Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] Out. Para. 1/1

OF SECOND MARRIAGES (TWO ARTICLES)

 In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head 
there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it is lawful?

 (2) Whether it is a sacrament?


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a second marriage is lawful?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because we 
should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in 
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that 
"to take a second husband is in truth fornication," which is unlawful. 
Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose [*On 1 
Cor. 7:40 and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not good. 
Therefore it is unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one should be debarred from being present at such 
things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred from being 
present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). 
Therefore they are unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin. Now a person 
incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married twice. 
Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage 
(Gn. 25:1).

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:14): "I will . . . that the 
younger," namely widows, "should marry, bear children." Therefore second 
marriages are lawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The marriage tie lasts only until death (Rm. 7:2), 
wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and 
consequently when one dies the other is not hindered from marrying a 
second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only 
second marriages are lawful, but even third and so on.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause which is 
wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely 
concupiscence which incites also to fornication.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A second marriage is stated not to be good, not that it is 
unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the signification which is in 
a first marriage, where one husband has one wife, as in the case of 
Christ and the Church.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Men who are consecrated to Divine things are  debarred not 
only from unlawful things, but even from things which have any appearance 
of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from second marriages, 
which lack the decorum which was in a first marriage.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Irregularity is not always incurred on account of a sin, 
and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [*"Defectus 
sacramenti," i.e. defect of signification; Cf. A[2], OBJ[3]]. Hence the 
argument is not to the point.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For he 
who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament should be 
done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, marriage 
ought nowise to be repeated.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is given. But 
no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. 
iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, signification is essential to a sacrament. But the 
signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage, because 
there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the case 
of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving another. 
But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders. Therefore it 
is not a sacrament.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second 
marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is excused 
[*Cf. Q[69], A[1]] by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring, 
and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and 
non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity is 
contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental union.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is 
a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find all the 
essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter---which 
results from the parties having the conditions prescribed by law---and 
the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of 
the present), it is clear that a second marriage is a sacrament even as a 
first.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This is true of a sacrament which causes an everlasting 
effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is  implied that the 
first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is 
clear in all those sacraments which imprint a character. But those 
sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can be repeated without 
injury to the sacrament, as in the case of Penance. And, since the 
marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done to the sacrament if a 
woman marry again after her husband's death.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although the second marriage, considered in itself, is a 
perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first 
marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its 
full signification, since there is not a union of only one woman with 
only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And on account 
of this defect the blessing is omitted in a second marriage. This, 
however, refers to the case when it is a second marriage on the part of 
both man and woman, or on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin 
marry a man who has had another wife, the marriage is blessed 
nevertheless. Because the signification is preserved to a certain extent 
even in relation to the former marriage, since though Christ has but one 
Church for His spouse, there are many persons espoused to Him in the one 
Church. But the soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else 
it commits fornication with the devil. Nor is there a spiritual marriage. 
For this reason when a woman marries a second time the marriage is not 
blessed on account of the defect in the sacrament.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The perfect signification is found in a second marriage 
considered in itself, not however if it be considered in relation to the 
previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A second marriage in so far as there is a defect in the 
sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the sacrament of 
Order.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE 
MARRIAGE DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)

 In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to 
marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2) plurality of wives; 
(3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other?

 (2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked?

 (3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses?

 (4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time?

 (5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter?

 (6) Whether the one without the other's consent may take a vow that 
prohibits the payment of the debt?

 (7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time? 

 (8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time?

 (9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival?

 (10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the 
marriage debt?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually bound, under 
the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the marriage debt. For no 
one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a 
precept. Yet he who has had intercourse with his wife cannot partake of 
the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome [*Serm. de Esu Agni viii] 
quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the debt 
does not come under the obligation of a precept.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is hurtful 
to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person to pay the debt 
when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they have already 
paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse the one who asks.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an 
obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt comes under 
the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit 
for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise weakening the body: but 
apparently this is untrue.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage 
is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as well as to the 
community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage, 
for since it is a contagious disease, the wife is not bound to cohabit 
with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is often transmitted to 
the offspring. Therefore it would seem that a wife is not bound to pay 
the debt to a leprous husband.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one 
spouse in the power of the other (1 Cor. 7:4). But a slave is bound by an 
obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service according 
to Rm. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute 
is due," etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually bound to the 
payment of the marriage debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (1 Cor. 
7:2). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not 
bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is troubled with 
concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of 
precept.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an 
office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement  of nature must be 
observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the 
generative power that alone which is in excess of what is required for 
the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that a 
thing should be first perfected in itself, and that afterwards it should 
communicate of its perfection to others: and this is also the order of 
charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife has power 
over her husband only in relation to the generative power and not in 
relation to things directed to the preservation of the individual, the 
husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, in matters pertaining to 
the begetting of children, with due regard however to his own welfare.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is possible through fulfilling a precept to render 
oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge becomes 
irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who pays the 
marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit for the 
exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is sinful, 
but on account of its carnal nature. And so, according to the Master 
(Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the ministers of the 
Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own discretion, 
because without sin they may either abstain out of reverence or receive 
Christ's body out of devotion.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The wife has no power over her husband's body, except as is 
consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated above. Wherefore if 
she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but 
an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband is not bound to 
satisfy her.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: If the husband be rendered incapable of paying the debt 
through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through having 
already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right 
to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot rather than as a 
wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other cause, then if 
this be a lawful cause, he is not bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be 
an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his wife's sin, should she fall into 
fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Hence he 
should endeavor to do his best that his wife may remain continent.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage. Wherefore a 
wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she is not 
bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from 
marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation. And though the child 
begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not at all.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for 
it?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage 
debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative  precept is 
binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the 
debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore he is not bound to 
payment otherwise.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now 
even for married people it is better to be continent than to make use of 
marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband 
should presume that it pleases her to be continent, and so he is not 
bound to pay her the debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master 
over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master save when 
the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the 
debt to his wife except when she demands it.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact 
the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he not pay it when 
he is not asked.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against 
the wife's concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick 
person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the 
husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although she ask not for it. 
Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his 
subjects even though they rebel against it. But the payment of the debt 
on the husband's part is directed against the sins of his wife. Therefore 
sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though 
she ask it not of him.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly, 
as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when namely 
the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay 
the debt, but is silent through shame. And so even though she does not 
ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it, 
whenever his wife shows signs of wishing him to do so.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also 
when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to avoid which 
is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives 
in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him to admit 
this presumption if he does see such signs.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty 
of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband. Yet 
if the master were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some 
other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to fulfill his duty, 
if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by "not 
serving to the eye" (Eph. 6:6; Col.  3:22) which is the Apostle's command 
to servants.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the 
debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not be too 
insistent, on account of the besetting danger.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage 
debt? [*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the 
marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was unclean, 
even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask 
for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife may also.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from monthly 
periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in the offspring. 
Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for the debt, 
this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental to the 
offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear. 
Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may ask for the debt 
during her menses.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, "Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers" 
(Lev. 18:19) where Augustine observes: "Although he has already 
sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem 
to have spoken figuratively."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, "All our justices" are become "as the rag of a menstruous 
woman" (Is. 64:6) where Jerome observes: "Men ought then to keep away 
from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring 
conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come together in 
sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to all": and thus the same 
conclusion follows.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous 
woman, for two reasons both on account of her uncleanness, and on account 
of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such 
intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was a ceremonial 
precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept. For since 
marriage is chiefly directed to the good of the offspring, all use of 
marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is in order. 
Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on account of 
the second reason, although not on account of the first. Now, the 
menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue is that to 
which women are subject at stated periods when they are in good health; 
and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of blood through some 
disorder resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the menstrual flow be 
unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to approach to a menstruous 
woman both on account of her infirmity  since a woman in that state 
cannot conceive, and because an issue of this kind is lasting and 
continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. When 
however the woman is subject to a natural issue of the menstruum, she can 
conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a short time, wherefore it 
is forbidden to approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to 
ask for the debt during the period of that issue.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: The issue of seed in a man is the result of infirmity, nor 
is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a complaint of this 
kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As long as a woman is subject to the menses it cannot be 
certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth, and in course 
of time become fruitful, and "vice versa," as the Philosopher observes 
(De Gener. Anim. xvi).


