Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF 
NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the 
good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?

 (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?

 (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is 
stricken in consequence of sin.

 (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?

 (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

 (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For 
man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains 
unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). 
Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes 
remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents 
are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, 
when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed 
on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no 
agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is 
possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards 
another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good 
of his nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is 
patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an 
accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is 
in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not 
diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho 
(Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, 
and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the Glossa 
Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the 
good of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First,  there are 
the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that 
flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, 
since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above 
(Q[60], A[1]; Q[63], A[1]), this inclination to virtue is a good of 
nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of 
human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor 
diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed 
through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. 
the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because human 
acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above (Q[50], A[1]). 
Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two 
contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be 
diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact 
that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which 
is the inclination to virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of 
nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone 
may see who reads the context.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an 
inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not 
changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the 
inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and 
passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something is caused 
or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the 
production of habits (Q[51], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it 
acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness 
makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from 
diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a 
diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of 
action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that 
such like inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the 
soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object 
moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the 
reason and will, as stated above (Q[77], AA[1], 2). The result of this is 
the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, 
but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on 
another and puts it out of order.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can  be 
destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human 
nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if 
the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be 
continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be 
entirely taken away.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are 
uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies 
with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since 
therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the 
whole can also be taken away by sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude 
for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of 
sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind 
can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not 
exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of 
virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be 
in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the good of nature, that is 
diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is 
befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it 
is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is 
to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact 
that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of 
sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed 
entirely.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished 
by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example 
of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely 
destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a 
finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it 
will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite 
length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the 
subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same 
quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quantity be 
halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on 
thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less 
than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question 
at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature 
less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the 
aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two 
others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends 
to the good of virtue, as to its term and end.  Consequently its 
diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, 
secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished 
by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above (A[1]). But 
it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed 
against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first 
way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature 
being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of 
the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident 
that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed 
indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: 
and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this 
inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a 
transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the 
very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is 
diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains 
rooted in the nature of the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by 
subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and 
this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as 
stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: 
nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, 
in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one 
hand, and not on the other.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, 
else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to 
act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus 
even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his 
nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet 
this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of 
reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably 
reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence 
are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. 
For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But 
these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been 
said above (Q[76], A[1]; Q[77], AA[3],5; Q[78], A[1]). Therefore they 
should not be reckoned as effects of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no 
place among the effects of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act 
of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural  should not be 
reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be 
reckoned a wound of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it has been stated (Q[77], A[3]) that to sin from 
weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a 
passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two 
things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz. 
ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which 
four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that 
one or the other reckoning is incomplete.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect 
hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected 
by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was 
forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (Q[81], 
A[2]); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute 
of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; 
which destitution is called a wounding of nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of 
virtue, as stated above (Q[61], A[2]), viz. the reason, where prudence 
resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of 
fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in 
so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the 
wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of 
good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is 
deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and 
in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the 
delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human 
nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination 
to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of 
actual sin, as was explained above (AA[1], 2), these four wounds are also 
the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is 
obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, 
good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be 
the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more 
easily inclined to sin again.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain 
proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gn. 8:21: "Man's 
senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and 
thought of man's heart are prone to  evil from his youth.'].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[82], A[3], ad 1), concupiscence is 
natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far 
as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a 
weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the 
reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to 
fortitude which pertains to the irascible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of 
Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, 
viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these 
three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. "Error" and 
"vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being 
weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not 
the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that "where 
these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less 
good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But sin does not 
destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species 
and order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the 
"privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura 
Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the 
effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since 
mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must 
be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. 
Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, 
according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now 
weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[5], A[5], mode, species and order 
are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every 
being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form 
from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether 
substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some 
measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms of 
things are like numbers," so that a form has a certain "mode" 
corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a 
relation of "order" to  something else.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, 
corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good 
belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, 
species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There 
is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, 
species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (AA[1]
,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue 
and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely 
taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act 
itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of 
which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of 
mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species 
and order.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as 
explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the 
result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects 
are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas 
original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is 
equal in all, as stated above (Q[82], A[4]). Therefore death and suchlike 
defects are not the result of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But 
these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or 
Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than 
original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the body 
by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. 
Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12), "By one man sin entered 
into this world, and by sin death."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of 
itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is the 
cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its 
nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly intended by 
the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the 
intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the 
cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the cause of another 
if it causes it by  removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. 
viii, text. 32, that "by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the 
stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the 
cause of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by 
the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not 
only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of 
reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held 
together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the 
FP, Q[97], A[1]. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the 
sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by 
the disorder among the powers, as stated above (A[3]; Q[82], A[3]), so 
also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, 
even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all 
consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although 
the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered 
according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, 
produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, the 
effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being 
removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal 
force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of 
the stones resting on them will be equal; but that one will move with 
greater velocity, which has the greater weight according to the property 
of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is 
removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the nature of the 
human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural 
temperaments, some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to 
fewer, although original sin is equal in all.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause 
that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:11): "He . . 
. shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that 
dwelleth in you": but each is done according to the order of Divine 
wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of 
all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before attaining to the 
immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by 
Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for 
a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the 
impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance 
of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act, 
actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through 
eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which 
is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we 
may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore 
actual sin does not  cause those defects, as original sin does.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether death and other defects are natural to man?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to 
man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" 
(Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals 
which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally 
corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such is 
the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life 
is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital 
functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De 
Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like defects are natural 
to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now 
"God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural to man.

