the act but from the infirmity of fallen nature;
therefore it refers to natural love as well, since the impotence arising
from the supernaturalness of the act was
already present
in the state of innocence. This also seems to be the meaning of the
Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 3; Denz., no. 813): “If anyone should
say that without the inspiration of the Holy Ghost and His assistance
man can believe, hope, love, or repent as is required in order that the
grace of justification should be granted to him, let him be anathema.”
Nevertheless, the
Thomists add, it is not possible for the grace of justification not to
be conferred upon one who loves God, the author of nature, above all
things with an affectively efficacious love. (Cf. below, q. 109, a. 6,
on whether man, without grace, can prepare himself for grace, and q.
112, a. 3.).
Moreover, the
aforesaid teaching of Molina is contrary to the final proposition of the
body of the present article of St. Thomas, where he contrasts the state
of fallen nature with that of integral nature: “In the state of corrupt
nature, man requires the help of grace healing nature, even for loving
God naturally above all things.” There is no doubt but that St. Thomas
is speaking also of affectively efficacious natural love, that is, with
the intention of pleasing God in all things and of withdrawing from
mortal sin. This is confirmed by what has been said above (Ia IIae, q.
89, a. 6): “When man begins to have the use of reason . . . (he should)
deliberate concerning himself. And if anyone orders his life toward the
proper end (that is, to God even as author of nature), he will obtain
the remission of original sin by grace. In the present article St.
Thomas is not yet speaking of effectively efficacious love, that is, of
the fulfillment of every natural precept; but he refers to it in the
following article.
Finally, the
opinion of Molina is thus refuted by theological argument: A weak power,
inclined to selfish good opposed to the divine, cannot produce the
superior act of a healthy power with reference to God, unless it is
healed. But man in the state of fallen nature has a weak will, inclined
to a selfish good. Therefore he cannot produce a preeminent work with
reference to God. This act is pre-eminently that of a healthy power,
since it virtually contains the fulfillment of the whole natural law,
for the actual accomplishment of the law follows from the efficacious
will to fulfill it. Hence grace is necessary not only for the actual
observance of the whole natural law, but also for the intention of
fulfilling it. Nor is the eflicacious natural volition granted for
accomplishing anything which is now naturally impossible.
This weakness of
the will consists in its “following a selfish good unless healed by the
grace of God,” as stated in the article. In other words, it is turned
away from God and even its natural final end; for sin offends God even
as author of nature. Moreover, it is a disorder of the concupiscence
which the demon augments and enkindles.
First doubt.
What, then, of the natural love of God in the separated souls of
children who die without baptism, of whom St. Thomas speaks
(IIa, d. 33,
q. 2, a. 2 ad 5)?
Reply.
There is, first of all, an innate love and a necessary, elicited mlove
of God, confusedly, as in happiness in general, for this love remains
even in the demons (Ia, q. 60, a. 5 ad 5). Secondly, there is a free,
imperfect, inefficacious love, or love of complacency, toward God as
principle of all natural good, but not really an efficacious love.
Otherwise we should have to deny the last proposition in the body of the
present article.
In this
connection it seems that, as stated in a.2 ad 3, “Nature is more
corrupted in regard to the appetite for good than in regard to the
knowledge of the truth.” For the mind of fallen man is able by its own
powers to judge speculatively that God is the highest good, lovable and
worthy of love above all things; but without healing grace, he is
incapable of recognizing this with his practical judgment, impelling him
to action. Hence the words of Medea spoken of by the poet: “I see what
is better, and I approve it (speculatively), but I follow what is
worse.” Man, then, is more deeply wounded in his will by which he sins
than in his intellect. If, therefore, a child, reaching the full use of
reason, loves God, the author of nature, above all things with an
affectively efficacious love, this can only be by means of healing
grace.
Objection.
Fallen man can, without grace, love his country, or his friend, or his
chastity more than his own life; therefore, with still greater reason
can he so love God, the author of nature.
Reply.
I reply by distinguishing the antecedent: fallen man does this without
the special help of God, if it is done from a worldly motive, such as
the desire for fame or glory, granted; but if from the pure motive of
virtue, denied; for this requires the special help of God, as conceded
to many pagans, according to Augustine. Moreover it is more difficult to
love God, the author of nature, above all things in a manner that is
affectively efficacious than to love the attractiveness of any
particular virtue more than one’s life; for this is, at least virtually,
to love all the virtues beyond all sensible feelings.This is more
difficult; for instance that a soldier, ready to die for his country, is
not willing to spare his enemy when he should.
Second doubt.
What grace is required for this affectively efficacious love of God,
author of nature above all things?
Reply.
