Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are 
eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?

 (2) Whether there should be one or two?

 (3) Whether two suffice?

 (4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with 
thy whole heart"?

 (5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?

 (6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?

 (7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";

 (8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any precept should be given about charity?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about charity. For 
charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it is the form of 
the virtues as stated above (Q[23], A[8]), while the precepts are about 
the virtues themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the mode is 
not included in the precept. Therefore no precepts should be given about 
charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the 
Holy Ghost" (Rm. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the Lord 
is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from 
a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. Therefore 
no precept should be given about charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to which 
the precepts are directed, as shown above (FS, Q[90], A[2]; FS, Q[100], 
A[9]). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they should 
have a place among the chief precepts which are those of the decalogue. 
But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts should be given about 
charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept. 
Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Dt. 10:12. 
Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity, 
which is the love of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; FS, Q[99], A[1]), a precept 
implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of 
precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two 
ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every 
affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the 
character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to the 
end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it is 
due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake 
of something else that he should  give a medicine in order to heal. Now 
the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and this 
union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the 
spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the 
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a 
pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the 
virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to 
the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions---such are the 
virtues that regulate the passions---or at least to the possession of a 
good conscience---such are the virtues that regulate operations---or to 
the having of a right faith---such are those which pertain to the worship 
of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God. 
For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the 
passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man 
a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an 
untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue representation of God, 
and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is 
for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of 
another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in 
Mt. 22:39.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FS, Q[100], A[10]) when we were treating 
of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under those precepts 
which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance, this precept, 
"Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe that this should be 
done out of charity. The act of love does, however, fall under special 
precepts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, 
except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as may 
be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the 
precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will, wherefore it 
is not opposed to charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love 
of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of charity had not 
to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are 
included in all of them.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts 
of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to virtue, as stated 
above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (Q[33], 
A[5]). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27), charity 
loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently directed to 
love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore 
there was no need to add the precept about loving our neighbor. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it 
is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we put not 
aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): "If any man 
come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My 
disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not distinct from 
the precept of the love of our neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 13:8): "He that loveth his 
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all 
its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in the 
love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our 
neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have 
from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[91], A[3]; FS, Q[94], A[2]) when 
we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what 
propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the 
conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence 
whoever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent has no 
need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however, 
some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually 
contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific 
conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical 
matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has the 
character of principle, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1], 
ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which the love of our neighbor 
is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the 
love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who 
are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these 
precepts is included in the other.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of 
which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given 
about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that 
which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit 
precept about both, for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to the 
end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice from the 
same source and from no other

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is 
included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each precept 
to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.

 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether two precepts of charity suffice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For 
precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished by 
their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of 
charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown 
above (Q[25], A[12]; Q[26]), it seems that there ought to be four 
precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace 
and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of the 
virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in 
avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, and by 
the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been 
not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so two 
precepts of charity are not sufficient.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 22:40): "On these two commandments 
dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Charity, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]), is a kind of 
friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore 
Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible between less 
than two": and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of 
charity (Q[25], A[4]). Now since good is the object of dilection and 
love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that 
there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to 
love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor 
for God's sake, as for the sake of our end

