151.smtAquin.: SMT SS Q[90] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (THREE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration: 
under which head there are three points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

 (2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

 (3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man. Origen says 
(Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes to live 
according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according 
to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it is evident 
that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is manifest that 
the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living God."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion. But 
it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore seemingly it 
is also unlawful to adjure a man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it belongs 
to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior imposes an 
oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy 
things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy of God" 
(Rm. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is 
lawful to adjure.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his 
reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his 
promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders 
himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order 
himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by beseeching 
his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as stated above (Q[83], 
A[1]). Accordingly when either of these orderings is confirmed by 
something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference 
between them, that man is master of his own actions but not of those of 
others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by invoking the 
Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an obligation unless 
they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the strength of the oath they 
have taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing, 
intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an 
obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind 
himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over 
another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their inferiors 
by this kind of adjuration, if there be need  for it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or 
of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without 
putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully 
employed in respect of anyone.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man intends 
to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would bind 
himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure our Lord 
Jesus Christ [*Mt. 26:63].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an 
obligation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to employ 
terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain 
thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we 
adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence 
for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God 
Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through His 
eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says (Tract. 
xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance with the 
power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice." Now rather 
than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power given by 
Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when invoking 
the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration. Therefore, if 
it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of 
necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore the 
antecedent is false also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact associates 
himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship with the 
demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you should be made 
partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall cast 
out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of 
God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there are  two ways 
of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of some 
holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is not 
lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of 
benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the 
demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion, we 
may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during the 
course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are 
not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy angels, 
because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), "the rebel spirit is ruled 
by the just spirit." Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as being our 
enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name, lest they do 
us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, 
as recorded by Lk. 10:19: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon 
serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing 
shall hurt you."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning 
something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this 
would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain 
holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of the 
demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of the 
Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam. Apost. 
vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the 
instrumentality of the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not authoritatively 
by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly appeal.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to 
obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated 
above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the 
unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man," says: 
"A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the demons, 
however much they speak the truth."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby the demon's 
help is besought in doing or learning something: for this savors of 
fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by 
adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. An 
adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to one 
that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it is 
vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible,  swearing 
is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an irrational 
creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards 
one.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above 
(AA[1],2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed towards 
irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own actions. 
The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seemingly, 
neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we have not the 
power to command irrational creatures, but only He of Whom it was said 
(Mt. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea obey Him." Therefore in no way, 
apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and 
to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the apocryphal 
Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions by 
some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is also 
the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the arrow is 
an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the irrational 
creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God, Who 
disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to the devil, 
who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational creatures in order to 
inflict harm on man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two 
kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational 
creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an 
irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director and 
mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of this 
kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to God, and 
this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God: secondly, by 
way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses the irrational 
creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration used in the 
exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is expelled from 
an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure the demons by 
beseeching them to help us.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] Out. Para. 1/1

OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF 
PRAISE (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of 
invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken (Q[83]
). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there are two 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?

