Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF 
NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the 
good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?

 (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?

 (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is 
stricken in consequence of sin.

 (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?

 (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

 (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For 
man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains 
unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). 
Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes 
remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents 
are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, 
when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed 
on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no 
agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is 
possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards 
another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good 
of his nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is 
patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an 
accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is 
in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not 
diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho 
(Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, 
and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the Glossa 
Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the 
good of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First,  there are 
the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that 
flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, 
since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above 
(Q[60], A[1]; Q[63], A[1]), this inclination to virtue is a good of 
nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of 
human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor 
diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed 
through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. 
the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because human 
acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above (Q[50], A[1]). 
Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two 
contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be 
diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact 
that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which 
is the inclination to virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of 
nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone 
may see who reads the context.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an 
inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not 
changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the 
inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and 
passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something is caused 
or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the 
production of habits (Q[51], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it 
acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness 
makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from 
diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a 
diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of 
action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that 
such like inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the 
soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object 
moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the 
reason and will, as stated above (Q[77], AA[1], 2). The result of this is 
the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, 
but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on 
another and puts it out of order.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can  be 
destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human 
nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if 
the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be 
continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be 
entirely taken away.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are 
uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies 
with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since 
therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the 
whole can also be taken away by sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude 
for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of 
sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind 
can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not 
exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of 
virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be 
in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the good of nature, that is 
diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is 
befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it 
is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is 
to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact 
that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of 
sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed 
entirely.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished 
by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example 
of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely 
destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a 
finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it 
will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite 
length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the 
subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same 
quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quantity be 
halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on 
thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less 
than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question 
at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature 
less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the 
aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two 
others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends 
to the good of virtue, as to its term and end.  Consequently its 
diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, 
secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished 
by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above (A[1]). But 
it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed 
against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first 
way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature 
being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of 
the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident 
that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed 
indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: 
and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this 
inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a 
transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the 
very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is 
diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains 
rooted in the nature of the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by 
subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and 
this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as 
stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: 
nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, 
in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one 
hand, and not on the other.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, 
else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to 
act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus 
even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his 
nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet 
this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of 
reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably 
reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence 
are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. 
For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But 
these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been 
said above (Q[76], A[1]; Q[77], AA[3],5; Q[78], A[1]). Therefore they 
should not be reckoned as effects of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no 
place among the effects of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act 
of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural  should not be 
reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be 
reckoned a wound of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it has been stated (Q[77], A[3]) that to sin from 
weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a 
passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two 
things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz. 
ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which 
four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that 
one or the other reckoning is incomplete.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect 
hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected 
by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was 
forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (Q[81], 
A[2]); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute 
of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; 
which destitution is called a wounding of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of 
virtue, as stated above (Q[61], A[2]), viz. the reason, where prudence 
resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of 
fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in 
so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the 
wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of 
good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is 
deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and 
in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the 
delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human 
nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination 
to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of 
actual sin, as was explained above (AA[1], 2), these four wounds are also 
the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is 
obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, 
good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be 
the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more 
easily inclined to sin again.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain 
proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gn. 8:21: "Man's 
senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and 
thought of man's heart are prone to  evil from his youth.'].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[82], A[3], ad 1), concupiscence is 
natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far 
as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a 
weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the 
reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to 
fortitude which pertains to the irascible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of 
Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, 
viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these 
three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. "Error" and 
"vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being 
weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not 
the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that "where 
these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less 
good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But sin does not 
destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species 
and order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the 
"privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura 
Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the 
effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since 
mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must 
be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. 
Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, 
according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now 
weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[5], A[5], mode, species and order 
are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every 
being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form 
from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether 
substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some 
measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms of 
things are like numbers," so that a form has a certain "mode" 
corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a 
relation of "order" to  something else.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, 
corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good 
belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, 
species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There 
is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, 
species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (AA[1]
,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue 
and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely 
taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act 
itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of 
which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of 
mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species 
and order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as 
explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the 
result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects 
are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas 
original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is 
equal in all, as stated above (Q[82], A[4]). Therefore death and suchlike 
defects are not the result of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But 
these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or 
Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than 
original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the body 
by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. 
Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12), "By one man sin entered 
into this world, and by sin death."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of 
itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is the 
cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its 
nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly intended by 
the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the 
intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the 
cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the cause of another 
if it causes it by  removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. 
viii, text. 32, that "by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the 
stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the 
cause of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by 
the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not 
only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of 
reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held 
together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the 
FP, Q[97], A[1]. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the 
sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by 
the disorder among the powers, as stated above (A[3]; Q[82], A[3]), so 
also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, 
even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all 
consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although 
the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered 
according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, 
produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, the 
effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being 
removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal 
force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of 
the stones resting on them will be equal; but that one will move with 
greater velocity, which has the greater weight according to the property 
of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is 
removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the nature of the 
human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural 
temperaments, some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to 
fewer, although original sin is equal in all.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause 
that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:11): "He . . 
. shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that 
dwelleth in you": but each is done according to the order of Divine 
wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of 
all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before attaining to the 
immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by 
Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for 
a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the 
impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance 
of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act, 
actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through 
eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which 
is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we 
may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore 
actual sin does not  cause those defects, as original sin does.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether death and other defects are natural to man?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to 
man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" 
(Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals 
which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally 
corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such is 
the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life 
is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital 
functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De 
Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like defects are natural 
to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now 
"God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural to man.

 (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment 
or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But death 
and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above 
(A[5]). Therefore they are not natural to man.

 (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. 
Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5]
, AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was 
proved in the FP, Q[75], A[6]. Therefore the human body is naturally 
incorruptible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, 
in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular 
nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and 
self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every corruption and 
defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since 
this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it 
belongs.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 2/4

 On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some 
universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or 
again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by 
some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." This force intends the good and 
the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and 
corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect corruption and 
defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the inclination of 
the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards 
the inclination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its 
particular form  according to the discretion of the universal agent. And 
although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form 
of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the 
rational soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to 
matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its 
own, as stated in the FP, Q[75], A[2]. Consequently as regards his form, 
incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But 
since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the 
inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In 
this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his 
matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 3/4

 The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the 
other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve 
them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in 
respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is 
everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, 
considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, 
and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in 
any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen 
by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith in 
order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can 
be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this 
condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be 
breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of 
iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he would do 
without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not 
adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In 
like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of 
its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable 
as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. 
Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, 
and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible 
matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming 
man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of original justice, 
gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the FP, Q[97], 
A[1]. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and 
that death is the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 4/4

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?

 (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher 
nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence the sun's 
ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says 
(Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a much higher 
nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it 
does not contract a stain from them by sinning.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (Q[74], 
AA[1],2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 
42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything 
whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the 
will stained by sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something 
positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, it can only 
be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be 
caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens 
that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; 
for instance, in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, 
is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the 
stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it 
a pure privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and 
privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain 
caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): "Thou hast 
stained thy glory": and it is written (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present 
it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each 
case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect 
of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a 
comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, e.g. 
a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed 
to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a twofold 
comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, 
whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the refulgence of 
the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected 
for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul 
cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and 
when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason 
and of the Divine law, as shown above (Q[71], A[6]). Wherefore the loss 
of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a 
stain on the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own 
power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by 
its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, 
against the light of reason and of the Divine law. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by the 
intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the 
intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. 
On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement towards 
things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. 
Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately, 
according to Osee 9:10: "They . . . became abominable as those things 
were which they loved."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor 
does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's 
brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins 
occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of 
light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to 
the diversity of the interposed bodies.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after 
the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except 
habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as 
stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the stain does not remain in the 
soul after the act of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, 
as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain when the 
body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when 
the act of sin is past.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the 
stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no longer 
there, neither is the stain in the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing to you 
that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in 
you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?"

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of 
sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above (A[1]
), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its 
withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And therefore 
so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in 
him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and 
to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin 
ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine 
law, man does not at once return to the state in which he was before, and 
it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the 
previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of 
some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement 
ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to  return by a contrary 
movement.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, 
except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something private, 
viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent 
body remains in the same position and relation as regards the 
illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is 
past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so there 
is no comparison.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the 
defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. 
Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, 
so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the 
debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the 
punishment due to them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?

 (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?

 (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

 (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?

 (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?

 (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?

 (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?

 (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of 
sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to 
be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related 
to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt 
of punishment is not an effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, 
since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, 
which is evil.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate 
affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a further 
debt of punishment, because then it would go on  indefinitely. Therefore 
sin does not incur the debt of punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish upon 
every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. 
Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words 
"tribulation and anguish."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that 
whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment 
therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary 
supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason "hot 
water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we 
find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up 
against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, 
are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. 
Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that 
order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, 
it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: 
wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which 
repression is punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment 
corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In 
the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own 
reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs 
him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the 
state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal 
order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by 
sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine 
law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by 
himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a 
third, inflicted by God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by 
reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental to 
the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of 
punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God 
or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not 
directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of 
punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that 
"punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently 
the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin 
as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further 
punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the 
purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to 
the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore 
sin is not the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. 
lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore 
sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the 
will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q[74], AA[1]
,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are 
punishments of others.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, 
as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such 
can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its 
essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that 
it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially 
something against the will, as stated in the FP, Q[48], A[5]. 
Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be 
the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in 
three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an 
impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like 
are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is 
withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a 
punishment, and is from God, as stated above (Q[79], A[3]), the result is 
that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It 
is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rm. 1:24) when he says: 
"Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their 
passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine 
grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always 
said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the 
substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an 
interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior 
act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in 
order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: "We wearied 
ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so 
that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the 
last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding 
sin, but also with regard to itself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into 
sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for 
the good of those who are punished, when, to wit,  men arise from sin, 
more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the amendment of 
others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of 
sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the 
punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, since the very fact 
that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man 
from sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the 
same answer applies to the Third Objection.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. 
For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality: 
wherefore it is written (Is. 27:8): "In measure against measure, when it 
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore 
it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But 
no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and 
"what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states 
(Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for 
its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men" 
[Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal 
punishment on man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is 
accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore 
it cannot be of infinite duration.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46): "These shall go into 
everlasting punishment"; and (Mk. 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme against 
the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an 
everlasting sin."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), sin incurs a debt of punishment 
through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause 
remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the 
debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is 
sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which 
destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, 
defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the 
principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by 
Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while 
there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be 
remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle 
whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the 
principle of the order whereby man's will is  subject to God, the 
disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, 
although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the 
principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. 
Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, 
considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, 
both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to 
equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is 
committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact 
they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for 
life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time 
occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the 
murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this punishment, in 
its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now 
according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned 
against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A 
man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards 
continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the 
very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, 
everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked 
would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for 
ever."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human 
laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, 
but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not 
for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may 
be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to Prov. 
19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." 
Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, 
are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the 
thought of those punishments, according to Ps. 59:6: "Thou hast given a 
warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, 
that Thy beloved may be delivered."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but 
He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, 
nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, 
and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the 
punishment endures.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in 
quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me,  O Lord, but yet 
with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now 
God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine 
justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as 
to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore 
according to God's vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in 
quantity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, 
according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the 
measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against 
God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the 
greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a more grievous sin to 
strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is 
infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed 
against God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in 
quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore it is 
infinite in quantity also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal 
sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two 
things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which 
is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there 
is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, 
both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement 
of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be 
infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from 
something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also 
is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But 
in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding 
punishment is the "pain of sense," which is also finite.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner 
to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible 
with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated 
above (A[3]). The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one 
who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I . . . 
have not charity, I am nothing."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from something, 
for it is thus that man sins against God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, 
not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long 
as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment 
corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is 
irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for  ever; wherefore it 
incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the 
thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur 
punishment of infinite quantity.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. 
Because punishment, as stated above (A[4]), is proportionate to the 
fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal 
punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from another, 
since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore 
some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above (A[4]), 
it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore 
Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is 
incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original 
sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have died in 
original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of 
God, as shown by our Lord's words (Jn. 3:3): " Unless a man be born 
again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Much more, therefore, will the 
punishments of all other sins be everlasting.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being 
united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its punishment to 
each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to 
a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of 
sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. 
Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins 
are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished 
eternally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), a sin incurs a debt of eternal 
punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order 
of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that 
order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is 
disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the 
last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far 
as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the 
order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some 
temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of 
His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but 
only temporal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect 
of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance of 
the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in  respect of their 
turning away from something. Because some sins consist in turning away 
from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to 
the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are 
referred to it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account 
of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a 
human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because 
eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, 
but to its irremissibility, as stated above (A[3]).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. 
For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause 
of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt 
of punishment ceases also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a 
virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is 
removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But 
a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore, 
when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (2 Kgs. xii, 13,14): "David said to 
Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The 
Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless 
because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme 
. . . the child that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is 
punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of 
punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and 
the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the 
act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes 
man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of 
Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of 
penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so 
that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too 
indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, 
either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would 
wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation 
is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently 
it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act  has ceased there 
still remains the debt of punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident 
that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul 
being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that 
it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as 
stated above (Q[86], A[1]). Now man is united to God by his will. 
Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will 
accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his 
own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear 
patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways 
punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, 
it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of 
punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory 
punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in 
this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. 
Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain 
respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the 
involuntary (Q[6], A[6]). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of 
sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed 
of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, 
as stated above (Q[86], A[2]), so the debt of punishment also can remain. 
But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not 
remain in the same way, as stated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he 
may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he 
should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as 
regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the 
other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the 
sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the 
contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in 
order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given 
to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified 
by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. 
For it is written (Jn. 9:3,2) about the man born blind: "Neither hath 
this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In 
like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, 
suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, 
and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been 
baptized. Moreover before they  are baptized, there is no more sin in 
them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore 
not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should 
be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is 
frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked 
(Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be 
scourged like other men"; and (Job 21:7): "[Why then do] the wicked live, 
are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in 
brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab. 1:13): "Why lookest 
Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and 
holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], 
the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment 
is inflicted for a sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pt. 2:22) that "He did no 
sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said (1 Pt. 2:21) 
that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted 
by God for sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): "Who ever perished 
innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen 
those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and 
Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is 
inflicted for a sin."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As already stated (A[6]), punishment can be considered in 
two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment 
is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of 
punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one 
who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even 
in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. 
If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being 
something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. 
Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by 
God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to 
original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, 
the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, 
and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties 
which result from this defect in human nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet 
is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in 
the FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good 
is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, 
it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he 
may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the 
sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his 
soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to 
man, not simply  but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name 
of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man 
prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to 
health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, they 
are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: 
because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal 
medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the 
punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of 
innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so 
that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original 
sin as its cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which 
children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original 
sin, as stated above (Q[85], A[5]); and they remain even after baptism, 
for the cause stated above (Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not 
equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to 
itself, as stated above (Q[85], A[5], ad 1). Nevertheless, they are 
directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those 
who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means---and also to 
the glory of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they 
are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief goods. 
Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the 
virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices 
for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does 
not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The 
very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their 
spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): 
"Therefore pride hath held them fast."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for 
our sins.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it 
is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the 
iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth 
generation of them that hate Me"; and (Mt. 23:35): "That upon you may 
come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, 
according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their 
parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to 
Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the 
father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father's 
wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather  than of 
outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they 
imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their 
own sins, but for those of their parents.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear 
the iniquity of the father."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one 
takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in so 
far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above (A[7]). If, however, 
we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is 
penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful 
act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is 
medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another's 
sin. For it has been stated (A[7]) that ills sustained in bodily goods or 
even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the 
health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have 
such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either by God 
or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their 
masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, 
however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this 
penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one 
punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in 
the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom 
the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it 
is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's 
sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it 
patiently.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, 
because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. 
Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some 
fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad 
Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for 
another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father's 
property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying (Ezech. 
18:4): "All souls are Mine."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to 
temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of 
their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be 
referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference 
to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of 
them that hate Me," and in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we 
read: "Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers." The sins of the 
fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are 
the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents' 
crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their 
parents' example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they 
deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents, 
they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth 
generation," because men are wont to live long  enough to see the third 
and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their 
parents' sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their 
children's punishments so as to grieve for them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for 
another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or 
medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are 
punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather 
than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment of 
kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so 
far as the child is the father's property, and because the examples and 
the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. 
Consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is 
more eager to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their 
punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to 
deserve more severe punishment.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] Out. Para. 1/2

OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)

 In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the 
debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider 
venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider 
venial sin in itself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?