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though four 
things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept as 
regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and of one's own 
body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth, the love of 
himself and of his own body always remains in him." And yet the mode of 
this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love 
himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his 
loving God and his neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[28], A[4]; Q[29], A[3]), the other acts 
of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence 
the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts. 
And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were 
given about each act---about joy (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord 
always"---about peace (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men"---about 
beneficence (Gal.  6:10): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all 
men"---and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of 
beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the 
positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless 
we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, 
against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): "Thou shalt not hate thy 
brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): "Be not grieved with 
her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made desirous of 
vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another"; against discord 
(1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no 
schisms among you"; and against scandal (Rm. 14:13): "That you put not a 
stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole 
heart?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man should 
love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is not a 
matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; FS, Q[100], A[9]). Now the 
words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the love of God. 
Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his 
whole heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing" 
(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be loved 
with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love 
of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mortally. Now 
a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore a venial sin 
is a mortal sin, which is absurd.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to 
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), "to 
be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection is not a 
matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought not to be 
commanded to love God with our whole heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
God with thy whole heart."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is 
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is 
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own 
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances, 
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last 
end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind of 
totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the love 
of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does not 
prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and higher 
virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper 
virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole heart."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold 
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always 
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in 
the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that 
it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the 
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter 
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it 
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are 
directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding 
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal 
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and hinder 
the actual movement of the heart towards God.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole 
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy 
whole strength"?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou shalt 
love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with thy whole 
soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does not mean 
here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily action: and 
therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense. Now the heart 
understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part of the soul. 
Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and soul.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal depends 
on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with all thy 
strength."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in Mt. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which words 
do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly 
worded in Dt. 6.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places: 
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are 
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with 
thy whole strength." In Mt. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. "with 
thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole 
strength" is omitted, but "with thy  whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12 
we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," 
and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is the same 
as "strength." Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in 
place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might." [*St. Thomas 
is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Dt.), 
"ex tota virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus tuis" (Lk.), although the 
Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes ischyos}, which the Douay 
renders "with thy whole strength."]

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of 
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must 
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted 
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all 
the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards the 
intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the 
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three 
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect 
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified 
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by "strength," 
"force" or "might." Accordingly we are commanded to direct our whole 
intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with thy whole 
heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the 
words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according to God, 
in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our external 
actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength," "force" or 
"might."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished work 
(Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom's 
works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the contrary 
sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart" to the 
thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the intellect. Again 
some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the intellect, "with thy 
whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy mind" as pointing to the 
memory. And again, according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), 
"heart" signifies the vegetative soul, "soul" the sensitive, and "mind" 
the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, and 
understanding ought all to be referred by us to God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of 
God?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil this 
precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius, Exposit. 
Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded anything 
impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from Dt. 6:5. 
Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, since 
according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a 
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly 
commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by 
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal sin, 
and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who also) 
will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10): "Let 
them minister, having no crime."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way of 
salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is 
lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone to 
what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this 
precept in this life.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the 
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt 
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence 
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with 
all his heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and 
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by 
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly 
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached, 
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the 
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be 
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the 
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those 
who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary 
to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that man should 
be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God 
will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will 
be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though 
imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil it 
more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he approaches by 
some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled 
after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without 
conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too he 
that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing against 
the love of God, does not sin mortally.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why should 
not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man attains it in 
this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. 
And how would one know this if no precept  pointed it out."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is 
unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men, even 
to our enemies, as may be seen in Mt. 5:44. But the word "neighbor" 
denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist towards all 
men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly expressed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the origin 
of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to ourselves," 
whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one's love 
for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that which results 
from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally. 
Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his 
neighbor as himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 22:39): "The second" commandment "is 
like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates 
both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving is 
indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to love 
others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the 
natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it 
matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 Jn. 4:21, 
or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express the 
same affinity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not 
mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like 
manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, 
namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he loves 
himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a "holy" 
love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should 
not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things, even as he 
ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his 
neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for 
loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own 
profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even 
as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a 
"true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or 
pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but loves himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 

™Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included in the 
precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if man 
loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more, he 
wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. Therefore 
the order of charity is not included in the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently 
delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given 
above (Q[26]) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not 
included in the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love of 
our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words, "Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of charity is 
not included in the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us 
first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My Law in 
their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their 
heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant 
2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity 
comes under the precept of the Law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is essential 
to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that 
virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since 
it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown 
above (Q[25], A[12]; Q[26], AA[1],2). It is therefore evident that the 
order of charity must come under the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if 
he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to gratify 
more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice 
to the one he ought to love more.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of 
charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love God 
with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him 
above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor "as 
ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. In like 
manner where we are commanded (1 Jn. 3:16) "to lay down our souls," i.e. 
the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given to understand 
that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again 
when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good . . . especially to those 
who are of the household of the faith," and when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 
5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and especially of those of his 
house," it means that we ought to love most those of our neighbors who 
are more virtuous or more closely united to us. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; 
and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the first 
head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

 (2) What is its subject?