Of itself, by reason of its object, it requires only help of a natural
order, but accidentally and indirectly, by reason of the elevation of
the human race to the supernatural order, it requires supernatural help,
that is, healing grace (as declared in the article). This is because the
aversion to a final natural end cannot be cured without the aversion to
a final supernatural end being cured; for this latter contains
indirectly an aversion to the final natural end, for every sin against
the supernatural law is indirectly against the natural law: God is to be
obeyed, whatever He may command. Moreover, as we shall state in the
following article, the love of God virtually includes the fulfillment of
the whole natural law, for which supernatural healing grace is required.
The Thomists also
reject the other opinion of Molina, that man imbued with the teaching of
faith can without grace love God, the author of grace, in respect to the
substance of this act, although not in respect to its mode as proper to
salvation. Contrary to this, the Thomists generally hold, as for the act
of faith, that the act is specified by its formal object; but the formal
object of the aforesaid act is God, the author of grace; therefore this
act is essentially supernatural, or supernatural in respect to substance
and not merely in respect to mode (cf. Salmanticenses, De Gratia,
disp. III, dub. III; and our De revelatione, I, 498, 511). A
natural act in respect to substance would be an act specified by a
natural object, such as an act of acquired temperance, which might yet
become supernatural in respect to mode, according as it is commanded by
charity and ordered by it to the reward of eternal life.
ARTICLE IV.
WHETHER MAN, WITHOUT GRACE, BY HIS NATURAL POWERS,\
CAN FULFILL THE PRECEPTS OF THE NATURAL LAW
State
of the question. In this
article, as is evident in the body, we are especially concerned with the
precepts of the decalogue which already belong to the natural law and
can substantially be fulfilled without charity; indeed, even the acts of
faith and hope can be accomplished in the state of mortal sin. Let us
examine:
1. St.
Thomas’ conclusions and arguments;
2. How
they are based on Holy Scripture and tradition;
3. The
refutation of the objections. (The article should be read.)
I. ST. THOMAS’ CONCLUSION
His first conclusion is that in the
state of corrupt nature, man cannot, without healing grace, fulfill all
the precepts of the natural law with respect to the substance of the
works, while on the contrary he would be able to do this without grace
in the state of integral nature (supposing, however, natural
concurrence). From these last words, which are found in St. Thomas, it
is evident that he is concerned in this instance with the precepts of
the natural law in respect to the substance of the works, for the
substance of a work correlative with a supernatural precept is
supernatural and cannot, even in the state of integral nature, be
produced without grace. In fact, precepts are called supernatural
because they enjoin acts which surpass the powers of nature. In article
two it is stated that “grace was necessary to man in the state of
integral nature in order to perform or will a supernatural work.”
The argument
supporting this conclusion is the same as in the preceding article for
the impossibility of loving God, author of nature, with an affectively
efficacious love; indeed the argument now holds with still greater
reason, that is, in the case of effectively efficacious love or the
fulfillment of all the precepts of the natural law.
In other words, a
weak man cannot of himself perform the very superior work of a healthy
man, unless he is first cured. Nor can a will turned away from even its
natural final end be properly oriented in regard to all the means to
that end. It would be rash to deny this first conclusion or to maintain
that effectively efficacious love of God, author of nature, above all
things can be attained without grace. This is conceded by the Molinists.
It would be rash because the
Council of Orange (Denz., nos. 181 ff., 199) refers not only to
impotence arising from the supernaturalness of the work, but from the
weakness of fallen nature.
The second
conclusion is that in no state can man without grace fulfill the
commands of the law with respect to the mode of acting, that is,
performing them from charity. This is of faith. St. Thomas makes the
assertion without proof, for he has already said, in article two, that
man even in the state of incorrupt nature required “grace added to
nature in order to perform or will supernatural good,” and particularly
to elicit a supernatural act of charity. For acts are specified by their
objects and therefore the act specified by a supernatural object is
essentially supernatural.
II. THE BASES OF TRADITION
They are
as indicated by Billuart, in addition to many texts of St. Augustine.
1. The
Council of Milevum (Denz., no. 105), against the Pelagians who
declared that without grace man can keep all the commandments of God,
but with difficulty; with grace, however, he can do so with facility; it
is defined that “if anyone should say . . . that grace . . . is given to
us that we may more easily fulfill the divine commands, and . . ., that,
without it, we are able to fulfill them, although not easily, let him be
anathema.” From this it is deduced that the commandments of God cannot
be fulfilled as is necessary for salvation, that is, from charity,
without grace.
St. Augustine
always defends this truth against the Pelagians in his De spiritu et
littera, De gratia Christi, De libero arbitrio; in the
book De haeresibus (heresy 88), speaking of the Pelagians, he
says: “They are such enemies of the grace of God that they believe a man
can accomplish all the divine commands without it.” Likewise, St.