 (2) Whether they differ generically?

 (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?

 (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?

 (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating 
circumstance?

 (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with 
mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a word, 
deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being 
against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin 
is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat or 
drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever 
sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's glory. 
Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it 
seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as 
enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 
3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: 
because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, 
which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. 
Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to 
enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as Augustine again says 
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 
'pervertere' means to overthrow, to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's 
law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, 
sins mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns 
away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, 
consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins 
mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is 
one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But a 
crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided 
with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if 
taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken 
metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we 
speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh 
with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be 
taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply 
opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be 
taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is 
venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Q[71], A[1], ad 
3; Q[72], A[5]; Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison 
with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an 
irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated 
above (Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a 
life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as stated above 
(Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be 
repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as 
stated above (Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the 
end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can 
be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of 
order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a 
higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore 
such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, 
sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to 
the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called 
venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of 
punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the  sin ceases, as 
explained above (Q[87], A[6]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and 
irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, 
but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of 
the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided 
with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a 
division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the 
generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its 
parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other 
afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine 
gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a 
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to 
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to 
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not 
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law 
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts 
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law 
intends.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does 
not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually refer 
all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this 
precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one 
fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer 
oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes 
only actual reference of the human act to God's glory, and not habitual 
reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God 
habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins 
mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as 
enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by 
referring it to God, not actually but habitually.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in 
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: 
because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ 
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some 
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically 
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above (Q[18], 
A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any 
object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than 
God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. 
Therefore venial and mortal  sin do not differ generically.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin 
is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. 
Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, 
according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins 
committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore 
mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from 
sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins 
differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). 
Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it was stated above (Q[74], A[3], ad 3; A[10]) that 
sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial 
sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins 
are generically venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. 
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal 
sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. 
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has 
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": 
and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, a sin is called 
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, 
to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin contains 
something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through weakness or 
ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through 
not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, 
but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to 
speak now.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no 
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have 
a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and 
another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act 
is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing 
that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his 
last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently it is a 
mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. 
blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one's neighbor, 
e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by 
reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed 
to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary 
to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive 
laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and 
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of 
the agent, as stated above (Q[18], AA[4],6), it  happens sometimes that a 
sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal 
on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, 
or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own 
genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of 
adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a 
sin generically mortal because venial, by reason of the act being 
imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle 
of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of 
unbelief.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is 
contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of God, 
and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it 
belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary to 
charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal 
by reason of their genus.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial from 
their cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by 
reason of the imperfection of the act.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. 
For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial and mortal sin 
are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above (A[1]). 
Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore 
it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like dispositions 
and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or 
species, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore venial sin does not dispose to 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal 
sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now 
every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his 
Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works that it may 
destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is 
absurd.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth small 
things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems 
to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little he is disposed to 
fall away together into mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a 
twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of  disposition. 
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the 
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves 
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said 
to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin 
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it disposes 
to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does 
not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, 
for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin 
can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part 
of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened 
by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner 
fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, 
as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be 
that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. 
Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle 
thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin 
generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, 
turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will 
not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to 
subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something 
that is a mortal sin in its genus.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to 
one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated above 
(A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore 
an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial 
sin dispose to mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in 
genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit in 
different ways, as stated (AA[1],2).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; 
but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas 
a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a venial sin can become mortal?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For 
Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth not the 
Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," 
i.e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them." Now a sin is called 
mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a 
venial sin can become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of 
reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as stated 
above (Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable 
disease, as stated above (A[1]). But a curable disease may become 
incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a 
disposition to mortal, as stated (A[3]). Therefore a venial sin can 
become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be 
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at 
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, 
like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an 
act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be 
continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not 
possible for a venial sin to become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 2/4

 Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, 
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in 
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above 
(A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 3/4

 Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins 
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial 
sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the 
venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that 
of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the 
punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while 
venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated above (Q[87], 
AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal 
sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no 
other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in 
Matth.). It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the 
remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments 
may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 4/4

 If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one 
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A[3]) with 
regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin 
disposes to mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins 
making one mortal sin dispositively.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the 
consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the 
reason in consenting is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding 
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo 
change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be 
taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect 
thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, 
becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to 
something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a 
substantial form, into which it is never changed.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. 
For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that 
"if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they 
become mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial 
sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a 
circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, 
if morose [*See Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not 
morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a 
circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, 
both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act 
to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, 
therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity 
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, 
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be 
venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an 
accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity 
of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q[72], A[5], ad 1; 
Q[87], A[5], ad 1).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is 
an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be 
taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its 
nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act. 
This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another 
genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the 
deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another 
man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which 
forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this 
circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin 
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species.  For it 
has been stated above (A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin consists 
in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the 
deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. 
Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin 
to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it 
transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the 
specific difference of the moral act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to 
another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something 
accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species 
through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene 
in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. 
disobedience, contempt, or the like.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3

 We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a 
movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the angry 
movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder 
or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a 
venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as 
it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long 
time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason. 
If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a 
sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so 
as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a 
little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless 
perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great 
scandal or something of the kind.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3

 With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of 
its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere lust 
of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to 
God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. 
That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as 
when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own 
unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case 
the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive 
drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer 
avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to 
drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin 
returns to its specific nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those 
matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the 
delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of 
the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger is 
said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the 
approval of the deliberating reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless 
it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated  above (Q[18], A[5]
, ad 4).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a mortal sin can become venial?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial 
sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a 
venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A[5]). Therefore also a 
mortal sin can become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that 
he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who sins 
venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a 
person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than 
God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a 
mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits the sin of 
fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to refrain from 
that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the 
love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal 
sin can become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant 
from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in 
itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as 
when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal 
sin become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal 
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal 
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the 
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can become 
perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can 
become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus 
of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of 
fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by 
addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a 
deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not 
diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word; 
rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by 
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not 
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a 
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above 
(A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate 
reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, 
the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is 
destroyed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even 
as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not vice 
versa. Hence the argument does not prove.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as 
the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits 
fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or 
venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself 
is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so 
far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard 
himself in the love of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things 
which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." Now 
murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. 
But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge who sentences a 
thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, 
are not murderers.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] Out. Para. 1/1

OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are 
six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?

 (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," 
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);

 (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?

 (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?

 (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?

 (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For 
Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins 
be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us 
of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing 
else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a 
stain in the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the 
inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in venial 
sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. 
Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a 
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (Q[86], A[1]). But, 
in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through 
inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it 
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the 
gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to 
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of 
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal 
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of 
similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one 
resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the 
other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, 
there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, 
the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a 
hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because 
it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other 
virtues, as we shall show further on (SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 
2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes 
something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the 
nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, 
properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, 
however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is 
in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that 
results from acts of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins 
lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever 
the soul from its heavenly spouse.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the 
habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal 
thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which 
accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is 
entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to 
a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as 
"wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are said (1 
Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are 
something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are 
outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably 
designated as wood, hay and stubble.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be  saved 
yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who commits a 
venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in 
mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are 
unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who build 
"gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and 
good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But 
those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit 
venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we have no 
sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably 
designated by these three.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees 
of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds 
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he 
will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal 
punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (Q[87], A[5]). 
Therefore these three signify venial sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, 
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious 
stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are 
designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this 
explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (Gal. 
5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom 
of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he 
who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." 
Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal 
sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are 
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: 
as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good 
thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his 
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, 
to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything 
in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it 
is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's 
neighbor, wherefore they are designated by "gold," "silver," and 
"precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate 
themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated 
by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, 
without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while 
the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while 
the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of 
temporal trials in this life, or  of purgatory after this life, and yet 
he is saved for ever.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual 
foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they 
are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps. 136:1): "Upon 
the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do 
not destroy the edifice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and 
stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" the 
"foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have 
esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted 
and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with 
venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the 
spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal 
things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, 
and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore 
they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in 
them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain 
longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the 
fervor of charity in order to remove them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things 
are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." 
Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to 
"wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt up at 
once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are 
removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less 
attached to them.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of 
innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: 
"Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to 
be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But 
he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial 
sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose 
that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had 
arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been 
checked." Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat, which was 
accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more 
than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) 
that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when 
he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden 
fruit." Again there seems to have  been a certain movement of unbelief in 
Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying 
(Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. 
Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the 
original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally 
notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could 
also sin venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal 
was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. 
Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him 
of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's state. 
Therefore he could not sin venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a 
venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be 
understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin 
which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had 
committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that 
aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless 
there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow or the 
like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is 
venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the 
excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to 
mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to 
commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of 
the original state by sinning mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through 
the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a 
genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things 
referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now each 
of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the 
lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising 
of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being 
perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of 
reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of 
reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a 
higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be 
out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the 
end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the 
end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest 
place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the 
appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in 
the state of innocence, as stated in the FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an 
unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always 
subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no 
inordinateness in man, unless first of  all the highest part of man were 
not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is 
evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial 
sin, before committing a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same 
sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily 
forgiven.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first 
mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the 
outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the 
desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she gave 
way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, 
as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original 
state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot 
do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with 
any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not 
sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because 
man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called 
the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man 
understands in common with the angels." But man can commit a venial sin 
in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial 
sin also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love 
a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore 
he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning 
venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins 
generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like frivolities. 
Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be 
venial as stated above (A[3]), unless there is a special prohibition, 
which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man 
in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive 
state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the FP, Q[58], 
A[3]; FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from 
principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. 
Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect  considers a conclusion, it 
must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of 
appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]), 
ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. 
Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, except as they 
stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, 
they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the 
same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is 
a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in 
subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are 
acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, 
wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end 
which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything 
that they do of their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for 
the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them (FP, Q[63], 
A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or 
intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, 
at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, or to some 
inordinate end, for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, 
that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin. 
Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end 
they have in view.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal 
sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in 
unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rm. 8:1) that "there 
is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not 
according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of 
the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rm. 7). Therefore the reason 
why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not 
according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because 
they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. 
Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the 
first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are 
not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of 
damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation 
is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of 
the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the 
first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so 
made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this liability 
seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever 
has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even 
without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that "God is not a respecter 
of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what 
He does not impute to another. But he does not impute first movements to 
believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to 
unbelievers.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of 
unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is 
evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not 
be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (Q[79], A[4]). Now the 
sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore 
it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in 
unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the sinner. 
Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, 
on the contrary, increases it, as stated above (Q[73], A[10]). Therefore 
a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much 
more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, 
on account of their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the 
mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief": whereas the 
sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of 
grace, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more, do you think, he 
deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the 
testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?"

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original 
sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, 
although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that 
believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the 
condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the 
Reply to the Second Objection is evident.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result 
of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability 
pertains, not to actual but to original sin.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin 
alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to 
mortal sin, as stated above (Q[88], A[3]). Therefore in an unbeliever, in 
whom original sin is not remitted,  venial sin exists before mortal sin: 
and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and 
without mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with 
mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in 
the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing 
another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first 
able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that time, it 
can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because 
this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to 
sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. 
Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's 
limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on (SS, 
Q[69], A[6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal 
sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for 
venial sin with no other than original sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with 
original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is 
because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years 
hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, 
much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which 
is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is 
not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the 
first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate 
about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by 
means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does 
not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is capable of 
discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not 
doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there 
cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin 
shall have been remitted to him through grace.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, 
but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes to 
fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, 
not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of 
the lack of use of reason, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can 
refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the 
aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. 
For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think 
of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since 
the end is the first thing in the  intention. Therefore this is the time 
when man is bound by God's affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed 
by saying (Zach. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] Out. Para. 1/3

TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90-108)


OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the 
extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations 
we have spoken in the FP, Q[114]. But the extrinsic principle moving to 
good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by 
His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the 
second place, of grace.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] Out. Para. 2/3

 Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its 
parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our 
consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The 
effects of law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] Out. Para. 3/3

 Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

 (2) Concerning the end of law;

 (3) Its cause;

 (4) The promulgation of law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For 
the Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But 
nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not 
make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to 
reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, 
and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, 
neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the 
intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Q[57]). Nor again is 
it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason 
ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing 
pertaining to reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. 
But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from 
what has been said above (Q[9], A[1]). Therefore law pertains, not to the 
reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, 
ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has 
force of law."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it 
belongs to reason to command, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]). Therefore 
law is something pertaining to reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 1/1 

 I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced 
to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from 
"ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure 
of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, 
as is evident from what has been stated above (Q[1], A[1], ad 3); since 
it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first 
principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. 
ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and 
measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and 
the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows 
that law is something pertaining to reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in 
something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and 
since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in 
the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In 
this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by 
reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be 
called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus 
the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the 
members."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and 
the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so 
in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to 
understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard 
to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, 
the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the 
practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be 
done, as stated above (Q[13], A[3]; Q[76], A[1]) and since as the 
Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical 
reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, 
as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to 
conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect 
that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these 
propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while 
sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated 
above (Q[17], A[1]): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, 
that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the 
end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the 
nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in 
this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign 
has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of 
lawlessness rather than of law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the law is always something directed to the common good? 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common 
good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But 
commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of 
the law is not always the common good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions 
are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is directed to 
some particular good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on 
reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the 
foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of 
that which is directed private good. Therefore the law is not only 
directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an 
individual.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for 
no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the law belongs to that which is 
a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as 
reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is 
something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to 
this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the 
first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the 
practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is 
bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]). 
Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to 
happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as 
imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect 
community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to 
universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition 
of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he 
says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are 
adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body 
politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 
1.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of 
the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that 
thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat 
in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a 
share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the 
common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must 
needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the 
common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters 
regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law 
aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are 
given even concerning particular matters. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but 
those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a 
common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the 
common good is said to be the common end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative 
reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable 
principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, 
unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and 
whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make 
laws. For the Apostle says (Rm. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, who have 
not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are 
a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in general. Therefore 
anyone can make a law for himself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention 
of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man can lead another 
to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so 
every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a 
state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can 
make laws for his household.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of 
the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with 
the Commonalty."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the 
order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, 
belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent 
of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to 
the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole 
people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end 
concerns him to whom the end belongs.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a person not only 
as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled. 
In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares 
the direction that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same 
text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue 
efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not  taken, 
it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove 
an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 
9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some 
public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall 
state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3; SS, Q[64], A[3]). Wherefore the 
framing of laws belongs to him alone.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a 
part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according to 
Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, 
but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one household is 
ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. 
Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make certain commands 
or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether promulgation is essential to a law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For 
the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law 
needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be 
promulgated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to 
do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only 
those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore 
promulgation is not essential to a law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, 
since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the jurists say 
(Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns 
those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws 
are established when they are promulgated."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a law is imposed on others by way 
of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied 
to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that 
a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be 
applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made 
by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is 
necessary for the law to obtain its force.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be 
gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the 
common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God 
instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him  naturally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are 
bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified 
to them by others, after it has been promulgated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future 
time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it 
is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that 
"lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is written."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there 
are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether there is an eternal law?