 (3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?

 (4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?

 (5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?

 (6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among the 
gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, 
as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is directed to the good 
alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "no man makes 
bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are the gifts of the Holy 
Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is directed to evil also, 
for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain wisdom is "earthly, 
sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the 
gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is the 
knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things which 
man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom which is 
an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of Divine things 
belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Q[4], 
A[5]; FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue rather 
than a gift.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the Lord, 
that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is understanding." And in 
this passage according to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augustine 
follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: "Behold piety, that is 
wisdom." Now both fear and piety are gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore 
wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as 
though it were distinct from the others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall 
rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 1/2 

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs 
to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are 
able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according 
thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be 
understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus. 
Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus, and 
by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that belong 
to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine 
or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise architect, I have 
laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is 
simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he 
is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1 
Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in 
the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the 
deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the 
Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the 
sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind of 
likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a 
perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). And 
just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a 
highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by 
knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things 
something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a 
last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing, 
according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they 
have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs 
fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if 
he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called 
"earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom," if 
in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it imitates 
the devil's pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over 
all the children of pride."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, 
differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the 
latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending 
from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since 
faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the 
gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of 
wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he knows" 
(Ethic. i, 3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a 
manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by 
worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is 
stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if a 
man fear and worship God, this shows that he  has a right judgment about 
Divine things.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject. 
For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of God." Now 
charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as 
stated above (Q[24], A[1]). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as 
its subject.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of doctrine is 
according to her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be described as 
"sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia]," and this would seem to regard 
the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or 
sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than in the 
intellect.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the 
gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two things where 
one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary 
to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), wisdom denotes a certain 
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of 
judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, 
secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about 
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after 
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the 
science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of such 
matters by a kind of connaturality.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to 
pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its 
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge 
aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius 
says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he 
not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of 
charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is 
joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a gift, 
has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence 
in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (FS, 
Q[14], A[1]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence 
also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain 
sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the  Second Objection is evident, 
that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted. For, apparently 
this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only 
fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and 
perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in the text 
quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised 
by all.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and 
judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of 
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of 
knowledge, according to human ideas.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely 
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom 
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, 
is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift, 
speculative and not practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of operation 
which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which are eternal 
and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we 
seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a mighty 
bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, in 
which there is no toiling under a load, since according to Wis. 8:16, 
"her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." 
Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not practical or active.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom towards 
them that are without." Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom is 
not merely speculative, but also practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of 
the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the domain 
of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same authority (De 
Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of the 
heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. FP, Q[79], A[9]; FS, Q[74], A[7]]; 
it considers them, in so far as it contemplates Divine things in 
themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by 
Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine rules.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also 
practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of things to 
which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii. Wherefore from 
the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more  excellent than wisdom as an 
intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately by a kind of 
union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct us not only in 
contemplation but also in action.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in 
themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are the 
subject-matter of human actions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared with 
something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation 
which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of 
human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the direction of 
wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human acts; on the 
contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet, and labor a 
rest.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with mortal 
sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible with 
mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is this, the testimony 
of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in one's wisdom, according 