 (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment 
or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But death 
and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above 
(A[5]). Therefore they are not natural to man.

 (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. 
Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5]
, AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was 
proved in the FP, Q[75], A[6]. Therefore the human body is naturally 
incorruptible.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, 
in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular 
nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and 
self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every corruption and 
defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since 
this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it 
belongs.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 2/4

 On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some 
universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or 
again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by 
some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." This force intends the good and 
the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and 
corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect corruption and 
defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the inclination of 
the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards 
the inclination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its 
particular form  according to the discretion of the universal agent. And 
although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form 
of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the 
rational soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to 
matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its 
own, as stated in the FP, Q[75], A[2]. Consequently as regards his form, 
incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But 
since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the 
inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In 
this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his 
matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 3/4

 The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the 
other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve 
them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in 
respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is 
everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, 
considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, 
and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in 
any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen 
by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith in 
order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can 
be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this 
condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be 
breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of 
iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he would do 
without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not 
adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In 
like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of 
its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable 
as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. 
Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, 
and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible 
matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming 
man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of original justice, 
gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the FP, Q[97], 
A[1]. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and 
that death is the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 4/4

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?

 (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher 
nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence the sun's 
ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says 
(Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a much higher 
nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it 
does not contract a stain from them by sinning.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (Q[74], 
AA[1],2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 
42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything 
whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the 
will stained by sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something 
positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, it can only 
be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be 
caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens 
that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; 
for instance, in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, 
is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the 
stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it 
a pure privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and 
privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain 
caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): "Thou hast 
stained thy glory": and it is written (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present 
it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each 
case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect 
of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a 
comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, e.g. 
a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed 
to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a twofold 
comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, 
whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the refulgence of 
the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected 
for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul 
cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and 
when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason 
and of the Divine law, as shown above (Q[71], A[6]). Wherefore the loss 
of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a 
stain on the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own 
power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by 
its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, 
against the light of reason and of the Divine law. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by the 
intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the 
intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. 
On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement towards 
things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. 
Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately, 
according to Osee 9:10: "They . . . became abominable as those things 
were which they loved."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor 
does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's 
brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins 
occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of 
light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to 
the diversity of the interposed bodies.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after 
the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except 
habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as 
stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the stain does not remain in the 
soul after the act of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, 
as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain when the 
body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when 
the act of sin is past.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the 
stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no longer 
there, neither is the stain in the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing to you 
that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in 
you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?"

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of 
sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above (A[1]
), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its 
withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And therefore 
so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in 
him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and 
to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin 
ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine 
law, man does not at once return to the state in which he was before, and 
it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the 
previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of 
some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement 
ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to  return by a contrary 
movement.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, 
except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something private, 
viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent 
body remains in the same position and relation as regards the 
illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is 
past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so there 
is no comparison.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the 
defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. 
Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, 
so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the 
debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the 
punishment due to them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?

 (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?

 (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

 (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?

 (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?

 (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?

 (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?