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt 
to her husband if he ask for it? [*This and the previous article are 
omitted in the Leonine edition.]

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the marriage 
debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written (Lev. 20:18) that if 
any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death. 
Therefore it would seem that both he who asks and she who grants are 
guilty of mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Not only they that do them but they also that consent 
to them are worthy of death" (Rm. 1:32). Now he who knowingly asks for 
the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she also sins 
mortally by consenting to pay the debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he kill 
himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should a wife give 
her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual 
murder.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, "The wife hath not power of her own body, but the 
husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the debt 
even during her menses.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her 
husband. But she would give her husband an occasion of sin, if she paid 
him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication. 
Therefore, etc.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous woman 
may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it. For just as she 
would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to 
make it dangerous for herself, so is she  not bound to pay for fear of 
danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate from 
marriage, by which the husband is given entire power of his wife's body 
with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any parallel between bodily 
affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the 
wife be ailing, it is quite certain that she would be endangered by the 
carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain with regard to the 
offspring which perhaps would not be forthcoming.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask for 
the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so either knowingly or in 
ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and 
admonitions; yet not so insistently as possibly to afford him an occasion 
of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be deemed that 
way inclined. If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may put forward 
some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for not paying the debt, 
unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the husband 
ultimately persists in his request, she must yield to his demand. But it 
would not be safe for her to make known [*"Indicare," as in the 
commentary on the Sentences; the Leonine edition reads "judicare."] her 
disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a repulsion towards 
her, unless his prudence may be taken for granted.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This refers to the case when both willingly consent, but 
not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Since there is no consent without the concurrence of the 
will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband's sin unless she 
pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather 
than consenting.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A madman should be given back his sword if a greater danger 
were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus it is in the 
case in point.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the marriage 
act. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) the agent is more 
noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is as agent 
and the wife as patient. Therefore they are not equal in that act.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt 
without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above (AA[1],2). 
Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the woman was made on the man's account in reference to 
marriage according to Gn. 2:18, "Let us make him a help like unto 
himself." But that on account of which another thing is, is always the 
principal. Therefore, etc.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 4: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in 
marriage "the husband is the head of the wife" (Eph. 5:23). Therefore 
they are not equal in the aforesaid act.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:4): "The husband . . . hath not 
power of his own body," and the same is said of the wife. Therefore they 
are equal in the marriage act.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of 
union, as stated above (Q[44], AA[1],3). Therefore husband and wife are 
equal in the marriage act.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion. 
Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities of 
the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another two 
cubits in length. But equality of proportion is that which is observed 
between two proportions of the same kind as double to double. 
Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not 
equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the more 
noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household 
management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with 
reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, 
because just as in both the marriage act and in the management of the 
household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to 
the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining 
to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, 
D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there 
is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between agent and 
activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This is accidental. For the husband having the more noble 
part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less ashamed 
than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound 
to pay the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the husband 
is bound to pay it to the wife.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not 
that they are not equal in proportion.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the 
members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities, so is 
the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is 
equality of proportion between them.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt 
without their mutual consent?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to 
the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For  husband and wife are 
equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above (A[5]). Now it is lawful 
for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in 
defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this is also lawful to the 
wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either 
husband or wife may without the other's consent take the aforesaid vow.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of 
another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot, 
without sin, refuse their consent to the other's taking a vow of 
continence whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a 
person's spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore 
the one can take a vow of continence either absolutely or for a time, 
without the other's consent.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as 
it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other's consent, vow not 
to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore 
he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do 
what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey in what 
is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to 
pay the debt to his wife for a time, by occupying him in some service. 
Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that which would hinder 
him from paying the debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): "Defraud not one another, 
except . . . by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to 
prayer."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now "the husband 
. . . hath not power of his own body, but the wife" (1 Cor. 7:4). 
Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of 
continence whether absolutely or for a time.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and 
consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our 
will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under 
this head. Therefore in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow 
without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since 
husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt 
which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without 
the other's consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep 
the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken vow [*Cf. Q[53], AA[1],4; 
Q[61], A[1]].