 (2) Whether there is a natural law?

 (3) Whether there is a human law?

 (4) Whether there is a Divine law?

 (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?

 (6) Whether there is a law of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is an eternal law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is 
imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law 
could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is 
eternal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could 
not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be 
promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to 
an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is 
eternal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is 
the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable 
and eternal."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is 
nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler 
who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the 
world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the FP, Q[22], 
AA[1],2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine 
Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the 
Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine 
Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, 
according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be 
called eternal. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, 
inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rm. 
4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." 
Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of 
an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of 
things foreknown by Him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in 
both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word 
and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation 
cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it 
directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that is to say, 
the law itself is not ordained to the end---except accidentally, in a 
governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must 
needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, 
and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is 
not ordained to another end.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is in us a natural law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is 
governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. 
Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all 
things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in 
superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law 
is natural to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as 
stated above (Q[90], A[2]). But the directing of human acts to their end 
is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, 
which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts 
for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. 
But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with 
which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other 
animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a 
natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not 
the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as 
follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural 
law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what 
is evil."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule 
and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in  him that 
rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and 
measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes 
of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine 
providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above 
(A[1]); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal 
law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive 
their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among 
all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the 
most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by 
being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share 
of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper 
act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational 
creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. 
4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what 
the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" 
in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O 
Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason, 
whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function 
of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine 
light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than 
the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were something 
different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation 
thereof, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which 
is according to nature, as stated above (Q[10], A[1]): for every act of 
reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act 
of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite 
in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts 
to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the 
Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the 
rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational 
manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational 
creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to 
reason, as stated above (Q[90], A[1]). Irrational creatures, however, do 
not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no 
participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is a human law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law 
is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (A[2]). Now 
through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine 
states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the 
ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there  is no need for a human 
law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above 
(Q[90], A[1]). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice 
versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from 
human reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. 
x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are 
uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal men are 
fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from 
human reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds 
of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2), a law is a dictate 
of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure 
takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each 
proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 
6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from 
naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the 
various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, 
but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of 
the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the 
human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of 
certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human 
reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of 
law be observed, as stated above (Q[90], AA[2],3,4). Wherefore Tully says 
in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in 
nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their 
utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were 
approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation of the 
dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and 
imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a 
natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of 
certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single 
truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part 
of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal 
law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the 
particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, 
contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed 
further to sanction them by law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the 
principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of 
all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the 
rule and measure, although it is not the  measure of things that are from 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, 
which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with 
which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot 
have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of 
sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring 
and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there was any need for a Divine law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, 
as stated above (A[2]), the natural law is a participation in us of the 
eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (A[1]). 
Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural 
law, and human laws derived therefrom.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that "God left man in the 
hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated 
above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore man was left to the direction of his 
reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above 
(A[3]). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a 
Divine law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational 
creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the 
natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the 
rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Ps. 
118:33): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary 
for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for 
four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to 
perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were 
ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural 
faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of 
the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is 
derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness 
which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (Q[5], 
A[5]), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human 
law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 2/5

 Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, 
especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form 
different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary 
laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt 
what he ought to do and what he  ought to avoid, it was necessary for man 
to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is 
certain that such a law cannot err.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 3/5

 Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is 
competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior 
movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and 
yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct 
himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not 
sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this 
purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 4/5

 Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law 
cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away 
with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder 
the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. 
In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and 
unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all 
sins are forbidden.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 5/5

 And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said: 
"The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; 
"converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but also 
interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the 
certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by 
directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: By the natural law the eternal law is participated 
proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural 
end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional 
law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from 
some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles 
imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the 
reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles, 
namely, the precepts of the Divine law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than 
that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently the 
comparison fails.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is but one Divine law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where 
there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of 
mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8: "God is 
the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver 
intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the 
same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: "He will have all 
men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore 
there is but one Divine law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, 
which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace 
is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the 
Divine law but one.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being 
translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." 
But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz. the 
levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine 
law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[30], A[3], distinction is the 
cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as 
those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g. a horse and 
an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy 
and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. 
Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25) compares the state of man under the Old 
Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New 
Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer under a pedagogue."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 2/4

 Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in 
connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. 
For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common 
good as to its end, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). This good may be 
twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was 
directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the 
law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans 
(Ex. 3:8,17). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to 
this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of 
His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Mt. 
4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence 
Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal goods are 
contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but 
the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 3/4

 Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the 
order of righteousness (A[4]): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old 
Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Mt. 5:20: "Unless 
your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you 
shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the saying that "the 
Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" ( Sentent. 
iii, D, xl).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 4/4

 Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its  
commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New 
Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, 
bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine 
says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little 
difference [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' 
and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel---fear 
and love."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As the father of a family issues different commands to the 
children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one 
kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another 
more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a 
greater capacity for Divine things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than 
through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: "There is no other name . . . 
given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings 
all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But 
before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ 
was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto 
salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain general 
precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is 
one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain 
particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in 
the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, 
as already explained.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For 
Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But the "fomes" 
of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the 
"fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it 
are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, from not 
following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following 
them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above 
(Q[90], A[2]). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our 
own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my 
members, fighting against the law of my mind."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]; Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to 
its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by  way of 
participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that every 
inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the 
law, is called a law by participation, as stated above (A[2]; Q[90], A[1]
, ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold 
inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines 
his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects to 
different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a 
mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a 
lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into 
another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a 
soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of 
mercantile legislation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various 
natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is 
against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a 
way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek 
animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is 
allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he 
should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in 
the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could 
take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the 
influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one 
individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that, 
after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse 
of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did 
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like 
to them."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Body Para. 3/3

 So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the 
"fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so 
far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct 
inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather 
is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence 
of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of 
its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it 
is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper 
dignity, has the nature of a law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an 
incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as 
stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine 
law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be 
condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers law in the light of a rule or 
measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law 
become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but 
by a kind of participation, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper 
inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the  inclination of 
sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained 
to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species 
or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is 
subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from 
the order of reason.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

 (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and 
to punish, as the Jurist states?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For 
men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is 
"that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God alone, 
because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as we stated above 
(Q[55], A[4]) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does 
not make men good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the 
very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore in 
man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make 
men good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above 
(Q[90], A[2]). But some behave well in things regarding the community, 
who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the 
business of the law to make men good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says 
(Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects, 
but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention 
of every lawgiver is to make good citizens."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is 
nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects 
are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its 
being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see 
that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in 
their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every 
subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler," as the 
Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by those 
who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect 
of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue 
is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect 
of  law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in 
some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on 
true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine 
justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good 
simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which 
is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in 
opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, 
but in respect to that particular government. In this way good is found 
even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good 
robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Q[63], A[2]), viz. 
acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action 
contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the acquired 
virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it 
when it already exists. And since law is given for the purpose of 
directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does 
law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of 
the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating 
them to good works."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that 
one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and 
sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of 
virtue, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with 
the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is the part 
that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of 
the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he be well 
proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent 
unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the common good of 
the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least 
those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of 
the community, that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey 
the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) 
that "the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but 
the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good man."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is 
not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet 
in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the 
citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists in 
its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at 
being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with 
respect to that particular government.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as 
consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and "punishment." 
For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist states. But command 
and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are superfluous.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be 
good, as stated above (A[1]). But counsel aims at a higher good than a 
command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to 
command.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does 
reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so also is 
to reward.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as 
stated above (A[1]). But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of 
being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may be done 
through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," as 
Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore punishment is 
not a proper effect of law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits 
something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids 
something, as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or 
punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting 
something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now it 
is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, 
in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain principles to 
assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the 
precept of the law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law 
directs, as stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2; Q[91], A[4]). Again there are 
three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above (Q[18], A[8]), some acts 
are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the 
act of the law is a precept or command, for "the law commands all acts of 
virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil generically, viz. acts of vice, 
and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically 
indifferent, and in respect of these the law permits; and all acts that 
are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called 
indifferent. And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in 
order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect of 
law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a 
prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a 
wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be  within 
the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore 
too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. 7:12) says: "I 
speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish 
pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain 
is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but 
only to punish.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is 
good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so 
likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, even by 
punishing, leads men on to being good.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) 
The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law, 
which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the 
"fomes," suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] Out. Para. 2/2

 Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) What is the eternal law?

 (2) Whether it is known to all?

 (3) Whether every law is derived from it?

 (4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?

 (5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?

 (6) Whether all human things are subject to it?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type 
existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many 
types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 
46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore the 
eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, 
as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name in God, as 
stated in the FP, Q[34], A[1]: whereas type refers to the Essence. 
Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above 
our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above our minds 
is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of 
truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law is 
not the same as the sovereign type. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal 
law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the 
things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must 
pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by 
those who are subject to his government. And just as the type of the 
things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the 
products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his 
subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be 
present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is 
the Creator of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer 
to the products of his art, as stated in the FP, Q[14], A[8]. Moreover He 
governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single 
creature, as was also stated in the FP, Q[103], A[5]. Wherefore as the 
type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has 
the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as 
moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law. 
Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine 
Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types 
which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in 
them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their 
different relations to things, as stated in the FP, Q[15], A[2]. But law 
is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as 
stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And things, which are in themselves 
different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to 
one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type 
of this order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be 
considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the 
word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and 
expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to 
the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by 
the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God 
the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a 
Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they 
refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are 
expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And 
among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is 
expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal 
name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship 
between type and word.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same 
relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the human 
intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by 
reason of itself, but by reason of its being  consonant with things, 
since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the 
reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each 
thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as 
was stated in the FP, Q[16], A[1]. Consequently the Divine intellect is 
true in itself; and its type is truth itself.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the eternal law is known to all?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, 
as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God no man 
knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing 
in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law 
is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But 
all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not 
know the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal 
law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according to Ethic. i, 
"any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is 
not known to us.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of 
the eternal law is imprinted on us."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; 
secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: 
thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its 
rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except 
the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows 
it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a 
kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the 
unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men 
know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles 
of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge 
of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less 
cognizant of the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in 
themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to 
Rm. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being 
understood by the things that are made."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to his 
own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for 
it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not 
follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows 
also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as 
when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job 
12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that 
eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher 
alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by 
judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way we 
speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical 
judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none 
can judge of the eternal law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. 
For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above (Q[91], A[6]), which 
is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since 
thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," of which the Apostle says 
(Rm. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not 
every law is derived from the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, 
because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is that, 
according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly." 
But some laws are unjust, according to Is. 10:1: "Woe to them that make 
wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which 
is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things which are 
punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the 
eternal law, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore not even every good law is 
derived from the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, 
and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the 
eternal law, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore all laws proceed from the 
eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2), the law denotes a kind 
of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers 
ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be 
derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does 
not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we 
observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government 
is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the 
plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to 
his inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of 
whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the 
under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law 
is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of 
government in  the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal 
law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the 
eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right 
reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. 
Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but 
what man has drawn from the eternal law."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it 
is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect it is 
evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it 
denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not 
the nature of law, as stated above (Q[91], A[6]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of 
right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from 
the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called 
an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. 
Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance 
of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the 
eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Rm. 13:1.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as 
approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are 
directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because 
more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very 
fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes 
under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were 
human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently it does 
not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that 
it is not on a perfect equality with it.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to 
the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the 
Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to 
(the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore 
God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal. 
Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the 
King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be subject 
. . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the 
Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the 
eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many 
necessary things are subject to Divine providence:  for instance, the 
stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore 
even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and 
consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order 
to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Q[92], A[2]). Therefore 
necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the eternal law is the type of 
the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine 
government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is not 
subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal 
law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by looking 
around us. For those things are subject to human government, which can be 
done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to 
human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or 
feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by God, whether it be 
contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things 
pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal 
law, but are the eternal law itself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the 
will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it is 
subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is 
the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God's will, 
as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things 
are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are planned by Divine 
Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is said to be reasonable 
[rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their 
type [ratio].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of 
God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the 
eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of 
appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is 
said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in 
respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary 
things that are created.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some 
necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive 
from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is 
in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, is said 
to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed 
to.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law? 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the 
eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above 
(Q[90], A[4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational 
creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore none 
but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently 
natural contingents are not.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as 
stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated 
above (A[1]). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in 
any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not 
subject to the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural 
contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal 
law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the sea 
with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass 
their limits."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the 
eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to 
rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law 
directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of 
someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own 
actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things 
subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things, 
for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by 
others, as stated above (Q[1], A[2]). Consequently man cannot impose laws 
on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can 
impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his 
command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule 
which is a principle of action.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward 
principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints on 
the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this 
way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148:6: 
"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions 
and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. 
Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through 
being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, 
through understanding the Divine commandment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to natural 
things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being 
promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as 
stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are  obedient 
to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by obeying 
it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than 
human reason does. And as the members of the human body are moved at the 
command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no 
apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved 
by God, without, on that account, being rational.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are 
outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order of 
universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose 
providence nothing can escape, as stated in the FP, Q[22], A[2]. And 
since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above 
(A[1]), hence the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal 
law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the 
eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by the 
spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of 
God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to Rm. 8:14: 
"Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." 
Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.: 
'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the 
law of God." But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh 
dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is 
the law of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law 
is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of 
blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are 
already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under 
the eternal law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades 
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of 
the universe is administered."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the 
eternal law, as explained above (A[5]): first, by partaking of the 
eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, 
i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive 
principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to 
the eternal law, as stated above (A[5]). But since the rational nature, 
together with that which it has in common with all creatures, has 
something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is 
subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational 
creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (A[2]), 
it also has a natural  inclination to that which is in harmony with the 
eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue" 
(Ethic. ii, 1).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 2/3

 Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in 
the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is 
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good 
is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are 
found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of 
good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, 
besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of 
grace and virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as 
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the 
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their 
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this 
imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in 
so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, 
according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence Augustine 
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to 
the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of 
the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts 
of His creation with most suitable laws."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. 
First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being pinned 
down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage 
a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains from evil deeds, 
through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of 
virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not under the law, because he 
fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is poured into his heart 
by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the 
works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy 
Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under 
the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (A[4], ad 2); it follows 
that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under 
the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where 
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of 
God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to the 
Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion; 
since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine 
justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate 
so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and consequently there 
remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law. 
For we have seen above (Q[85], A[2]) that sin does not destroy entirely 
the good of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved  towards the end 
by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in 
the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We 
therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some 
deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that 
some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state. 
Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six 
points of inquiry:

 (1) What is the natural law?

 (2) What are the precepts of the natural law?

 (3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

 (4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?

 (5) Whether it is changeable?