 (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of 
sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to 
be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related 
to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt 
of punishment is not an effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, 
since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, 
which is evil.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate 
affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a further 
debt of punishment, because then it would go on  indefinitely. Therefore 
sin does not incur the debt of punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish upon 
every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. 
Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words 
"tribulation and anguish."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that 
whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment 
therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary 
supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason "hot 
water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we 
find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up 
against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, 
are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. 
Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that 
order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, 
it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: 
wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which 
repression is punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment 
corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In 
the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own 
reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs 
him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the 
state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal 
order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by 
sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine 
law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by 
himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a 
third, inflicted by God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by 
reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental to 
the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of 
punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God 
or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not 
directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of 
punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that 
"punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently 
the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin 
as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further 
punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the 
purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to 
the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore 
sin is not the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. 
lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore 
sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the 
will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q[74], AA[1]
,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are 
punishments of others.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, 
as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such 
can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its 
essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that 
it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially 
something against the will, as stated in the FP, Q[48], A[5]. 
Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be 
the punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in 
three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an 
impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like 
are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is 
withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a 
punishment, and is from God, as stated above (Q[79], A[3]), the result is 
that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It 
is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rm. 1:24) when he says: 
"Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their 
passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine 
grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always 
said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the 
substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an 
interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior 
act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in 
order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: "We wearied 
ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so 
that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the 
last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding 
sin, but also with regard to itself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into 
sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for 
the good of those who are punished, when, to wit,  men arise from sin, 
more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the amendment of 
others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of 
sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the 
punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, since the very fact 
that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man 
from sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the 
same answer applies to the Third Objection.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. 
For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality: 
wherefore it is written (Is. 27:8): "In measure against measure, when it 
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore 
it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But 
no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and 
"what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states 
(Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for 
its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men" 
[Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal 
punishment on man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is 
accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore 
it cannot be of infinite duration.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46): "These shall go into 
everlasting punishment"; and (Mk. 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme against 
the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an 
everlasting sin."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), sin incurs a debt of punishment 
through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause 
remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the 
debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is 
sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which 
destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, 
defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the 
principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by 
Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while 
there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be 
remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle 
whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the 
principle of the order whereby man's will is  subject to God, the 
disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, 
although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the 
principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. 
Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, 
considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, 
both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to 
equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is 
committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact 
they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for 
life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time 
occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the 
murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this punishment, in 
its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now 
according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned 
against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A 
man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards 
continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the 
very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, 
everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked 
would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for 
ever."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human 
laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, 
but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not 
for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may 
be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to Prov. 
19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." 
Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, 
are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the 
thought of those punishments, according to Ps. 59:6: "Thou hast given a 
warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, 
that Thy beloved may be delivered."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but 
He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, 
nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, 
and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the 
punishment endures.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in 
quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me,  O Lord, but yet 
with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now 
God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine 
justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as 
to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore 
according to God's vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in 
quantity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, 
according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the 
measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against 
God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the 
greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a more grievous sin to 
strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is 
infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed 
against God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in 
quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore it is 
infinite in quantity also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal 
sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two 
things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which 
is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there 
is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, 
both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement 
of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be 
infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from 
something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also 
is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But 
in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding 
punishment is the "pain of sense," which is also finite.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner 
to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible 
with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated 
above (A[3]). The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one 
who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I . . . 
have not charity, I am nothing."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from something, 
for it is thus that man sins against God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, 
not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long 
as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment 
corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is 
irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for  ever; wherefore it 
incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the 
thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur 
punishment of infinite quantity.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. 
Because punishment, as stated above (A[4]), is proportionate to the 
fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal 
punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from another, 
since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore 
some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above (A[4]), 
it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore 
Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is 
incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original 
sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have died in 
original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of 
God, as shown by our Lord's words (Jn. 3:3): " Unless a man be born 
again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Much more, therefore, will the 
punishments of all other sins be everlasting.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being 
united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its punishment to 
each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to 
a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of 
sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. 
Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins 
are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished 
eternally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), a sin incurs a debt of eternal 
punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order 
of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that 