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be 
willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of 
the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross 
is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross 
without his wife's consent, even as he  might go fighting without the 
consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not 
entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a 
parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule 
the wife and not "vice versa," the wife is bound to follow her husband 
rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there would be more danger to 
the wife's chastity as a result of wandering from country to country, 
than to the husband's, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife 
cannot take this vow without her husband's consent.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other's vow 
of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to 
hinder not the other's good, but the harm to himself.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one 
can without the other's consent vow not to demand the debt, not however 
not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own 
rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that if one were never to 
ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who 
would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others 
assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by 
one spouse without the other's consent.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Just as the wife receives power over her husband's body, 
without prejudice to the husband's duty to his own body, so also is it 
without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot 
ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily health, so 
neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. 
And yet the master cannot for this reason prevent her from paying the 
debt.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for 
the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when the disease 
gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast 
day. Therefore the remedy should be applied then by asking for the debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on 
feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on those days 
certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the 
debt at some other time.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy because they are 
devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. 
But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore 
neither is it lawful at a holy time.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless 
since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it 
renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on  those days when 
one ought especially to give one's time to spiritual things, it is not 
lawful to ask for the debt.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: At such a time other means may be employed for the 
repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar 
things, to which even those who observe perpetual continence have 
recourse.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is 
bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a 
holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took possession of a 
woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the 
morning to the procession. But this would not have happened had she not 
sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a mortal sin. 
Now the Lord commanded (Ex. 19:15): "Come not near your wives," when 
namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more therefore do 
husbands sin mortally if they have intercourse with their wives at a time 
when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the New Law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time 
is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so 
as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance 
drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate 
infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by 
asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more grievous sin to 
ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of 
the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but 
because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service against 
her conscience.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but 
that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was given to a carnal 
people many things were required under an obligation of precept, for the 
sake of bodily cleanness, which are not required in the New Law which is 
the law of the spirit.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a 
festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those  who consent 
thereto are equally punished (Rm. 1:32). But the one who pays the debt 
consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins also.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and 
therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore one ought not 
to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one 
at a time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty towards a temporal 
master.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): "Defraud not one another, 
except by consent, for a time," etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the 
other must pay.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since the wife has power of her husband's body, and "vice 
versa," with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound to pay 
the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to the 
decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once 
openly.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As far as he is concerned he does not consent, but grants 
unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently 
he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of 
the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one who asks lest he 
be afforded an occasion of sin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be 
made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? [*This article is 
omitted in the Leonine edition.]

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at certain 
times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration of the others 
sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the 
celebration of marriage be forbidden then.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming on feast 
days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may be asked for on 
those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the law of 
the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not dissolved if they 
be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a 
commandment of the Church.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:5): "A time to embrace, and a 
time to be far from embraces."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, When the newly married spouse is given to her husband, 
the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal  preoccupations by 
reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be 
signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this account it is 
forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought especially 
to arise to spiritual things. Those times are from Advent until the 
Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to the ancient Canons, 
is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its proper place, TP, 
Q[30]), from Septuagesima until the octave day of Easter, on account of 
the Easter Communion, and from the three days before the Ascension until 
the octave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for Communion 
to be received at that time.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly and 
carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the other 
sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: There is not such a distraction of minds caused by the 
payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a marriage; 
and consequently the comparison fails.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since time is not essential to a marriage contracted within 
the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament. Nor 
is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may do 
penance for having disobeyed the commandment of the Church. It is thus 
that we are to understand the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), 
namely that should a marriage have been contracted or a wedding 
celebrated at the aforesaid times, those who have done so "ought to be 
separated." Nor does he say this on his own authority, but in reference 
to some canonical ordinance, such as that of the Council of Lerida, which 
decision is quoted by the Decretals.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] Out. Para. 1/1

OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are 
five points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?

 (2) Whether this was ever lawful?

 (3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?

 (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?

 (5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have 
several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature. But "it 
was not a sin" to have several wives "when this was the custom," 
according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the text (Sent. 
iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have 
several wives.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys 
a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even as the 
written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv, 
38) that "it was not contrary to a commandment" to have several wives, 
"because by no law was it forbidden." Therefore it is not against the 
natural law to have several wives.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of 
offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing them 
to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have 
several wives.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, "Natural right is that which nature has taught all 
animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff. De just. 
et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be 
united to but one female, since with many animals the one male is united 
to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have 
several wives.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), 
in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as agent to 
patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against 
the order of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or for one 
craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary 
to the law of nature for one husband to have many wives.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the 
formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural 
law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature 
that one man should have one wife, according to Gn. 2:24, "They shall be 
two in one flesh." Therefore it is of natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 7: Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind 
himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given 
to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power 
of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks. 
Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give 
the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him 
to pay both were both to ask at the same time.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 8: Further, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to 
thyself" [*Cf. Tobias 4:16] is a precept of the natural law. But a 
husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another 
husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were he 
to have another wife in addition.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 9: Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to 
the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and the wife's 
jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. 
Therefore, since jealousy is "love impatient of sharing the beloved," it 
would seem to be contrary to the natural  law that several wives should 
share one husband.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, All natural things are imbued with certain principles 
whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but 
also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such 
actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue 
of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards 
by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its 
specific nature. Now just as in those things which act from natural 
necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper 
actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are 
endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and 
appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural 
concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the 
action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the 
end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the 
proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a 
natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and 
this is called "the natural law" or "the natural right," but in other 
animals "the natural instinct." For brutes are rather impelled by the 
force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own 
judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept 
naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting 
manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue 
of his generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or 
belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to 
reason and so forth. Now whatever renders an action improportionate to 
the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be 
contrary to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either 
to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens 
in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; 
for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating 
hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food, 
and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end. 
Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the 
principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance 
eating inordinately in respect of undue time. Accordingly if an action be 
improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal 
end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law, 
which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts 
of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way 
improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as 
rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, 
not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second 
which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative 
matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles: and thus 
the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of 
children, and this end is competent to man according to  his generic 
nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and 
thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned as a marriage good. But for 
its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, 
among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as 
stated above (Q[41], A[1]). And in reference to this they owe one another 
"fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has 
another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the 
signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the "sacrament" is said 
to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the 
marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he 
is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality 
of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of 
marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, 
and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly 
destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot 
easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one 
husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of 
several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation 
is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with one another" 
[*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one 
husband. The third end, it removes altogether, because as Christ is one, 
so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been 
said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and 
in a way not against it.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the 
first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts of the 
mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions 
from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De Inv. Rhet. ii), or 
weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), "fear of the law and 
religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are 
approved by custom." Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the 
natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of 
the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, 
except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is 
what Augustine means by saying that "they did not disobey the 
commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/4