 (2) Whether God should be praised with song?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether God should be praised with the lips?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the lips. The 
Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): "The best of men ere accorded not praise, 
but something greater." But God transcends the very best of all things. 
Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but something greater than 
praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. 43:33) to be "above all praise."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is an 
act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than with the 
lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the words of Is. 
29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies'] Me with their lips, 
but their heart is far from Me." Therefore the praise of God lies in the 
heart rather than on the lips.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be 
encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked 
proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is 
written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so a 
man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth." But God is not incited 
to better things by man's words, both because He is unchangeable, and 
because He is supremely good, and it is not possible for Him to grow 
better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise Thee 
with joyful lips."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in 
speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man we use 
words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him. 
Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others may 
learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may 
incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who hear 
him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to imitate him. 
On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not indeed to make 
known our thoughts to Him Who is the searcher of hearts, but that we may 
bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His 
sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is aroused 
towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise shall 
glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the salvation 
of God." And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in his affections 
to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed to God, according 
to Is. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee lest thou shouldst 
perish." The praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting 
their affections towards God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 33:2): "His 
praise shall always be in my mouth," and farther on: "Let the meek hear 
and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with me." 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to His 
essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He is 
above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the honor of 
latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his Psalter 
[*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is speechless, O God," as 
regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow shall be paid to Thee." 
Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which are ordained for 
our good. In this respect we owe Him praise; wherefore it is written (Is. 
63:7): "I will remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of the 
Lord for all the things that the Lord hath bestowed upon us." Again, 
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns," 
i.e. divine praises "of the sacred writers, are directed respectively to 
the Blessed Processions of the Thearchy," i.e. of the Godhead, "showing 
forth and praising the names of God."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one 
praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when it 
fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus. 
17:7,8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward 
fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise God, as stated 
above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as stated.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether God should be praised with song?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song. For the 
Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one another in 
psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should employ nothing in 
the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of 
Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should 
employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing and 
making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men whose 
duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not with the 
voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors, ease your 
throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the church resound with 
theatrical measures and airs." Therefore God should not be praised with 
song.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great, 
according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His servants; and 
you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who are in the 
church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): "I 
hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar must not 
sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana Ecclesia). 
Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical instruments 
and human song, according to Ps. 32:2,3: "Give praise to the Lord on the 
harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing 
to Him a new canticle." But the Church does not make use of musical 
instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine praises, for fear 
of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like manner neither should 
song be used in the divine praises.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the 
praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by singing, 
both because the attention of the singers is distracted from the 
consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all their 
attention to the chant, and because others are less able to understand 
the thing that are sung than if they were recited without chant. 
Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of 
Milan, a Augustine relates (Confess. ix).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the praise of the voice is 
necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore 
whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in 
the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in 
various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher 
state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). Hence 
the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that 
the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion. 
Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am inclined to approve of 
the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears 
the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion": and he says of 
himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched to 
the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to 
those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are sung 
outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse spiritual 
devotion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but reproves 
those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse devotion, 
but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says 
(Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved by the voice than 
by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally, and then had rather 
not hear the singer."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is a 
more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, whom 
it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of preaching and 
teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest thereby they be 
withdrawn from greater things. Hence  Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): 
"It is a most discreditable custom for those who have been raised to the 
diaconate to serve as choristers, for it behooves them to give their 
whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking charge of the alms."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), "Teaching should 
not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument such as the 
harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such things as make 
good hearers." For such like musical instruments move the soul to 
pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it. In the Old 
Testament instruments of this description were employed, both because the 
people were more coarse and carnal---so that they needed to be aroused by 
such instruments as also by earthly promises---and because these material 
instruments were figures of something else.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a chant 
that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the singer 
chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what he says, 
both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as Augustine remarks 
(Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit, according to its 
variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice, and singing, by 
some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred." The same applies to 
the hearers, for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet 
they understand why it is sung, namely, for God's glory: and this is 
enough to arouse their devotion.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] Out. Para. 1/2

VICES OPPOSED TO RELIGION (QQ[92]-114)


SUPERSTITION, i.e. BY WAY OF EXCESS (QQ[92]-96)


OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)

 In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. 
First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship 
to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly 
contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that 
pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of 
superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must 
consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards 
irreligion and its parts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?

 (2) Whether it has several parts or species?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to 
religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other. 
But religion is included in the definition of superstition:  for the 
latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of religion," according 
to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in 
superstition." Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura Deorum ii, 
28] states that the superstitious were so called because they spent the 
day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive 
[superstites] them." But this may be done even in accordance with true 
religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to 
religion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion 
admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q[81], A[5], ad 3), there is 
no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe 
Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou 
strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of 
superstition hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to 
religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]), religion is a moral 
virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above (FS, 
Q[64], A[1]). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One 
by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of 
virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called 
"how much," but also with regard to other circumstances: so that, in 
certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the 
mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, 
but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of 
virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought 
not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the 
Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not 
that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but because 
it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it 
ought not.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil 
things---thus we speak of a good thief---so too sometimes the names of 
the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence 
is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Lk. 16:8, "The 
children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their 
generation than the children of light." It is in this way that 
superstition is described as religion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its 
etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of 
signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which  it is 
applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ 
sometimes: for "lapis" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot 
[laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts 
the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that 
"superstition" means that from which the word is derived.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute 
quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate 
quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship 
that ought not to be done.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there are various species of superstition?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. 
According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one contrary includes 
many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to which superstition is 
contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to 
the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to 
which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are 
directed to God, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Therefore superstition, 
which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations 
of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a show of 
wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a hypocritical 
religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of 
superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition 
(De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going 
beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances (A[1]). For 
as we have stated (FS, Q[72], A[9]), not every diversity of corrupt 
circumstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is 
referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this 
respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above 
(FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], AA[2],6).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on the 
part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine 
worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the 
true God, but "in an undue mode," and this is the first species of 
superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any 
creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition, divided 
into many species in respect of the various ends of divine worship. For 
the end of divine worship is in  the first place to give reverence to 
God, and in this respect the first species of this genus is "idolatry," 
which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of religion 
is that man may be taught by God Whom he worships; and to this must be 
referred "divinatory" superstition, which consults the demons through 
compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of 
divine worship is a certain direction of human acts according to the 
precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred 
the superstition of certain "observances."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he 
says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is 
superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to 
say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose 
of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to the second 
species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind belong all sorts 
of amulets and such like," and this refers to the third species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from a 
cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single 
defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated 
above (A[1]; Q[10], A[5]). The saying of the Philosopher is true of 
opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head of 
superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons: 
and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for "religion as 
applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore 
this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in 
an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to 
wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of 
religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] Out. Para. 1/2

OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of 
the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God; 
(2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4) 
of the superstition of observances.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true 
God?