order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is 
disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the 
last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far 
as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the 
order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some 
temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of 
His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but 
only temporal punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect 
of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance of 
the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in  respect of their 
turning away from something. Because some sins consist in turning away 
from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to 
the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are 
referred to it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account 
of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a 
human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because 
eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, 
but to its irremissibility, as stated above (A[3]).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. 
For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause 
of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt 
of punishment ceases also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a 
virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is 
removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But 
a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore, 
when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (2 Kgs. xii, 13,14): "David said to 
Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The 
Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless 
because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme 
. . . the child that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is 
punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of 
punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and 
the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the 
act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes 
man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of 
Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of 
penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so 
that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too 
indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, 
either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would 
wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation 
is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently 
it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act  has ceased there 
still remains the debt of punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident 
that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul 
being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that 
it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as 
stated above (Q[86], A[1]). Now man is united to God by his will. 
Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will 
accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his 
own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear 
patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways 
punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, 
it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of 
punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory 
punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in 
this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. 
Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain 
respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the 
involuntary (Q[6], A[6]). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of 
sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed 
of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, 
as stated above (Q[86], A[2]), so the debt of punishment also can remain. 
But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not 
remain in the same way, as stated.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he 
may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he 
should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as 
regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the 
other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the 
sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the 
contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in 
order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given 
to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified 
by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. 
For it is written (Jn. 9:3,2) about the man born blind: "Neither hath 
this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In 
like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, 
suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, 
and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been 
baptized. Moreover before they  are baptized, there is no more sin in 
them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore 
not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should 
be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is 
frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked 
(Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be 
scourged like other men"; and (Job 21:7): "[Why then do] the wicked live, 
are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in 
brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab. 1:13): "Why lookest 
Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and 
holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], 
the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment 
is inflicted for a sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pt. 2:22) that "He did no 
sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said (1 Pt. 2:21) 
that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted 
by God for sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): "Who ever perished 
innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen 
those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and 
Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is 
inflicted for a sin."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As already stated (A[6]), punishment can be considered in 
two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment 
is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of 
punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one 
who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even 
in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. 
If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being 
something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. 
Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by 
God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to 
original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, 
the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, 
and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties 
which result from this defect in human nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet 
is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in 
the FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good 
is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, 
it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he 
may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the 
sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his 
soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to 
man, not simply  but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name 
of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man 
prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to 
health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, they 
are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: 
because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal 
medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the 
punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of 
innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so 
that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original 
sin as its cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which 
children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original 
sin, as stated above (Q[85], A[5]); and they remain even after baptism, 
for the cause stated above (Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not 
equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to 
itself, as stated above (Q[85], A[5], ad 1). Nevertheless, they are 
directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those 
who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means---and also to 
the glory of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they 
are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief goods. 
Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the 
virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices 
for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does 
not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The 
very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their 
spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): 
"Therefore pride hath held them fast."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for 
our sins.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it 
is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the 
iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth 
generation of them that hate Me"; and (Mt. 23:35): "That upon you may 
come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, 
according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their 
parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to 
Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the 
father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father's 
wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather  than of 
outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they 
imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their 
own sins, but for those of their parents.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear 
the iniquity of the father."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one 
takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in so 
far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above (A[7]). If, however, 
we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is 
penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful 
act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is 
medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another's 
sin. For it has been stated (A[7]) that ills sustained in bodily goods or 
even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the 
health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have 
such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either by God 
or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their 
masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, 
however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this 
penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one 
punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in 
the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom 
the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it 
is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's 
sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it 
patiently.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, 
because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. 
Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some 
fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad 
Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for 
another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father's 
property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying (Ezech. 
18:4): "All souls are Mine."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to 
temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of 
their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be 
referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference 
to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of 
them that hate Me," and in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we 
read: "Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers." The sins of the 
fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are 
the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents' 
crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their 
parents' example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they 
deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents, 
they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth 
generation," because men are wont to live long  enough to see the third 
and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their 
parents' sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their 
children's punishments so as to grieve for them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for 
another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or 
medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are 
punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather 
than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment of 
kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so 
far as the child is the father's property, and because the examples and 
the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. 
Consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is 
more eager to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their 
punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to 
deserve more severe punishment.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] Out. Para. 1/2

OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)

 In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the 
debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider 
venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider 
venial sin in itself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?

 (2) Whether they differ generically?

 (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?

 (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?

 (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating 
circumstance?

 (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with 
mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a word, 
deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being 
against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin 
is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat or 
drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever 
sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's glory. 
Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it 
seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as 
enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 
3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: 
because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, 
which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. 
Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to 
enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as Augustine again says 
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 
'pervertere' means to overthrow, to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's 
law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, 
sins mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns 
away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, 
consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins 
mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is 
one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But a 
crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided 
with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if 
taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken 
metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we 
speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh 
with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be 
taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply 
opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be 
taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is 
venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Q[71], A[1], ad 
3; Q[72], A[5]; Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison 
with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an 
irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated 
above (Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a 
life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as stated above 
(Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be 
repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as 
stated above (Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the 
end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can 
be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of 
order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a 
higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore 
such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, 
sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to 
the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called 
venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of 
punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the  sin ceases, as 
explained above (Q[87], A[6]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and 
irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, 
but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of 
the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided 
with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a 
division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the 
generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its 
parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other 
afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine 
gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a 
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to 
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to 
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not 
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law 
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts 
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law 
intends.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does 
not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually refer 
all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this 
precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one 
fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer 
oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes 
only actual reference of the human act to God's glory, and not habitual 
reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God 
habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins 
mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as 
enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by 
referring it to God, not actually but habitually.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in 
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: 
because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ 
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some 
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically 
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above (Q[18], 
A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any 
object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than 
God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. 
Therefore venial and mortal  sin do not differ generically.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin 
is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. 
Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, 
according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins 
committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore 
mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from 
sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins 
differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). 
Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it was stated above (Q[74], A[3], ad 3; A[10]) that 
sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial 
sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins 
are generically venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. 
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal 
sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. 
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has 
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": 
and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, a sin is called 
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, 
to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin contains 
something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through weakness or 
ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through 
not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, 
but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to 
speak now.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no 
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have 
a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and 
another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act 
is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing 
that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his 
last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently it is a 
mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. 
blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one's neighbor, 
e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by 
reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed 
to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary 
to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive 
laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and 
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of 
the agent, as stated above (Q[18], AA[4],6), it  happens sometimes that a 
sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal 
on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, 
or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own 
genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of 
adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a 
sin generically mortal because venial, by reason of the act being 
imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle 
of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of 
unbelief.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is 
contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of God, 
and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it 
belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary to 
charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal 
by reason of their genus.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial from 
their cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by 
reason of the imperfection of the act.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. 
For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial and mortal sin 
are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above (A[1]). 
Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore 
it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like dispositions 
and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or 
species, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore venial sin does not dispose to 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal 
sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now 
every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his 
Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works that it may 
destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is 
absurd.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth small 
things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems 
to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little he is disposed to 
fall away together into mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a 
twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of  disposition. 
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the 
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves 
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said 
to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin 
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it disposes 
to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does 
not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, 
for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin 
can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part 
of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened 
by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner 
fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, 
as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be 
that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. 
Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle 
thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin 
generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, 
turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will 
not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to 
subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something 
that is a mortal sin in its genus.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to 
one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated above 
(A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore 
an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial 
sin dispose to mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in 
genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit in 
different ways, as stated (AA[1],2).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; 
but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas 
a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a venial sin can become mortal?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For 
Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth not the 
Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," 
i.e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them." Now a sin is called 
mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a 
venial sin can become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of 
reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as stated 
above (Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable 
disease, as stated above (A[1]). But a curable disease may become 
incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a 
disposition to mortal, as stated (A[3]). Therefore a venial sin can 
become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be 
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at 
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, 
like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an 
act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be 
continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not 
possible for a venial sin to become mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 2/4

 Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, 
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in 
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above 
(A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 3/4

 Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins 
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial 
sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the 
venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that 
of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the 
punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while 
venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated above (Q[87], 
AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal 
sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no 
other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in 
Matth.). It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the 
remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments 
may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 4/4

 If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one 
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A[3]) with 
regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin 
disposes to mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins 
making one mortal sin dispositively.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the 
consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the 
reason in consenting is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding 
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo 
change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be 
taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect 
thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, 
becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to 
something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a 
substantial form, into which it is never changed.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. 
For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that 
"if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they 
become mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial 
sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a 
circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, 
if morose [*See Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not 
morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a 
circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, 
both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act 
to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, 
therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity 
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, 
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be 
venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an 
accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity 
of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q[72], A[5], ad 1; 
Q[87], A[5], ad 1).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is 
an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be 
taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its 
nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act. 
This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another 
genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the 
deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another 
man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which 
forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this 
circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin 
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species.  For it 
has been stated above (A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin consists 
in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the 
deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. 
Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin 
to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it 
transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the 
specific difference of the moral act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to 
another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something 
accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species 
through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene 
in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. 
disobedience, contempt, or the like.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3

 We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a 
movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the angry 
movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder 
or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a 
venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as 
it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long 
time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason. 
If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a 
sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so 
as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a 
little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless 
perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great 
scandal or something of the kind.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3

 With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of 
its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere lust 
of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to 
God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. 
That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as 
when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own 
unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case 
the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive 
drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer 
avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to 
drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin 
returns to its specific nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those 
matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the 
delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of 
the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger is 
said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the 
approval of the deliberating reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless 
it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated  above (Q[18], A[5]
, ad 4).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a mortal sin can become venial?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial 
sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a 
venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A[5]). Therefore also a 
mortal sin can become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that 
he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who sins 
venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a 
person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than 
God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a 
mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits the sin of 
fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to refrain from 
that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the 
love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal 
sin can become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant 
from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in 
itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as 
when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal 
sin become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal 
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal 
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the 
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can become 
perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can 
become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus 
of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of 
fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by 
addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a 
deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not 
diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word; 
rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by 
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not 
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a 
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above 
(A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate 
reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, 
the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is 
destroyed.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even 
as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not vice 
versa. Hence the argument does not prove.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as 
the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits 
fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or 
venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself 
is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so 
far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard 
himself in the love of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things 
which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." Now 
murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. 
But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge who sentences a 
thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, 
are not murderers.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] Out. Para. 1/1

OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are 
six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?