 Reply OBJ 4: Natural right has several significations. First a right is 
said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by nature: 
and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: "Natural right 
is not the result of opinion but the product of an innate force." And 
since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not 
that they be from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a 
higher moving  principle---thus the movements that are caused in the 
elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the 
Commentator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things 
that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they 
are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely 
God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym. v) that "the 
natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." 
Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its principle but also 
from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is 
contradistinguished with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if 
we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are 
dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of 
natural right, but only those which are dictated by natural reason and 
are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid 
definition, namely: "Natural right is what nature has taught all 
animals." Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural 
right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against natural right 
taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It 
is also against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from 
what has been said, for such is nature's dictate to every animal 
according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain 
animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely 
the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with 
one, for instance the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 2/4

 The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 3/4

 Since, however, the arguments adduced "on the contrary side" would seem 
to show that plurality of wives is against the first principles of the 
natural law, we must reply to them.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 4/4

 Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was 
founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only with 
those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of 
attainment, but also with those without which the secondary end of 
marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it 
sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 7: In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body, 
not in all respects, but only in those things that are required by 
marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every 
time his wife asks for it, if we consider the principal end for which 
marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as 
far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so far as it is instituted 
as a remedy (which is its secondary end), marriage does require the debt 
to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by 
taking several wives a man does not bind himself to the impossible, 
considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of 
wives is not against the first principles of the natural law. 

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 8: This precept of the natural law, "Do not to another what 
thou wouldst not were done to thyself," should be understood with the 
proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to 
be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore bound not to withstand 
his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a 
husband is unwilling for his wife to have another husband, he must not 
have another wife: because for one man to have several wives is not 
contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: 
whereas for one wife to have several husbands is contrary to the first 
principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring 
which is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely 
destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of the offspring 
means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of 
offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman may be impregnated a 
second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in De 
Gener. Animal. vii. 4), is nevertheless considerably hindered, because 
this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of 
them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because 
as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows 
uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is 
necessary for its education. Wherefore the marriage of one wife with 
several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas 
the converse has been.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 9: The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the 
natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so much 
opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a 
wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife's love is not so 
averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband's love 
is to another sharing the same wife with him. Consequently both in man 
and in other animals the male is more jealous of the female than "vice 
versa."


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have several 
wives. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7), "The natural law 
has the same power at all times and places." Now plurality of wives is 
forbidden by the natural law, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore as it is 
unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because it was 
lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former, it would also 
be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for according to 
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), "as God is the founder of nature, He 
does nothing contrary to the principles which He has planted in nature." 
Since then God has planted in our nature the principle that one man 
should be united to one wife, it would seem that He has never dispensed 
man from  this.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only lawful 
for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read in the Law of 
a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since then in the Old 
Testament all who wished to do so, without any distinction, took to 
themselves several wives, nor were reproached on that account, either by 
the law or by the prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by 
dispensation.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the 
same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any other reason 
for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of 
God, and this is necessary also now. Therefore this dispensation would be 
still in force, especially as we read nowhere of its having been recalled.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good should not 
be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity and the 
sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage 
where one man is joined to several wives, are greater goods than the 
multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation ought not to 
have been granted with a view to this multiplication.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, It is stated (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set because 
of transgressors [Vulg.: 'transgressions']," namely in order to prohibit 
them. Now the Old Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition 
thereof, as appears from Dt. 21:15, "If a man have two wives," etc. 
Therefore they were not transgressors through having two wives; and so it 
was lawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who 
are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to God, 
for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one time it 
was lawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is 
said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts, 
but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn 
from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary 
according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other 
circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first 
precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only 
in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding, it is 
lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the 
above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he 
derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in 
those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this 
permission is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the one wife 
was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in 
writing, but was imprinted on the  heart, like other things belonging in 
any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter 
could be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed 
originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example continued to 
others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be 
observed, in order to ensure the multiplication of the offspring to be 
brought up in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be 
borne in mind before the secondary end. Wherefore, since the good of the 
offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for 
a time the impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was 
necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was for the 
removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of 
wives was framed, as stated above (A[1]).

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The natural law, considered in itself, has the same force 
at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some impediment 
it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 
3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at all times and 
places the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but it 
may happen accidentally that a person is ambidextrous, because our nature 
is variable; and the same applies to the natural, just as the Philosopher 
states (Ethic. i, 3,7).

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted 
that is was never lawful to have several wives without having a 
dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation 
thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God has implanted in 
nature, but an exception to them, because those principles are not 
intended to apply to all cases but to the majority, as stated. Even so it 
is not contrary to nature when certain occurrences take place in natural 
things miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent occurrences.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Dispensation from a law should follow the quality of the 
law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the heart, it was 
not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the natural 
law to be given under the form of a written law but by internal 
inspiration.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: When Christ came it was the time of the fulness of the 
grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad among all 
nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same reason 
for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when the worship of God was 
spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The offspring, considered as one of the marriage goods, 
includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why it is 
reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to its 
being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept with God 
is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife, which is 
reckoned a marriage good, and than the  signification which pertains to 
the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to the knowledge of 
faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the two other 
goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor are they entirely 
done away, since there remains faith towards several wives; and the 
sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not signify the 
union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the plurality of 
wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which 
distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the Church 
triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the union of 
Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but also with the 
Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*Jn. 19:2].