 (2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in the 
worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone that shall 
call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Now whoever worships God 
calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is conducive to 
salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in any 
age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just worshiped God 
in whatever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: wherefore 
Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special kind of worship, as 
related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no worship of God is pernicious.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet the 
Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore Gregory, 
replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who 
stated that there existed in the churches various customs in the 
celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose carefully whatever you 
find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the Roman territory, 
or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the Church." Therefore no 
way of worshiping God is pernicious.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. August. 
Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in a gloss on 
Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal 
observances became deadly," and yet these observances belonged to the 
worship of God. Therefore there can be something deadly in the divine 
worship.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most 
pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to 
Christian religion." Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which 
is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by word, so it 
is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that the outward 
worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q[81], A[7]). Consequently, 
if anything false is signified by outward worship, this worship will be 
pernicious.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the part 
of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something 
discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the 
mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to make 
use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of Christ were 
foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be pernicious for anyone 
to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood 
in outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and especially in 
common worship which is offered by ministers impersonating the whole 
Church. For even as he would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the 
name of another person, proffer things that are not committed to him, so 
too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the 
Church,  gives worship to God contrary to the manner established by the 
Church or divine authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence 
Ambrose [*Comment. in 1 ad Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter 
Lombard] says: "He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than 
Christ delivered it." For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says 
that superstition is "the use of human observances under the name of 
religion."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in 
spirit and truth, according to Jn. 4:23. Hence a worship that contains 
falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by an 
inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others followed 
them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts about this 
matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship are 
in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to 
disregard them is unlawful.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship of God. 
It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, 
for He will yet far exceed." Now the divine worship is directed to the 
glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship, 
"whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as Augustine 
says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and 
charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we have 
received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God. Therefore 
if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there will be no 
excess in the divine worship.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that the 
good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy 
Writ." But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be 
superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with 
regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in 
the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God. 
Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion, 
through not being proportionate  to its end. Now the end of divine 
worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind and 
body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God's glory, and 
subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of 
the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship, provided it 
be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in 
keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to 
God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate 
concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments 
of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general 
custom---which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep. xxxvi], "has the 
force of law"---all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, 
because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection 
with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) 
quotes the words of Lk. 17:21, "The kingdom of God is within you," 
against the "superstitious," those, to wit, who pay more attention to 
externals.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is done 
for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so that 
there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with external 
acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute quantity.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] Out. Para. 1/1

OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of 
inquiry:

 (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?

 (2) Whether it is a sin?

 (3) Whether it is the gravest sin?

 (4) Of the cause of this sin.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of 
superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. But 
heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q[11], A[1]). Therefore 
idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which 
superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied to 
idolatry and to that which belongs to the  true religion. For just as we 
speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of 
true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of 
false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God, 
which is the latria of true religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species 
of superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any 
genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 
8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and further on (1 
Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to 
idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?" implying an answer in 
the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry. 
Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of 
superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to whom 
that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just as it is 
undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rm. 
1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the creature rather than the 
Creator." Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly called 
idolatry, and should rather be named "worship of creatures."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited Silas 
and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing the 
whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says: "Ye 
men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious." 
Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[92], A[2]), it belongs to superstition 
to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when 
divine worship is given to whom it should not be given. Now it should be 
given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]) 
when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give 
worship to any creature whatsoever.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 2/5

 Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means 
of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it 
given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is 
called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways. 
For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced 
certain effects by the power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that 
the images themselves contained something God-like, and consequently that 
divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes 
Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep], as Augustine states (De Civ. 
Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to 
the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these 
(Rm. 1:23,25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the 
glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a 
corruptible man, and of birds, and of  four-footed beasts, and of 
creeping things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served 
the creature rather than the Creator."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 3/5

 These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men 
to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men: for 
instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole 
world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but by 
reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God to 
be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and reason: 
even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his 
soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the 
whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all such 
things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro 
asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, 
namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the cause of 
all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances created by 
the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account of their having a 
share of the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed 
the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they 
stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again 
they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up into the 
fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit of their 
virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De 
Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 4/5

 The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which 
the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in the 
schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said to 
belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be represented on the 
stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating 
to images was held to belong to "civil theology," which was celebrated by 
the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 5/5

 Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry. 
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything invented 
by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to 
a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of faith by 
outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by external 
worship. Such a confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by 
the term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore heresy is a 
species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one sense it 
may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and then its 
signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in 
this sense, the thing to which it is shown is  not included in its 
definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to true 
religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the 
same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false king. In another sense 
latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it 
is essential thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be 
given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria of 
true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is applied equivocally 
to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which is carnal.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is nothing in the 
world" means that those images which were called idols, were not 
animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though 
they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we must 
understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice to idols is not 
anything," because by being thus sacrificed the sacrificial flesh 
acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles thought, nor 
uncleanness, as the Jews held.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles of 
worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the term 
"idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without 
the use of images.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether idolatry is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin that 
the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith employs 
images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there 
images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the Church are 
images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby 
idols are worshipped, is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the 
angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it will 
be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward 
worship, according to Jn. 4:24, "God . . . they must adore . . . in 
spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God is 
worshipped by faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to worship 
idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly. 
Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice 
to the divine worship.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore them," 
i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains it: 
and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin 
to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter.  For some 
[*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and other 
things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others 
aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor 
should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this 
is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the 
same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to 
the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the 
worship of latria.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 2/4

 Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible 
sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most 
high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely, 
the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine, as quoted 
below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), 
"external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are 
signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter 
significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they 
signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we should 
offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible 
sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 3/4

 Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, 
not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but as being 
in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) 
quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in such a way as to 
remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom rather than with 
the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says that "we must not 
seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for 
sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various 
and contrary opinions about the nature of their gods, and the sovereign 
good." This error was embraced also by certain heretics [*The 
Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized in 
time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the 
faith in his heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 4/4

 But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the 
inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of what 
one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to 
pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one's heart. 
Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his 
worship of idols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he 
did dishonestly were so done by him that the people believed him to act 
honestly."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor 
again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria may 
be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that 
belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed and 
confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ, 
to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in 
the TP, Q[25], A[3]. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has 
been said above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst 
is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior worship, which 
consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship. 
Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are opposed to 
internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to 
external worship.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it is. 
Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, or 
denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to another, which 
pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith are 
more grievous sins than idolatry.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater 
evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against nature, 
as stated in Rm. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin 
than idolatry.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we say 
that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that 
you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet 
you are much worse than they are, for they worship things that exist, but 
should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist 
not at all." Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous 
than idolatry.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you again to 
the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the Law, to which 
they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols, 
to which they had been given before their conversion." Therefore idolatry 
is not the most grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the 
uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every sin 
is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. 
First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most 
grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly 
commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another 
than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the 
whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against 
God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be 
for a man to give God's honor to a creature, since, so far as he is 
concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine 
sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part 
of the sinner. Thus  the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to be 
graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way 
nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they 
have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin 
through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account 
of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds 
undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without internal 
unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated above (A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it 
deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith by 
deeds.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the 
will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in 
order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but 
it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against 
nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more 
manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, 
in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor, 
so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of 
his own nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is 
more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more 
derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition 
to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is 
different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and 
worship Him alone.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not 
quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, 
because both are species of pestiferous superstition.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of 
man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the 
cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's nature, since rather 
does man's natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine 
worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, 
neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since 
"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit," according to Mt. 7:18: nor 
again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, 
"the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end 
of all evil." Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among 
men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated [*Peter 
Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated either by 
Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, 
who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the 
Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first 
to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to 
make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the 
sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not 
possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. the 
demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what 
name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and 
their professors": and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry. 
Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men 
they," i.e. idols, "came into the world."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive 
cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account 
of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine 
honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is 
assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made 
to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who 
then had died as a man he began to worship as a god." The same passage 
goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving either their affection, or 
their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg.: 'names']," i.e. of the 
Godhead, "to stones and wood." Secondly, because man takes a natural 
pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), 
wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully 
fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; 
hence it is written (Wis. 13:11-17): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut 
down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of 
his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and 
then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his 
children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of the 
true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave 
divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, 
wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1,2): "All men . . . neither by 
attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have 
imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of 
the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods 
that rule the world."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of 
the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving 
answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. 
Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of  the Gentiles are 
devils."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, 
a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or 
disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. 
Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin, 
because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some 
time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or 
through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in 
so far as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as 
homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may 
precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent 
remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in 
his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished 
by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] Out. Para. 1/1

OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there 
are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether divination is a sin?

 (2) Whether it is a species of superstition?