to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom." Therefore 
wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated 
above (A[1]). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine 
truth, according to Rm. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the truth of God 
in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of 
charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that 
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal 
perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it does not 
divide the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition. 
Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into a 
malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated 
above (A[1]), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of other 
things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain connaturalness 
or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity, as stated 
above (A[2]; Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of which we are speaking 
presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with mortal sin, as 
shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which 
we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: These words are to be understood as referring to worldly 
wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human reasons. In 
such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov. 30:2: "The wisdom 
of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine wisdom according to 1 
Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we speak 
but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason, and is 
compatible with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it presupposes 
it, and for that very reason divides the children of perdition from the 
children of the kingdom.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace. For it is 
more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for the perfect 
to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom among the 
perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it seems that 
much less all who have grace have wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the Philosopher 
states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) that the wise man 
"judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above . . 
. is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']". Now it is not for 
all that have grace, to judge, or put others in order, but only for those 
in authority. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says 
(Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for 
instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of 
mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have 
grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God; since 
he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that love Him 
(Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth none but him 
that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all those who have 
charity and are without mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above 
(A[4]), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation and 
consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain various 
degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the measure of 
right judgment attained by some, whether in the contemplation of Divine 
things or in directing human affairs according to Divine rules, is no 
more than suffices for their salvation. This measure is wanting to none 
who is without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace, since if 
nature does not fail in necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore 
it is  written (1 Jn. 2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as to 
the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted 
mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to 
the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able 
to direct not only themselves but also others according to those rules). 
This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have sanctifying grace, 
but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which the Holy Ghost 
dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one indeed by the 
Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending to the 
hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2 Cor. 
1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in authority to 
direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to direct and 
judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad Demophil.).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the habit of 
wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not the act, on 
account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of reason in them.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to the 
gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the 
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both 
these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps. 
118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the Apostle 
says (Rm. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the 
Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit of adoption of 
sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rm. 8:15). Therefore the seventh 
beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather than 
by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems to be 
charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she conveyeth herself 
into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets": whereas 
peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects, since they 
result from charity, as stated above (Q[29], A[3]). Therefore the 
beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined in respect of the 
love of charity rather than in respect of peace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is from 
above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy  to be 
persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, judging 
without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without 
dissimulation']." Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should 
not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that 
"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of 
rebellion, but only obedience to reason."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift 
of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is 
denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a peacemaker is 
one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both cases 
this is the result of setting in due order those things in which peace is 
established, for "peace is the tranquillity of order," according to 
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to wisdom to set things 
in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2), wherefore 
peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is expressed in 
the words, "they shall be called the children of God." Now men are called 
the children of God in so far as they participate in the likeness of the 
only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to Rm. 8:29, "Whom He 
foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son," Who is 
Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man 
attains to the sonship of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to 
wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy Ghost 
is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we receive from Him the 
likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the 
first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and consequently 
reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom. 
Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the cause but the 
effect of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (A[3]) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift, not 
only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now 
the first thing, to be effected in this direction of human acts is the 
removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is said to be "the 
beginning of wisdom," because it makes us shun evil, while the last thing 
is like an end, whereby all things are reduced to their right order; and 
it is this that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that "the 
wisdom that is from above" (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost) 
"first indeed is chaste," because it avoids the corruption of sin, and 
"then peaceable," wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which 
reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that 
follow, they declare in becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to 
peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the 
first thing he has to do is, as far as he  can, to be moderate in all 
things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in 
those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be 
guided by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further that 
wisdom is "easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required that 
man may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace 
with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be 
opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the good." 
Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies, sympathy 
in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted by the words 
"full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should strive in all charity 
to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by the words 
"judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above . 
. . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']," lest he should 
purpose to sate his hatred under cover of correction.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] Out. Para. 1/1

OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this 
head there are three points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?

 (2) Whether folly is a sin?

 (3) To which capital sin is it reducible?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For seemingly 
unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the 
same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Divine things alone, 
whereas folly is about both Divine and human things. Therefore folly is 
not contrary to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. But 
folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor. 3:18): 
"If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a 
fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But wisdom 
is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): "Every man is 
become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. 
Moreover, it is written (Is. 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this 
hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be deceived. Therefore 
folly is not contrary to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a fool 
is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when 
he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to 
Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift  of wisdom 
is given as a remedy against folly."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from "stupor"; 
wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): "A fool is one 
who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved." And folly differs from 
fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that folly implies 
apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity denotes 
entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is fittingly 
opposed to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 For "sapiens" [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from sapor 
[savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish between savors 
of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes." Wherefore it 
is manifest that "folly" is opposed to "wisdom" as its contrary, while 
"fatuity" is opposed to it as a pure negation: since the fatuous man 
lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has the sense, though dulled, 
whereas the wise man has the sense acute and penetrating.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary to 
wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so that 
unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a 
fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that judgment, 
which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails in judgment 
about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called a fool.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (Q[45], 
A[1], ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the highest 
cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly 
opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things: and it 
is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes us 
foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 
3:19).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due to 
the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for heavenly 
things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as 
Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the result of a 
man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who 
do not discern what is injurious to them, and this belongs to folly 
simply.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether folly is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises in us 
from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De 
Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary.  Therefore it is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly is 
not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 1:32): "The prosperity of fools 
shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin. Therefore 
folly is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Folly, as stated above (A[1]), denotes dullness of sense 
in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is the last 
end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect contract 
dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indisposition, as 
in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin. Secondly, by 
plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense is rendered 
incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to 1 Cor. 2:14, "The 
sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God," 
even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose taste is infected with 
an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those 
things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from 
spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing 
happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires pleasure, 
without which there is no sin, although he does not desire sin simply, 
for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the contemplation of 
truth, of which we have spoken above (Q[16]) when we were treating of 
knowledge and understanding.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether folly is a daughter of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For Gregory 
(Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among which however 
he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): "The wisdom of this 
world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) 
"the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with crafty 
devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter of 
duplicity rather than of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in 
some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from 
anger rather than from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 7:22): "Immediately he  followeth 
her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to 
bonds."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As already stated (A[2]), folly, in so far as it is a 
sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable 
of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged into earthly 
things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of pleasures; and 
these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is 
a sin, arises chiefly from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste for 
God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust, 
pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life to 
come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not 
causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly 
with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly 
wisdom, is a cause of this folly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above (FS, Q[48]
, AA[2],3,4), produces a great change in the nature of the body, 
wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results from a bodily 
impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual 
impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises 
chiefly from lust, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] Out. Para. 1/2

TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ[47]-170)


ON PRUDENCE (QQ[47]-56)


OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)

 After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence 
consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider 
prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; 
fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?

 (2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in 
the speculative reason?

 (3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?

 (4) Whether it is virtue?

 (5) Whether it is a special virtue?

 (6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?

 (7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?

 (8) Whether its proper act is command?

 (9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?

 (10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?

 (11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the  same in 
species as that which regards the common good?

 (12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

 (13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?

 (14) Whether prudence is in all good men?

 (15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?