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the natural 
law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural law. But 
fornication is forbidden (Acts 15:29) in conjunction with ceremonies of 
the law which for the time were being imposed on those who were brought 
to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore simple fornication which 
is intercourse with a concubine is not against the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as Tully 
says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden by positive law; 
indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be sentenced to be 
taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have a 
concubine.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is given 
simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions. Now one 
unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an unmarried 
man, so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not against the 
law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a time.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures no 
one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if her master 
use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is not against 
the natural law to have a concubine.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, everyone may give his own property to another. Now the 
wife has power of her husband's body (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore if his wife 
be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another woman without 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, According to all laws the children born of a concubine 
are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of which 
they are born were naturally shameful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, as stated above (Q[41], A[1]), marriage is natural. But this 
would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man  could be 
united to a woman otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is against the 
natural law to have a concubine.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), an action is said to be against 
the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end intended by 
nature, whether through not being directed thereto by the action of the 
agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or 
through being in itself improportionate to that end. Now the end which 
nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and rearing of the 
offspring. and that this good might be sought after, it attached pleasure 
to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 8). Accordingly to 
make use of sexual intercourse on account of its inherent pleasure, 
without reference to the end for which nature intended it, is to act 
against nature, as also is it if the intercourse be not such as may 
fittingly be directed to that end. And since, for the most part, things 
are denominated from their end, as being that which is of most 
consequence to them, just as the marriage union took its name from the 
good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is the end chiefly sought 
after in marriage, so the name of concubine is expressive of that union 
where sexual intercourse is sought after for its own sake. Moreover even 
though sometimes a man may seek to have offspring of such an intercourse, 
this is not befitting to the good of the offspring, which signifies not 
only the begetting of children from which they take their being, but also 
their rearing and instruction, by which means they receive nourishment 
and learning from their parents, in respect of which three things the 
parents are bound to their children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. 
viii, 11,12). Now since the rearing and teaching of the children remain a 
duty of the parents during a long period of time, the law of nature 
requires the father and mother to dwell together for a long time, in 
order that together they may be of assistance to their children. Hence 
birds that unite together in rearing their young do not sever their 
mutual fellowship from the time when they first come together until the 
young are fully fledged. Now this obligation which binds the female and 
her mate to remain together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is 
evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to have 
intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, which is the 
signification of a concubine.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured in many 
points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have intercourse 
with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication as though it 
were lawful, as also other things contrary to the ceremonial laws of the 
Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature. Wherefore the apostles 
inserted the prohibition of fornication among that of other ceremonial 
observances, because in both cases there was a difference of opinion 
between Jews and Gentiles.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This law was the result of the darkness just mentioned, 
into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor to God as 
stated in Rm. 1:21, and did not proceed from the  instinct of the natural 
law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law was abolished.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In certain cases no evil results ensue if a person 
surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a time, so that 
in neither case is the surrender against the natural law. But that does 
not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument does not prove.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law forbids 
not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the virtues: 
for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat immoderately, 
although by doing so a man uses his own property without injury to 
anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's property that she 
may serve him, she is not his that she may be his concubine. And again it 
depends how a person makes use of his property. For such a man does an 
injury to the offspring he begets, since such a union is not directed to 
its good, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The wife has power of her husband's body, not simply and in 
all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and consequently she 
cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the detriment of the 
good of marriage.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have intercourse 
with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication: and 
a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to commit fornication 
with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying (Gn. 38:23): "Surely she 
cannot charge us with a lie." But a lie is not always a mortal sin. 
Neither therefore is simple fornication.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But the Old 
Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine, save in a 
certain case (Dt. 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the sins of 
the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride and 
covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins. 
Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less grievous, 
because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation. But 
concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since lustful 
actions are not always mortal sins, neither is simple fornication a 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the  kingdom of 
God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 
6:9,10). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a 
crime according to Tobias 4:13, "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all 
fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime." Therefore, 
etc.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42, Q[1], A[4]), 
those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of friendship 
between man and God, and between man and man; for such sins are against 
the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul. Wherefore 
since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due relations of the 
parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in sexual intercourse, 
there can be no doubt that simple fornication by its very nature is a 
mortal sin even though there were no written law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It often happens that a man who does not avoid a mortal 
sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an incentive. Thus, 
too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not fornication. Nevertheless 
that would have been a pernicious lie, for it would have involved an 
injury if he had not kept his promise.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A sin is called deadly, not because it is punished with 
temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death. Hence also 
theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are sometimes not 
punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies to fornication.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so 
neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements of lust 
and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage intercourse. 
Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some movements of 
pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are to be 
understood as comparing vices in their genus and not in their particular 
acts.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A circumstance is the more effective in aggravating a sin 
according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin. Hence although 
fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of its incentive, 
yet on account of the matter about which it is, it has a greater gravity 
than immoderate eating, because it is about those things which tighten 
the bond of human fellowship, as stated above. Hence the argument does 
not prove.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a 
concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but one 
wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has been 
lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has also  been lawful to have 
a concubine.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a wife; 
wherefore according to the Law (Dt. 21:11, seqq.) a bondswoman gained her 
freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we read that 
certain men who were most beloved of God, for instance Abraham and Jacob, 
had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore these were not wives, 
and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a concubine.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast out, and 
her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham sent Agar 
away, and her son was not his heir (Gn. 21:14). Therefore she was not 
Abraham's wife.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were 
never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the 
decalogue, namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Therefore it was 
never lawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4): 
"What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband." But it is never 
lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse with 
another man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have a 
concubine.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the 
time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion 
from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument is 
not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's sons from mortal 
sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked crime (Gn. 
37:2), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore we must say 
that since it is against the natural law to have a concubine outside 
wedlock, as stated above (A[3]), it was never lawful either in itself or 
by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) intercourse 
with a woman outside wedlock is an action improportionate to the good of 
the offspring which is the principal end of marriage: and consequently it 
is against the first precepts of the natural law which admit of no 
dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old Testament we read of concubines 
being taken by such men as we ought to excuse from mortal sin, we must 
needs understand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to have 
been called concubines, because they had something of the character of a 
wife and something of the character of a concubine. In so far as marriage 
is directed to its principal end, which is the good of the offspring, the 
union of wife and husband is indissoluble or at least of a lasting 
nature, as shown above (A[1]), and in regard to this there is no 
dispensation. But in regard to the secondary end, which is the management 
of the household and community of works, the wife is united to the 
husband as his mate: and this was lacking in those who were known as 
concubines. For in this respect a dispensation was possible, since it is 
the secondary end of marriage. And from this point of view they bore some 
resemblance to concubines, and for this reason they  were known as such.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several wives is not 
against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to have a 
concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The patriarchs of old by virtue of the dispensation which 
allowed them several wives, approached their bondswomen with the 
disposition of a husband towards his wife. For these women were wives as 
to the principal and first end of marriage, but not as to the other union 
which regards the secondary end, to which bondage is opposed since a 
woman cannot be at once mate and slave.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by dispensation to 
grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder (as we shall state 
further on, Q[67], A[6]), so by the same dispensation Abraham was allowed 
to send Agar away, in order to signify the mystery which the Apostle 
explains (Gal. 4:22, seqq.). Again, that this son did not inherit belongs 
to the mystery, as explained in the same place. Even so Esau, the son of 
a free woman, did not inherit (Rm. 9:13, seqq.). In like manner on 
account of the mystery it came about that the sons of Jacob born of bond 
and free women inherited, as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.) because 
"sons and heirs are born to Christ both of good ministers denoted by the 
free woman and of evil ministers denoted by the bondswoman." 