 (6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the natural law is a habit?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the soul: 
power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's 
powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through 
them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the 
conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can only apply 
to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the 
FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown 
further on (A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards, does not 
always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an 
act, but a habit.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is 
that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the 
natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by 
it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, 
properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it 
has been stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law is 
something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. 
Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for 
he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is 
that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a 
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, 
since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason 
actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this 
way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, 
the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold 
those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of 
virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he 
mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz. 
powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul 
besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that 
wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own natural 
properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it 
is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the 
first principles of human actions.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held 
habitually; and this is granted.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a 
man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on account 
of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the 
habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a 
child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural 
law, which is in him habitually.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several 
precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above 
(Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, 
it would follow that there are also many natural laws.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human 
nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold. 
Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on 
account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by reason 
of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even 
things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to 
the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above 
(Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one 
precept of the natural law. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in 
relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of 
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. 
Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the 
natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of 
demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are 
self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two 
ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is 
said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the 
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of 
the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For 
instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very 
nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and 
yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not 
self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain 
axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are 
those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is 
greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal 
to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, 
who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one 
who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an 
angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the 
unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended 
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, 
is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a 
man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the 
same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is 
based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all 
others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is 
the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is 
the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical 
reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end 
under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical 
reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that 
which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, 
that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All 
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever 
the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs 
to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a 
contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural 
inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and 
consequently as objects of pursuit, and their  contraries as evil, and 
objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural 
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in 
man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the 
nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every 
substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its 
nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of 
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the 
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that 
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in 
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those 
things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to 
all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, 
education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an 
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature 
is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth 
about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains 
to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun 
ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other 
such things regarding the above inclination.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the character 
of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human 
nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they 
are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one 
first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law 
are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things 
regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained 
under the law of reason.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the 
natural law. Because, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]) it is essential to a 
law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are 
ordained to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially 
in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are 
the subject of natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore 
all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow 
that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special 
sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are  common 
to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing is 
virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue 
are prescribed by the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are 
natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under 
the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in 
their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as 
virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has 
been stated (A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to which a 
man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined 
naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: 
thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is 
the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to 
act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue. 
Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the 
natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act 
virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, 
i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed 
by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature 
does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have 
been found by men to be conducive to well-living.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, 
drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common 
good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to 
man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also 
against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may 
mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this 
sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary 
to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual 
lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing 
to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for 
some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious 
for others, as being out of proportion to them.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the natural law is the same in all men?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it 
is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is that which 
is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this  is not common to all 
men; because, as it is written (Rm. 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." 
Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be 
just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that 
nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard 
to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs 
everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now 
different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the 
desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to 
other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common 
to all nations."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs 
those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is 
proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process 
of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The 
speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from 
the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly 
with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its 
proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth 
without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with 
contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and 
consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the 
more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter 
defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all 
men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is 
not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the 
principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, 
truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of 
detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the 
same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether 
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for 
all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the 
speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally 
known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle 
are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. 
But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the 
truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it 
equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according 
to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper  conclusion, 
that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now 
this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular 
case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore 
goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of 
fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail 
the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were 
to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a 
guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of 
conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle 
may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, 
is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to 
certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those 
general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both 
as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may 
fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as 
natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on 
account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason 
is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; 
thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural 
law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates 
(De Bello Gall. vi).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is 
contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since 
they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs 
to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after 
saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the 
Gospel," adds at once, by way of example, "by which everyone is commanded 
to do to others as he would be done by."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things 
that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions 
drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing 
in a few.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so 
all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be 
directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all 
men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the natural law can be changed?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on 
Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss 
says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct 
the law of nature." But that which is  corrected is changed. Therefore 
the natural law can be changed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are 
against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when 
God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and when he 
ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Ex. 
12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of 
fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of all 
things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But 
these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems 
that the natural law is subject to change.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law 
dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary 
according to time, but remains unchangeable."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two 
ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the 
natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of 
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the 
Divine law and by human laws.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of 
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, 
ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether 
unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles, 
which, as we have said (A[4]), are certain detailed proximate conclusions 
drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that 
what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in 
some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes 
hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated above (A[4]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction of 
the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the 
natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of 
some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good 
which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of 
nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account 
of original sin, according to 1 Kgs. 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh 
alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on 
any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. In like 
manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to 
him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any 
woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The 
same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For 
whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is 
not  taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that 
theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is 
commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done 
by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in the FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. 
First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm 
to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus 
we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because 
nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, 
"the possession of all things in common and universal freedom" are said 
to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions 
and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason 
for the benefit of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not 
changed in this respect, except by addition.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the 
heart of man. Because on Rm. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not the 
law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had 
blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." 
But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the law of 
nature can be blotted out.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of 
nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more therefore 
can the law of nature be blotted out.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many 
things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of nature. 
Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in 
the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which 
is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law 
cannot be blotted out.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[4],5), there belong to the natural 
law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and 
secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it 
were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those 
general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be 
blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a 
particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the 
general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of 
concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But 
as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be 
blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in 
speculative  matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or 
by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even 
unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rm. i), were not esteemed sinful.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not 
universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the 
natural law, in the way stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature 
is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the 
natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain 
enactments which are unjust.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] Out. Para. 1/1

OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; 
(2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Its utility.

 (2) Its origin.

 (3) Its quality.

 (4) Its division.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by 
men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, 
as stated above (Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be induced to be good 
willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of 
laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have 
recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is better 
than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have 
been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision 
of judges, than to frame laws in addition.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, 
as is evident from what has been stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2). But since 
human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter 
pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into 
sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of 
them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed 
by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there 
was no need of human laws.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made  that in 
fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might 
be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of 
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these things 
are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws 
should be made.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[1]; Q[94], A[3]), man has a 
natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be 
acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that 
man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and 
clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason 
and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, 
to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is 
difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this 
training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing 
man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and 
especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently 
a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at 
the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined 
to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or 
rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by 
admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, 
and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be 
restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they 
might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they 
themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do 
willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now 
this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the 
discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and 
virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher 
says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect 
in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and 
righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of 
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to 
do.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by 
being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed 
are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that 
all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and 
this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise 
men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be 
necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those 
who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas 
judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: 
and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances 
into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, 
because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas 
those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are 
affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their 
judgment is  perverted.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, 
and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever 
possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters 
to be left to the decision of men.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law 
"have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher says in 
the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened 
or not happened," and the like.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the 
natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just 
is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things 
which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. 
Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural 
law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated 
by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those 
things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the 
natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Q[94], A[4]). 
Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the 
natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is 
equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the 
natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is 
clearly false.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are 
derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the reason 
for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says 
[*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore 
not all human laws are derived from the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from 
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence 
for the laws."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not 
just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on 
the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be 
just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first 
rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been 
stated above (Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human law has just 
so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. 
But if in any point it deflects  from the law of nature, it is no longer 
a law but a perversion of law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law 
in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of 
determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by 
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the 
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the 
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman 
needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. 
Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the 
natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must not kill" may be 
derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no 
man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the 
law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he 
be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But 
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human 
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the 
natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, 
have no other force than that of human law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are 
by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural 
law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument avails for those things that are derived from 
the natural law, by way of conclusions.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied 
to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human 
affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various 
people.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring 
to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural 
law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is 
based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what 
is the best thing to decide.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2

 Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we 
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions 
of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their 
demonstrations."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is 
appropriate?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality  of 
positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall 
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the 
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly 
expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for 
no private benefit, but for the common good." Because he had previously 
expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying that "law is 
anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful 
to discipline, and further the common weal." Therefore it was needless to 
add any further conditions to these.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. 
vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add "just."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to 
Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the 
definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be 
necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is 
necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human 
law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be 
necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. 
Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and "useful."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be 
determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as 
to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that 
is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and 
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is 
both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or 
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz. 
the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above (A[2]; Q[93], A[3]
). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states 
[*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore 
Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three 
conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is 
proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline," 
inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it "further 
the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of 
mankind.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. 
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes 
on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the 
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it 
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on 
the order of reason, to which  he refers by saying "just": secondly, it 
depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be adapted 
to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the 
ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on children as 
adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live 
alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on 
certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted to place and 
time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law 
should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to the removal 
of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of 
expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law 
itself. And since, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]), law is ordained to the 
common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or 
human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the "law of 
nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it." 
But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all nations." 
Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, 
but rather under natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not 
formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the commonalty, 
senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all 
have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materially. But 
art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to 
infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and 
soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems that, as 
this division includes "military law," and "public law," referring to 
priests and magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining 
to other offices of the state.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. 
But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man. 
Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of 
lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, another the 
"Falcidian" law, etc.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 1/6

 I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something 
contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or 
irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is 
divided properly and of itself in respect of  its being rational or 
irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are 
entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, 
many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be 
divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the 
notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained 
above (A[2]). In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of 
nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in which something 
may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above (A[2]). Because, 
to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law 
of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, 
and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of 
the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved 
in Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature 
by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according as 
each state decides on what is best for itself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 2/6

 Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the 
common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided 
according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the 
common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by 
governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. 
Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 3/6

 Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one 
who governs the community of the state, as shown above (Q[90], A[3]). In 
this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms 
of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) 
one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we 
have "Royal Ordinances." Another form is "aristocracy," i.e. government 
by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the 
"Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the 
Senate" [Senatus consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government 
by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have "Praetorian," also 
called "Honorary," law. Another form of government is that of the people, 
which is called "democracy," and there we have "Decrees of the 
commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is 
altogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, 
there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the 
best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the "Lords and 
Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 4/6

 Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. 
In this respect, according to the various matters of which the law 
treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after 
their authors: thus we have the "Lex Julia" about adultery, the "Lex 
Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, 
not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to which 
they refer.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 5/6 

 Reply OBJ 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, 
in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from the 
natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its 
premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is 
distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural 
law which is common to all animals.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 6/6

 The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are 
six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?

 (2) Whether human law should repress all vices?

 (3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?

 (4) Whether it binds man in conscience?

 (5) Whether all men are subject to human law?

 (6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the 
law?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the 
individual?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the 
community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says 
(Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of 
legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of 
decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed 
about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the 
community, but also for the individual.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above 
(Q[90], AA[1],2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore 
human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather for the 
individual.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above 
(Q[90], AA[1],2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in 
Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can be so 
certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws 
should be framed not in general but for individual cases.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii, 
art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the majority 
of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly 
happen in an individual case."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that 
end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as  Isidore says 
(Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit, 
but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence human laws should be 
proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many 
things. Wherefore law should take account of many things, as to persons, 
as to matters, and as to times. Because the community of the state is 
composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor 
is it established to endure for only a short time, but to last for all 
time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. 
Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, i.e. 
positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down simply in a 
general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that "the 
legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but which, 
when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. 
Some things affect the community in one respect, and individuals in 
another. These are called "privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, 
because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many 
matters; and in regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular 
acts of legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being laws, 
but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such 
are decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds 
"all matters subject to decrees."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to many; 
wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things 
belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in 
that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there are 
things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use 
consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law would be of no 
use, if it did not extend further than to one single act. Because the 
decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are 
made for the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law is a 
general precept, as stated above (Q[92], A[2], OBJ[2]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all 
things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as 
natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as 
being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less 
frequently it fail.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. 
For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order that, in 
fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be 
held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law. 
Therefore human laws should repress all evils.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens 
virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds 
of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated 
above (Q[95], A[2]). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. 
Therefore human law should repress all vices.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the 
law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits 
these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But Divine 
providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly allows 
some vices, by not repressing them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2), law is framed as a rule 
or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that 
which it measures, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different 
things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men 
should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says 
(Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to nature, and 
according to the customs of the country." Now possibility or faculty of 
action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing 
is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to 
one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child as to a full-grown 
man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, 
since many things are permitted to children, which in an adult are 
punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many 
things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would be 
intolerable in a virtuous man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of 
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all 
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, 
from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those 
that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human 
society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft 
and such like.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. 
Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor is 
injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not 
suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of 
imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that 
they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being 
unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: 
thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): "He that violently bloweth his nose, 
bringeth out blood"; and (Mt. 9:17) that if "new wine," i.e. precepts of 
a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the 
bottles break, and  the wine runneth out," i.e. the precepts are 
despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal 
law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine says 
(De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government of 
states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished by 
Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is 
this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does." Wherefore, too, 
human law does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by the natural 
law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the 
virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But human law 
does not prohibit all vices, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore neither 
does it prescribe all acts of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the 
end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under a 
precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above 
(Q[90], A[2]). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common 
good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe all acts 
of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law 
"prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the acts 
of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like 
manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the former, 
forbidding the latter."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their 
objects, as explained above (Q[54], A[2]; Q[60], A[1]; Q[62], A[2]). Now 
all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of 
an individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus matters of 
fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for 
upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with the other 
virtues. But law, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]) is ordained to the common 
good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the 
law. Nevertheless human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of 
every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the 
common good---either immediately, as when certain things are done 
directly for the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver 
prescribes certain things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens 
are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the 
obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts  of 
virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes 
some acts of each virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, 
from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act of justice 
is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: 
and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue. Secondly an act of 
virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous 
man does it. Such an act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not 
come under a precept of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the 
common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether human law binds a man in conscience?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For 
an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher power. But the 
power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. 
Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a Divine court, such as 
is the court of conscience.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the 
commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made void by 
human laws, according to Mt. 15:6: "You have made void the commandment of 
God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not bind a man in 
conscience.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on 
man, according to Is. 10:1 et seqq.: "Woe to them that make wicked laws, 
and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment, 
and do violence to the cause of the humble of My people." But it is 
lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore human laws 
do not bind man in conscience.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 2:19): "This is thankworthy, if 
the conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be 
just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal law 
whence they are derived, according to Prov. 8:15: "By Me kings reign, and 
lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to be just, both from 
the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good---and from 
their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed 
the power of the lawgiver---and from their form, when, to wit, burdens 
are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with 
a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part of the community, 
each man in all that he is and has, belongs to the community; just as a 
part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts 
a loss on the part, in order to save the  whole: so that on this account, 
such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and 
binding in conscience, and are legal laws.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being 
contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned 
above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his 
subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but rather 
to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author, as when a 
man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him---or in 
respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally on the 
community, although with a view to the common good. The like are acts of 
violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 
5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Wherefore such 
laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal 
or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, 
according to Mt. 5:40,41: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy 
cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him 
other two."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: 
such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else 
contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be 
observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather 
than man."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As the Apostle says (Rm. 13:1,2), all human power is from 
God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters that are 
within its scope, "resisteth the ordinance of God"; so that he becomes 
guilty according to his conscience.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the 
commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. 
Wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on 
its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend to this: 
wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided 
he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all are subject to the law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those 
alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle says 
(1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just 
are not subject to the law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that 
is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by the public 
law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost, 
for they are the sons of God, of  whom it is said (Rm. 8:14): "Whosoever 
are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not 
all men are subject to human law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De 
Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." But he that 
is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are 
subject to the law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:1): "Let every soul be subject 
to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to imply 
subjection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men should be 
subject to human law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2; A[3], ad 2), the notion 
of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; 
secondly, that it has coercive power. Wherefore a man may be subject to 
law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator: 
and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law 
framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is not 
subject to a power. In one way, by being altogether free from its 
authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the 
laws of the sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are not 
subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher 
law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but 
not in those matters in which the subject receives his orders from the 
emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the 
lower authority, since he is directed by that of a higher. In this way, 
one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a subject thereto in 
certain matters, in respect of which he is ruled by a higher law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject 
to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are not subject to 
the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary 
to the will: but the will of the good is in harmony with the law, whereas 
the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Wherefore in this sense the 
good are not subject to the law, but only the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion: 
for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men": because "they 
are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of the law written in 
their hearts," as the Apostle says (Rm. 2:14,15). Consequently the law 
does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man: 
and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law of the 
Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are 
inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless the very 
fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the 
Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pt. 2:13:  "Be ye subject . . . to every human 
creature for God's sake."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the law," as to 
its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced by 
himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the 
sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt from the law, 
because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the 
law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6: "To Thee only have I sinned," a gloss says 
that "there is no man who can judge the deeds of a king." But as to the 
directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own 
will, according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that 
"whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep himself. And a wise 
authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] says: 'Obey the law that 
thou makest thyself.'" Moreover the Lord reproaches those who "say and do 
not"; and who "bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders, but 
with a finger of their own they will not move them" (Mt. 23:3,4). Hence, 
in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to 
its directive force; but he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not 
of constraint. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when 
it is expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it according to 
time and place.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the 
letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): "Although men 
judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are 
made they must pass judgment not on them, but according to them." But if 
anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the 
intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment on the law. 
Therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to disregard the 
letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make 
the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the law. 
Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, 
but should always act according to the letter of the law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by 
words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: for Wisdom 
says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." 
Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise 
than by the words of the law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is said 
is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not subject 
to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take account of the 
motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), every law is directed to the 
common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly. 
Hence the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et 
Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us 
to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which 
have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now it happens often that the 
observance of some point of law conduces to the common weal in the 
majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since 
then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the 
law according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention 
to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of 
that law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be 
observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an 
established law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is 
good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that 
the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the 
city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened 
to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to 
the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common weal, which the 
lawgiver had in view.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law 
according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing instant 
remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and 
what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this who are in 
authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to 
dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to 
allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, the 
mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no 
law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the 
law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which he sees 
that the letter of the law is not to be observed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not 
interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by reason 
of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be 
a matter of doubt, he must either act according to the letter of the law, 
or consult those in power.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every 
single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words 
all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even 
if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration, he 
ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but should 
frame the law according to that which is of most common occurrence.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] Out. Para. 1/1

OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES) 

 We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether human law is changeable?