Augustine on Ps. 118, conc. 5, and in Sermon 148 (de tempore),
chap. 5, where he is concerned with the precepts of the decalogue.
The opposite
error in Baius (Denz., nos. 1061,1062) was condemned because it rejects
the distinction between fulfilling the commandments in respect to
substance and in respect to mode, supernaturally.
2.
The Council of Orange
(II, c. 25; Denz., no. 199) declared: “We must believe that through the
sin of the first man free will was so inclined and weakened, that no one
has since . . . been able to perform what is good for the sake of God
unless the grace of divine mercy precedes him.” Hence St. Thomas’ second
conclusion is of faith; that is, without grace, men cannot fulfill the
commandments with respect to supernaturalness of mode, namely,
so as to be
performed out of charity. And the Molinists admit this.
Doubt.
Whether grace is necessary for the fulfilling of any supernatural
precept, in respect to its substance. Herein lies the controversy with
the Molinists. Scotus and the Molinists hold that without grace men
imbued with the teaching of faith can fulfill, substantially, even
interior works correlative to the supernatural precepts of faith, hope,
and charity.
Reply.
The Thomists reply that it is not possible, since precepts are called
supernatural because they enjoin acts which, in themselves, essentially
surpass the powers of nature, and these acts are such, in fact, because
they are specified by a supernatural formal object. Thus, for example,
an act of Christian faith differs from an act of acquired temperance.
Insistance
by Molina, Lugo, and Billot, that diversity of the activating principles
(that is, of habits) alone is sufficient to cause acts to differ in
species, even when they attain the same formal object.
Reply 1.
These very activating principles, that is, habits and powers, should be
specified by the formal object. 2. The Salmanticenses reply (De
gratia, disp. III, dub. III, no. 60): “I deny the antecedent, for if
it were true, as our adversaries contend, nothing in true philosophy but
would waver (or be overturned) in regard to species and the distinction
of powers and habits; we should be compelled to establish new bases such
as were not taught by Aristotle, Master Thomas, or the leaders of other
schools. Although younger writers would easily grant this, we should
have no leader from among the ancients. The result would indeed be to
the highest detriment of true wisdom; wherefore it is essential in this
respect to hinder their proclivity with all our powers.” Cf. other texts
of the Salmanticenses quoted in our De revelatione, I, 495.
To the same
effect Thomas de Lemos, O.P., replied in the celebrated discussions of
the Congregatio de Auxiliis, on May 7 and 28, 1604, before
Clement VIII (cf. De revelatione, I, 491). He challenged the
opinion of Molina in the following words: “By which system he would
overturn faith as well as philosophy; faith, certainly, because thus God
is feared and loved by the powers of nature, as the end is supernatural;
philosophy indeed since, in this way, the formal object of a superior
habit is attained by the inferior powers.” And on May 28, 1604, session
54 settled a problem proposed according to the interpretation of the
Thomists explained by Lemos. Lemos expresses the same opinion in his
Panoplia gratiae at the beginning of Bk. IV, nos. 24f. (Cf. De
revelatione, I, 491; Del Prado, De gratia, I, 48;
Suarez expresses agreement with us in De gratia, Bk. II, c. II,
nos. 22 f., quoted in De revelatione, ibid.) Thus Suarez,
as well as Lemos and the Salmanticenses considers it rash to deny the
aforesaid traditional teaching of theologians. In respect to this matter
many Jesuits follow Suarez, including the Wirzburg school (De
virtutibus theologicis, disp. II, c. III, a. 3); Bellarmine is also
cited and, among more recent writers, Wilmers (De fide divina,
1902, pp. 352, 358, 375); Mazzella, in the first two editions of De
virtutibus infusis, and Pesch (De gratia, nos. 69, 71, 410).
Objection.
The Molinists object, referring to Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2 where it is
stated that “the species of habits are distinguished in three ways: 1.
according to the activating principles of such dispositions, 2.
according to nature, 3. according to objects.” Therefore, declare the
Molinists, habits are not specified only by their objects.
Reply.
All of these are to be taken together and not separately. An act cannot
be essentially supernatural from the standpoint of its eliciting
principle and according as it presupposes habitual grace unless it is at
the same time supernatural from the standpoint of its object. Moreover,
we contend in De revelatione, I, 506, in agreement with the
Salmanticenses and other Thomists, that from St. Thomas’context it is
clearly evident that, when he says habits are specified according to
their active principles, he means according to their objective,
regulating, specifying principles; for he says in the answer to the
second objection of the same article: “The various means (of knowledge)
are like various active principles according to which the habits of
science are differentiated.” And in answer to the third objection:
“Diversity of ends differentiates virtues as diversity of active
principles” or motives according as the end is the object of a prior act
of the will, in other words, the intention.