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] Out. Para. 1/1

OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)

 In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity 
contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having 
two successive wives?

 (2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at once?

 (3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a 
virgin?

 (4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?

 (5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the bigamy 
that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude and unity 
are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not cause plurality, 
a man who has two wives successively, the one in being, the other in 
non-being, does not thereby become the husband of more than one wife, so 
as to be debarred, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 3:2; Titus 1:6), from 
the episcopate. 

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a man who commits fornication with several women gives 
more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives 
successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular. 
Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either because of 
the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now it is not on 
account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage by words of 
the present and, his wife dying before the consummation of the marriage, 
he were to marry another, he would become irregular, which is against the 
decree of Innocent III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia). Nor again is it on 
account of the second, for then a man who had committed fornication with 
several women would become irregular: which is false. Therefore bigamy 
nowise causes irregularity.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the 
ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments 
to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a 
defect in a sacrament when the entire signification of the sacrament is 
not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of 
Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Therefore the 
perfect signification of the sacrament requires the husband to have only 
one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently bigamy, 
which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there are four kinds 
of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives successively; 
the second is when a man has several wives at once, one in law, the other 
in fact; the third, when he has several successively, one in law, the 
other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow. Accordingly 
irregularity attaches to all of these.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive the 
sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest spirituality, 
both because they administer spiritual things, namely the sacraments, and 
because they teach spiritual things, and should be occupied in spiritual 
matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is most incompatible with 
spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly carnal, they should 
give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which does indeed show itself 
in bigamous persons, seeing that they were unwilling to be content with 
one wife. The first reason however is the better.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The multitude of several wives at the same time is a 
multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly 
inconsistent with the signification of the sacrament, so that the 
sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several 
successive wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not 
entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void the 
sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required of 
those who are the dispensers of sacraments.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 2: Although those who are guilty of fornication give proof of 
greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent concupiscence, since 
by fornication one party is not bound to the other for ever; and 
consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity, because it 
destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which signification 
is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the consent, and in 
the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both of these at the 
same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the decree of Innocent 
III disposes of the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 27), namely 
that consent alone by words of the present is sufficient to cause 
irregularity.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives, 
one in law, the other in fact?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that irregularity does not result from bigamy when 
one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and one in fact. 
For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in the sacrament. 
Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law there is no 
sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of Christ with 
the Church. Therefore since irregularity does not result from bigamy 
except on account of a defect in the sacrament, it would seem that no 
irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has 
married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has not a 
lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular 
by dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or adultery. 
Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally the 
woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not in law, and 
knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or dead. Now this 
man has contracted marriage with several women either in law or in fact, 
and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among 
several women. Therefore irregularity is not contracted by reason of the 
aforesaid kind of bigamy.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of 
bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a certain 
likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are secondary, and the 
first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Although there is no sacrament in this case there is a 
certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness in 
fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails. 

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist, because 
the first marriage lacked its perfect signification. Nevertheless if, by 
the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to return to his first wife 
and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular forthwith, because the 
irregularity is the result not of the sin but of imperfect signification.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by marrying one 
who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater impediment to 
him than the defect of another. But if the man himself who marries is not 
a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore much less does he if his 
wife is not a virgin.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after 
corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular, 
since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done 
so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this kind 
of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily. But 
sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin, for 
instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her 
carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always 
cause irregularity.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more guilty than 
before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been consummated, 
has intercourse with another man, her husband does not become irregular, 
otherwise he would be punished for his wife's sin. Moreover, it might 
happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the debt at her asking, 
before she is accused and convicted of adultery. Therefore it would seem 
that this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): "We command thee 
never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a 
bigamist, or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one who 
is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do 
penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of 
subjection."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on 
either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh on the 
part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of 
sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because on the part of the 
husband it is required that he should not have married another wife, but 
not that he should be a virgin, whereas  on the part of the wife it is 
also required that she be a virgin. The reason assigned by those versed 
in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church militant 
which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in which there are many 
corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a virgin: 
wherefore virginity on the part of the spouse, but not on the part of the 
bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a bishop. This 
reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of the Apostle (Eph. 
5:25): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church," 
which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the bridegroom 
Christ; and again he says (Eph. 5:23): "Because the husband is the head 
of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." Wherefore others say 
that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and that the bride signifies 
the Church triumphant in which there is no stain. Also that the synagogue 
was first united to Christ as a concubine; so that the sacrament loses 
nothing of its signification if the bridegroom previously had a 
concubine. But this is most absurd, since just as the faith of ancients 
and of moderns is one, so is the Church one. Wherefore those who served 
God at the time of the synagogue belonged to the unity of the Church in 
which we serve God. Moreover this is expressly contrary to Jer. 3:14, 
Ezech. 16:8, Osee 2:16, where the espousals of the synagogue are 
mentioned explicitly: so that she was not as a concubine but as a wife. 
Again, according to this, fornication would be the sacred sign 
[sacramentum] of that union, which is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, 
before being espoused to Christ in the faith of the Church, was corrupted 
by the devil through idolatry. Hence we must say otherwise that 
irregularity is caused by a defect in the sacrament itself. Now when 
corruption of the flesh occurs outside wedlock on account of a preceding 
marriage, it causes no defect in the sacrament on the part of the person 
corrupted, but it causes a defect in the other person, because the act of 
one who contracts marriage terminates not in himself, but in the other 
party, wherefore it takes its species from its term, which, moreover, in 
regard to that act, is the matter as it were of the sacrament. 
Consequently if a woman were able to receive orders, just as her husband 
becomes irregular through marrying one who is not a virgin, but not 
through his not being a virgin when he marries, so also would a woman 
become irregular if she were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not 
if she were no longer a virgin when she married ---unless she had been 
corrupted by reason of a previous marriage.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In this case opinions differ. It is, however, more probable 
that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his flesh among 
several women.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Irregularity is not the infliction of a punishment, but the 
defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not always necessary for bigamy 
to be voluntary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who marries a 
woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular 
by knowing her  carnally.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: If a woman commits fornication after being married, her 
husband does not become irregular on that account, unless he again knows 
her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery, since otherwise 
the corruption of the wife nowise affects the marriage act of the 
husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the debt, or if he 
do so at her request, being compelled by his own conscience, even before 
she is convicted of adultery, he becomes irregular, albeit opinions 
differ on this point. However, what we have said is more probable, since 
here it is not a question of sin, but of signification only.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For Jerome says 
in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, "the husband of one 
wife") that if a man has had several wives before receiving Baptism, or 
one before and another after Baptism, he is not a bigamist. Therefore 
bigamy is removed by Baptism.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now Baptism 
removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity. Therefore 
it removes irregularity.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from an act. 
Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient in the 
representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed to 
Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than 
the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of the Old Law removed 
irregularities according to the Master's statement (Sent. iv,). Therefore 
Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the sacraments of the New 
Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon bigamy.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those 
understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has 
married a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at the 
time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament, not of 
a sin."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a 
woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a pagan cannot after 
Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins." Therefore in like manner one 
who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be ordained.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve  marriage. 
Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be removed 
by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed: unless 
perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation should be 
more easily granted.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It does not follow that what does a greater thing, does a 
lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not so in the case 
in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal of an 
irregularity.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This must be understood of punishments consequent upon 
actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does not 
recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the virtue of 
the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is effected by 
virginity or division of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Those irregularities were contracted through slight and 
temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by those 
sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose, whereas 
Baptism is not.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a 
dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): "It is not 
lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could do 
so, have taken to themselves a second wife."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the Divine 
law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs to the Divine law. 
Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:2): "It 
behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one wife," it would 
seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this matter.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is essential 
to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order that the 
recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is essential to 
a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore he cannot be 
granted a dispensation in this.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably undone. If, 
therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation, it was 
unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the  bishop of 
Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector, dist. 
34.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: "If a 
Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for 
it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same 
applies if he should be a bigamist." Therefore he may at least receive a 
dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by 
positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that a man 
be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist 
present himself for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the Pope 
can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop, only as 
regards the minor orders, though some say that in order to prevent 
religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom as regards the major 
orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This Decretal shows that there is the same difficulty 
against granting a dispensation in those who have married several wives 
in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does not prove that 
the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such cases.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This is true as regards things belonging to the natural 
law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to faith. But 
in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since the Church 
has the same power now as then of setting up and of putting down, she can 
grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Not every signification is essential to a sacrament, but 
that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and this is not 
removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads "officium," some read 
"effectum"; the meaning is the same, and is best rendered as above.]