 (2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?

 (3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the 
force of law?

 (4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by 
dispensation of those in authority?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether human law should be changed in any way?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at 
all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above 
(Q[95], A[2]). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human 
law should also remain without any change.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should 
be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human acts, as 
stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2). Therefore it should remain without change.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as 
stated above (Q[95], A[2]). But that which is right once is right always. 
Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal law, 
however just, may be justly changed in course of time."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[91], A[3]), human law is a dictate of 
reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for 
the just change of human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the 
part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part of 
reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from 
the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that 
the teaching of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was 
afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical 
matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for 
the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into 
consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many 
ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made 
institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the 
common weal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be 
rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom 
different things are expedient according to the difference of his 
condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "If 
the people have a sense of moderation and  responsibility, and are most 
careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law allowing 
such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the 
commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt 
as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels and 
criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly 
forfeit to such a people, and the choice devolves to a few good men."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as 
stated above (Q[91], A[2]), and therefore endures without change, owing 
to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author 
of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore 
his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law contains certain 
universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains 
certain particular precepts, according to various emergencies.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing 
can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. And 
therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and 
therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But right 
is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and 
the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above: wherefore 
rectitude of this kind is subject to change.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better 
occurs?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever 
something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human reason, 
like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give 
place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the same should 
apply to human laws.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the 
future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found possible 
to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because 
the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore it seems that laws 
should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we 
cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by 
experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it 
seems that as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur 
for legislation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It is 
absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those  traditions 
to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), human law is rightly changed, in 
so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain 
extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common 
good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that 
what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is 
looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding 
power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. 
Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or 
other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm 
done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very 
great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from 
the extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing 
law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the 
jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.] 
that "in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit 
to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered 
just."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and 
therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto 
should be changed. But "laws derive very great force from custom," as the 
Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently they should not be 
quickly changed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in 
view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or in a case 
of great urgency, as stated above. This answer applies also to the Third 
Objection.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether custom can obtain force of law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish 
a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law and from the 
Divine law, as stated above (Q[93], A[3]; Q[95], A[2]). But human custom 
cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore 
neither can it change human law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted 
against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing 
good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of 
human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that the mere 
custom should obtain force of law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose 
business it is to govern the community; wherefore private individuals 
cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. 
Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to abolish the law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The customs of 
God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered 
as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought 
to be punished as those who disobey the law of God."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will of the 
lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; 
the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as 
human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by 
speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses 
as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that by 
human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it 
manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by 
actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law 
can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which 
obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the 
inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually 
declared; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed 
from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force 
of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, 
as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding 
from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no 
custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for Isidore says 
(Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be 
eradicated by law and reason."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[96], A[6]), human laws fail in some 
cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, 
in a case where the law fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when 
such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom 
shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by 
the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, the same 
reason remains, for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the 
custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes the 
custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be 
that it is not "possible according to the custom of the country" [*Q[95], 
A[3]], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it 
is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two 
conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, the 
consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in 
favor of a particular observance, that does the authority of the 
sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing 
the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot make laws, yet the 
whole people can. If however the people have not the free power to make 
their own laws, or to  abolish a law made by a higher authority; 
nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom obtains force of law, 
in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for 
that people: because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to 
approve of that which is introduced by custom.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from 
human laws. For the law is established for the "common weal," as Isidore 
says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the 
private convenience of an individual: because, as the Philosopher says 
(Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of 
one man." Therefore it seems that a man should not be dispensed from 
acting in compliance with the general law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as 
follows (Dt. 1:17): "You shall hear the little as well as the great; 
neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment of 
God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, 
seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a community 
cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the 
Divine law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the 
natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion," nor be 
"helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid 
down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from the Divine and 
natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): "A dispensation is 
committed to me."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out 
to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household is 
called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he 
distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure. 
Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very 
fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by each 
individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to 
the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular 
individual, or in some particular case, either because it would hinder 
some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as 
explained above (Q[96], A[6]). But it would be dangerous to leave this to 
the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident 
and sudden emergency, as stated above (Q[96], A[6]). Consequently he who 
is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that 
rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application 
to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to 
be observed. If however  he grant this permission without any such 
reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent 
dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, 
if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says 
(Lk. 12:42): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser 
[Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?"

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, 
this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention of 
benefiting, the common good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served 
out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of 
any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, 
it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which 
never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, however, 
which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a 
dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not be paid back to the 
betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each 
man stands as a private person to the public law to which he is subject. 
Wherefore just as none can dispense from public human law, except the man 
from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the 
precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but 
God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

 In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law 
itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points of 
inquiry:

 (1) Whether the Old Law was good?

 (2) Whether it was from God?

 (3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?

 (4) Whether it was given to all?

 (5) Whether it was binding on all?

 (6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law was good?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written 
(Ezech. 20:25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments 
in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good except on 
account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the 
Old Law was not good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to 
the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law was not 
salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For  the Apostle says (Rm. 
7:8, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without 
the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; and I died." Again he 
says (Rm. 5:20): "Law entered in that sin might abound." Therefore the 
Old Law was not good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be 
possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to human 
custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts 15:10): "Why 
tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which 
neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" Therefore it seems 
that the Old Law was not good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:12): "Wherefore the law indeed 
is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a 
doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right 
reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the 
Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed concupiscence 
which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, "Thou 
shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods" (Ex. 20:17). Moreover the same law 
forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason. 
Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in 
the same way (Rm. 7): "I am delighted," says he (verse 22), "with the law 
of God, according to the inward man": and again (verse 16): "I consent to 
the law, that is good."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius 
states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect 
good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a 
thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end: 
while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in 
attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. 
Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; but it is 
imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back 
to health. Again it must be observed that the end of human law is 
different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the 
temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by directing 
external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful 
condition of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is 
to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which end is 
hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. 
Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of human law, viz. 
the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the 
perfection of the Divine law: but it is requisite that it should make man 
altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be 
done save by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which 
fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" (Rm. 5:5): 
since "the grace of God is life everlasting" (Rm. 6:23). But the Old Law 
could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as 
it is written  (Jn. 1:17), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth 
came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but 
imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: "The law brought nothing to 
perfection."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are 
said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the remission 
of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a 
sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and judgments in which they shall 
not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text 
goes on: "And I polluted them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in 
their own gifts, when they offered all that opened the womb, for their 
offenses."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the 
cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in so 
far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, 
and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men, 
but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rm. 5:11): "Sin, taking 
occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the 
same sense when it is said that "the law entered in that sin might 
abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not 
final: in so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the 
more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it, 
and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more 
from its being forbidden.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of 
grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (Rm. 9:16): "It is 
not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and 
runs in the commandments of God, "but of God that showeth mercy." 
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): "I have run the way of Thy 
commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by giving me grace 
and charity.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law was from God?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is 
written (Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was 
imperfect, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore the Old Law was not from God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all 
the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does 
not continue for ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18): "There is 
indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness 
and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore the Old Law was not from God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also 
the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of sin, as stated 
above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law  does not pertain 
to God, to Whom "none is like among the lawgivers" (Job 36:22).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that God "will have all men 
to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated 
above (A[1]). Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to 
God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 15:6) while speaking to the Jews, to 
whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment of God for 
your tradition." And shortly before (verse 4) He had said: "Honor thy 
father and mother," which is contained expressly in the Old Law (Ex. 
20:12; Dt. 5:16). Therefore the Old Law was from God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father 
of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two 
ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says (Lk. 
24:44): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law 
. . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning Me": and (Jn. 
5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for 
he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since by withdrawing 
men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the 
worship of one God, by Whom the human race was to be saved through 
Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 3:23): "Before the faith came, 
we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that faith which was 
to be revealed." Now it is evident that the same thing it is, which gives 
a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say 
"the same," I mean that it does so either by itself or through its 
subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to 
Christ, Who was to cast him out, according to Mt. 12:26: "If Satan cast 
out Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against 
himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom 
came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and yet 
perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, not simply, 
but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are 
given to children are perfect in comparison with the condition of those 
to whom they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence the 
Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): "The law was our pedagogue in Christ."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Those works of God endure for ever which God so made that 
they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But the Old 
Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; not as though 
it were evil, but as being weak and useless for this time; because, as 
the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought nothing to perfection": 
hence he says (Gal. 3:25): "After the faith is come, we are no longer 
under a pedagogue."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[79], A[4]), God sometimes permits  
certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also 
did He wish to give such a law as men by their own forces could not 
fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find 
themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the 
help of grace.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet 
another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. faith 
in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we 
were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him insufficient aids to 
salvation.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but 
immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so that the word 
"angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to Ps. 102:20,21: 
"Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His." But the 
Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: for it is written (Ex. 
20:1): "And the Lord spoke . . . these words," and further on: "I am the 
Lord Thy God." Moreover the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, 
and the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God 
immediately.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to Jn. 1:17, "the Law was given by Moses." But 
Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written (Ex. 33:11): 
"The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his 
friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God immediately.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as 
stated above (Q[90], A[3]). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the 
salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering spirits," as 
stated in Heb. 1:14. Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given 
through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the Law was "given 
[Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And Stephen 
said (Acts 7:53): "(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of 
angels."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides 
the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that "the 
gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels," there is a 
special reason why the Old Law should have been given through them. For 
it has been stated (AA[1],2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet 
disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which was to 
come through Christ. Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an 
order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself 
exercises the principal and perfect acts; while those things which 
dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his 
subordinates:  thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, 
but prepares the material by means of the workmen who assist him under 
his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the 
New Testament should be given by the incarnate God immediately; but that 
the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the 
angels. It is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to 
the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old; 
because in the New Testament "God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son," 
whereas in the Old Testament "the word was spoken by angels" (Heb. 2:2).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef. 
chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is 
sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in 
truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the external delivery; 
and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who supported the 
effectual power of speaking." Hence also it is that the angel spoke as 
personating the Lord.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated in 
Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and shortly 
afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he 
saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not see the very 
Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. 
Accordingly when Scripture states that "He spoke to him face to face," 
this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of the people, who 
thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke 
and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate creature, i.e. an angel 
and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision "face to face" means some 
kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the 
Divine Essence.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own 
authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it through 
others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it 
through the angels.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the 
Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation which was to 
come through Christ, as stated above (AA[2],3). But that salvation was to 
come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according to Is. 49:6: "It 
is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes 
of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to 
be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to 
the farthest part of the earth." Therefore the Old Law should have been 
given to all nations, and not to one people only.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34,35, "God is not a respecter of 
persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and  worketh justice, 
is acceptable to Him." Therefore the way of salvation should not have 
been opened to one people more than to another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated above 
(A[3]). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to 
the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written (Ecclus. 17:14): 
"Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all nations He bestows 
temporal goods, which are of less account with God than spiritual goods. 
Therefore He should have given the Law also to all peoples.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 3:1,2): "What advantage then hath 
the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God 
were committed to them": and (Ps. 147:9): "He hath not done in like 
manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto 
them."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given 
to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people alone 
remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away 
to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the Law, lest 
a holy thing should be given to dogs.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 2/4

 But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to 
idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous, as 
is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25,26: "Did you offer victims and 
sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But 
you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, 
the star of your god, which you made to yourselves." Moreover it is 
stated expressly (Dt. 9:6): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth 
thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art 
a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in the 
preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, which He 
promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 3/4

 What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16) that 
"to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, 'And to 
his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And to thy seed,' which is 
Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to 
that people, on account of the promised made to their fathers that Christ 
should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of whom 
Christ was to be born, should be signalized by a special sanctification, 
according to the words of Lev. 19:2: "Be ye holy, because I . . . am 
holy." Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that 
this promise was made to him, viz. that Christ should be born of his 
seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written (Is. 
41:2): "Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called him to 
follow him?"

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 4/4

 It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous  election 
that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung from 
them received the law; according to Dt. 4:36, 37: "Ye did [Vulg.: 'Thou 
didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy 
fathers, and chose their seed after them." And if again it asked why He 
chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof; a 
fitting answer is given by Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): "Why He 
draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish 
not to err."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ, 
was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ should be 
born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other 
peoples; according to Rm. 9:4: "To whom," namely the Jews, "belongeth the 
adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the testament, and the giving 
of the Law . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according 
to the flesh."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things which are 
given according to due; but it has no place in those things which are 
bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his 
own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of persons: but if he 
were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them 
according to personal merits, he would be a respecter of persons. Now God 
bestows the benefits of salvation on the human race gratuitously: 
wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some 
rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. viii): 
"All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not, 
out of justice He teaches not": for this is due to the condemnation of 
the human race for the sin of the first parent.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of 
sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries 
of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that 
the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate beings: and also 
bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts, 
according to Ps. 35:7: "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. 
Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to his law. 
But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the earth" (Ps. 
46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe 
the Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old 
Law: for it is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the 
words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If therefore other 
men could be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would 
be in a worse plight than other men. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to 
the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any 
stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the 
Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he 
celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born 
in the land." But it would have been useless to admit strangers to the 
legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could have been 
saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved 
without observing the Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the 
Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that the 
Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved without 
observing the Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, 
and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those precepts 
of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe 
the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because they 
belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by 
the Old Law, they were not binding on save the Jewish people alone.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above (A[4]), was 
given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative of 
holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of that people. Now 
whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, 
are binding on them alone: thus clerics who are set aside for the service 
of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound; 
likewise religious are bound by their profession to certain works of 
perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like 
manner this people was bound to certain special observances, to which 
other peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:13): "Thou 
shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this 
reason they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt. 26:3: 
"I profess this day before the Lord thy God," etc.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his law 
which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things to be 
observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his state 
becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship 
of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is 
written (Dt. 4:8): "What other nation is there so renowned that hath 
ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" In like manner, from 
this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the 
laity, and the state of religious than that of folk living in the world. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more 
securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural 
law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are 
now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to those of 
the religious, although they can be saved without this.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time 
of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation which was to 
come through Christ, as stated above (AA[2],3). But man needed this 
salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should 
have been given immediately after sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those 
from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the "seed, 
which is Christ" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as related in Gn. 
12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of 
Abraham.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe 
through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born of no other 
of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, 
according to 2 Kgs. 23:1: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning 
the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore the Old Law should 
have been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set 
because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made 
the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator": 
ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains. 
Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this order 
of time.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time 
of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect of 
which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on 
some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law restrains and 
tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by 
the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do. Hence it was 
fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as would be 
appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two 
things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud of his knowledge, as 
though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation: and 
accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome in this matter, 
man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written 
law: and man was able to learn from experience that his reason was 
deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong  into 
idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore, after those times, it 
was necessary for a written law to be given as a remedy for human 
ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of sin" (Rm. 3:20). But, 
after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his 
weakness, through his being unable to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the 
Apostle concludes (Rm. 8:3,4), "what the Law could not do in that it was 
weak through the flesh, God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . 
that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was 
most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began to be 
obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that 
this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they 
might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming 
that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law of 
grace.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once 
after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident in his 
own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because 
as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual 
sinning.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a 
general precept, as stated above (Q[90], AA[2],3); wherefore at the time 
of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household 
precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so as to form a 
people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that 
they should be given a law; for "slaves are not that part of the people 
or state to which it is fitting for the law to be directed," as the 
Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only 
those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people, 
who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the 
promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, according to Rm. 4:11: 
hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon 
as they were collected together.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are 
distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the first 
head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?