Similarly in Ia
IIae, q. 51, a. 3, St. Thomas shows that the regulating reason is the
active principle of the moral virtues, and the understanding of
principles is the principle of knowledge, that is, as proposing the
formal object (objectum formale quo) or motive. Moreover, when he
says that habits are specified according to nature, this is according as
the habit is good or bad, suitable or not suitable to the nature; or
according as it is suitable to human nature as such, or suitable to the
divine nature in which man participates; but it cannot be of itself
suitable to a higher nature, unless at the same time it has a formal
object proportionate or of the same order; otherwise it would be an
accidentally infused habit, such as infused geometry. Father Ledochowski,
General of the Society of Jesus, further acknowledges that the teaching
of Molina we are discussing is not that of St. Thomas (cf. De
revelatione, I, 489).
III. REFUTATION
OF THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE NECESSITY OF GRACE FOR OBSERVING
SUBSTANTIALLY ALL THE PRECEPTS OF THE NATURAL LAW
The first
classical difficulty is
indicated by St. Thomas in the first objection, taken from the text of
St. Paul to the Romans (2:14): “The Gentiles who have not the (written)
law, do by nature those things which are of the law.”
Reply.
According to St. Augustine, followed by St. Prosper, St. Fulgentius, and
by St. Thomas here in his refutation, these words are to be understood
of the Gentiles acting from grace; and then “by nature” is not
interpreted according as it is opposed to grace, and according as it is
equivalent to “the powers of nature,” but according as it is opposed to
the Mosaic law, so that the meaning is: “The Gentiles who have not the
written law, do naturally those things which are of the law,” in other
words, without the law of Moses, but not without the spirit of grace.
Thus Augustine in De spiritu et littera, Bk. I, c. 27, quoted
here by St. Thomas; likewise St. Chrysostom.”
But other interpreters understand this of the infidel Gentiles and hence
“by nature” of the powers of nature; but this disposes of the objection
just as well, for the meaning is that the Gentiles by their own natural
powers perform certain works of the law, but not all.
The second
difficulty is as follows: if
the observance of the whole natural law, in respect to the substance of
the works, is impossible to fallen nature, then the Jansenist heresy
follows logically, that is, that certain of the precepts of God are
impossible to fallen man. Luther and Calvin held the same opinion.
Reply.
“What we can do with divine assistance is not altogether impossible for
us”; and we avoid Jansenism by declaring that the grace necessary to
accomplish the commandments is not wanting to anyone except by reason of
his own fault. All adults receive graces at least remotely sufficient
for salvation, and if they did not resist them, they would obtain
further graces. The error of Luther and Calvin is apparent from this:
according to them, Christ did not come to form observers of the law, but
to redeem the faithful from the obligation of observing the law, in
accordance with Luther’s words : “Sin strongly and believe more
strongly,” in other words, believe firmly that you are freely elect, and
you are saved, even if you persevere in crimes and the transgression of
the law until death.
The Jansenists
erred similarly by maintaining that certain commands of God are
impossible not only to fallen man, but even to the just man. This is
manifest from the first proposition of Jansen (Denz., no. 1092): “Other
precepts of God are impossible to just, willing, zealous men with the
powers which they now possess; they also lack the grace which would make
them possible”; in 1653 this was condemned as heretical. The Council of
Trent had previously defined (Denz., no. 804): “God does not command the
impossible, but by commanding He urges you both to do what you can and
to ask what you cannot, and He assists you that you may be able.” Also
in the corresponding canon (Denz., no. 828). The foregoing words of the
Council are taken from St. Augustine, and, according to them, sufficient
grace to pray is never wanting, and by it man has at least the remote
power of observing the divine precepts, for “by commanding, God urges
you to do what you can and to ask what you cannot, and He assists you
that you may be able.”
I insist.
God cannot demand that a blind man see, although he may see by a
miracle; therefore, neither can He demand that fallen man observe the
law, although he may do so by means of grace.
Reply.
The disparity lies particularly in the fact that the blind man is not
offered a miracle which would cure him; but fallen man is offered grace
by which he may observe the law, and he would receive it if he did not
voluntarily set obstacles in the way. Hence one must pray as did
Augustine, saying: “Lord, grant what Thou commandest and command what
Thou wilt,” that is, give us grace to fulfill Thy commands and command
what Thou wilt.
First doubt.
Which grace is required by fallen man for the keeping of the whole
natural law?
Reply.
As in the explanation of the preceding article: of itself, by reason of
its object, help of the natural order would suffice, since the object is
natural. Accidentally, however, and by reason of the elevation of the
human race to a supernatural end, supernatural grace is required, which
under this aspect is called healing grace. This is because in the
present economy of salvation man cannot be converted to God, his final
natural end, and remain estranged from God, his supernactural end, since
this aversion is indirectly opposed to the natural law, according to
which we ought to obey God, whatever He may command.