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: In particular cases there is no ratio that applies to all 
equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is reasonably 
established for all, in consideration of what happens in the majority of 
cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain definite case.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are 
seven points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?

 (2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?

 (3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?

 (4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband? 

 (5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?

 (6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?

 (7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of natural 
law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law save Christ's 
has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore inseparableness of a 
wife is not of natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But the 
indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore it is 
not of the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly 
directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring. But 
all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that time it 
is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of 
marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the good of 
the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot 
beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of another, 
even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore the 
indissolubility of marriage is against rather than according to the 
natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, Those things which were assigned to nature when it was 
well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of nature. 
Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things according to 
Mt. 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to God. 
Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to sunder "what 
God hath joined together." Since then the indissolubility of marriage is 
gathered from this passage (Mt. 19:6) it would seem that it is of natural 
law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the 
rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole 
life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their 
children, and that children should be their parents' heirs (2 Cor. 
12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and 
wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to live together 
for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of marriage is of 
natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Christ's law alone brought mankind "to  perfection" [*Cf. 
Heb. 7:19] by bringing man back to the state of the newness of nature. 
Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove all that was 
contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to "the 
law of the spirit of life" [*Cf. Rm. 8:2].

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as the latter 
is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church, and in so far 
as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to the good of the 
offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more directly 
incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with the good 
of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently, as stated 
above (Q[65], A[2], ad 5), the indissolubility of marriage is implied in 
the good of the sacrament rather than in the good of the offspring, 
although it may be connected with both. And in so far as it is connected 
with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural law, but not as 
connected with the good of the sacrament.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been said.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good in respect 
of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring; although in 
respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of the 
contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy for 
concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for all 
rather than what may be suitable for one. Therefore although the 
indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the offspring with regard 
to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the offspring 
absolutely speaking: and for this reason the argument does not prove.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to put away 
a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the good of the 
offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law, which admit 
of no dispensation. Now such is the putting away of a wife, as stated 
above (A[1]). Therefore, etc.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the fact 
that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation could a man 
have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his wife away.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as of old. 
But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his wife. Neither, 
therefore, could he in olden times.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a 
husband towards his wife, as stated above (Q[65], A[5], ad 2,3). Now by 
Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned  not. Therefore it could 
be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In the commandments, especially those which in some way 
are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural course 
of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some 
natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered from following 
its course: it is thus in all things that happen by chance less 
frequently in nature. In this way, however, there is no variation in the 
course of those natural things which happen always, but only in the 
course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause altogether 
supernatural, as in the case of miracles: and in this way there can be a 
variation in the course of nature, not only in the course which is 
appointed for the majority of cases, but also in the course which is 
appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at the 
time of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, and by 
the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ's Passion [*Jos. 10:14; 4 
Kgs. 20:10; Is. 38:8; Mt. 27:15]. In like manner the reason for a 
dispensation from a precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in 
the lower causes, and in this way a dispensation may bear upon the 
secondary precepts of the natural law, but not on the first precepts 
because these are always existent as it were, as stated above (Q[65], 
A[1]) in reference to the plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes 
this reason is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may be 
given by God even from the first precepts of the natural law, for the 
sake of signifying or showing some Divine mystery, as instanced in the 
dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son. 
Such dispensations, however, are not granted to all generally, but to 
certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to miracles. 
Accordingly, if the indissolubility of marriage is contained among the 
first precepts of the natural law, it could only be a matter of 
dispensation in this second way; but, if it be one of the second precepts 
of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation even in the 
first way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary precepts 
of the natural law. For the indissolubility of marriage is not directed 
to the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, 
except in so far as parents have to provide for their children for their 
whole life, by due preparation of those things that are necessary in 
life. Now this preparation does not pertain to the first intention of 
nature, in respect of which all things are common. And therefore it would 
seem that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention 
of nature, and consequently that it is contrary not to the first but to 
the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a 
matter of dispensation even in the first way.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The good of the offspring, in so far as it belongs to the 
first intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and 
instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision 
be made for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or other 
goods belongs seemingly to the second  intention of the natural law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To have a concubine is contrary to the good of the 
offspring, in respect of nature's first intention in that good, namely 
the rearing and instruction of the child, for which purpose it is 
necessary that the parents remain together permanently; which is not the 
case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence the 
comparison fails. But in respect of nature's second intention, even the 
having of a concubine may be a matter of dispensation as evidenced by 
Osee 1.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of 
marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first 
intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was 
made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a 
matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was lawful to divorce a wife under the 
Mosaic law. For one way of giving consent is to refrain from prohibiting 
when one can prohibit. It is also unlawful to consent to what is 
unlawful. Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid the putting away of a 
wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for "the law . . . is holy" 
(Rm. 7:12), it would seem that divorce was at one time lawful.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost, according 
to 2 Pt. 1:21. Now it is written (Malachi 2:16): "When thou shalt hate 
her, put her away." Since then that which the Holy Ghost inspires is not 
unlawful, it would seem that it was not always unlawful to divorce a wife.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely 
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that even as the apostles permitted 
second marriages, so Moses allowed the bill of divorce. But second 
marriages are not sinful. Therefore neither was it sinful under the 
Mosaic law to divorce a wife.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: On the contrary, our Lord said (Mt. 19:8) that Moses granted the 
Jews the bill of divorce by reason of the hardness of their heart. But 
their hardness of heart did not excuse them from sin. Neither therefore 
did the law about the bill of divorce.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum 
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "Moses, by granting the 
bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice of God, but deprived their 
sin of its guilt, for while the Jews acted as though they were keeping 
the law, their sin seemed to be no sin."