 (16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the 
appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): "Prudence is 
love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder." 
Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. 
Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to 
prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the appetitive 
faculty, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore prudence is not in 
the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it is 
better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of 
prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of 
which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is 
in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the 
rational faculty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the 
knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who sees 
as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of 
uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the 
cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs 
directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by 
the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to 
the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the 
present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the 
reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows 
therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FP, Q[82], A[4]) the will moves all the 
faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is 
love, as stated above (FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Accordingly prudence is said 
to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the 
act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence is 
love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in 
tending to God." Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason 
to discern.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so  far as 
they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the 
present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence 
considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now 
of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the 
reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more 
properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) 
that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes 
counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been already counselled" 
(Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence 
indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of 
counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but 
in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. 
Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, 
since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a 
defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher 
goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is "something more than a 
merely rational habit," such as art is, since, as stated above (FS, Q[57]
, A[4]) it includes application to action, which application is an act of 
the will.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the 
speculative reason?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, 
but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov. 10:23): 
"Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in 
contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is concerned 
with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller 
knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore 
prudence resides also in the speculative reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same 
part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but 
also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence 
also is both practical and speculative.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is 
right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the 
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent 
man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about 
things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that 
deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it 
is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[45], AA[1],3), wisdom considers  the 
absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause 
in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus 
of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and 
it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. 
vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a 
particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, 
but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with 
regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. 
Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but 
not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest 
cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. 
And so it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but 
not wisdom absolutely.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word 
prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or 
practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the 
speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice 
and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the 
direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in 
relation to its object which is the "necessary true," it comes under 
neither counsel nor prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Every application of right reason in the work of production 
belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right 
reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed 
way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the 
speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the 
like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently 
in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, 
but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, 
but not a speculative prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of 
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA[1],2). But 
"reason deals with universals," according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore 
prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot 
comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is 
right reason, is not about singulars.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not 
in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of 
prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that  "prudence 
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of 
singulars also."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not 
only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, 
which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently 
apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, 
and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular 
matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the 
universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are 
concerned.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and 
yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the 
conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, 
because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as 
stated in De Anima iii.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be 
comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" (Wis. 
9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a 
certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of 
these suffices for human prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not 
reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in 
the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to 
judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that 
prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is 
chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this 
sense.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says 
(De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to desire and 
what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the 
Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue 
of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a 
virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 
14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of graving, and to 
devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the 
work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, 
else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds to thy 
prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, 
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], A[3]; FS, Q[56], A[1]) when 
we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its 
possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood 
in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, 
secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of 
good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify 
the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the 
appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man 
to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but 
without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those 
virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the 
nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but 
also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the 
aspect of good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply 
right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. 
Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other 
intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, 
among which virtues it is enumerated.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any 
kind of right reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because 
art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in order that a 
man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will 
rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter 
of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed 
means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may 
be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on 
account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is 
need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, 
as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence 
itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other 
things according to prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is a special virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no 
special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since 
virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows a mean 
appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man 
decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as 
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the effect of 
moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of prudence, 
right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue certain things 
have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every 
virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence has 
not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action" (Ethic. 
vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a 
special virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other 
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and 
prudence, justice and fortitude."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their 
objects, as shown above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[2]; FS, Q[54], A[2]
), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other 
objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it 
must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely 
according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its 
formal aspect, as explained above (FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Because one 
and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, 
and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects. 
Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of 
powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in 
the same power, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[1]). Consequently any 
difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of 
powers, will "a fortiori" require a difference of habits.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated 
above (A[2]), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by 
a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and 
"understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and "prudence" 
are about contingent things, art being concerned with "things made," that 
is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and 
so forth; and prudence, being concerned with "things done," that is, with 
things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above (FS, 
Q[57], A[4]). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral 
virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the 
intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, 
wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special 
virtue, distinct from all other virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral 
virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual 
virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral 
virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is something that 
partakes of reason, so moral virtue has  the aspect of virtue, in so far 
as it partakes of intellectual virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues, 
and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that it is 
not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from 
containing a species which is operative in every other species of that 
same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as 
they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are 
the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the 
appetitive power, that is, considered as good.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. 
Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, 
it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to 
the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power. 
Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he 
has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man 
are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational 
creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to 
Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason 
as to their end. But prudence is "right reason applied to action," as 
stated above (A[2]). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as 
their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is 
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are 
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral 
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue 
ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures 
the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to prudence to 
appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of 