 (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?

 (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral 
precepts?

 (4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?

 (5) Whether it contains any others besides these?

 (6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts. 

™Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because 
a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (Q[90], AA[2],3). 
Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 13:9): "If there be any other 
commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor 
as thyself." But this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law 
contained but one commandment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever 
you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the 
Law and the prophets." But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the 
Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one 
commandment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): "Making void the Law of 
commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old Law, 
as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises 
many commandments.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something 
which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from the 
necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its 
very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being 
necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be 
necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given 
about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently we must 
say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their 
relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect of the diversity of 
those things that are ordained to that end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: 
yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of the 
things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one 
according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of a 
house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of 
acts ordained thereto.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the 
commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing friendship, 
either between man and man, or between man and God. Wherefore the whole 
Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor 
as thyself," as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of 
one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God's 
sake. Hence the Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which 
are about the love of God and of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord 
said (Mt. 22:40): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and 
the prophets." 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards another 
arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on 
another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever you 
would that men should do to you, do you also to them," this is an 
explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the 
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": so that it is an 
explanation of this commandment.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For 
the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above (Q[91], 
AA[4],5; Q[98], A[5]). But the moral precepts belong to the law of 
nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance 
where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things that are 
of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for 
the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old 
Law, which is a Divine law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" (2 
Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to 
Ps. 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou 
hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the 
Old Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover, He gave them 
discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an 
inheritance." Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on Heb. 
12:11: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is an 
exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore the Law which was 
given by God comprised moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident 
from Ex. 20:13,15: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This was 
reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law is to 
created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the 
Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since likeness 
is the reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth 
its like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is 
supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it is written (Lev. 
19:2; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man 
is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it 
was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: 
and these are the moral precepts of the Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being 
altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. For just as 
grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine  law presuppose the natural 
law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's 
assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but 
also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now 
human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to the universal 
principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it 
became obscured in the point of things to be done in detail. But with 
regard to the other moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from 
the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went 
astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in 
themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to 
rescue man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not 
only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the 
Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, 
such as the Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors 
to which reason is liable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the 
letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the moral 
precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without 
furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, 
besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man is for the 
purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, 
as stated above (Q[1], A[3]). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given 
to men should not comprise other than moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer 
to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a virtue, viz. 
religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and 
ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the moral precepts are about acts 
of virtue, as stated above (A[2]), it seems that the ceremonial precepts 
should not be distinct from the moral.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify 
something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 
3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." 
Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts 
about certain figurative actions.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): "Ten words . . . He wrote 
in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should 
teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do." But the ten 
commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral 
precepts there are others which are ceremonial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Body Para. 1/1 

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the Divine law is instituted 
chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted 
chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence human 
laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything 
relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common good of 
mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating 
to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the formation of 
human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other 
hand the Divine law directed men to one another according to the demands 
of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the chief 
aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts 
of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain 
external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: 
and it is these works that are said to belong to the Divine worship. This 
worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was 
the goddess of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were 
made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states 
[*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word "ceremony" was introduced among 
the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived from a town near 
Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred 
chattels of the Romans were taken thither and most carefully preserved. 
Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship 
are specially called ceremonial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore 
the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the natural 
law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined 
both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these very 
determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of 
natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of 
the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral 
precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since 
it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination 
of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such 
sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremonial 
precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the 
moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot 
be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. Now these 
similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, 
but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the things of God are set forth 
in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the 
case of metaphorical expressions; but also by similitudes of things set 
before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also  
judicial precepts?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to 
the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine says 
(Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning 
the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is 
foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral 
precepts; and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are 
ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not 
put any judicial precepts in the Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from Thy 
judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But 
a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial 
precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to Ps. 
93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like 
the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the 
moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not 
be held as distinct from them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and 
ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts" 
antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and 
ceremonial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3), it belongs to the Divine law 
to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the 
abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral 
precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined by 
Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, 
both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the 
determination of the universal principle about Divine worship is effected 
by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts 
of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the 
judicial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; 
viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; 
"ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; 
and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be 
maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rm. 7:12) after saying that 
the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy, and 
good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with regard 
to the ceremonial precepts (since the word "sanctus"---"holy"---is 
applied to that which is consecrated to God); and "good," i.e. conducive 
to virtue, as to the moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the 
ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under 
one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the 
life we have to lead.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of 
the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the judicial 
precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they 
are derived from reason; and something in common with the ceremonial 
precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This 
explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both judicial and moral 
precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments"; 
and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You 
shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts," where "precepts" 
denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers to judicial and 
ceremonial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral 
precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to 
the judicial precepts.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and 
ceremonial precepts?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, 
judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong 
to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial 
precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped. Now 
besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, 
liberality, and several others, as stated above (Q[60], A[5]). Therefore 
besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God, and 
observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now 
precepts concern moral matters, as stated above (A[4]). Therefore besides 
the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others 
which are called "commandments." [*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of 
here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with the 
Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.]

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of the Lord 
thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: 'He 
hath'] commanded thee." Therefore in addition to the above, the Law 
comprises "testimonies."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications (i.e. 
"Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the 
Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but 
also others, called "justifications." 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and 
ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you." 
And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the 
precepts of the Law are included under them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; 
other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now 
the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their 
fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of 
the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit 
consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, 
or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in 
the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority 
of God the lawgiver: e.g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is 
one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": 
and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the 
Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, 
and punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: 
"If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee 
higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called 
"justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones 
justly.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 2/5

 The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in 
so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one 
according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law 
which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold 
just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 3/5

 Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be 
done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue 
would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the 
order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are 
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not 
kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." 
Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as 
something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because 
they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an example 
whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in 
pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like 
cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that 
"justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty as fixed 
by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; 
to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 4/5

 Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and 
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the 
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be  styled 
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the 
commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things 
be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those things 
"commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the very 
word seems to denote.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 5/5

 From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, 
ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character 
of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as 
stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of 
duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far as 
they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says 
(De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to 
the ceremonial and judicial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its 
precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the 
observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats. 
For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and 
love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth the 
Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and 
walk in His ways, and love Him?" But the desire for temporal goods leads 
man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that 
"covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and 
threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this 
makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 
6).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in 
sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher the means of 
persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal 
threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should 
have used, not these, but more lofty means.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt 
cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as 
stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the just 
and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the 
unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth 
sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth 
as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and 
will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you 
will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to 
the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every law, 
men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and 
rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences, the 
means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore 
the process of argument in sciences should be ordered becomingly, so that 
the instruction is based on principles more generally known. And thus 
also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs 
to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as 
children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. 
Now it has been said above (Q[98], AA[1],2,3) that the Old Law disposed 
men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to 
the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in 
comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming: 
and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still 
under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in his 
despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear 
from the words of the Apostle (Phil. 3:13,15): "Forgetting the things 
that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth myself to 
those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be 
thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit 
in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their end in 
temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct 
men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an 
affection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, 
is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man 
desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the 
love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: "He will praise Thee, when Thou 
shalt do well to him."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or 
punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades men 
by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this 
respect it employs higher means.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the 
Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the Law as 
long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of 
the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain individuals, 
although they observed the justice of the Law, met with 
misfortunes---either because they had already become spiritual (so that 
misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal 
things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while 
outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether 
fixed on temporal  goods, and far removed from God, according to Is. 
29:13 (Mt. 15:8): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their 
hearts is far from Me."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the 
moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts. 
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of 
nature?

 (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all 
the virtues?

 (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the 
ten precepts of the decalogue?

 (4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?

 (5) Their number;

 (6) Their order;

 (7) The manner in which they were given;

 (8) Whether they are dispensable?

 (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of 
the Law?

 (10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?

 (11) The distinction of other moral precepts;

 (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law 
of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave them 
instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is 
in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law of nature is not 
learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral 
precepts belong to the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human 
law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that belong to 
the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is 
the same in all men, while these moral institutions are various for 
various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law 
should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain 
matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that faith 
"worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature; 
since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral 
precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who 
have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which 
must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the 
moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and 
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to 
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, 
which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good 
which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant 
from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from 
the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical 
reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (Q[94], 
AA[2],4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge 
of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so 
evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to 
approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles: 
while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much 
consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not competent 
to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible 
for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for 
those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of 
which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as 
the articles of faith.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters 
which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in 
accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must 
needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of 
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but 
not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural 
reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or 
not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt 
not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of nature 
absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful 
consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of 
nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the 
less wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of 
the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to judge of 
which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about 
the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, 
nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord 
thy God in vain."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about 
all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old Law is 
called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy 
justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore 
the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a 
duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to none of 
the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to 
each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about 
the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says 
(Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common 
good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts 
are only about the acts of justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a 
transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments 
of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. 
Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common 
good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]), the precepts of the Law must needs 
be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the 
Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a 
state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state 
which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now 
human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the Divine law for 
another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, 
implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to 
one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with one 
another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose 
proper function consists in directing the human community. Wherefore 
human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands 
acts of other virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature 
of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men 
in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. And 
therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters 
whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is united 
to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the 
Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human reason 
is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues: 
since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason 
in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the acts of the 
reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is  
therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about 
the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which 
the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, 
come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, which pertain 
to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of 
those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character of 
justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again, 
inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to 
reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to 
another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to 
reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks 
(Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about 
the different kinds of community.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten 
precepts of the decalogue?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are 
reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first and 
principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," 
and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Mt. 22:37,39. But these 
two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all 
the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial 
precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the decalogue, 
one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." 
Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the 
decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But 
among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of 
justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts 
of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The gloss on Mt. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they shall 
revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, 
set them out in detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so 
many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other 
precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to  have given 
the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the 
people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts the 
knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which 
with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general 
principles: and those also which become known to man immediately through 
divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not 
reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz. first general 
principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once 
imprinted on the natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for 
instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar 
principles: and again those which the careful reflection of wise men 
shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these 
principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both 
kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in 
different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, 
as principles in their proximate conclusions; while those which are known 
through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their 
principles.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Those two principles are the first general principles of 
the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through 
nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are 
referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one 
respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of 
God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am God." In this 
respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to 
the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as 
it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues 
are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of 
justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts 
of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one 
another?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably 
distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct from 
faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said 
at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not have strange gods 
before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not 
make . . . any graven thing," etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these 
are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but 
two.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are  distinct from 
the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and, "Thou 
shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is affirmative: and 
that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," is 
negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says 
(Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 7:7): "I had not known 
concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence it 
seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept; and, 
therefore, should not be divided into two.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on 
Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring 
to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by 
different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. 26:26, "Ten women 
shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the 
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its 
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he 
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am the 
Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," 
(thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on 
Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities"); the third 
precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven 
thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God 
in vain." He states that there are six precepts pertaining to our 
neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou 
shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth, 
"Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"; 
the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the 
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if 
it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is 
written (Mt. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements, 
"I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before 
Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen 
(Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to 
God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place, 
"Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not 
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, "Remember that 
thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way 
as Hesychius.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything 
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as 
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be 
made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex. 25:18---Augustine 
more fittingly unites these two,  "Thou shalt not have strange gods 
before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," into one 
precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the purpose of carnal 
knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet 
other things, which are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to 
the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct 
precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that 
which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus he distinguishes 
three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our 
neighbor. And this is better.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the 
precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those 
about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather 
than about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed to the 
precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as 
the first general principles of the natural law are self-evident to a 
subject having natural reason, and need no promulgation; so also to 
believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject 
possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is" 
(Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of 
faith.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative, 
when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor his 
parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does 
the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept is 
included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct 
precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that "Thou shalt 
not steal," and another binding one to keep another's property intact, or 
to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different 
precepts about believing in God, and about not believing in strange gods.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the 
Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it were 
one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness, 
therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions against 
coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the 
diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. 
x, 5).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably 
set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso viii), is "a 
transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of 
heaven." But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or 
his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any 
precepts directing man in his relations to himself, but only such as 
direct him in his relations to God and himself, it seems that  the 
precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the 
worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and the 
offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the 
Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others also, 
pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also 
do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the teaching of 
God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt not take the 
name of the Lord thy God in vain." Therefore there should be also a 
precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so 
has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of charity extends 
to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto 
charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is 
charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should 
there have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbors.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought 
or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and adultery, the 
prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit 
adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the prohibition of the 
sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's 
goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the 
same should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false 
witness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the 
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible 
part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, 
"Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue should have included some 
precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it 
seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant, 
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two 
tablets of stone."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), just as the precepts of human law 
direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of 
the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth 
of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in a 
community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to 
the head of the community; the other is that he behave well to those who 
are his fellows and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary 
that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering 
man  in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts 
ordering man in his relations to other men who are his neighbors and live 
with him under God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 2/4

 Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; 
secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master consists in 
his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the 
first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have strange gods." 
Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to 
him: and this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take 
the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is due to the master in 
return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this 
belongs the third commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in 
memory of the creation of all things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 3/4

 To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in 
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying his 
debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring 
one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to none, either 
by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's 
neighbor---sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence; 
and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill": sometimes in a 
person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is 
prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit adultery": sometimes in 
his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this 
regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is 
forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy 
neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt 
not covet."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 4/4