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, on this point there are two opinions. For some  say that 
under the Law those who put away their wives, after giving them a bill of 
divorce, were not excused from sin, although they were excused from the 
punishment which they should have suffered according to the Law: and that 
for this reason Moses is stated to have permitted the bill of divorce. 
Accordingly they reckon four kinds of permission: one by absence of 
precept, so that when a greater good is not prescribed, a lesser good is 
said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not prescribing virginity, 
permitted marriage (1 Cor. 7). The second is by absence of prohibition: 
thus venial sins are said to be permitted because they are not forbidden. 
The third is by absence of prevention, and thus all sins are said to be 
permitted by God, in so far as He does not prevent them whereas He can. 
The fourth is by omission of punishment, and in this way the bill of 
divorce was permitted in the Law, not indeed for the sake of obtaining a 
greater good, as was the dispensation to have several wives, but for the 
sake of preventing a greater evil, namely wife-murder to which the Jews 
were prone on account of the corruption of their irascible appetite. Even 
so they were allowed to lend money for usury to strangers, on account of 
corruption in their concupiscible appetite, lest they should exact usury 
of their brethren; and again on account of the corruption of suspicion in 
the reason they were allowed the sacrifice of jealousy, lest mere 
suspicion should corrupt their judgment. But because the Old Law, though 
it did not confer grace, was given that it might indicate sin, as the 
saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that if it had been a 
sin for a man to put away his wife, this ought to have been indicated to 
him, at least by the law or the prophets: "Show My people their wicked 
doings" (Is. 58:1): else they would seem to have been neglected, if those 
things which are necessary for salvation and which they knew not were 
never made known to them: and this cannot be admitted, because the 
righteousness of the Law observed at the time of the Law would merit 
eternal life. For this reason they say that although to put away one's 
wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless became lawful by God's 
permitting it, and they confirm this by the authority of Chrysostom, who 
says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John 
Chrysostom] that "the Lawgiver by permitting divorce removed the guilt 
from the sin." Although this opinion has some probability the former is 
more generally held: wherefore we must reply to the arguments on both 
sides [*Cf. FS, Q[105], A[4], ad 8; FS, Q[108], A[3], ad 2; Contra Gentes 
iii, cap. 123].

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: He who can forbid, sins not by omitting to forbid if he has 
no hope of correcting, but fears by forbidding to furnish the occasion of 
a greater evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting on Divine 
authority he did not forbid the bill of divorce.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The prophets, inspired by the Holy Ghost, said that a wife 
ought to be put away, not as though this were a command of the Holy 
Ghost, but as being permitted lest greater evils should be perpetrated.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This likeness of permission must not be applied  to every 
detail, but only to the cause which was the same in both cases, since 
both permissions were granted in order to avoid some form of wickedness.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Although their hardness of heart excused them not from sin, 
the permission given on account of that hardness excused them. For 
certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are not 
forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not by availing themselves of 
the permission granted to them.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: A good may be omitted in two ways. First, in order to 
obtain a greater good, and then the omission of that good becomes 
virtuous by being directed to a greater good; thus Jacob rightly omitted 
to have only one wife, on account of the good of the offspring. In 
another way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil, and then 
if this is done with the authority of one who can grant a dispensation, 
the omission of that good is not sinful, and yet it does not also become 
virtuous. In this way the indissolubility of marriage was suspended in 
the law of Moses in order to avoid a greater evil, namely wife-murder. 
Hence Chrysostom says that "he removed the guilt from the sin." For 
though divorce remained inordinate, for which reason it is called a sin, 
it did not incur the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal, in 
so far as it was done by Divine permission: and thus its guilt was taken 
away from it. And therefore he says again [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus 
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "divorce was 
permitted, an evil indeed, yet lawful." Those who hold the first opinion 
understand by this only that divorce incurred the debt of temporal 
punishment.


Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband?

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was lawful for a divorced wife to have 
another husband. For in divorce the husband did a greater wrong by 
divorcing his wife than the wife by being divorced. But the husband 
could, without sin, marry another wife. Therefore the wife could without 
sin, marry another husband.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine, speaking about bigamy, says (De Bono Conjug. 
xv, xviii) that "when it was the manner it was no sin." Now at the time 
of the Old Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to marry 
another husband: "When she is departed and marrieth another husband," 
etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by marrying another husband.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, our Lord showed that the justice of the New Testament is 
superabundant in comparison with the justice of the Old Testament (Mt. 
5). Now He said that it belongs to the superabundant justice of the New 
Testament that the divorced wife marry not another husband (Mt. 5:32). 
Therefore it was lawful in the Old Law.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: On the contrary, are the words of Mt. 5:32, "He that  shall marry 
her that is put away committeth adultery." Now adultery was never 
permitted in the Old Law. Therefore it was not lawful for the divorced 
wife to have another husband.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, it is written (Dt. 24:3) that a divorced woman who 
marries another husband "is defiled, and is become abominable before the 
Lord." Therefore she sinned by marrying another husband.

Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, According to the first above mentioned opinion (A[3]), 
she sinned by marry