Second doubt.
To observe the whole natural law for a long time is supernatural actual
grace sufficient, or is habitual grace required?
Reply.
According to ordinary providence, habitual grace is required, by which
alone man is solidly well disposed toward his final end. And this firm
disposition toward his final end is itself required that man may keep
the whole natural law enduringly and perseveringly. Nevertheless, by an
extraordinary providence, God can fortify a man’s will in regard to the
observance of all the natural precepts by means of continuous actual
graces; but if a man does what lies within his power by the help of
actual grace, God will not withhold habitual grace from him. As we shall
see below (a. 9), over and above habitual grace, actual grace is
required for the just man to perform any supernatural good work, and
even to persevere for long in the observance of the whole natural law,
in spite of the rebellion of the sense appetites against reason, and the
temptations of the world and the devil.
Third doubt.
Whether in the state of pure nature man would be able to observe
enduringly the whole natural law without special help of the natural
order.
Reply.
I reply in the negative with Billuart: Since to do so demands constancy
of the will in good against the ternmations that arise. A constancy
which man established in the state of pure nature would not have had, of
himself, with the aid of ordinary concurrence alone; hence, to persevere
he would have had need of special natural help which God would have
given to many, but not to those in whom He would have permitted the sin
of impenitence of this natural order in punishment for preceding sins.
Cajetan’s opinion.
In his commentary on the present article, which preceded the disputes
aroused by Molina, at a time when the terminology of this subject was
not yet fully established, Cajetan spoke less accurately in explaining
the answer to the third objection. He says, “man, by nature, can
believe, hope, love God, with respect to the substance of the act,” and
he cites the example of a formal heretic who adheres to certain dogmas.
He expresses himself similarly in regard to IIa IIae, q. 171, a. 2 ad 3.
But it is evident from the context and from this example that Cajetan is
referring to the generic substance of the acts, not to the specific
substance, not to the formal object itself (objectum
formale quod et quo);
for a heretic believes formally, not by divine, but by human faith.
Later Cajetan
corrects his terminology (commenting on IIa IIae, q. 6, a. I, no. 3 ),
declaring that “it should be said, therefore, that the act of faith
springs forth as a result of no natural knowledge, of no natural
appetite, but from the appetite for eternal beatitude and from an
adherence to God supernaturally revealing and preserving His Church.”
Cajetan likewise defends the common opinion of Thomists against Scotus
and Durandus (Ia IIae, q. 51, a. 4): “Infused habits are of themselves
essentially supernatural.” Also, q. 62, a:3; q. 63, a. 6, and IIa IIae,
q. 17, a. 5, no. I, where he defends the opinion that with out infused
virtue there would be no act “proportionate to the supernatural object,”
nor to the supernatural end. (Cf. Del Prado, De gratia, I,
50 and our De revelatione, I, 484 f., note I.)
ARTICLE V.
WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT ETERNAL
LIFE WITHOUT GRACE
After considering
the observance of the divine commands in themselves, St. Thomas
considers it in relation to eternal life. The question is here posed
generally and indefinitely; later, in q. I 14, a. 1 2,3, here he is
dealing with merit properly speaking, the question will be more
particularly treated as to whether man without grace can merit de
condigno eternal life. The answer is negative and is of faith,
against the Pelagians.
1. It is
proved from authority in the argument Sed contra (Rom. 6:23):
“the grace of God life eternal,” which is thus explained by Augustine,
here quoted: “that it may be understood that God, in His compassion,
leads us unto eternal life.” St. Augustine is also quoted in the answer
to the second objection. (Cf. Council of Orange, II, can. 7, Denz., no.
180; and Trent, Sess. VI, can. 2, Denz., no. 812.)
2. It is
thus proved by theological reasons: Acts leading to an end must be
proportionate to the end. But eternal life is an end exceeding the
proportion of human nature (cf. Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 5, on supernatural
beatitude). Therefore man cannot by his natural powers produce works
meritorious of eternal life. Read the answer to the third objection with
respect to the distinction between final natural end and supernatural
end (cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chap. 147, and De veritate,
q. 14, a. 2). These references are clear, and whatever is to be said on
this subject is reserved for consideration in q. 114, a. 1 and 2, that
is, whether man can merit anything de condigno, and so merit
eternal life.
ARTICLE VI.
WHETHER MAN CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE
BY HIMSELF WITHOUT THE EXTERIOR HELP OF GRACE
State of the question.
The external help of grace with which we are here concerned, is not only
the preaching of the gospel itself, confirmed by miracles (the Pelagians
admitted this), nor is it only the natural concurrence of God for the
performance of a naturally good act, the necessity of which the Semi-Pelagians
did not deny, but, as the body of the article explains, it refers to
actual supernatural help.