 (3) Of the species of divination;

 (4) Of divination by means of demons;

 (5) Of divination by the stars;

 (6) Of divination by dreams;

 (7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;

 (8) Of divination by lots.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether divination is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived 
from something "divine": and things that are divine pertain to holiness 
rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to say 
that learning is an evil?" and again: "I could nowise admit that 
intelligence can be an evil." But some arts are divinatory, as the 
Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to 
pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that 
divination is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature 
inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to 
foreknow future events; and this belongs to  divination. Therefore 
divination is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be 
found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or 
fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui 
divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a 
penance of five years' duration, according to the fixed grades of 
penance."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The 
future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in 
itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce 
their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects can 
be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, 
even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes produce their 
effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they 
rarely fail: and from such like causes their future effects can be 
foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even 
as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things 
concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and 
death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent; 
and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in 
relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 
2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes 
by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a 
consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate 
inclination to produce these effects. Consequently such like effects 
cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man 
cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, 
as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such 
things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His 
eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the FP, 
Q[14], A[13]; FP, Q[57], A[3]; FP, Q[86], A[4]. Hence it is written (Is. 
41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know 
that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell 
such like future things by any means whatever, except by divine 
revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this 
reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. 
viii, 9): "They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For 
they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they 
forecast the future to men."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that 
happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can be 
foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent 
future things, through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, 
i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then 
only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue 
manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is manifestly a sin. 
Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says 
in his commentary on Mich. 3:9, seqq. that "divination is  always taken 
in an evil sense."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share 
of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as stated 
above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future 
events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to 
divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of 
other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil's deceit, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human 
means, but not by the undue means of divination.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether divination is a species of superstition?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition. 
The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now divination is 
apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 
xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore 
it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition 
undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue worship. 
Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true 
religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to 
divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from 
his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an operation of 
the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, 
under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved 
themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of 
shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of 
the demons." Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23), 
"whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is 
superstitious." Therefore divination is a species of superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; QQ[92],94), superstition denotes 
undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two 
ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an 
oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is something 
divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an oath (Q[89], 
A[4], ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous 
sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help of the demons 
for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results 
from the demons' operation, either because the demons are expressly 
invoked that the future may  be made known, or because the demons thrust 
themselves into futile searchings of the future, in order to entangle 
men's minds with vain conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 
39:5): "Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies." Now it is 
vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries to get it from a 
source whence it cannot be foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that 
divination is a species of superstition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in 
view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind of 
superstition as regards the mode of operation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the 
demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with the 
demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude 
about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution for 
the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand 
in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there were 
consultations about the future in connection with religious matters. 
Hence where it is written (Is. 8:19): "And when they shall say to you: 
Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchantments," it is 
added by way of answer: "Should not the people seek of their God, a 
vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.: 'seek of their God, for the 
living of the dead?']"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/3

 In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit 
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 3/3

 In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit 
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several species of 
divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there are not 
seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in 
all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact with the 
demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not several 
species of divination.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as stated 
above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[6]). But all divination is directed 
to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all 
divinations are of one species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether one 
detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same species of sin. Now 
divinations seem to differ merely according to  the various signs whence 
the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there are not 
several species of divination.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination (Etym. 
viii, 9).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), all divinations seek to acquire 
foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and help of a 
demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help, or else 
thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things 
unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have been explained 
in the FP, Q[57], A[3]. When demons are expressly invoked, they are wont 
to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to 
human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to foretell the 
future: and this species is called "prestigiation" because man's eyes are 
blindfolded [praestringuntur]. Sometimes they make use of dreams, and 
this is called "divination by dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions 
or utterances of the dead, and this species is called "necromancy," for 
as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, {nekron} "means dead and 
{manteia} divination, because after certain incantations and the 
sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to 
answer questions." Sometimes they foretell the future through living men, 
as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by 
"pythons," of whom Isidore says that "pythons are so called from Pythius 
Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination." Sometimes they 
foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate 
beings. If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron or 
polished stone, it is called "geomancy," if in water "hydromancy," if in 
the air "aeromancy," if in fire "pyromancy," if in the entrails of 
animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, "aruspicy."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 2/4

 The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the 
demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain 
knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of 
certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the 
position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," who 
are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days on 
which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds or 
of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, 
this belongs in general to "augury," which is so called from the 
chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as "auspice" is derived from 
watching birds [avium inspectione]. These are chiefly wont to be observed 
in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, 
these observations have for their object men's words uttered 
unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he 
wishes to foreknow, then it is called an "omen": and as Valerius Maximus 
[*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, "the observing of omens has a 
touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not 
on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus that when the 
Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a 
centurion happened to  exclaim at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the 
banner, we had best stand here': and on hearing these words they took 
them as an omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further." If, 
however, the observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, 
of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of 
divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines of 
the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e. divination of the hand (because 
{cheir} is the Greek for hand): while the divination which is taken from 
signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is called 
"spatulamancy."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 3/4