 The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also 
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds; 
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the 
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name of 
the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the 
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept, 
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps. 
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the 
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His 
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last 
end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because 
the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity. 
Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his 
neighbor, because in this respect the natural law had become obscured on 
account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this 
respect the natural law retained its vigor: or again, because love of 
oneself is contained in the love of God and of one's neighbor: since true 
self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the 
decalogue includes those precepts only which refer to our  neighbor and 
to God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are 
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is 
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written 
before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the precepts 
of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once. 
Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a man, 
especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he owes 
certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which 
regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to 
himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that 
everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore the 
precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach 
the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the 
instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and, consequently, 
they are not contained in the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in 
celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, or in 
sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were 
offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be 
commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind 
by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this 
precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord made heaven and 
earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the 
repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in 
the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in the 
Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (Is. 58:13): "If thou 
turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy 
day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious." 
Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, 
especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were celebrated on 
account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the 
celebration of the Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery 
from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though 
temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual 
Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other 
solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by one greater 
than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their 
controversy." Hence, since oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing 
is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. 
According to one interpretation, however, the words, "Thou shalt not take 
the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a prohibition of false 
doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou shalt not say that 
Christ is a creature."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate 
dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts  that forbid 
the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate 
dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return for 
another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's debt to 
his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by denying it: 
since the father is the principle of generation and being, and also of 
upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds 
of kindness or service to be done to anyone except to one's parents. On 
the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for 
any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child 
is a part of his father; and "parents love their children as being a part 
of themselves," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just 
as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards 
himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving 
one's children.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in 
so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are of 
themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be 
forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and 
falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural 
for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired only for the 
sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and 
false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but 
only sins of deed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 6: As stated above (Q[25], A[1]), all the passions of the 
irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part. 
Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first 
elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible 
passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set 
in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly previous to 
love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is; 
according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, 
how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three precepts 
belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of 
our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in 
proper order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative 
precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. But 
according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap. 
De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore 
among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should 
have preceded the affirmative.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's  actions. But 
actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the 
precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably 
placed last in order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:1): "The things that are of 
God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God']. 
But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as 
stated above (A[3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[3],5, ad 1), the precepts of the 
decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it 
is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, 
as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is 
clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to 
be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely contrary to 
reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently it was 
necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man 
to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an 
army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, it is requisite 
first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the 
opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he 
should be in coordination with the other soldiers.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Body Para. 2/3

 Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that 
man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in common 
with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the 
third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army, it is a greater 
sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, 
than to be insolent to his commander: and this last is more grievous than 
if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Body Para. 3/3

 As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, 
it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more grievous 
sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he 
is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in 
his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which 
regards his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to 
be according to the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more 
repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by 
thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one 
already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of 
the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards 
external goods.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way 
of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the love of 
our neighbor, as shall be declared later on (SS, Q[25], A[1]; SS, Q[26], 
A[2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the 
others. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect 
of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect of his son. 
Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the 
precepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of affirmative and 
negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is 
not altogether cogent. For although in the order of execution, vices 
should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn 
away from evil, and do good," and Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do perversely; 
learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, 
because "the crooked line is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by 
the law is the knowledge of sin" (Rm. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation 
precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the 
order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding 
God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed 
last, since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of 
execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of 
reason.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably 
formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to acts of 
virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But 
in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. 
Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the 
decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept. 
Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in 
some matters, and negative precepts in others.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on 
reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine law. 
Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and 
not only in the first and third.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by 
God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts. 
Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not 
only in the second and fourth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far as it 
induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat of 
punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. 
Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and 
not only in the first and second.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the 
memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the  tables of thy 
heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be 
made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the 
precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things, 
in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a 
suitable manner in formulating His Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the 
Divine law: wherefore it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and 
understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to 
arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident 
that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its 
opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the 
affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is 
not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is white: 
because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that 
one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to the negative 
precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than 
that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a 
primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering 
a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if he 
has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can 
sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as stated in Ethic. viii, 
14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one 
about the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of the 
Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; 
hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts 
include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept; 
thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou shalt not make a 
graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. 
Consequently there was need to state the reason in each case.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point 
of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed that there 
would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was 
necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents are already on 
the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a 
promise of reward is added to the precept about honoring one's parents. 
The same applies to the precept forbidding idolatry: since thereby it 
seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which 
they think they can get by entering into a compact with the demons.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to 
evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of  punishment is only 
affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men 
were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the general 
custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of 
the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is affixed to the 
first two precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a 
past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made therein. 
Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed 
to it that does not belong to the natural law, wherefore this precept 
needed a special admonition.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. 
For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural law. But the 
natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as 
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of law to apply in 
certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above 
(Q[96], A[6]; Q[97], A[4]). Therefore a dispensation can be granted in 
the precepts of the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does 
to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by 
man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, 
it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our superiors are God's 
viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:10): "For what I 
have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it 
in the person of Christ." Therefore superiors can dispense with the 
precepts of the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding 
murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept: 
for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as 
evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the precepts of the 
decalogue are dispensable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept 
of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept; for it 
is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in that day, saying: 
Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will 
fight against him." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are 
dispensable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for 
that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting 
covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the 
decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by 
dispensation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[96], A[6]; Q[97], A[4]), precepts  
admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if 
the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is 
frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and 
chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, 
whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by 
any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or 
the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention 
of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in 
some community a law were enacted, such as this---that no man should work 
for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its 
enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts 
would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, 
subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of 
procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far 
as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be 
prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the 
lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it 
were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch 
as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on 
account of some greater utility.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the 
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct 
us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is 
God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice 
to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that 
each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take 
the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the decalogue 
admit of no dispensation whatever.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which 
contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle 
that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in reference to 
certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in certain 
cases.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God continueth 
faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He were 
to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice 
itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him 
not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even 
in those matters in which men are directed to one another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so 
far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense the 
precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it 
lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers 
or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the 
precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by 
that precept, as  Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner 
when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose 
it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 2/3

 Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away 
the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to them 
by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, 
he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the 
command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts 
the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of 
the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that 
sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God 
would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or 
an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication: 
because he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is 
the Author of the institution of marriage.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 3/3

 Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence 
of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any 
determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that 
this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this point they 
admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such 
matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the 
like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are 
subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place 
of God: and yet not in all respects.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a 
dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does 
something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mt. 12:3, 
seqq.).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of 
the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done 
justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like 
manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt. 26:20) that 
"thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode 
of virtue falls under the precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver 
comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver is 
directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it 
belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue 
falls under the precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working 
willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of the Divine 
law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye  the Lord with gladness"; 
and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a 
cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly; 
and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is 
done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the 
precept of the law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the 
habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). Now 
whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence 
it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would deserve 
to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention 
of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by habituating him to 
good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of law has 
compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is 
brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now the law 
compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because 
that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty 
of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently 
situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law 
is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the 
lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now 
man, the framer of human law, is competent to judge only of outward acts; 
because "man seeth those things that appear," according to 1 Kgs. 16:7: 
while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of 
the inward movements of wills, according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of 
hearts and reins is God."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 2/4

 Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some 
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is 
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it 
is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of 
virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii. 
The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the 
judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does in 
ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine 
law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable 
or pardonable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 3/4

 The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from 
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a 
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about 
which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two, Divine 
law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does 
not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine 
law does, according to Mt. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with his brother, 
shall be in danger of the judgment."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 4/4

 The third point is that he should "act from a firm and  immovable 
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that 
the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of 
virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law, 
since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who 
gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the 
precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not that they 
be done from the habit of justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the 
first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law: and 
this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter 
itself of the precept: and this is something leading or disposing to 
virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter 
of the precept are not the same: just as neither in other things is the 
end the same as that which conduces to the end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls 
under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness works 
unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in 
one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so far as pleasure ensues 
from the love of God and one's neighbor (which love falls under the 
precept), and love causes pleasure: and in another respect does not fall 
under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for 
"pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in 
Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure either on account of its end, 
or through its proceeding from a becoming habit.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of 
the Divine law. For it is written (Mt. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into 
life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow that the 
observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into life. But good 
works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from 
charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute all my 
goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and 
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore the mode of charity 
is included in the commandment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing 
all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the Apostle 
says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore the mode of 
charity falls under the precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, 
it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law  without having 
charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace, 
which is always united to charity. Therefore one can fulfil the precepts 
of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine 
declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included 
in the commandment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If 
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that 
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has 
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that 
whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good 
this may be in itself: which is absurd.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some 
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept; 
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this 
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor 
(say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally 
whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an affirmative 
precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding not for all 
time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the 
other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is altogether outside 
the precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Body Para. 2/2

 Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of 
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and 
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it, 
viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not 
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity; 
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses 
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as 
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e. inasmuch as the 
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of 
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above 
(Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act 
ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true in saying 
that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, that is to say 
that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must 
honor his father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. 
Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not break 
this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of 
charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep 
one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which is 
included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction that God 
should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all  things would 
be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of 
charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore he that honors 
his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue 
of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother," but in virtue of the 
precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." And 
since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they 
can be binding, each one at a different time: so that it may happen that 
a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at 
the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of 
charity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he 
fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity. 
Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to 
fulfil the law without grace.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law 
besides the decalogue?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral 
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord declared 
(Mt. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity "dependeth the whole 
law and the prophets." But these two commandments are explained by the 
ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other 
moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and 
ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the 
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and 
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in the 
decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above 
(A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts 
besides the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the 
virtues, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains, besides 
the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, 
and chastity; so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to 
the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. And 
yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other 
moral precepts in the Law besides those of the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is 
unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of sin, 
and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides those of 
the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral 
precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99], AA[3],4), 
the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their 
institution alone: since before they were instituted, it  seemed of no 
consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the moral 
precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, 
even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there are three 
grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need no 
promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our 
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above (A[3]), which are, as it 
were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an 
erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed, the 
reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they 
need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few instances, 
happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the precepts of the 
decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so 
evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to 
the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Body Para. 2/2

 But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know 
those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to the 
decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many 
corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the 
worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding 
things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt. 18:10,11): 
"Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son 
or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let 
there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic 
spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead." 
The second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition 
of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine 
(Dt. 13). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. 
To the fourth commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added 
the precept about honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up 
before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and 
likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed 
towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To 
the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of 
hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according 
to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor": 
likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17): "Thou 
shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth commandment which 
forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to 
Dt. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor 
whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the prohibition against 
unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,23: "Thou shalt not lie with 
mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast." To the seventh 
commandment which prohibits theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, 
according to Dt. 23:19: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to 
usury"; and the prohibition against fraud, according to Dt. 25:13: "Thou 
shalt not have divers weights in thy bag"; and universally all 
prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth 
commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the  prohibition 
against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2: "Neither shalt thou yield 
in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth"; 
and the prohibition against lying (Ex. 23:7): "Thou shalt fly lying," and 
the prohibition against detraction, according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt 
not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the people." To the other two 
commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden 
all kinds of evil desires.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of 
God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them; 
but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less 
evidently.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial 
and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the 
decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the 
superadded moral precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as 
stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And since those virtues which direct our 
conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does 
the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the 
common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on these 
virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to 
the act of fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in 
the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear from Dt. 
20:3, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do 
not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is 
left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the 
household; hence it is said (Dt. 21:20) in the person of parents: "He 
slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to 
debauchery and banquetings."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified 
man. Because the Apostle says (Rm. 2:13): "For not the hearers of the Law 
are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified." 
But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law. 
Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of 
justification.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My 
judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual 
life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts 
of the Law was a cause of justification.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But 
human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice consisting in 
fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law 
justified man. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth": 
which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the 
moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that 
which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign or 
a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the 
causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may 
denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in 
the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the precepts of 
the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to the justifying grace 
of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra 
Faust. xxii, 24), "even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed 
Christ."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Body Para. 2/3

 But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice 
that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so that 
accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as 
man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of justice: 
secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense 
justification is nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice, 
like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or the infused 
virtue, as is clear from what has been stated (Q[63], A[4]). The acquired 
virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God 
Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are 
speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just 
before God, according to Rm. 4:2: "If Abraham were justified by works, he 
hath whereof to glory, but not before God." Hence this justice could not 
be caused by moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the 
moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Body Para. 3/3

 If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of 
justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various 
ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained 
something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship to 
God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in 
itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said 
of these precepts that they did not justify man save through the devotion 
and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the 
moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular, 
contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained 
that which is just in itself according to that "general justice" which is 
"every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts 
belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected with 
the human mode of life, between one man and another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution  of 
justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to 
live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which the 
Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this 
passage (Gal. 3:12).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice: 
it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about that 
justice which is before God.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider 
them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their duration. Under 
the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;

 (2) Whether they are figurative?

 (3) Whether there should have been many of them?

 (4) Of their various kinds.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their 
pertaining to the worship of God?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not 
consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, in the Old 
Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food 
(Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. (Lev. 
19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts"; and 
again (Num. 15:38): "To make to themselves fringes in the corners of 
their garments." But these are not moral precepts; since they do not 
remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not 
pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore 
they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the 
worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not 
consist in their pertaining to Divine worship.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which 
pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the "cerei" 
[candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other things 
besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore it does not 
seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to 
the Divine worship.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e. 
rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the same as the Latin 
"salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not 
only those that pertain to the worship of God. Therefore not only those 
precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the 
ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. But 
there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God; 
such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover and of 
the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down 
in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain 
to the worship of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 18:19,20): "Be thou to the people in 
those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the 
ceremonies and the manner of worshipping."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[99], A[4]), the ceremonial precepts 
are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, 
just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts 
whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the 
worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called 
ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The reason for their 
being so called was given above (Q[99], A[3]), when we established the 
distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the 
like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those things 
whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too in 
other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science 
whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which 
regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and other such 
matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with the view 
of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a 
king make use of certain special observances. Consequently such are 
contained under the ceremonial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very 
probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of the 
lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the 
Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated in Lev. 24:2. 
Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine worship 
were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so that all ceremonial 
precepts may be included under the observance of solemnities.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very 
much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek but Latin. We 
may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God, those precepts 
above all seem to be rules of salvation, which direct man to God: and 
accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial 
precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain 
amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial precisely 
because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind of 
consequence. For, since the precepts referring to  the Divine worship 
must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on (A[2]), the 
consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. 
For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as 
to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10) 
and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law: because precepts 
of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should be 
manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of 
the Law were given as figures of something, it seems unbecoming that 
Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they 
signified.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be 
entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in 
representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: 
because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to represent 
the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be 
done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to 
the Divine worship, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore they should not be 
figurative.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is 
worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts of 
faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial 
precepts should not be figurative.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they 
that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a figure is 
not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore 
the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not be 
figurative.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . . 
judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the 
new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; Q[99], AA[3],4), the ceremonial 
precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine 
worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is composed of 
soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the 
soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is 
written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living 
God." And as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the outward 
worship is ordained to the internal worship. Now interior worship 
consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections. 
Wherefore according to the various ways in which the intellect and  
affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his 
external actions are applied in various ways to the Divine worship.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the 
Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not consist 
in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from 
the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: "Joy and 
gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine 
Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us 
under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. 
Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various states of 
human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth 
manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet 
opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external 
worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future 
truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who 
is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law 
this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to be 
foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as 
something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is 
not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the 
Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the 
good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a shadow is 
less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the 
shadow to the Old.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in 
proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall, were 
he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the 
Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured people under a veil of 
figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using 
those figures to the honor of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on 
account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine 
things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: 
and therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of sensible 
figures.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which, 
however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were taught 
by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of God.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial 
precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be 
proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above 
(AA[1],2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing 
of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all things . . . and 
one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" (1 Cor. 8:6). Therefore 
there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an 
occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts 15:10): 
"Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which 
neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" Now the transgression 
of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation. Since, 
therefore, every law should conduce to man's salvation, as Isidore says 
(Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been 
given in great number.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and 
bodily worship of God, as stated above (A[2]). But the Law should have 
lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught 
them to worship God "in spirit and in truth," as stated in Jn. 4:23. 
Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] My 
manifold laws"; and (Job 11:6): "That He might show thee the secrets of 
His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[96], A[1]), every law is given to a 
people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who 
have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated above (Q[95], 
A[1]); some, inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or 
rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and improved by means 
of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of the 
law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that 
the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people 
there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall 
them by means of ceremonial precepts from the worship of idols to the 
worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary 
on the other hand to devise many means of repressing every single one: 
and again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order that being 
burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they might 
have no time for the service of idols. As to those who were inclined to 
good, it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial 
precepts; both because thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and 
more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, which was 
foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the 
world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified 
by various ceremonies.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce 
thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, if it 
be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and then the 
remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that which conduces to an end 
is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied: thus many remedies are 
given to a sick man, when one is not enough to heal him. Now the 
ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect, both for representing 
the mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for 
subjugating men's minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19): 
"There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the 
weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought nothing to 
perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, that 
the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the sin of 
idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were 
they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they would in 
consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from 
giving them many ceremonial precepts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it 
forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. Many 
such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as 
Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii). Nevertheless it 
behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much as to allow 
men to fall away into the worship of idols.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into 
sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably 
divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances." 
For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done 
only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in which Christ 
"delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2). 
Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law 
the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law 
there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and "sacraments."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in which 
sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. But all 
the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated 
above (A[1]). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore 
"sacred things" should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, "observances" are so called from having to be observed. 
But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it is written 
(Dt. 8:11): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at any time 
thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and judgments 
and ceremonies." Therefore the "observances" should not be considered as 
a part of the ceremonies.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the 
ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16,17): 
and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the 
words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be inclined 
in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of 
ceremonies is unsuitable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony. 
For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24): "They shall offer 
a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies 
require." Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev. 7:35): "This is 
the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies." Of sacred things 
also it is written (Ex. 38:21): "These are the instruments of the 
tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies of the Levites." And 
again of the observances it is written (3 Kgs. 9:6): "If you . . . shall 
turn away from following Me, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . 
. ceremonies which I have set before you."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), the ceremonial precepts are 
ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the 
worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The 
worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in honor 
of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things," such as 
the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the worshippers 
two points may be considered. The first point is their preparation for 
Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of the 
people or of the ministers; and to this the "sacraments" refer. The 
second point is their particular mode of life, whereby they are 
distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the 
"observances," for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in 
some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained to the 
worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the 
victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things of the New Law; while 
their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the 
New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, contains 
Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He sanctified "the 
people by His own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a 
sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law  did not contain Christ, but 
foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called sacraments. In order to 
signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of 
the Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come. 
Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. 
But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to the Divine 
worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they 
retained the common designation of sacred things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the 
people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of 
observances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not 
called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection with the 
worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort 
of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they affected 
the fitness of the people who worshipped God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so 
were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn festivals 
seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts are 
counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): 
"Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things 
that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which 
head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?