That the
difficulty of this question may be more manifest, St. Thomas considers
the following. 1. The arguments maintained by the Pelagians or Semi-Pelagians,
namely. it seems that without actual grace man can prepare himself for
habitual grace, for, we read (Zach. 1:3): “Turn ye to Me . and I will
turn to you.” 2. It is frequently said. “To him who does what he can,
God does not deny grace”; and (Luke 11:13): “If you then, being evil,
know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your
Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him?” 3. It
would be an infinite process, since to prepare himself for a prior
grace, man would require another, and so on ad infinitum.
4. In the Book of Proverbs (16:1) it is said that “it is the part of man
to prepare the soul,” according to the Vulgate; but in many codices this
verse is lacking and in the Greek codices in which it occurs, the sense
is: “It is the part of man to form a proposal in his heart,” as if to
say: man proposes and God disposes.
On the other hand
we find in the Gospel according to St. John (6:44): “No man can come to
me, except the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him.” How are these
quotations to be reconciled? Let us examine 1. The errors on this
subject which have been condemned; 2. the disagreement among Catholic
theologians; and 3. the opinion of St. Thomas.
I. The
condemned errors. The Pelagians, denying original sin, maintained,
at least at the beginning of their heresy, that man by his own powers,
without grace, can prepare himself for grace so as to merit the first
grace. This was condemned by the Councils of Neo-Caesaria and Milevum (Denz.,
nos. 104 ff., 133 ff .).
The Semi-Pelagians said that fallen man, without grace, can have of
himself the beginning of salvation and can prepare himself for grace,
by asking, desiring, knocking, seeking; thus he does not merit grace,
but he disposes himself for it by himself alone, and God seizes upon
this beginning of salvation as an occasion for conferring grace,
otherwise He would be an acceptor of persons if He conferred grace upon
one rather than another without any reason on the part of man.”
This was condemned by the Council of Orange (II, can. 3 and 6, Denz.,
nos. 176,179). The same declaration was made by the Council of Trent (Sess.
VI, can. 3, Denz., no. 813).
II. Among Catholic theologians, notwithstanding the condemnation
of the Semi-Pelagians, Molina, following the lead of Durandus, Scotus,
and Gabriel Biel, maintains in his Concordia (disp. 10), that if
one does what one can by merely natural powers, God never denies actual
grace, and at last bestows sanctifying grace; not that man may prepare
himself positively for grace, but he prepares himself negatively by not
placing obstacles to it and by removing impediments.
And in order to avoid Semi-Pelagianism, Molina declares It that God
confers actual grace and subsequently habitual grace, not on account of
the merit of a natural act, but on account of the covenant between God
and Christ from the beginning. Christ indeed presented His merits to the
Father, and the Father promises that He will bestow grace upon anyone
who does what is possible to his natural powers or who uses well the
goods of nature.
III. The doctrine of St. Thomas, as is clear from the last lines
of the article and from the answer to the second objection, is that
fallen man cannot prepare himself for habitual grace except by the help
of prevenient actual grace, and “when it is said that man does what he
can, the meaning is that this is within the power of man, as he is moved
by God.” These words in the answer to the second objection are contrary
to the opinion proposed subsequently by Molina. Stated more briefly the
thesis of St. Thomas is: Fallen man can in no way dispose himself either
for habitual or for actual grace by his natural powers alone.
Scriptural proof. It is proved from the authority of Scripture in
the argument Sed contra: “No man can come to Me, except the
Father, who hath sent Me, draw him” (John 6:44). But if man could
prepare himself, there would be no need of his being drawn by another.
“Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted” (Lam. 5:21).
See also Jer. 31:18. “The will is prepared by the Lord” (Prov. 8:35,
according to the Septuagint, but the Hebrew text is not so clear). St.
Augustine here and there puts it forward against the Semi-Pelagians, and
it is quoted by the Council of Orange, Denz., no. 177). “Without Me you
can do nothing” (John 15:15); therefore neither can one prepare oneself
for grace, since that is doing something ordained to salvation. “Who
hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? For of Him,
and by Him, and in Him, are all things” (Rom. 11:35 f.). According to
the contrary opinion a man could reply: I first gave him my effort and
disposition. “Who distinguisheth thee?” (I Cor. 4:7.) Man may answer: my
striving. “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” (ibid.)
Man may reply: I have my effort and my disposition. “You have not chosen
Me: but I have chosen you” (John 15:16). The Semi-Pelagians would say: I
chose Thee first by disposing myself for grace. This text is addressed
to the apostles, of course, but in that they are the friends of God, and
therefore it also applies to other friends of God.
The Council of Orange (can. 3, Denz., no. 176), according to the obvious
meaning of the words, declares that all preparation for grace is of
itself prevenient grace; there is no reference to a covenant entered
into between God the Father and Christ. Read canons 3, 4, 5. Likewise
the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, chap. 5, Denz. 797, and chap. 6).
St. Augustine (De peccatorum meritis, Bk. I, chap. 22),
especially in the three arguments against the Semi-Pelagians, maintained
the following.
1. In the affair of salvation nothing at all must be withdrawn from
divine grace; but something would be withdrawn if the disposition for
grace were not from grace.
2. The Church prays God not only to help those who will and strive after
good, but also that those who will it not be made to will it.
3. It is said in II Cor. 3:5: “Not that we are sufficient to think
anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.” But the slightest preparation
for grace is a good thought. Therefore. Hence the words of Augustine on
St. John, at the beginning of tract 26: “Why does God draw this man and
not that man? Do not attempt to judge if you do not wish to err.”
Theological
proof. By theological
argument St. Thomas thus proves his thesis in the body of the article in
form.
Since every agent
acts on account of a proportionate end, the order of agents corresponds
to the order of ends, and the disposition toward a supernatural end
cannot be produced except by God, the supernatural agent.
But man prepares
himself for grace according as he disposes himself for it as for a
proximate supernatural end, and according as he turns to God as to his
final supernatural end.
Therefore man
cannot prepare himself for grace except by the supernatural help of God,
moving him. St. Thomas does not fear to repeat this principle often;
these repetitions are a kind of leitmotiv in theology, like St. John’s
often repeated: “Beloved, let us love one another” (I John 4:7).
The major of this
argument is based on the principle of finality, not that from this
metaphysical principle the dogma may be rationally demonstrated, but
that the dogma cannot be contrary to the principle of finality. For the
corollary of this principle is: the order of agents corresponds to the
order of ends; hence it is necessary that man be converted to his final
end by the motion of the prime mover, just as the will of the soldier is
directed toward striving for victory by the motion of the leader of the
army, and toward following the standard of some battle by the motion of
the commander. Moreover, according to this principle, the disposition
toward a supernatural end cannot be produced except by a supernatural
agent, that is, except by God according as He moves toward something
which exceeds all nature created or capable of being created.
The minor of this
argument, however, is explained later in more detail, but it is already
self-evident (cf. q. 112, a. 3). More briefly, the argument can be
stated thus:
Every
disposition, whether remote or proximate, should have a certain
proportion to the form for which it disposes; otherwise it would not
dispose for it.
But merely
natural acts have no proportion with supernatural grace; they do not
attain to the life of grace nor do they in any way require it.
Therefore man by
his own natural powers cannot prepare himself even remotely for grace,
without supernatural help; it is not only morally impossible, but
physically and absolutely as well.
Confirmation.
In order to dispose himself, man would at least need to have a good
thought from himself.
But, according to
II Cor. 3:5: “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,
as of ourselves,” in the order of salvation.
Hence, with still
greater reason, to desire, ask, merit even de congruo, or dispose
ourselves in any way. For merit de congruo already pertains to
salvation; it is a right, based on friendship, to a supernatural reward.
And if man without grace could pray and thus obtain grace, the first
step to salvation would be attributable to nature. Hence this is
condemned by the Council of Orange, c. 7.
The whole proof,
therefore, is reducible to the infinite distance between the order of
nature and the order of grace, since grace as essentially supernatural
surpasses the powers and the requirements of any intellectual nature,
created or capable of creation. God from all eternity might at any time
create angels of greater and ever greater perfection so that they would
have an ever loftier natural intelligence and an ever more steadfast
will; but never could these superior angels naturally dispose themselves
for grace, which is of a higher order.
Thus the
imagination may become ever better endowed in its own order but it will
never arrive at the dignity of the intellect; thus the sides of a
polygon inscribed in a circle may be ever multiplied but, however small
each side, it will never be equivalent to a point. With still greater
reason, when it is a question of the impossibility of disposing oneself
naturally for the life of grace, natural good works can be ever
increased, but they will never amount to a disposition proportionate to
grace, which is essentially supernatural, whether for man or for any
angel capable of being created, and they can always be created with
greater perfection, since no limit of possibility can be named which
would exhaust divine omnipotence.
How beautiful,
how wonderful; how great a light there is in this doctrine! “All bodies,
the firmament and the stars, the earth and its kingdoms, are not worth
the least of spirits, for it is conscious of all that and of itself; and
bodies are conscious of nothing. All bodies and all spirits together and
all their productions are not worth the slightest movement of charity,
for that is of an infinitely higher order” (Pascal, Thoughts).
Confirmation from
the refutation of the objections.
First
objection. But it is said in
Zach. 1:3: “Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you.”