 To this second species of divination, which is without express 
invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing 
certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult, 
whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by observing the 
shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by observing 
which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing upon them, a 
person may happen to draw; or by holding out several unequal sticks and 
noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by throwing dice, and 
observing who throws the highest score; or by observing what catches the 
eye when one opens a book, all of which are named "sortilege."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 4/4

 Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The 
first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the head of 
"necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the disposition or 
movement of some other being, and this belongs to "augury"; while the 
third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult; and 
this belongs to "sortilege." Under each of these many others are 
contained, as explained above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not the 
same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to invoke 
the demons than to do things that deserve the demons' interference.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the ultimate 
end whence divination takes its general formality. But the various 
species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, according 
as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by them, not 
as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in detraction, but 
as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of 
principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative sciences.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the demons is 
not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to  1 Pt. 2:22, "Who 
did no sin." Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is thy name?" and the 
latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are many" (Mk. 5:9). Therefore 
it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask 
unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired of the 
woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war 
(1 Kgs. 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists in 
questioning demons is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if 
it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know what is 
hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery 
of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be 
found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . . . 
that consulteth pythonic spirits."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two 
reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which is 
a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him. 
This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against certain 
persons (Is. 28:15): "You have said: We have entered into a league with 
death, and we have made a covenant with hell." And still more grievous 
would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon 
invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. For the demon who 
intends man's perdition endeavors, by his answers, even though he 
sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead 
him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence 
Athanasius, commenting on the words of Lk. 4:35, "He rebuked him, saying: 
Hold thy peace," says: "Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ 
put a stop to his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish 
his wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, however 
much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the 
divine Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: According to Bede's commentary on Lk. 8:30, "Our Lord 
inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which he 
tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine forth 
more graciously." Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us 
of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of 
others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell 
the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him 
knowledge of things hidden from us.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), "there is 
nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being about 
to smite the king with the divine sentence, was  permitted to appear to 
him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some occult 
dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or else the 
spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but some 
phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the devil, and 
styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of 
things are wont to be called by the names of those things."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to spiritual 
health that results from the research of the unknown by invoking the 
demon.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is 
lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: thus a physician 
foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly 
bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world, according to 
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the stars is not 
unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according to 
the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through many 
experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some 
future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem not 
unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as it is 
based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the stars 
contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God's 
creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is not 
unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those astrologers 
whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they 
seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their 
divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and 
condemns."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 1/7

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), the operation of the demon 
thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain 
opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in vanity and 
falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing 
the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by 
their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can be foreknown by 
observing the stars: and it is evident that those things which happen of 
necessity can be foreknown by this mean,: even so astrologers forecast a 
future eclipse.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 2/7

 However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by 
observing the stars there have been various opinions.  For some have 
stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by 
means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since 
every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it stands 
(thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds from the 
same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it signifies 
the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so far 
as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot be said that 
the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of 
future events; nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause 
of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a common higher 
cause, which is divine providence. on the contrary the appointment of the 
movements and positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on 
a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future 
contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of 
necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter 
are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their 
occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire 
foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except in 
so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 3/7

 Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the 
first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human affairs 
or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi [*Ed. Did. 
v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a natural cause, 
such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs 
accidentally, neither is a "being" properly speaking, nor is "one"---for 
instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or that a treasure 
be discovered when a man digs a grave---for these and like occurrences 
are not one thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the operation 
of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds 
from some one principle, which is the form of a natural thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 4/7

 In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of will 
and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the intellect or 
reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently 
neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows 
(De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal 
body. Wherefore it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct 
impression on the intellect and will: for this would be to deny the 
difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle 
reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who held that "such is the will of 
man, as is the day which the father of men and of gods," i.e. the sun or 
the heavens, "brings on" [*Odyssey xviii, 135].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 5/7

 Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will's 
operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an 
inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression on 
the human body, and consequently on the sensitive  powers which are acts 
of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however, 
the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 
11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on the free-will, 
and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the 
heavenly bodies.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 6/7

 Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow 
casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude future 
human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion; and so 
the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will 
be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand if one were 
to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow those future 
things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain 
and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious 
divination.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 7/7

 Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by 
observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great 
number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for 
the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly 
bodies: while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these 
inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many 
cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend 
on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. 
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): "When astrologers tell the 
truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown 
to man, lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the 
action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they 
are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs." Wherefore 
he concludes: "Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers, and of 
all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, lest his 
soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership 
with them enmesh itself in their fellowship."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is 
not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by 
God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15,16): "By a dream in a vision 
by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in 
their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the ears of men, and teaching 
instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore it is not unlawful 
to make use of divination by dreams.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking,  make use 
of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: 
thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of his chief 
baker (Gn. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon 
(Dan. 2,4). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of 
men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the 
future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the 
purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found 
among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],6), divination is superstitious 
and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must 
consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from 
dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for 
instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen 
in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while 
sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are 
referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and 
in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, 
consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of 
future occurrences, or be cognizant of them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 2/5

 Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes 
in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold: 
one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a 
man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while 
asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, 
so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future 
occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by chance. But 
sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward 
disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the 
imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is 
abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for 
this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to 
discover internal dispositions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 3/5

 In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and 
spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is 
affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a 
heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping 
with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is 
sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their 
dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num. 12:6, "If there be 
among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I 
will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes, however, it is due to the 
action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their 
sleep, and by  this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to 
those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 4/5

 Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making 
use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those 
dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or 
outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be 
an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelation 
of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, 
through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the 
divination extending beyond its possible limits.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 5/5

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of 
external things is unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like 
observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy 
men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid 
attention to auguries, for it is related (Gn. 44:5) that Joseph's steward 
said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in which my lord drinketh 
and in which he is wont to divine [augurari]": and he himself afterwards 
said to his brethren (Gn. 44:15): "Know you not that there is no one like 
me in the science of divining?" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use 
of this kind of divination.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future 
occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, "The kite in the air 
hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed 
the time of their coming." Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes 
from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the birds' 
knowledge in order to know the future, and this is divination by augury.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet 
Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and 
interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's servant, 
acted in like manner (Gn. 24). Therefore it seems that this kind of 
divination is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found 
among you anyone . . . that observeth omens."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever 
dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the 
cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom as 
from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be known 
from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also 
the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them. Now the cause 
of dumb animals' actions is a  certain instinct whereby they are inclined 
by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This 
instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first place it may be 
due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive 
soul, every power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is 
subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that 
of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from 
being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the 
dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which 
certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must observe two 
things: first, that such observations must not be applied to the 
foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be foreknown 
from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA[5],6): 
secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in 
some way may have reference to these animals (since they acquire through 
the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things 
necessary for their life---such as changes resulting from rain and wind 
and so forth).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, 
namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon 
Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and 
vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb 
animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to 
be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words which 
are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the stars, 
yet are they ordered according to divine providence and sometimes 
according to the action of the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are superstitious 
and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set according to the 
order of nature or of divine providence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when 
Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, he 
spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion 
about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have 
about things concerning them; and in order to know these things it is not 
unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the frequent 
cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a 
dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his 
instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words, 
having previously prayed to God.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful? 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not unlawful, 
because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My lots are in Thy hands," 
says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining 
the divine will when a man is in doubt."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances which 
the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both in the Old 
and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of lots. 
For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the Lord's command, 
pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again 
Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 
Kgs. 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the Lord, was 
discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonas 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was 
chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk. 1:9): and the apostles by drawing 
lots elected Matthias to the apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would 
seem that divination by lots is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e. single 
combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called 
"popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because 
something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem to 
be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with 
the Philistine (1 Kgs. 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would seem that 
divination by lot is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can. 
Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make up 
your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have condemned, 
is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish them 
to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among 
Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under pain of anathema."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 1/7

 I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), sortilege consists, properly 
speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may come 
to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to 
know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, an honor, a 
dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called "sortilege 
of allotment"; if one seeks to know what ought to be done, it is called 
"sortilege of consultation"; if one seeks to know what is going to 
happen, it is called "sortilege of divination." Now the actions of man 
that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the 
dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so 
minded as though the human acts requisite for sortilege depended for 
their result on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and 
false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, 
so that a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 2/7

 Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must 
needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing  spiritual cause. If we 
ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege of 
allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in 
the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of 
something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus 
leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 3/7

 If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause, 
it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech. 21:21) that "the 
king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking 
divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted 
entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden by the 
canons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 4/7

 Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov. 
16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the 
Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine 
declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. OBJ[1]].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 5/7

 Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have 
recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount to 
tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Lk. 1:8, says: 
"He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men." Secondly, 
if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to lots without 
reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says (Super Act. 
Apost. i): "But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, 
after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take 
note that the apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling 
together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God." 
Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence 
Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): "Those who tell 
fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so 
rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does this custom 
also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to 
worldly matters and to the vain things of this life." Fourthly, if anyone 
resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should 
be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede 
says (Super Act. Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias 
was decided by lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not 
yet poured forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were ordained 
not by lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is different with 
earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in 
elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in 
the distribution of earthly possessions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 6/7

 If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine 
judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence 
Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of persecution, 
the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at his 
post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and 
the Church be forsaken, should  there be no other means of coming to an 
agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by lot." Again he 
says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou aboundest in that which it 
behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which cannot be given to 
two; should two come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either 
in need or in some claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than 
in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not give 
to both."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 7/7