 (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or 
figurative?

 (3) The causes of the sacrifices;

 (4) The causes of the sacrifices;

 (5) The causes of the sacred things;

 (6) The causes of the observances.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial 
precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the 
commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to the 
carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, 
which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were 
based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the 
reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason for the 
ceremonial observances of the Old Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law 
of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that 
man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 
6,13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. Therefore in 
the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of 
testing man's obedience, having no reason in themselves.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed 
from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial 
precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems 
therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: for the 
reason of a precept is taken from some cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:9): "The commandment of the Lord 
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are 
commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not 
be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts 
have a reasonable cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is 
the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things 
which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the 
Apostle states (Rm. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required for 
things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, 
which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since 
those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the end, or 
which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. 
Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate 
to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever conduces to 
the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a 
saw is taken from cutting, which is its end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9. 
Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other 
precepts of the Law, were institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is 
written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of 
nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts 
were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be 
gathered.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances of 
the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of 
the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool 
and linen. But there could be a reason for them in relation to something 
else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. 
On the other hand, the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to 
faith and the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: and 
yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in 
as much as it signified something. And so also the ceremonial precepts of 
the Old Law were reasonable  on account of their relation to something 
else.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable 
causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." But 
the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to 
something else, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a 
figurative cause?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, 
but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, the 
chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither 
of these had any but a figurative cause: because each was given as a 
sign. For it is written (Gn. 17:11): "You shall circumcise the flesh of 
your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you": 
and of the celebration of the Passover it is written (Ex. 13:9): "It 
shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes." 
Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts have none but a 
figurative reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the 
ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above (Q[101], A[2]). 
Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain 
thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it seems 
that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the 
ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to 
whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number 
of animals to be offered, and other such particular circumstances. 
Therefore there is no literal cause for the precepts of the Old Law.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so 
did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1 Cor. 10:11) 
that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the stories 
of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the 
literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, 
besides their figurative causes.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the reason for whatever conduces 
to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial 
precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for 
that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the 
words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be 
utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on Osee 1:3. 
Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be 
taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to 
be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: 
whether they refer  to the shunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine 
benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the 
disposition of mind which was then required in those who worshipped God. 
Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their 
being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are 
figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ Himself and 
the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of 
the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state 
of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which 
refers to the anagogical sense.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture 
belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in order to 
convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal 
ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, on account of 
which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that 
time, does not go beyond the order of literal causes. Consequently when 
we assert that the cause of the celebration of the Passover was its 
signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign 
of God's covenant with Abraham, we assign the literal cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had 
been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the purpose 
of worshipping God then and there.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws (Q[96], AA[1]
,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to 
particular conditions, which depend on the judgment of those who frame 
them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old 
Law have no literal cause, but only a figurative cause; whereas in the 
abstract they have a literal cause.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which 
pertained to sacrifices?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the 
ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were offered 
in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: 
such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs no such 
sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? 
Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were 
unfittingly offered to God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice 
to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the turtledove 
and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was 
made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more noble than these. Since 
therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not 
only of these three should sacrifices have been offered to Him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over 
birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes. 
Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine 
sacrifices.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be 
offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded to be offered, 
so also should the young of the turtledove.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of 
animals, as is clear from Gn. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed to life. 
Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals 
should be offered to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us (Rm. 
12:1), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto 
God."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to 
God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore it was 
unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially 
as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption 
and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, it was 
unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, 
or a blind, or otherwise defective animal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 8: Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof, 
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): "Are not they that 
eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was therefore 
unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims, 
namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so 
also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female animals 
was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of 
both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsistent that female 
animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and 
that nevertheless birds should not be offered up in peace-offerings.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. 
Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so that it 
was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the 
following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other 
peace-offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 11 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in 
order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should have been 
offered up for all sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 12 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were 
offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem to be 
suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; 
for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of flour, 
sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a 
pan, sometimes on a gridiron.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 13 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be 
recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that besides 
animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be 
offered to God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 14 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the 
heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward sacrifice, 
the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which 
salt represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): "My spirit is sweet 
above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of 
leaven which makes bread savory, should be forbidden in a sacrifice; 
while the use was prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense 
which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining to 
the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 1:13): "The priest shall offer it 
all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor 
to the Lord." Now according to Wis. 7:28, "God loveth none but him that 
dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever is 
acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these ceremonies of the 
sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the ceremonies of the Old Law had 
a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended 
for Divine worship; and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they 
were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies 
pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the 
divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two ways. 
First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind 
to God, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in 
order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that whatever 
he has is from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as 
its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and sacrifices, by the 
fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as 
though in recognition of his having received them from God, according to 
the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we 
have given Thee what we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up 
sacrifices man made protestation that God is the first principle of the 
creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be 
directed. And since, for the human mind to  be directed to God aright, it 
must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its 
end in any other; for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer 
sacrifice to any other but God, according to Ex. 22:20: "He that 
sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." 
Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies of 
the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from 
offering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about the 
sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had 
fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf: as though those 
sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to offer 
sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols. 
Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): "I spake not to your fathers and I 
commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of 
Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had 
fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; wherefore it is 
written (Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten 
Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have life 
everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ 
Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an odor of sweetness" (Eph. 
5:2). And for this reason all the other sacrifices of the Old Law were 
offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount 
sacrifice---the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says 
(Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the Old Law "often" offered "the same 
sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but" Christ offered "one 
sacrifice for sins, for ever." And since the reason of the figure is 
taken from that which the figure represents, therefore the reasons of the 
figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true 
sacrifice of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him on 
account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He stood in 
need of them: wherefore it is written (Is. 1:11): "I desire not 
holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs 
and buckgoats." But, as stated above, He wished them to be offered to 
Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the right ordering 
of man's mind to God; and in order to represent the mystery of the 
Redemption of man by Christ.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 2: In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a 
suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered in 
sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters 
offered all other animals to their gods, or made use of them in their 
sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling) 
considered it abominable to slay these animals, wherefore they used not 
to offer them in sacrifice to their gods. Hence it is written (Ex. 8:26): 
"We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our 
God." For they worshipped the sheep; they reverenced the ram (because 
demons appeared under the form thereof); while they employed oxen for  
agriculture, which was reckoned by them as something sacred.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3

 Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's 
mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is chiefly by means of 
these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most 
clean, and partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals are either 
wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be tame, 
they have unclean food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what is clean 
should be offered to God. These birds especially were offered in 
sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise. 
Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals represented purity of 
heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev. 1, "We offer a calf, when we 
overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our 
unreasonable motions; a goat, when we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, 
when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened 
bread of sincerity." And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and 
simplicity of heart.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3

 Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they 
might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, "Christ is 
offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to 
signify His innocence; in the ram, to foreshadow His headship; and in the 
goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' [*An allusion to Col. 
2:11 (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the 
two natures"; or else the turtledove signified chastity; while the dove 
was a figure of charity. "The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of 
believers with the water of Baptism."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Fish through living in water are further removed from man 
than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish die as 
soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in 
the temple like other animals.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young; 
while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi Moses 
observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded 
to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God but what is best.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, 
because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, forasmuch 
as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt with 
fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made fit for human 
consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified the 
destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death on account of his 
sins; as though those animals were slain in man's stead, in order to 
betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals 
signified the slaying of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 6: The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial 
animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters 
sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi  Moses says (Doct. 
Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of slaying which was least 
painful to the slain animal." This excluded cruelty on the part of the 
offerers, and any mangling of the animals slain.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 7: It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in 
contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice to 
God: and for this reason too they were forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer 
"the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God." 
For the same reason they did not offer animals before the seventh day, 
because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on 
account of its exceeding softness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 1/5

 Reply OBJ 8: There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in 
which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called "a 
holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God 
specially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His goodness: and 
typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the 
counsels. Wherefore the whole was burnt up: so that as the whole animal 
by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so it might denote that the 
whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of 
God, and should be offered to Him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 2/5

 Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on 
account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and this typifies the 
state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts: 
for one part was burnt; while the other was granted to the use of the 
priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God through the 
ministry of His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for 
the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin of the priest, the 
whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should 
have the use of that which was offered for their own sins, to signify 
that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be 
satisfaction for sin: for if the offering were granted to the use of 
those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same as if 
it had not been offered.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 3/5

 The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which was 
offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the welfare and prosperity 
of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to 
be received: and this typifies the state of those who are proficient in 
the observance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into 
three parts: for one part was burnt in honor of God; another part was 
allotted to the use of the priests; and the third part to the use of the 
offerers; in order to signify that man's salvation is from God, by the 
direction of God's ministers, and through the cooperation of those who 
are saved.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 4/5

 But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted 
to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: the  blood being 
poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was 
burnt upon the altar (Lev. 9:9,10). The reason for this was, first, in 
order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and 
eat the fat of the victims, according to Dt. 32:38: "Of whose victims 
they eat the fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings." Secondly, 
in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were forbidden 
the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; 
wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:4,5): "Flesh with blood you shall not eat: 
for I will require the blood of your lives": and they were forbidden to 
eat the fat, in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is 
written (Ezech. 34:3): "You have killed that which was fat." Thirdly, on 
account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most necessary for 
life, for which reason "life" is said to be "in the blood" (Lev. 
17:11,14): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in 
order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency of all good 
things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. 
Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding of Christ's blood, and the 
abundance of His charity, whereby He offered Himself to God for us.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 5/5

 In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were 
allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent a certain kind of 
divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it was 
customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade [spatula], and the 
breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things 
were taken away from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest's need 
of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people---this was signified by 
the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in 
order to bear with human frailty---and this was signified by the right 
shoulder.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 9: Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of 
sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because 
the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves 
was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who were unable to offer 
bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one 
was bound to offer them against his will, hence these birds were offered 
not among the peace-victims, but among the holocausts and victims for 
sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on 
account of their lofty flight, while befitting the perfection of the 
holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is 
doleful.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 10: The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: because 
all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The second 
place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in 
the court only, and on the very day of the sacrifice (Lev. 7:6,15). The 
third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which 
were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order 
were the "ex-voto" peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten 
even  on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is bound to 
God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins 
he has committed; thirdly, because of the benefits he has already 
received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to 
receive from Him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 11 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 11: Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the 
sinner, as stated above (Q[73], A[10]): wherefore different victims are 
commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of 
some other private individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. 
iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower the 
species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very 
base animal, was offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered for a 
priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 12 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 12: In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the 
poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a four-footed 
animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and that he who 
could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and that if a man had 
not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 12 Para. 2/2

 The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the 
"living bread" (Jn. 6:41,51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were, 
during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He 
was like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was 
like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked in the fire, 
i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked 
again in a pan by the toils which He suffered in the world; and consumed 
by fire on the cross as on a gridiron.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 13 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 13: The products of the soil are useful to man, either as 
food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine was 
offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as 
healing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells sweetly and 
binds easily together.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 13 Para. 2/2

 Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood, 
whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace of Christ; salt, His 
knowledge; incense, His prayer.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 14 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 14: Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both 
because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in 
order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from 
those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to denote 
the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in 
the sacrifices to idols.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 14 Para. 2/3

 Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of 
putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be incorrupt. 
Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, 
mortification of the flesh. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 14 Para. 3/3

 Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary 
in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of a good name: for 
incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the 
sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed from devotion, but rather from 
suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein (Num. 5:15).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining 
to holy things?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the 
ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For Paul said 
(Acts 17:24): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He being 
Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands." It was 
therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be 
set up for the worship of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by 
Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. Therefore it 
should not have been changed by the building of a temple.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should lead 
man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship requires 
multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New 
Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law there should have 
been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of 
God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and simplicity. 
Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided 
by means of veils.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears first of 
all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first movement 
begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore 
it should have been built so as to point to the east rather than the west.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4) that they should "not make 
. . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was therefore 
unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in the 
tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the 
candlestick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there 
without reasonable cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 7: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:24): "You shall make an altar 
of earth unto Me": and again (Ex. 20:26): "Thou shalt not go up by steps 
unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should 
be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass; and 
of such a height that it was  impossible to go up to it except by steps. 
For it is written (Ex. 27:1,2): "Thou shalt make also an altar of setim 
wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad . . . and three 
cubits high . . . and thou shalt cover it with brass": and (Ex. 30:1,3): 
"Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and 
thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 8: Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for not 
even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found. But one 
cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming 
to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz. curtains, curtains of 
goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins (Ex. 26).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 9: Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the 
subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable for the 
tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate 
things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 10: Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): "I will bless the Lord at all 
times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the solemn festivals 
were instituted for the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that 
certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that it 
seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to 
holy things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that those who "offer gifts 
according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly 
things. As it was answered to Moses, when he was to finish the 
tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the 
pattern which was shown thee on the mount." But that is most reasonable, 
which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies 
relating to holy things had a reasonable cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that 
man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence less 
those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas 
he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from others in 
some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men for kings 
and princes, who ought to be reverenced by their subjects, to be clothed 
in more precious garments, and to possess vaster and more beautiful 
abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a special abode, 
special vessels, and special ministers to be appointed for the divine 
worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater 
reverence for God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above (A[2]; Q[100]
, A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow the 
mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows something should be 
determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, 
certain special points had to be observed in matters pertaining to the 
worship of God. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who is 
worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, 
is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, 
for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, who worship Him, are 
corporeal beings: and for their sake there was need for a special 
tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of God, for two 
reasons. First, that