 (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," 
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);

 (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?

 (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?

 (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?

 (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For 
Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins 
be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us 
of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing 
else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a 
stain in the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the 
inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in venial 
sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. 
Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a 
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (Q[86], A[1]). But, 
in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through 
inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it 
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the 
gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to 
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of 
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal 
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of 
similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one 
resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the 
other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, 
there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, 
the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a 
hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because 
it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other 
virtues, as we shall show further on (SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 
2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes 
something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the 
nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, 
properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, 
however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is 
in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that 
results from acts of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins 
lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever 
the soul from its heavenly spouse.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the 
habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal 
thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which 
accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is 
entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to 
a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as 
"wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are said (1 
Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are 
something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are 
outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably 
designated as wood, hay and stubble.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be  saved 
yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who commits a 
venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in 
mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are 
unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who build 
"gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and 
good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But 
those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit 
venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we have no 
sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably 
designated by these three.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees 
of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds 
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he 
will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal 
punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (Q[87], A[5]). 
Therefore these three signify venial sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, 
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious 
stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are 
designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this 
explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (Gal. 
5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom 
of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he 
who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." 
Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal 
sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are 
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: 
as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good 
thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his 
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, 
to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything 
in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it 
is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's 
neighbor, wherefore they are designated by "gold," "silver," and 
"precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate 
themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated 
by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, 
without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while 
the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while 
the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of 
temporal trials in this life, or  of purgatory after this life, and yet 
he is saved for ever.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual 
foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they 
are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps. 136:1): "Upon 
the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do 
not destroy the edifice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and 
stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" the 
"foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have 
esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted 
and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with 
venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the 
spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal 
things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, 
and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore 
they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in 
them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain 
longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the 
fervor of charity in order to remove them.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things 
are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." 
Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to 
"wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt up at 
once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are 
removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less 
attached to them.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of 
innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: 
"Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to 
be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But 
he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial 
sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose 
that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had 
arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been 
checked." Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat, which was 
accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more 
than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) 
that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when 
he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden 
fruit." Again there seems to have  been a certain movement of unbelief in 
Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying 
(Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. 
Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the 
original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally 
notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could 
also sin venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal 
was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. 
Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him 
of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's state. 
Therefore he could not sin venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a 
venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be 
understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin 
which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had 
committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that 
aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless 
there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow or the 
like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is 
venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the 
excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to 
mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to 
commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of 
the original state by sinning mortally.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through 
the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a 
genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things 
referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now each 
of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the 
lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising 
of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being 
perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of 
reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of 
reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a 
higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be 
out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the 
end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the 
end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest 
place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the 
appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in 
the state of innocence, as stated in the FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an 
unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always 
subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no 
inordinateness in man, unless first of  all the highest part of man were 
not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is 
evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial 
sin, before committing a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same 
sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily 
forgiven.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first 
mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the 
outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the 
desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she gave 
way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, 
as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original 
state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot 
do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with 
any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not 
sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because 
man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called 
the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man 
understands in common with the angels." But man can commit a venial sin 
in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial 
sin also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love 
a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore 
he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning 
venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins 
generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like frivolities. 
Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be 
venial as stated above (A[3]), unless there is a special prohibition, 
which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man 
in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive 
state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the FP, Q[58], 
A[3]; FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from 
principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. 
Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect  considers a conclusion, it 
must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of 
appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]), 
ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. 
Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, except as they 
stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, 
they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the 
same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is 
a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in 
subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are 
acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, 
wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end 
which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything 
that they do of their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for 
the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them (FP, Q[63], 
A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or 
intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, 
at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, or to some 
inordinate end, for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, 
that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin. 
Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end 
they have in view.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal 
sin?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in 
unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rm. 8:1) that "there 
is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not 
according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of 
the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rm. 7). Therefore the reason 
why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not 
according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because 
they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. 
Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the 
first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are 
not in