 This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to the 
investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done by a 
man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so far as a 
miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common 
generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered unlawful, 
both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult, which is 
reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like trials are not 
sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen 
V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: "The sacred canons do not approve of 
extorting a confession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or 
boiling water, and no one must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to 
practice what is not sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For 
it is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our authority, 
after the culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have 
been approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown 
crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of 
men." The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that 
it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous 
effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in 
strength or skill.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] Out. Para. 1/1

OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there 
are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the 
magic art;

 (2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;

 (3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;

 (4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the observances 
of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two ways. First, by 
reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through 
being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for the 
sake of vainglory. Now the observances  of the magic art are not evil as 
to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers 
to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end, namely, the 
acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these 
observances.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who 
abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and 
wisdom." Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts 
and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its results 
through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above (A[1]), the reason why it is 
wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because they have 
no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons 
know scientific truths: because sciences are about things necessary and 
invariable, and such things are subject to human knowledge, and much more 
to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine 
says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon. 3,4]. Therefore it seems to 
be no sin to practice the magic art, even though it achieve its result 
through the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be 
found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth from the dead": 
which search relies on the demons' help. Now through the observances of 
the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought "by means of certain 
signs agreed upon by compact with the demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. 
Christ. ii, 20; see above Q[92], A[2]]. Therefore it is unlawful to 
practice the notary art.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is 
unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not 
in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing 
certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so forth. 
Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes, but as 
signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the sacramental 
signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty signs, and consequently 
a kind of "agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of 
consultation and of compact by tokens" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 
20; see above Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely 
repudiated and avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and 
noxious superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). 
This art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is 
not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner 
connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the consequence 
is that this effect is expected either from God or from the demons. Now 
it is certain that some have received wisdom and science infused into 
them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kgs. 3 and 2 Paralip 1). Moreover, 
our Lord said to His disciples (Lk. 21:15): "I will give you a mouth and 
wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and 
gainsay." However, this gift is not granted to all, or in connection with 
any particular  observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, 
as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8, "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word 
of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same 
Spirit," and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one 
and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He will." 
On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to enlighten the 
intellect, as stated in the FP, Q[109], A[3]. Now the acquisition of 
knowledge and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect, 
wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons. 
Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the 
intellectual soul is in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions," i.e. the 
operations "of the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern 
what is true," such as are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, 
however, be able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings 
of the sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it is not good 
to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that the magic art 
tends.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The abstinence of these children was not in accordance with 
a vain observance of the notary art, but according to the authority of 
the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles. 
Hence as a reward for their obedience they received knowledge from God, 
according to Ps. 118:100, "I have had understanding above the ancients, 
because I have sought Thy commandments."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons is a sin 
not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on account of 
the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to the case in 
point.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the 
purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that observances directed to the alteration of 
bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are lawful. 
It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to 
produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things have 
certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign; for 
instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like instances, all of 
which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, 5,7). Therefore it would 
seem lawful to employ such like forces for the alteration of bodies.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies, 
just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain occult 
forces resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly 
bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire from the 
heavenly bodies a certain occult  force for the production of certain 
effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and of such 
like things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many ways, as 
Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8,9). But their power is from God. 
Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of 
producing these alterations.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to 
superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums 
condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of 
certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing worn 
or fastened on."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily 
effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect 
naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful 
to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But, 
if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it follows that 
they are employed for the purpose of producing those effects, not as 
causes but only as signs, so that they come under the head of "compact by 
tokens entered into with the demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see 
above Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The 
demons are allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, 
but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to 
the various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as 
spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of various 
kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing 
natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such as 
they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in 
addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other vain 
observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be 
superstitious and unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their 
substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly 
bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire certain active 
forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies result from the 
conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing else but 
composition, order and shape, as stated in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a 
natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the 
influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are artificial, but only 
in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry 
held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11), that "by herbs, stones, 
animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again 
by certain movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens 
it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying 
into effect the various dispositions of the stars," as though the results 
of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the  power of the heavenly 
bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), "all these things 
are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject 
to them."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy 
from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite to 
inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any effect 
naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet 
astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the 
latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they 
come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons: whereas 
in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in 
certain shapes or characters.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom the 
demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose He 
will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, to 
employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary, it is 
appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no way is 
it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help by compacts either 
tacit or express.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are 
unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of 
fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes that 
occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which 
the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe such 
like signs.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody 
experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain times, or 
places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or 
ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come. Therefore it 
seems not unlawful to observe these things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine 
providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that 
precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore, 
according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that happened to the 
fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is 
not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds from divine providence. 
Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to observe these presages.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a 
thousand vain observances are com