Reply.
It is indeed prescribed for man that he turn to God freely, but the free
will cannot turn to God unless God Himself converts it to Himself,
according to the words of Jer. 31:18: “Convert me, and I shall be
converted.” Likewise Augustine and the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, chap.
6; Denz., no. 797).
Second
objection. But it is
generally said that to him who does what he can God does not deny grace.
Reply.
Contrary to what Molina says, to him who does what he can, with God’s
help; and it is a question of supernatural help granted through Christ
the Redeemer, since the following words of Christ are quoted: “Without
Me ye can do nothing.” Nor does natural help suflice to produce a
disposition which is supernatural in form, since the order of agents
should correspond to the order of ends. And God, as author of nature,
cannot move one to a supernatural end.
Third
objection. But this would be
an infinite process, for man would need some grace to prepare himself
for grace, and so on indefinitely.
Reply.
A disposition is required only for habitual grace, for every form
requires a disposition capable of receiving it. But for actual grace a
disposition is not required, since a disposition is not necessary for
yet another disposition.
Fourth
objection. But in Prov. 16:1
it is written: “It is the part of man to prepare the soul and of the
Lord to govern the tongue”; and further: “The heart of man disposes the
way, but it is the Lord who directs his steps.”
Reply.
Certainly, because man does this through his free will, but he does not
therefore do it without the help of God moving and drawing him. The
meaning of Holy Scripture here is that it does not suffice to consider
what thou wilt say or do, unless God directs the tongue and the work so
that thou mayest succeed. And this is also a very common saying: Man
proposes and God disposes. St. Thomas teaches this doctrine in several
other places as well. (Cf. Quodl., Ia, a. 7; in Ed. ad
Rom., c. 10, lect. 3; III C. Gentes, chap. 150;
De verit., q. 24, a. 15.)
Doubt.
Whether according to St. Thomas, following the doctrine which he
maintains in Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 6, to all who arrive at the use of
reason sufficient help is given for fulfilling the precept, there and
then urgent, of loving God efficaciously above all things.
Reply.
The Salmanticenses reply in the affirmative (In lam llae, q. 89,
a. 6, no. 65); God gives efficacious help only to those whom He at the
same time decided to justify and with the aforesaid efficacious help He
gives them sanctifying grace and explicit faith concerning the things
which are necessary as means essential to salvation.
Whether this
sufficient help which is then given to all is supernatural. It is at
least supernatural modally through the merits of Christ; but it may also
be said that it is supernatural substantially since it gives the
proximate power of accomplishing an efficacious act of the love of God
above all things, beyond the powers of fallen nature. This supernatural
help should result in a certain supernatural enlightenment for the
intellect and, if man would not resist this enlightenment, he would
receive the grace of faith with respect to the things necessary to
salvation. (Cf. below, what is said on justification and the salutary
but not meritorious acts which precede it; also Billuart, De gratia,
diss. VII, a. 4, nos. 2,3.)
It should be
remarked that Quesnel’s proposition was condemned:
“No graces are
given except through faith” (Denz., no. 1376); “Faith is the first grace
and the source of all the others” (Denz., no. 1377); “The first grace
which God grants to the sinner is the remission of sins” (Denz., no.
1378); likewise the Synod of Pistoia was condemned, denying grace
preceding good will and faith.
Concerning the
Molinist interpretation of the common axiom: “to him who does what he
can, God does not refuse grace.” Cf. Concordia, disp. X, latest
edition, Paris, pp. 43 and 564: “God always confers the helps of
prevenient grace on him who strives with natural powers to accomplish
what in him lies.” Molina, as we have said, maintained that: to him who
does what he can by his natural powers alone, God never denies actual
grace, and later He gives habitual grace. To avoid Semi-Pelagianism, he
continues, 1. claiming that this is done not on account of the value of
a natural good work, but for the sake of a convenant entered into
between God and Christ the Redeemer, a covenant for thus certainly
conferring grace; and 2. claiming that man thus naturally prepares
himself negatively only, that is, by not raising obstacles, not sinning
at least for some little time; but always, or as it were infallibly,
actual grace is then conferred upon him.
What is to be
thought of this covenant and of this natural, negative preparation? In
regard to the covenant, we may say with the Thomists that it lacks a
basis in tradition; on the contrary, it seems to be opposed to the
testimony of tradition and to the principles of sound theology.
1. This
pact has no basis either in Scripture or in the councils or in the
Fathers, Hence it is clearly fictitious. Certainly the Council of Orange
does not speak of it, although it would have been most useful for
recalling the Semi-Pelagians to the faith, had this theory been true.
The Semi-Pelagians would very easily have admitted it, since they did
not deny Redemption through Christ nor did they deny that the primary
grace was |