the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares 
(Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity 
pre-exist in the reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain  things 
naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of 
which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is 
"science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as 
naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, 
since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative 
matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; FS, Q[13], A[3]); while 
certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and 
such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these 
is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular 
conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to 
prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the 
means.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis" appoints 
the end to moral virtues, as stated above (FP, Q[79], A[12]): but 
prudence does not do this for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they 
appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by 
natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the 
way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is 
more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet "synderesis" 
moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the 
mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of 
moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as 
shown above (A[6]). Therefore it does not find the mean in them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no 
cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have 
being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral 
virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above 
(A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral 
virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral 
virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully 
states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature 
in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to 
moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5], 
OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . . 
even as a wise man decides."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists  precisely 
in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should 
not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that 
he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or 
daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural 
reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act 
according to reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by 
what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though 
the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is 
found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the 
end.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet 
does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so 
too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does 
not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain 
the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters 
after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which 
ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so 
the ruling of prudence is required.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether command is the chief act of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For 
command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) 
states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore 
command is not the chief act of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent 
man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" seem to 
be different acts, as appears from what has been said above (FS, Q[57], 
A[6]). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, 
since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of 
the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore 
command is not an act of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence 
commands."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated 
above (A[2]). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to 
action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such 
acts. The first is "to take counsel," which  belongs to discovery, for 
counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (FS, Q[14], A[1]). The 
second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act 
of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to 
action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act 
consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And 
since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it 
follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and 
consequently of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in 
judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against 
his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so 
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and 
the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse 
in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin 
voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, 
viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and 
to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the avoidance 
of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence 
that does not continue in heaven.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things 
discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to 
prudence which takes good counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes 
motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the 
reason, as stated above (FS, Q[17], A[1]).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For 
solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a 
solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion belongs chiefly to the 
appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not in 
the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above (A[1]). 
Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, 
wherefore it is related (1 Kgs. 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As for 
the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they 
are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is 
an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition to prudence 
rather than belonging to it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous man 
is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary  to solicitude. Since 
then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not opposed to 
good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem that solicitude 
does not belong to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and watch 
in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore 
solicitude belongs to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be 
solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as 
a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever 
has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a 
command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of 
action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be 
quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel." 
Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this 
reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence keeps most 
careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil 
counsel."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the 
principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and 
command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal 
certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter 
according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is the 
contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of 
prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely" not 
because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not 
over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he 
ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-much 
fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us 
take counsel, as stated above (FS, Q[44], A[2]) when we were treating of 
the passion of fear.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of 
many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher says 
(Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But 
prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not directed to the 
common good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for 
himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own. 
Therefore they are not prudent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and 
fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be  related only to a 
man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a 
faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed 
over his family?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have 
held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the 
good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not 
bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to 
charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5): wherefore the Apostle 
says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking that which is profitable to 
myself, but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it is contrary to 
right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of 
the individual.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and 
command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that 
prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also 
the common good of the multitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just 
as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is called 
"legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is 
called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in the same relation 
to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence 
his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is 
impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom. 
Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient 
Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a 
poor empire." Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and 
state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about 
the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their 
relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any 
part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common 
good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. 
v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the 
rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the 
sensitive part regards singulars.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that 
which extends to the common good?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same 
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the  
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence 
are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is the 
same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence is 
chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then 
prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and political 
prudence are the same habit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by 
things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good, 
which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common 
good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence and 
political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the common 
good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate 
to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy" 
which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all 
distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of 
prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[5]; Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the species of 
habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its 
formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, 
is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS, Prolog.; FS, Q[102], 
A[1]), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to 
different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and 
the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must 
needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different 
ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to 
one's own good; another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the 
common good of the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is 
directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is 
substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is the 
same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called 
"prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence, i.e. as being 
right reason applied to action, while it is called "political," as being 
directed to the common good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it belongs to 
a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well," wherefore the 
virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue 
of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the virtue 
of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the 
other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits 
directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically 
although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner, 
though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many, 
that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ 
specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed to the last 
end is above the other habits and commands them.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their 
rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence alone is 
the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects 
and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a true 
opinion."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not 
competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good counsel 
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A[8]). But 
command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of 
rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two 
kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs to 
rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is about 
"individual actions." Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these 
individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in 
subjects.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing 
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to 
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and 
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave 
as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled 
and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, 
nor of a subject as subject.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Body Para. 2/2

 Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in 
ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately 
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in 
the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the 
subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly, 
namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he 
is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he does 
take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also 
himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence can be in sinners?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord 
said (Lk. 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 
'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." Now the 
children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in 
sinners.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But 
there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of good 
counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners can take 
good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is 
impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no inner is a 
good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which 
takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent 
man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a 
good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil 
end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is 
good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good robber," 
and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of similarity, 
because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the 
prudence of which the Apostle says (Rm. 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 
'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places its ultimate 
end in the pleasures of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 2/3

 The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting 
ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold 
source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the 
common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a 
man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he 
is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because 
he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel 
aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a 
whole, but fails to make an effective command.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 3/3 

 The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, 
judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole 
life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in 
sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect 
prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is 
imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is 
imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first 
prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but 
that they are prudent in "their generation."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the 
appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other 
hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its 
principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms 
a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the 
appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as 
shown above (FS, Q[58], A[5]); secondly because prudence commands right 
actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore 
though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, 
yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises 
from a disorder of the appetite.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some 
particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end 
of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. 
Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in 
them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness," 
[*{deinotike}] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good 
and evil; or "cunning," [*{panourgia}] which is directed only to evil, 
and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of 
the flesh."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in all who have grace?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. 
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be 
done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all 
who have grace have prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated 
above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace who do not take 
good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore 
not all who have grace, have prudence

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people 
are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore 
prudence is not to be found in all who have grace. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can 
be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the 
other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what 
they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that 
whoever has one has all, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). Now whoever 
has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, 
and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (A[4]), he must, of 
necessity, have prudence also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard 
to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who 
have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things" (1 Jn. 2:27). There 
is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is 
able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in 
matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human 
life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, 
are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this 
point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern 
good from evil counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, 
wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic. ii, 1), 
hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the 
other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. Wherefore, 
in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of 
reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in 
idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also 
as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by 
practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other 
virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is for the 
perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the 
discerning of good and evil."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in us by nature?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher 
says that things connected with prudence "seem to be natural," namely 
"synesis, gnome" [*{synesis} and {gnome}, Cf. FS, Q[57], A[6]] and the 
like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now 
things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. 
Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence 
results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is wisdom, and 
in length of days prudence." Therefore  prudence is natural.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with 
that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural 
prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. 
viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual 
virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands 
experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated 
above (A[4]). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching 
and experience.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As shown above (A[3]), prudence includes knowledge both 
of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence 
applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge 
of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative 
science, because the primary universal principles of either are known 
naturally, as shown above (A[6]): except that the common principles of 
prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks 
(Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative reason is 
better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary 
universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical 
reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery 
through experience, or through teaching.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 2/3

 On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the 
matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter 
of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of 
human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in 
respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (FS, Q[51], A[1]; 
FS, Q[63], A[1]) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain 
virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they 
also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 3/3

 But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are 
of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. 
Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the 
knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason 
of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another 
in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of 
speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but 
about the means, as stated above (A[6]; FS, Q[57], A[5]), it follows that 
prudence is not from nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to 
prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said 
before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are the principles of the {ou 
heneka}" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)], namely, 
the end; and so he does not mention  {euboulia} among them, because it 
takes counsel about the means.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their 
natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but 
also because of their long experience.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an 
end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in 
like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, 
which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an 
infinity of singulars.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. 
For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than 
prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost 
by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same things, 
but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now the 
engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of many 
memories," as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1). 
Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that 
prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. 
But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore 
prudence can also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness 
is possible to art but not to prudence."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can 
forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they 
belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but 
also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (A[8]), its 
principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he 
has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not 
taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the 
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and 
sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Dan. 
13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart," 
and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the 
prudent [Douay: 'wise']."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the 
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, 
as stated above [*Cf. FS, Q[53], A[1]]. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The experience required by prudence results not from memory 
alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of 
universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A[3]). 
Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the 
principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)

 We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are 
four points of inquiry:

 (1) Which are the parts of prudence?

 (2) Of its integral parts;

 (3) Of its subjective parts;

 (4) Of its potential parts.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned 
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of 
prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." Macrobius 
(In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence 
six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding," "circumspection," 
"foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 
9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong to prudence. 
Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," 
"sense" and "understanding." And another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; 
Cf. Q[80], OBJ[4]] says that ten things are connected with prudence, 
namely, "good counsel," "shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative 
[*Regnativa]," "military," "political" and "domestic prudence," 
"dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore it seems that one or 
the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient