Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are 
eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?

 (2) Whether there should be one or two?

 (3) Whether two suffice?

 (4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with 
thy whole heart"?

 (5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?

 (6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?

 (7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";

 (8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any precept should be given about charity?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about charity. For 
charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it is the form of 
the virtues as stated above (Q[23], A[8]), while the precepts are about 
the virtues themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the mode is 
not included in the precept. Therefore no precepts should be given about 
charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the 
Holy Ghost" (Rm. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the Lord 
is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from 
a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. Therefore 
no precept should be given about charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to which 
the precepts are directed, as shown above (FS, Q[90], A[2]; FS, Q[100], 
A[9]). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they should 
have a place among the chief precepts which are those of the decalogue. 
But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts should be given about 
charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept. 
Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Dt. 10:12. 
Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity, 
which is the love of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; FS, Q[99], A[1]), a precept 
implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of 
precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two 
ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every 
affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the 
character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to the 
end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it is 
due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake 
of something else that he should  give a medicine in order to heal. Now 
the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and this 
union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the 
spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the 
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a 
pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the 
virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to 
the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions---such are the 
virtues that regulate the passions---or at least to the possession of a 
good conscience---such are the virtues that regulate operations---or to 
the having of a right faith---such are those which pertain to the worship 
of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God. 
For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the 
passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man 
a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an 
untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue representation of God, 
and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is 
for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of 
another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in 
Mt. 22:39.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FS, Q[100], A[10]) when we were treating 
of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under those precepts 
which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance, this precept, 
"Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe that this should be 
done out of charity. The act of love does, however, fall under special 
precepts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, 
except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as may 
be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the 
precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will, wherefore it 
is not opposed to charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love 
of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of charity had not 
to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are 
included in all of them.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts 
of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to virtue, as stated 
above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (Q[33], 
A[5]). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27), charity 
loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently directed to 
love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore 
there was no need to add the precept about loving our neighbor. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it 
is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we put not 
aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): "If any man 
come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My 
disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not distinct from 
the precept of the love of our neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 13:8): "He that loveth his 
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all 
its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in the 
love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our 
neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have 
from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[91], A[3]; FS, Q[94], A[2]) when 
we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what 
propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the 
conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence 
whoever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent has no 
need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however, 
some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually 
contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific 
conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical 
matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has the 
character of principle, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1], 
ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which the love of our neighbor 
is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the 
love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who 
are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these 
precepts is included in the other.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of 
which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given 
about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that 
which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit 
precept about both, for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to the 
end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice from the 
same source and from no other

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is 
included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each precept 
to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.

 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether two precepts of charity suffice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For 
precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished by 
their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of 
charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown 
above (Q[25], A[12]; Q[26]), it seems that there ought to be four 
precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace 
and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of the 
virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in 
avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, and by 
the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been 
not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so two 
precepts of charity are not sufficient.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 22:40): "On these two commandments 
dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Charity, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]), is a kind of 
friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore 
Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible between less 
than two": and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of 
charity (Q[25], A[4]). Now since good is the object of dilection and 
love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that 
there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to 
love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor 
for God's sake, as for the sake of our end

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though four 
things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept as 
regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and of one's own 
body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth, the love of 
himself and of his own body always remains in him." And yet the mode of 
this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love 
himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his 
loving God and his neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[28], A[4]; Q[29], A[3]), the other acts 
of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence 
the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts. 
And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were 
given about each act---about joy (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord 
always"---about peace (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men"---about 
beneficence (Gal.  6:10): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all 
men"---and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of 
beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the 
positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless 
we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, 
against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): "Thou shalt not hate thy 
brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): "Be not grieved with 
her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made desirous of 
vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another"; against discord 
(1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no 
schisms among you"; and against scandal (Rm. 14:13): "That you put not a 
stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole 
heart?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man should 
love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is not a 
matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; FS, Q[100], A[9]). Now the 
words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the love of God. 
Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his 
whole heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing" 
(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be loved 
with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love 
of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mortally. Now 
a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore a venial sin 
is a mortal sin, which is absurd.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to 
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), "to 
be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection is not a 
matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought not to be 
commanded to love God with our whole heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
God with thy whole heart."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is 
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is 
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own 
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances, 
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last 
end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind of 
totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the love 
of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does not 
prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and higher 
virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper 
virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole heart."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold 
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always 
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in 
the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that 
it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the 
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter 
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it 
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are 
directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding 
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal 
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and hinder 
the actual movement of the heart towards God.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole 
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy 
whole strength"?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou shalt 
love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with thy whole 
soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does not mean 
here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily action: and 
therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense. Now the heart 
understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part of the soul. 
Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and soul.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal depends 
on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with all thy 
strength."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in Mt. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which words 
do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly 
worded in Dt. 6.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places: 
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are 
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with 
thy whole strength." In Mt. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. "with 
thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole 
strength" is omitted, but "with thy  whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12 
we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," 
and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is the same 
as "strength." Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in 
place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might." [*St. Thomas 
is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Dt.), 
"ex tota virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus tuis" (Lk.), although the 
Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes ischyos}, which the Douay 
renders "with thy whole strength."]

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of 
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must 
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted 
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all 
the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards the 
intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the 
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three 
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect 
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified 
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by "strength," 
"force" or "might." Accordingly we are commanded to direct our whole 
intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with thy whole 
heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the 
words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according to God, 
in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our external 
actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength," "force" or 
"might."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished work 
(Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom's 
works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the contrary 
sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart" to the 
thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the intellect. Again 
some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the intellect, "with thy 
whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy mind" as pointing to the 
memory. And again, according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), 
"heart" signifies the vegetative soul, "soul" the sensitive, and "mind" 
the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, and 
understanding ought all to be referred by us to God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of 
God?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil this 
precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius, Exposit. 
Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded anything 
impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from Dt. 6:5. 
Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, since 
according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a 
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly 
commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by 
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal sin, 
and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who also) 
will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10): "Let 
them minister, having no crime."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way of 
salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is 
lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone to 
what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this 
precept in this life.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the 
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt 
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence 
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with 
all his heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and 
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by 
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly 
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached, 
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the 
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be 
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the 
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those 
who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary 
to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that man should 
be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God 
will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will 
be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though 
imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil it 
more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he approaches by 
some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled 
after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without 
conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too he 
that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing against 
the love of God, does not sin mortally.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why should 
not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man attains it in 
this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. 
And how would one know this if no precept  pointed it out."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is 
unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men, even 
to our enemies, as may be seen in Mt. 5:44. But the word "neighbor" 
denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist towards all 
men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly expressed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the origin 
of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to ourselves," 
whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one's love 
for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that which results 
from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally. 
Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his 
neighbor as himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 22:39): "The second" commandment "is 
like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates 
both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving is 
indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to love 
others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the 
natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it 
matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 Jn. 4:21, 
or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express the 
same affinity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not 
mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like 
manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, 
namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he loves 
himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a "holy" 
love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should 
not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things, even as he 
ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his 
neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for 
loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own 
profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even 
as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a 
"true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or 
pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but loves himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 

™Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included in the 
precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if man 
loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more, he 
wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. Therefore 
the order of charity is not included in the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently 
delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given 
above (Q[26]) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not 
included in the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love of 
our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words, "Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of charity is 
not included in the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us 
first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My Law in 
their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their 
heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant 
2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity 
comes under the precept of the Law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is essential 
to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that 
virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since 
it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown 
above (Q[25], A[12]; Q[26], AA[1],2). It is therefore evident that the 
order of charity must come under the precept.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if 
he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to gratify 
more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice 
to the one he ought to love more.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of 
charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love God 
with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him 
above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor "as 
ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. In like 
manner where we are commanded (1 Jn. 3:16) "to lay down our souls," i.e. 
the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given to understand 
that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again 
when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good . . . especially to those 
who are of the household of the faith," and when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 
5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and especially of those of his 
house," it means that we ought to love most those of our neighbors who 
are more virtuous or more closely united to us. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; 
and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the first 
head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

 (2) What is its subject?

 (3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?

 (4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?

 (5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?

 (6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among the 
gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, 
as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is directed to the good 
alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "no man makes 
bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are the gifts of the Holy 
Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is directed to evil also, 
for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain wisdom is "earthly, 
sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the 
gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is the 
knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things which 
man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom which is 
an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of Divine things 
belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Q[4], 
A[5]; FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue rather 
than a gift.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the Lord, 
that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is understanding." And in 
this passage according to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augustine 
follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: "Behold piety, that is 
wisdom." Now both fear and piety are gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore 
wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as 
though it were distinct from the others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall 
rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 1/2 

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs 
to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are 
able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according 
thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be 
understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus. 
Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus, and 
by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that belong 
to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine 
or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise architect, I have 
laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is 
simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he 
is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1 
Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in 
the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the 
deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the 
Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the 
sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind of 
likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a 
perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). And 
just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a 
highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by 
knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things 
something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a 
last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing, 
according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they 
have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs 
fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if 
he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called 
"earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom," if 
in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it imitates 
the devil's pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over 
all the children of pride."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, 
differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the 
latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending 
from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since 
faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the 
gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of 
wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he knows" 
(Ethic. i, 3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a 
manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by 
worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is 
stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if a 
man fear and worship God, this shows that he  has a right judgment about 
Divine things.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject. 
For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of God." Now 
charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as 
stated above (Q[24], A[1]). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as 
its subject.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of doctrine is 
according to her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be described as 
"sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia]," and this would seem to regard 
the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or 
sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than in the 
intellect.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the 
gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two things where 
one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary 
to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), wisdom denotes a certain 
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of 
judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, 
secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about 
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after 
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the 
science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of such 
matters by a kind of connaturality.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to 
pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its 
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge 
aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius 
says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he 
not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of 
charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is 
joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a gift, 
has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence 
in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (FS, 
Q[14], A[1]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence 
also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain 
sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the  Second Objection is evident, 
that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted. For, apparently 
this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only 
fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and 
perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in the text 
quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised 
by all.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and 
judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of 
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of 
knowledge, according to human ideas.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely 
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom 
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, 
is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift, 
speculative and not practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of operation 
which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which are eternal 
and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we 
seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a mighty 
bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, in 
which there is no toiling under a load, since according to Wis. 8:16, 
"her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." 
Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not practical or active.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom towards 
them that are without." Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom is 
not merely speculative, but also practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of 
the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the domain 
of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same authority (De 
Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of the 
heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. FP, Q[79], A[9]; FS, Q[74], A[7]]; 
it considers them, in so far as it contemplates Divine things in 
themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by 
Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine rules.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also 
practical.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of things to 
which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii. Wherefore from 
the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more  excellent than wisdom as an 
intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately by a kind of 
union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct us not only in 
contemplation but also in action.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in 
themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are the 
subject-matter of human actions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared with 
something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation 
which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of 
human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the direction of 
wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human acts; on the 
contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet, and labor a 
rest.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with mortal 
sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible with 
mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is this, the testimony 
of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in one's wisdom, according 
to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom." Therefore 
wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated 
above (A[1]). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine 
truth, according to Rm. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the truth of God 
in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of 
charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that 
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal 
perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it does not 
divide the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition. 
Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into a 
malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated 
above (A[1]), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of other 
things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain connaturalness 
or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity, as stated 
above (A[2]; Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of which we are speaking 
presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with mortal sin, as 
shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which 
we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: These words are to be understood as referring to worldly 
wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human reasons. In 
such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov. 30:2: "The wisdom 
of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine wisdom according to 1 
Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we speak 
but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason, and is 
compatible with mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it presupposes 
it, and for that very reason divides the children of perdition from the 
children of the kingdom.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace. For it is 
more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for the perfect 
to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom among the 
perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it seems that 
much less all who have grace have wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the Philosopher 
states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) that the wise man 
"judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above . . 
. is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']". Now it is not for 
all that have grace, to judge, or put others in order, but only for those 
in authority. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says 
(Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for 
instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of 
mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have 
grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God; since 
he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that love Him 
(Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth none but him 
that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all those who have 
charity and are without mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above 
(A[4]), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation and 
consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain various 
degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the measure of 
right judgment attained by some, whether in the contemplation of Divine 
things or in directing human affairs according to Divine rules, is no 
more than suffices for their salvation. This measure is wanting to none 
who is without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace, since if 
nature does not fail in necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore 
it is  written (1 Jn. 2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as to 
the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted 
mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to 
the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able 
to direct not only themselves but also others according to those rules). 
This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have sanctifying grace, 
but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which the Holy Ghost 
dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one indeed by the 
Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending to the 
hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2 Cor. 
1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in authority to 
direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to direct and 
judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad Demophil.).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the habit of 
wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not the act, on 
account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of reason in them.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to the 
gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the 
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both 
these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps. 
118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the Apostle 
says (Rm. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the 
Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit of adoption of 
sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rm. 8:15). Therefore the seventh 
beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather than 
by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems to be 
charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she conveyeth herself 
into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets": whereas 
peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects, since they 
result from charity, as stated above (Q[29], A[3]). Therefore the 
beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined in respect of the 
love of charity rather than in respect of peace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is from 
above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy  to be 
persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, judging 
without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without 
dissimulation']." Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should 
not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that 
"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of 
rebellion, but only obedience to reason."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift 
of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is 
denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a peacemaker is 
one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both cases 
this is the result of setting in due order those things in which peace is 
established, for "peace is the tranquillity of order," according to 
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to wisdom to set things 
in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2), wherefore 
peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is expressed in 
the words, "they shall be called the children of God." Now men are called 
the children of God in so far as they participate in the likeness of the 
only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to Rm. 8:29, "Whom He 
foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son," Who is 
Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man 
attains to the sonship of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to 
wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy Ghost 
is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we receive from Him the 
likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the 
first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and consequently 
reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom. 
Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the cause but the 
effect of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (A[3]) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift, not 
only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now 
the first thing, to be effected in this direction of human acts is the 
removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is said to be "the 
beginning of wisdom," because it makes us shun evil, while the last thing 
is like an end, whereby all things are reduced to their right order; and 
it is this that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that "the 
wisdom that is from above" (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost) 
"first indeed is chaste," because it avoids the corruption of sin, and 
"then peaceable," wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which 
reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that 
follow, they declare in becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to 
peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the 
first thing he has to do is, as far as he  can, to be moderate in all 
things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in 
those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be 
guided by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further that 
wisdom is "easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required that 
man may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace 
with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be 
opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the good." 
Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies, sympathy 
in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted by the words 
"full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should strive in all charity 
to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by the words 
"judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above . 
. . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']," lest he should 
purpose to sate his hatred under cover of correction.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] Out. Para. 1/1

OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this 
head there are three points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?

 (2) Whether folly is a sin?

 (3) To which capital sin is it reducible?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For seemingly 
unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the 
same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Divine things alone, 
whereas folly is about both Divine and human things. Therefore folly is 
not contrary to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. But 
folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor. 3:18): 
"If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a 
fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But wisdom 
is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): "Every man is 
become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. 
Moreover, it is written (Is. 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this 
hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be deceived. Therefore 
folly is not contrary to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a fool 
is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when 
he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to 
Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift  of wisdom 
is given as a remedy against folly."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from "stupor"; 
wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): "A fool is one 
who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved." And folly differs from 
fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that folly implies 
apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity denotes 
entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is fittingly 
opposed to wisdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 For "sapiens" [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from sapor 
[savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish between savors 
of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes." Wherefore it 
is manifest that "folly" is opposed to "wisdom" as its contrary, while 
"fatuity" is opposed to it as a pure negation: since the fatuous man 
lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has the sense, though dulled, 
whereas the wise man has the sense acute and penetrating.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary to 
wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so that 
unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a 
fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that judgment, 
which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails in judgment 
about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called a fool.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (Q[45], 
A[1], ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the highest 
cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly 
opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things: and it 
is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes us 
foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 
3:19).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due to 
the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for heavenly 
things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as 
Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the result of a 
man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who 
do not discern what is injurious to them, and this belongs to folly 
simply.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether folly is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises in us 
from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De 
Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary.  Therefore it is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly is 
not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 1:32): "The prosperity of fools 
shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin. Therefore 
folly is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Folly, as stated above (A[1]), denotes dullness of sense 
in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is the last 
end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect contract 
dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indisposition, as 
in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin. Secondly, by 
plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense is rendered 
incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to 1 Cor. 2:14, "The 
sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God," 
even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose taste is infected with 
an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those 
things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from 
spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing 
happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires pleasure, 
without which there is no sin, although he does not desire sin simply, 
for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the contemplation of 
truth, of which we have spoken above (Q[16]) when we were treating of 
knowledge and understanding.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether folly is a daughter of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For Gregory 
(Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among which however 
he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): "The wisdom of this 
world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) 
"the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with crafty 
devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter of 
duplicity rather than of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in 
some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from 
anger rather than from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 7:22): "Immediately he  followeth 
her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to 
bonds."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As already stated (A[2]), folly, in so far as it is a 
sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable 
of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged into earthly 
things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of pleasures; and 
these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is 
a sin, arises chiefly from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste for 
God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust, 
pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life to 
come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not 
causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly 
with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly 
wisdom, is a cause of this folly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above (FS, Q[48]
, AA[2],3,4), produces a great change in the nature of the body, 
wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results from a bodily 
impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual 
impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises 
chiefly from lust, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] Out. Para. 1/2

TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ[47]-170)


ON PRUDENCE (QQ[47]-56)


OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)

 After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence 
consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider 
prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; 
fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?

 (2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in 
the speculative reason?

 (3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?

 (4) Whether it is virtue?

 (5) Whether it is a special virtue?

 (6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?

 (7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?

 (8) Whether its proper act is command?

 (9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?

 (10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?

 (11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the  same in 
species as that which regards the common good?

 (12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

 (13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?

 (14) Whether prudence is in all good men?

 (15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?

 (16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the 
appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): "Prudence is 
love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder." 
Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. 
Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to 
prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the appetitive 
faculty, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore prudence is not in 
the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it is 
better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of 
prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of 
which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is 
in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the 
rational faculty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the 
knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who sees 
as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of 
uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the 
cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs 
directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by 
the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to 
the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the 
present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the 
reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows 
therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FP, Q[82], A[4]) the will moves all the 
faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is 
love, as stated above (FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Accordingly prudence is said 
to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the 
act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence is 
love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in 
tending to God." Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason 
to discern.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so  far as 
they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the 
present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence 
considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now 
of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the 
reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more 
properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) 
that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes 
counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been already counselled" 
(Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence 
indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of 
counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but 
in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. 
Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, 
since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a 
defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher 
goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is "something more than a 
merely rational habit," such as art is, since, as stated above (FS, Q[57]
, A[4]) it includes application to action, which application is an act of 
the will.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the 
speculative reason?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, 
but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov. 10:23): 
"Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in 
contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is concerned 
with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller 
knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore 
prudence resides also in the speculative reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same 
part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but 
also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence 
also is both practical and speculative.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is 
right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the 
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent 
man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about 
things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that 
deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it 
is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[45], AA[1],3), wisdom considers  the 
absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause 
in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus 
of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and 
it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. 
vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a 
particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, 
but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with 
regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. 
Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but 
not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest 
cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. 
And so it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but 
not wisdom absolutely.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word 
prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or 
practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the 
speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice 
and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the 
direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in 
relation to its object which is the "necessary true," it comes under 
neither counsel nor prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Every application of right reason in the work of production 
belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right 
reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed 
way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the 
speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the 
like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently 
in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, 
but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, 
but not a speculative prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of 
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA[1],2). But 
"reason deals with universals," according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore 
prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot 
comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is 
right reason, is not about singulars.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not 
in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of 
prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that  "prudence 
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of 
singulars also."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not 
only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, 
which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently 
apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, 
and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular 
matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the 
universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are 
concerned.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and 
yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the 
conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, 
because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as 
stated in De Anima iii.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be 
comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" (Wis. 
9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a 
certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of 
these suffices for human prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not 
reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in 
the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to 
judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that 
prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is 
chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this 
sense.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says 
(De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to desire and 
what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the 
Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue 
of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a 
virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 
14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of graving, and to 
devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the 
work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, 
else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds to thy 
prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, 
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], A[3]; FS, Q[56], A[1]) when 
we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its 
possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood 
in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, 
secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of 
good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify 
the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the 
appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man 
to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but 
without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those 
virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the 
nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but 
also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the 
aspect of good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply 
right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. 
Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other 
intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, 
among which virtues it is enumerated.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any 
kind of right reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because 
art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in order that a 
man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will 
rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter 
of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed 
means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may 
be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on 
account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is 
need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, 
as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence 
itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other 
things according to prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is a special virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no 
special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since 
virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows a mean 
appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man 
decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as 
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the effect of 
moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of prudence, 
right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue certain things 
have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every 
virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence has 
not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action" (Ethic. 
vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a 
special virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other 
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and 
prudence, justice and fortitude."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their 
objects, as shown above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[2]; FS, Q[54], A[2]
), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other 
objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it 
must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely 
according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its 
formal aspect, as explained above (FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Because one 
and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, 
and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects. 
Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of 
powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in 
the same power, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[1]). Consequently any 
difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of 
powers, will "a fortiori" require a difference of habits.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated 
above (A[2]), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by 
a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and 
"understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and "prudence" 
are about contingent things, art being concerned with "things made," that 
is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and 
so forth; and prudence, being concerned with "things done," that is, with 
things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above (FS, 
Q[57], A[4]). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral 
virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the 
intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, 
wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special 
virtue, distinct from all other virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral 
virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual 
virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral 
virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is something that 
partakes of reason, so moral virtue has  the aspect of virtue, in so far 
as it partakes of intellectual virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues, 
and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that it is 
not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from 
containing a species which is operative in every other species of that 
same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as 
they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are 
the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the 
appetitive power, that is, considered as good.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. 
Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, 
it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to 
the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power. 
Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he 
has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man 
are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational 
creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to 
Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason 
as to their end. But prudence is "right reason applied to action," as 
stated above (A[2]). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as 
their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is 
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are 
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral 
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue 
ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures 
the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to prudence to 
appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of 
the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares 
(Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity 
pre-exist in the reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain  things 
naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of 
which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is 
"science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as 
naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, 
since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative 
matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; FS, Q[13], A[3]); while 
certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and 
such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these 
is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular 
conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to 
prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the 
means.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis" appoints 
the end to moral virtues, as stated above (FP, Q[79], A[12]): but 
prudence does not do this for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they 
appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by 
natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the 
way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is 
more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet "synderesis" 
moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the 
mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of 
moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as 
shown above (A[6]). Therefore it does not find the mean in them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no 
cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have 
being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral 
virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above 
(A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral 
virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral 
virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully 
states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature 
in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to 
moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5], 
OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . . 
even as a wise man decides."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists  precisely 
in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should 
not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that 
he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or 
daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural 
reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act 
according to reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by 
what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though 
the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is 
found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the 
end.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet 
does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so 
too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does 
not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain 
the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters 
after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which 
ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so 
the ruling of prudence is required.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether command is the chief act of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For 
command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) 
states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore 
command is not the chief act of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent 
man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" seem to 
be different acts, as appears from what has been said above (FS, Q[57], 
A[6]). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, 
since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of 
the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore 
command is not an act of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence 
commands."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated 
above (A[2]). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to 
action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such 
acts. The first is "to take counsel," which  belongs to discovery, for 
counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (FS, Q[14], A[1]). The 
second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act 
of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to 
action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act 
consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And 
since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it 
follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and 
consequently of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in 
judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against 
his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so 
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and 
the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse 
in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin 
voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, 
viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and 
to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the avoidance 
of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence 
that does not continue in heaven.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things 
discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to 
prudence which takes good counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes 
motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the 
reason, as stated above (FS, Q[17], A[1]).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For 
solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a 
solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion belongs chiefly to the 
appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not in 
the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above (A[1]). 
Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, 
wherefore it is related (1 Kgs. 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As for 
the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they 
are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is 
an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition to prudence 
rather than belonging to it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous man 
is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary  to solicitude. Since 
then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not opposed to 
good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem that solicitude 
does not belong to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and watch 
in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore 
solicitude belongs to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be 
solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as 
a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever 
has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a 
command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of 
action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be 
quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel." 
Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this 
reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence keeps most 
careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil 
counsel."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the 
principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and 
command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal 
certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter 
according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is the 
contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of 
prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely" not 
because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not 
over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he 
ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-much 
fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us 
take counsel, as stated above (FS, Q[44], A[2]) when we were treating of 
the passion of fear.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of 
many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher says 
(Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But 
prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not directed to the 
common good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for 
himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own. 
Therefore they are not prudent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and 
fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be  related only to a 
man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a 
faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed 
over his family?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have 
held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the 
good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not 
bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to 
charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5): wherefore the Apostle 
says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking that which is profitable to 
myself, but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it is contrary to 
right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of 
the individual.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and 
command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that 
prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also 
the common good of the multitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just 
as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is called 
"legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is 
called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in the same relation 
to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence 
his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is 
impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom. 
Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient 
Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a 
poor empire." Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and 
state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about 
the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their 
relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any 
part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common 
good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. 
v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the 
rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the 
sensitive part regards singulars.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that 
which extends to the common good?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same 
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the  
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence 
are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is the 
same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence is 
chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then 
prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and political 
prudence are the same habit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by 
things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good, 
which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common 
good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence and 
political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the common 
good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate 
to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy" 
which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all 
distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of 
prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[5]; Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the species of 
habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its 
formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, 
is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS, Prolog.; FS, Q[102], 
A[1]), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to 
different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and 
the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must 
needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different 
ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to 
one's own good; another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the 
common good of the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is 
directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is 
substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is the 
same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called 
"prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence, i.e. as being 
right reason applied to action, while it is called "political," as being 
directed to the common good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it belongs to 
a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well," wherefore the 
virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue 
of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the virtue 
of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the 
other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits 
directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically 
although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner, 
though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many, 
that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ 
specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed to the last 
end is above the other habits and commands them.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their 
rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence alone is 
the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects 
and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a true 
opinion."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not 
competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good counsel 
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A[8]). But 
command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of 
rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two 
kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs to 
rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is about 
"individual actions." Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these 
individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in 
subjects.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing 
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to 
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and 
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave 
as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled 
and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, 
nor of a subject as subject.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Body Para. 2/2

 Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in 
ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately 
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in 
the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the 
subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly, 
namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he 
is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he does 
take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also 
himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence can be in sinners?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord 
said (Lk. 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 
'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." Now the 
children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in 
sinners.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But 
there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of good 
counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners can take 
good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is 
impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no inner is a 
good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which 
takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent 
man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a 
good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil 
end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is 
good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good robber," 
and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of similarity, 
because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the 
prudence of which the Apostle says (Rm. 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 
'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places its ultimate 
end in the pleasures of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 2/3

 The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting 
ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold 
source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the 
common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a 
man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he 
is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because 
he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel 
aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a 
whole, but fails to make an effective command.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 3/3 

 The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, 
judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole 
life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in 
sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect 
prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is 
imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is 
imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first 
prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but 
that they are prudent in "their generation."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the 
appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other 
hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its 
principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms 
a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the 
appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as 
shown above (FS, Q[58], A[5]); secondly because prudence commands right 
actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore 
though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, 
yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises 
from a disorder of the appetite.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some 
particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end 
of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. 
Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in 
them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness," 
[*{deinotike}] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good 
and evil; or "cunning," [*{panourgia}] which is directed only to evil, 
and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of 
the flesh."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in all who have grace?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. 
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be 
done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all 
who have grace have prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated 
above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace who do not take 
good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore 
not all who have grace, have prudence

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people 
are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore 
prudence is not to be found in all who have grace. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can 
be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the 
other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what 
they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that 
whoever has one has all, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). Now whoever 
has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, 
and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (A[4]), he must, of 
necessity, have prudence also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard 
to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who 
have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things" (1 Jn. 2:27). There 
is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is 
able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in 
matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human 
life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, 
are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this 
point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern 
good from evil counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, 
wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic. ii, 1), 
hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the 
other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. Wherefore, 
in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of 
reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in 
idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also 
as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by 
practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other 
virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is for the 
perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the 
discerning of good and evil."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence is in us by nature?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher 
says that things connected with prudence "seem to be natural," namely 
"synesis, gnome" [*{synesis} and {gnome}, Cf. FS, Q[57], A[6]] and the 
like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now 
things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. 
Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence 
results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is wisdom, and 
in length of days prudence." Therefore  prudence is natural.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with 
that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural 
prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. 
viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual 
virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands 
experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated 
above (A[4]). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching 
and experience.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As shown above (A[3]), prudence includes knowledge both 
of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence 
applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge 
of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative 
science, because the primary universal principles of either are known 
naturally, as shown above (A[6]): except that the common principles of 
prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks 
(Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative reason is 
better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary 
universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical 
reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery 
through experience, or through teaching.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 2/3

 On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the 
matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter 
of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of 
human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in 
respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (FS, Q[51], A[1]; 
FS, Q[63], A[1]) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain 
virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they 
also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 3/3

 But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are 
of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. 
Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the 
knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason 
of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another 
in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of 
speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but 
about the means, as stated above (A[6]; FS, Q[57], A[5]), it follows that 
prudence is not from nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to 
prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said 
before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are the principles of the {ou 
heneka}" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)], namely, 
the end; and so he does not mention  {euboulia} among them, because it 
takes counsel about the means.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their 
natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but 
also because of their long experience.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an 
end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in 
like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, 
which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an 
infinity of singulars.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. 
For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than 
prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost 
by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same things, 
but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now the 
engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of many 
memories," as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1). 
Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that 
prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. 
But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore 
prudence can also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness 
is possible to art but not to prudence."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can 
forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they 
belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but 
also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (A[8]), its 
principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he 
has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not 
taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the 
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and 
sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Dan. 
13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart," 
and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the 
prudent [Douay: 'wise']."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the 
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, 
as stated above [*Cf. FS, Q[53], A[1]]. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The experience required by prudence results not from memory 
alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of 
universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A[3]). 
Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the 
principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)

 We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are 
four points of inquiry:

 (1) Which are the parts of prudence?

 (2) Of its integral parts;

 (3) Of its subjective parts;

 (4) Of its potential parts.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned 
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of 
prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." Macrobius 
(In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence 
six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding," "circumspection," 
"foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 
9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong to prudence. 
Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," 
"sense" and "understanding." And another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; 
Cf. Q[80], OBJ[4]] says that ten things are connected with prudence, 
namely, "good counsel," "shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative 
[*Regnativa]," "military," "political" and "domestic prudence," 
"dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore it seems that one or 
the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But 
politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore 
they are not parts of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the intellective 
memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong not only to 
prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not 
be set down as parts of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of 
the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (FS, Q[16], A[1]
). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is connected 
with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to judgment, so also 
ought something to have been assigned corresponding to use.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q[47], 
A[9]). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the 
parts of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, "integral," as wall, 
roof, and foundations are parts of a house; "subjective," as ox and lion 
are parts of animal; and "potential," as the nutritive and sensitive 
powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a 
virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the 
things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called 
the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all the things mentioned 
above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six assigned 
by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh, viz. "memory" mentioned by 
Tully; and {eustochia} or "shrewdness" mentioned by Aristotle. For the 
"sense" of prudence is also called "understanding": wherefore the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the 
sense, and this is understanding." Of these eight, five belong to 
prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, "memory," "reasoning," 
"understanding," "docility" and "shrewdness": while the three others 
belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, 
"foresight," "circumspection" and "caution." The reason of their 
difference is seen from the fact that three things may be observed in 
reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if 
it be of the past, is called "memory," if of the present, whether 
contingent or necessary, is called "understanding" or "intelligence." 
Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, 
to which pertains "docility," or by "discovery," and to this belongs to 
{eustochia}, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which "shrewdness" is a part, 
which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in Poster. i, 
9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things 
known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to 
"reasoning." And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have 
three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and 
this belongs to "foresight"; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of 
the matter in hand, and this belongs to "circumspection"; thirdly, to 
avoid obstacles, and this belongs to "caution."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 2/4

 The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way 
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby 
a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, 
which differ specifically as stated above (Q[47], A[11]). Again, the 
prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species 
according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which 
is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered 
together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called 
"military." There is also the multitude that is united together for the 
whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is 
ruled by "domestic prudence": and such again is the multitude of a city 
or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is "regnative prudence" in the 
ruler, and "political prudence," simply so called, in the  subjects.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 3/4

 If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also 
speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 2) then its parts 
include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics," according to three 
methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining 
of science by demonstration, which belongs to "physics" (if physics be 
understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is 
to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and this belongs to 
"dialectics." The third method is to employ conjectures in order to 
induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to 
"rhetoric." It may be said, however, that these three belong also to 
prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary 
premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 4/4

 The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which 
are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it 
were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of 
prudence are "good counsel," which concerns counsel, "synesis," which 
concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and "gnome," which 
concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while "prudence" is 
about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The various enumerations differ, either because different 
kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is mentioned in one 
enumeration includes several mentioned in another enumeration. Thus Tully 
includes "caution" and "circumspection" under "foresight," and 
"reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under "understanding."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as 
sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply may 
be gathered from what has been said.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by 
taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with things 
pertaining to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Right command and right use always go together, because the 
reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the lower 
powers, which pertain to use.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] Out. Para. 1/1

OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under 
this head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Memory;

 (2) Understanding or Intelligence;

 (3) Docility; 

 (4) Shrewdness;

 (5) Reason;

 (6) Foresight;

 (7) Circumspection;

 (8) Caution.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether memory is a part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, 
as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive 
part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 
5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, 
whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future 
matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. 
vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the 
parts of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated 
above (Q[47], A[5]). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not 
by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which 
occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate 
to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from like" (Ethic. vi 
[*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to discover what is true in 
the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that 
"intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." 
Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, 
and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory 
is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[47], AA[3],6), prudence applies 
universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many 
things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, 
and memory is one of them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its 
perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his 
Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not only arises 
from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a 
man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat 
unwonted illustration of it, since the  unwonted strikes us more, and so 
makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this 
explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now 
the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is 
that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless 
they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge 
has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is 
assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man 
wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in 
order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the 
Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings 
memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one 
to the other." Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things 
we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, 
the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his 
Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the 
figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the 
things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) 
that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria 
ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing 
frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to 
another by a kind of natural order.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from 
the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good 
counsel for the future.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition; 
Aristotle's word is {nous}]

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When 
two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But 
intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according 
to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy 
Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q[8], AA[1],8). But 
prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been 
said above (Q[4], A[8]; FS, Q[62], A[2]). Therefore understanding does 
not pertain to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi, 
7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial 
objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts 
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] 
mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the  intellectual power, 
but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as 
self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of 
demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain 
statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of 
reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since 
prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence 
must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that 
understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, 
in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above (Q[47], 
AA[3],6), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a 
singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular 
proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a 
twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this 
belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we 
know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical 
universal principles, such as "One should do evil to no man," as shown 
above (Q[47], A[6]). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, 
is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent 
practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in 
the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (Q[47], AA[3],6). Now this 
primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. 
Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right 
estimate of some particular end.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a 
quick insight into divine things, as shown above (Q[8], AA[1],2). It is 
in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called both 
"understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and "sense," in 
so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means 
when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need to have the sense, 
and this is understanding." But this is to be understood as referring, 
not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the 
interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of 
prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual 
virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is 
requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be 
accounted a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, 
since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or 
blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for  this is befitting 
to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it 
makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also called 
"preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion 
of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1; Q[47], A[3]) prudence is 
concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are 
of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor 
can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in 
matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by 
others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of 
the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 
11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated 
assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we 
are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience 
gives them an insight into principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): 
"Lean not on thy own prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the 
multitude of the ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join 
thyself from thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to 
be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a 
part of prudence

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, 
yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other 
things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much 
towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, 
frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, 
neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through 
pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but 
also for himself, as stated above (Q[47], A[12], ad 3). Hence as stated 
(Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which 
docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some 
respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of 
prudence, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For 
shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations, 
as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning  of prudence is not a 
demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore shrewdness 
does not pertain to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic. 
vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness [*Ethic. 
vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of {eustochia}, i.e. "a happy 
conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel 
needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should 
not be accounted a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above (Q[48]) is a "happy 
conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. 
Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who is 
shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to prudence, as 
stated above (Q[47], A[9]). Therefore shrewdness does also.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of 
action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in 
practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, 
secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a 
man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so 
shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself, 
yet so that shrewdness be taken for {eustochia}, of which it is a part. 
For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness 
is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 
34). Nevertheless the philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q[48], OBJ[1]] who 
calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in 
general, hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are 
discovered rapidly."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle 
term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for 
instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be 
enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 34). In this 
way shrewdness belongs to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to 
prove that {euboulia}, i.e. good counsel, is not {eustochia}, which is 
commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take 
good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does 
not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel: 
indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance, something has to 
be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is 
fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore 
nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric  and prudence. 
Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it 
is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters 
whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of 
prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But 
prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason 
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a 
part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a 
part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in 
all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which 
employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a 
part of prudence

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the 
intelligence, as stated above (FP, Q[79], A[8]). If therefore 
intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add 
reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of 
Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated 
in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things 
to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for 
prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things 
required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or 
quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be 
numbered among these parts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good 
use.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the 
need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things in 
which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, 
for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do God and the 
angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence 
guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so 
much the farther, as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of 
art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, 
wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of 
their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain 
other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet 
prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may 
rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and 
uncertain. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, 
yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name 
from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf. SS, Q[8], A[1]], 
while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence 
each is accounted a part of reason as explained above (A[2]; Q[47], A[2]
,3).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? 
[*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or 
"foresight."]

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of 
prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the 
same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a prudent man 
is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also the 
derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De 
Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be 
also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to foresee," 
has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is 
not a part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its 
secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to 
be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number 
foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q[48]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[1], ad 2, AA[6],13), prudence 
is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them 
in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an 
end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to 
human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be 
done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, 
since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as 
such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, 
so long as he sits.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by 
man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of 
these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion 
of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be 
directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity,  one of 
them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate. 
Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the 
whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts 
of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary 
precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. 
Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight 
[providentia] as from its principal part.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, 
in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, 
though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence 
foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical 
matters.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion of 
foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without 
which no right order to the end is possible.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. 
For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings. But 
these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason 
wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should not be reckoned a 
part of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues 
rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but 
attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs 
to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things 
that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. 
Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence 
in addition to foresight.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q[48]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), it belongs to prudence chiefly to 
direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless 
both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Body Para. 2/2

 Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q[47], A[3]) is about 
singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of 
circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to 
the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by 
reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love 
to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse 
love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his 
heart, it will no longer be a means  suitable to the end. Hence the need 
of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the 
circumstances.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, 
the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in 
matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence 
has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, 
in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by 
its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to 
consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances. 
Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is 
reckoned a distinct part of prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of 
prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no 
man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 
19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the 
virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same 
faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it 
belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid 
evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, 
distinct from foresight.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man 
can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution does 
not belong to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk 
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are 
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, 
so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these 
matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has 
the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may 
have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our 
guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of 
virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the 
opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in 
idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to 
the one virtue of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent 
occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution 
is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may 
do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and 
these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, 
nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising 
prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as 
to suffer less harm thereby.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And 
since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules 
himself (Q[47], seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of 
prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?

 (2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?

 (4) Whether military prudence is?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a species of prudence is regnative?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of 
prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of 
justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of 
justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom 
[regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence 
is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are 
"aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 10], 
"tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy." Therefore neither should a 
regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain 
others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore 
(Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence 
to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to substitute regnative 
prudence in its place.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence is 
a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a special kind of 
prudence is regnative.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 1/1 

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to prudence 
to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special 
kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. 
Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance 
in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community 
of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according 
as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher 
end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a 
king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which 
reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence 
as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with prudence" is 
included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (Q[47], A[5], 
ad 1; FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason also the execution of 
justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of 
the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two 
virtues---prudence and justice---belong most properly to a king, 
according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall 
execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since, however, direction 
belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative 
prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather 
than to justice which is executive.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in 
Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated 
rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other 
rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to 
virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the 
principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies 
to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a 
share of kingly government.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted 
a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as 
stated above (A[1]). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the 
whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various 
objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the 
subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the 
subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from 
regnative prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each 
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so 
called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called 
political.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the 
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence 
and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, 
and deals with individuals."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his 
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings 
are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings 
are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they 
have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore 
the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power 
of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any 
sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move 
themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of 
government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in 
obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence 
which is called political.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of 
prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of 
regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even 
as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a 
thing retains the name of "proper."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of 
a habit, as stated above (Q[47], A[5]). Now the same actions are 
considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his 
subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments. Hence 
regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are 
speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in 
relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, 
he directs himself in relation to the common good.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of 
prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence is 
directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is 
directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1. 
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (Q[47], A[13]) prudence is only in good 
people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many 
sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic 
prudence should not be reckoned a species of  prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so 
also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a 
species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to 
regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither 
should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are 
various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of which 
is domestic, another legislative, and another political."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of 
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify 
arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is 
principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is 
a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the 
individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city 
or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which 
governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must 
domestic prudence be distinct from both.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last 
end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, 
the end of political prudence is "a good life in general" as regards the 
conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches 
as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance 
with the opinion of many.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail 
concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to "a 
good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household, for which 
above all a virtuous life is required.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The father has in his household an authority like that of a 
king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a 
king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of 
prudence, like regnative prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a 
part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to Ethic. 
vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to 
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence should not 
be accounted a species of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, just as military business is contained under political 
affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of  tradesmen, 
craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence 
corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any 
be assigned to military business.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in 
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due 
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels." Now 
it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in 
warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason, 
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, 
and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold 
tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand 
outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided 
animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved 
to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the 
irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in 
those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be 
not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such 
things as belong to the common good, but also a "military" prudence, 
whereby hostile attacks are repelled.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has 
certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms 
and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it 
belongs rather to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of 
individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the 
service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire 
common good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but 
the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the 
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with 
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head there 
are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?

 (2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

 (3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?

 (4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?

 [*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of 
deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law 
{synesis}, and of judging well according to general law  {gnome}, 
respectively.]


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a 
virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man 
makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of {euboulia} 
(deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty 
counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in 
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may 
give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii. But 
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which implies 
doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore 
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above 
(FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not connected with the 
other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men 
are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is 
not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia} 
(deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of 
virtue consists in right reason. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) 
is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[4]) the nature of a human 
virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it 
is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the 
reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life 
consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x. 
But {euboulia} (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it 
is derived from the {eu}, good, and {boule}, counsel, being "a good 
counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is 
evident that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a human virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil 
end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in 
speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a 
false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses 
through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid 
processes are contrary to {euboulia} (deliberating well), as the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not 
follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For 
man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his  parts, and this not only 
as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as 
regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more 
imperfect.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to 
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with 
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are 
contingent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In no sinner as such is {euboulia} (deliberating well) to 
be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good 
counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the 
end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be 
neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking 
counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due 
circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other 
hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are 
directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good 
counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or 
warfare, or the like.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from 
prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a 
distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. 
vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now 
this belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well) as stated above. Therefore 
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are 
specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, 
Q[18], AA[4],6). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) and prudence are 
directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to some 
particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore {euboulia} 
(deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to 
the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same 
virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to {euboulia} 
(deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence. There {euboulia} 
(deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But 
this does not apply to {euboulia} (deliberating well). Therefore 
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), virtue is properly  directed to 
an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ 
according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of 
goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of 
goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of 
love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to 
the same virtue of charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have 
they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes 
that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, 
inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently 
{euboulia} (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must 
needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. 
And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, 
so {euboulia} (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a 
principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as 
neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues 
without charity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding 
it, to {euboulia} (deliberating well) by eliciting it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one 
end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for counsel comes 
first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an 
immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are 
related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends 
of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be 
done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this proves not that 
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, 
but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of 
dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from 
demonstrative science, which decides the truth.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are not in 
us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But {synesis} (judging well 
according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states 
(Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common 
law) is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), {synesis} (judging well 
according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of judging." But 
judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is 
only in the good, it seems that {synesis} (judging well according to 
common law) is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a 
defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is 
in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore {synesis} (judging well 
according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, 
it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good 
command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not 
reasonable. Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is 
not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But {euboulia}, 
or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {synesis} (judging 
well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, {synesis} (judging well according to common law) 
signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but 
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence 
in Greek some, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to common 
law) are said to be {synetoi}, i.e. "persons of sense," or {eusynetoi}, 
i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those who lack this 
virtue are called {asynetoi}, i.e. "senseless."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must 
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of 
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for 
many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge 
well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through 
their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which 
seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has 
a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack 
good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising 
chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to 
judge aright). Hence there is need, besides {euboulia} (deliberating 
well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called 
{synesis} (judging well according to common law).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending 
a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right 
disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed 
the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it 
be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now 
that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they 
are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, 
is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First 
directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, 
because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct 
ideas: this belongs to {synesis} (judging well according to common law) 
which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through 
the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one 
judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of 
virtue results from the habits of moral  virtue; but this judgment is 
about the ends, whereas {synesis} (judging well according to common law) 
is rather about the means.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal 
principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter 
of action, as stated above (Q[47], A[13]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or 
execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges 
aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which 
commands aright, and this is prudence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special 
virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that {gnome} (judging well according to general 
law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (judging well 
according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of {synesis} 
(judging well according to common law), to have good judgment. Now no man 
can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. 
Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) extends to all 
matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good 
judgment called {gnome} (judging well according to general law).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now 
there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia} (deliberating 
well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there 
is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {synesis} (judging well 
according to common law).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from 
the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such 
things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the 
intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no 
intellectual virtue about such matters.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that {gnome} 
(judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower 
principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher 
principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; 
and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what 
is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible 
to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are 
beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the 
order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, 
of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one 
could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and  yet this 
is possible if we consider Divine Providence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not 
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the 
enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his 
deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of 
such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, 
according to which {synesis} (judging according to common law) judges: 
and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a 
higher virtue of judgment, which is called {gnome} (judging according to 
general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: {Synesis} (judging well according to common law) judges 
rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but 
certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated 
above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper 
principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common 
principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims 
at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which 
tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence {euboulia} 
(deliberating well) to which the research of counsel belongs is one for 
all, but not so {synesis} (judging well according to common law) whose 
act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, 
wherefore prudence also is only one.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all 
things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among 
men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things 
by his reason: this belongs to {gnome} (judging well according to general 
law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence. 
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy 
Ghost?

 (2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?

 (3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

 (4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc. 
corresponds to the gift of counsel?

 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts 
of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the 
virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now  for the purpose of 
taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence, 
or even of {euboulia} (deliberating well), as is evident from what has 
been said (Q[47], A[1], ad 2; Q[51], AA[1],2). Therefore counsel should 
not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost 
and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not given to 
all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy 
Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But counsel seems to be 
one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost specially to 
certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: "Behold . . . your brother 
Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore counsel should be numbered among 
the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Rm. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the 
Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not 
consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy 
Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the 
spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be 
numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord) 
shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of the Holy 
Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the 
motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode 
of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and 
place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as 
Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the 
rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform 
any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the 
Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, 
wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well), whether 
acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according to 
principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or {euboulia} 
(deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for himself or for 
another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and 
contingent things which may occur, the result is that "the thoughts of 
mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Hence in 
the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who 
comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel, 
whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human 
affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek 
counsel from those who are wiser.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel  others, 
may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled by God as 
to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common to 
all holy persons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according 
to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is the "faculty 
of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the gift of counsel 
is befitting the children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by 
the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly 
correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that 
which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes 
(Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in 
respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, 
as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Since, then, counsel is the first and 
lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment 
comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not 
counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a 
thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is 
helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also 
practical, as shown above (Q[9], A[3]). Therefore the gift of counsel 
does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated 
above (Q[47], A[8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man 
should be directed by God, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore the gift of 
counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for 
the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore 
they correspond to one another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is 
perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a 
body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the 
rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower 
motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule 
of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of 
reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by 
the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above 
(A[1]). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping 
and perfecting it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to 
the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy  Ghost, the position 
of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above 
(A[1]; FS, Q[68], A[1]), it follows that it would be unfitting to call 
the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment 
rather than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the 
counselled mind is moved by another counselling it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to 
prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of 
extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds 
to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the same things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence 
the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost, 
is enabled to direct itself and others.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven. 
For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an end. But in 
heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there 
man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel is not in 
heaven.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take counsel 
in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3). 
Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in 
heaven.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God, 
according to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." 
But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rm. 11:34, "Who hath 
been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the 
gift of counsel becoming.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt 
or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the 
heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the 
conflict, or not to have won."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]; FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of the 
Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God. 
Now we must observe two points concerning the motion of the human mind by 
God. First, that the disposition of that which is moved, differs while it 
is being moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement. 
Indeed if the mover is the principle of the movement alone, when the 
movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards the thing 
moved, since it has already reached the term of movement, even as a 
house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder. On the other 
hand, when the mover is cause not only of the movement, but also of the 
form to which the movement tends, then the action of the mover does  not 
cease even after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the 
air even after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us 
virtue and knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as 
long as we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the 
blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were 
ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men, 
do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern 
the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards 
these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the 
mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in another. 
For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing 
the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in 
the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this 
nescience the angel's mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. 
Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for 
they simply turn to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God about 
things beneath them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from 
God in such matters is called "counsel."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God 
preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in 
their nescience of what has to be done.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or 
resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as the acts 
of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves 
have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels, and the 
prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of counsel finds a place 
in them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of 
life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so 
neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on 
the way thither.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: and 
the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the source 
whence they receive.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the 
gift of counsel?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, 
does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the beatitudes are 
acts of virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[69], A[1]). Now we are directed by 
counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does not 
correspond more than any other to counsel. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for 
salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary 
for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James 
2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy." On the 
other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the 
life of perfection, according to Mt. 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of 
poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the beatitude 
of mercy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a 
certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of virtue. Now none 
of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Gal. 
5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the 
gift of counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is 
befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from 
evils so great, to pardon, and to give."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence 
such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond to 
the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Tim. 4:8, 
"Godliness [*'Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which is the same 
as mercy; see note on SS, Q[30], A[1]] is profitable to all things." 
Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of 
counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does 
so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in 
all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether they be 
necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work of mercy is 
necessary for salvation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the ultimate in 
practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which is the 
end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among 
the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action, in which practical 
knowledge is the guide. Among these we find "goodness" and "benignity" 
which correspond to mercy.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] Out. Para. 1/3

OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says 
(Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every virtue, not 
only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is 
opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and not 
a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence 
we have craftiness."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] Out. Para. 2/3 

 Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in 
evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect 
either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence, 
and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence, 
those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for prudence. 
And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these 
considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence 
which is opposed to solicitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] Out. Para. 3/3

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?

 (2) Whether it is a special sin?

 (3) Of precipitation or temerity;

 (4) Of thoughtlessness;

 (5) Of inconstancy;

 (6) Concerning the origin of these vices.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether imprudence is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is 
voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas 
imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. 
Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But 
imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are 
imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original 
justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But imprudence is 
not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save 
by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov. 21:20, 
"There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, 
and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it." Therefore 
imprudence is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a 
privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken as 
a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can 
be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that 
prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence 
is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving to have prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of 
reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right 
reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises 
counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require 
consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence is a sin in 
respect of prudence considered  under its proper aspect, since it is not 
possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing the 
rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this 
should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal 
sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of 
the Divine teaching: whereas if he act beside the Law and without 
contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it 
will be a venial sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash 
man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act precipitately. 
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who sins willingly 
against prudence is less to be commended."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It 
must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is 
included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul. 
Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of 
this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to the 
habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking 
the sin of imprudence consists.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether imprudence is a special sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever 
sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But imprudence 
consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore 
imprudence is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is. 
But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the 
general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned 
among those causes.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of 
virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results from 
each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; for 
instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above 
(QQ[48],49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it 
is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above 
(A[1]). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one 
special vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first, 
absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins; 
secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are 
its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two 
counts: first, essentially, because it is  predicated of all sins: and in 
this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a 
general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very 
acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is 
a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in 
so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of 
imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of 
the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some 
particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then 
imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three 
ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence, 
for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from 
other kinds that govern communities, as stated above (Q[48]; Q[50], A[7]
), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in 
respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues 
connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by 
defect of "counsel" to which {euboulia} (deliberating well) corresponds, 
"precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence; by defect of 
"judgment," to which {synesis} (judging well according to common law) and 
{gnome} (judging well according to general law) refer, there is 
"thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and "negligence" correspond to the 
"command" which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken 
by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are 
the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since however all these things are 
intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it 
follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts 
mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in 
"thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to 
"precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, 
belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers generality by participation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than 
prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows 
that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on 
account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, 
and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On 
the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice; and 
for this reason it can be called a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the same 
motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species 
of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and when one 
ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are various 
species: for instance, if one man were to take another's property from 
where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this would constitute 
the species called sacrilege, while if  another were to take another's 
property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this 
would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which 
are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, 
except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as 
stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in 
imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas 
precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory, 
who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given as a remedy 
to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under 
imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now 
rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore 
precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin 
happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also through 
being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and 
through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. 
Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin 
contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else of 
the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:19): "The way of the wicked is 
darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of 
ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to 
fall or to be precipitate.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the 
soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be 
precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from 
above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's, and not 
in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason, 
and the base is reached in the action performed by the body; while the 
steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are 
"memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in 
considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with 
another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes 
counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed 
into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking 
these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate 
counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of 
precipitation is contained under imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of  counsel and to 
the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above (Q[52], 
A[2]), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are not 
directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through the 
impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the 
directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly speaking, 
wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, which refuses to 
submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers to both, so that 
rashness is contained under precipitation, although precipitation refers 
rather to the first.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of 
reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be 
slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to 
rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter bears a 
certain likeness to right counsel.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included 
in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any sin, 
according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and yet it 
incites us to be thoughtless, according to Mt. 10:19, "Take no thought 
how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many 
things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to 
a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under 
thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. 
"counsel," "judgment" about what has been counselled, and "command" [*Cf. 
Q[47], A[8]]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also 
to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special 
sin contained under imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look straight 
on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this pertains to 
prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore 
thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering 
the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, 
so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a 
demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it 
judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back 
to the first  indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly 
to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the 
vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly 
through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment 
depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have 
the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words 
quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity 
of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden 
call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because "as we know 
not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God," according to 2 Paral 
20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with 
awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes 
cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore 
this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is 
above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a 
determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things 
have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in 
speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under 
imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance 
in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs 
to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude rather than 
to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay: 
'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work." 
But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to 
imprudence but to envy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere 
in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of "incontinency" in 
pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or "squeamishness" in unpleasant 
matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore inconstancy does not 
pertain to imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to 
the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. 
Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good 
purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite,  for a man 
does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of 
something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal 
completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in 
rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist 
the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own 
weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence 
inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now 
just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to 
prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to imprudence. 
Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. 
And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and 
thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises 
from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant 
because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and 
judged.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, 
and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, 
chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the 
contrary.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause 
inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin of 
inconstancy is due, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the 
appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil 
concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which 
points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in 
the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, 
against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of 
constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy 
pertains also.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. 
For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A[5], ad 2). But envy 
is a distinct vice from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is 
inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to 
lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, 
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do 
not arise from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of 
reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal 
vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather 
than from carnal vices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid 
vices arise from lust. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure above 
all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual pleasure which 
absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of 
prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from 
sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect 
of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above (AA[2],5), it 
follows that they arise chiefly from lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason 
to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the 
judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) 
that "the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not 
perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to 
it at all."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as 
inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind 
from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that 
"love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the 
more as they lead us away from reason.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] Out. Para. 1/1

OF NEGLIGENCE (THREE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points 
of inquiry:

 (1) Whether negligence is a special sin?

 (2) To which virtue is it opposed?

 (3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether negligence is a special sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For 
negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every 
virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. 
Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that 
which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be 
contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But 
negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither about 
evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he 
omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they 
are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special 
vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished 
from those which are committed through contempt.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack 
of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin, 
and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as 
solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special 
through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters, 
while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of 
act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all vices 
affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind 
of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as 
stated above (Q[47], A[9]), it follows that negligence, which denotes 
lack of solicitude, is a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the 
more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we about it. 
Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, 
in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act 
of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence just as 
precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason 
which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of 
sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special 
act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in 
all sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that 
one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but 
because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a 
due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some due 
circumstance be omitted.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For 
negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which belongs to 
sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed 
to prudence, but to charity, as stated above (Q[35], A[3]). Therefore 
negligence is not opposed to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But 
sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral 
virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence 
does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is "precipitation," nor a 
defect of judgment, since that is  "thoughtlessness," nor a defect of 
command, because that is "inconstancy." Therefore negligence does not 
pertain to imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth God, 
neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. 
Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a fool 
[imprudens] will regard no time." Now this is due to negligence. 
Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now 
solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to 
prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. 
This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) 
"a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]": and the right 
choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore negligence pertains to 
imprudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice 
also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution, 
yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, 
while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence it is 
becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is "an oppressive 
sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from action [*Cf. Q[35], A[1]; FS, 
Q[35], A[8]].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Omission regards the external act, for it consists in 
failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice, 
and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is 
the effect of right reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude 
also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise 
than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding, 
being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails 
through lack of a prompt will.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because 
according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth 
from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though 
negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to 
acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (FS, Q[44], A[2]) 
when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes us take counsel."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss 
of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, "I feared all my works," etc. 
says that "too little love of God aggravates the former," viz. 
negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the  love of God is done 
away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, "For thy negligences purify 
thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses the 
negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence were a 
mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for 
mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was 
prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:16): "He that neglecteth his 
own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), negligence arises out of a 
certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on 
the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it 
should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in 
two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. 
If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it 
will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will 
be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the 
charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case 
chiefly when negligence is due to contempt.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance 
that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin, 
provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of 
fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through 
lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a 
venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we 
say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a merely natural 
love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering 
made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not only from 
venial but also from mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which is 
necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of 
sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, 
wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the Law, 
since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, 
whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public.

 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] Out. Para. 1/1

OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a 
resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?

 (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

 (3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?

 (4) Of guile;

 (5) Of fraud;

 (6) Of solicitude about temporal things;

 (7) Of solicitude about the future;

 (8) Of the origin of these vices.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For 
prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs 
them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is 
any prudence a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is 
lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man ever 
hated his own flesh" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not 
a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he 
tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of 
the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of 
the flesh be accounted among sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according 
to Wis. 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike." 
Now it is written (Rm. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh 
is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[13]), prudence regards things 
which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the 
flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal 
goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, 
because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which 
does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above (FS, Q[2], 
A[5]). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature that 
which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of 
concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other 
hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as stated above 
(Q[47], A[1]; Q[49], A[6]), which can extend to evil things also. 
Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if 
something be added, it may be taken in a  bad sense: and it is thus that 
prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on 
account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal 
agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good 
of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good 
of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus 
that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible 
object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies 
direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the 
devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect 
under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or 
carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of "carnal" and 
again of "worldly" prudence, according to Lk. 16:8, "The children of this 
world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation," etc. The 
Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the 
external things of the world on account of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called 
"wisdom," as stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1), we may distinguish a 
threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence 
it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly, 
sensual and devilish," as explained above (Q[45], A[1], ad 1), when we 
were treating of wisdom.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it 
is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies 
contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh . . . 
is not subject to the law of God" (Rm. 8:7). Therefore prudence of the 
flesh is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now 
prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it 
cannot be subject to the law of God" (Rm. 8:7), and so it seems to be an 
unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. 
Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as 
stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that 
prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of 
the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the 
nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things  pertaining to 
the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, 
diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not 
of itself the nature of a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1; A[13]), a man is said 
to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of 
life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some 
particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something 
else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as 
corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man 
place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a 
mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot 
have several last ends, as stated above (FS, Q[1], A[5]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding 
to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that 
a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without 
turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place 
the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain 
this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But 
if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one 
is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no 
longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh 
as a means to an end.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a 
man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this 
is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy 
Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the law of 
God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be 
converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself 
cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just, 
nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is 
shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to 
prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some 
very grave matter.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether craftiness is a special sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words 
of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be 
crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay: 'subtlety'] 
to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty  [Douay: 
'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so 
either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin 
seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or 
worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from 
prudence of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The simplicity 
of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of 
this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to conceal one's 
meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to 
be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the 
young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to 
belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or 
worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): "We renounce the hidden 
things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the 
word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as 
science is "right reason applied to knowledge." In speculative matters 
one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when 
the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in 
another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to 
be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be 
against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. 
First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good 
not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the 
flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or 
evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, 
and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin 
opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as 
prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness 
sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual 
resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad 
sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an 
evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and 
counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be 
directed to a good end.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything that 
can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. 
For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain 
guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor. 12:16, "Being crafty I 
caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according 
to Ps. 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." Now craftiness 
like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not 
pertain to craftiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): "Guile [Douay: 'Deceit'] is 
in the heart of them that think evil things." But the thought of evil 
things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not 
seem to belong to craftiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Eph. 
4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and 
guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), it belongs to craftiness to adopt 
ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to 
attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be 
subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of 
thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as 
thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the 
adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual 
execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a 
certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and 
improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of 
craftiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, 
is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among 
those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as 
Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed 
chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Ps. 
104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants." Guile is also in the 
heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23, "His interior is full of deceit," but 
this is to devise deceits, according to Ps. 37:13: "They studied deceits 
all the day long."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise 
certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises 
deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless 
it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without 
craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less 
frequent occurrence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a 
man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is 
the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing 
himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, "Why do you not rather 
suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not belong to 
craftiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving 
external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a certain man named 
Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept 
back part of the price of the land." Now it pertains to injustice or 
illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. 
Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to 
prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the 
frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18) 
concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against 
their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 
13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: 
'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same object. 
Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Just as "guile" consists in the execution of craftiness, 
so also does "fraud." But they seem to differ in the fact that "guile" 
belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be 
effected by words, or by deeds, whereas "fraud" belongs more properly to 
the execution of craftiness by deeds.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in 
their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and 
to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another 
vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly 
nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against 
themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that 
what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Ps. 
7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. 
Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects,  according to 
Rm. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine 
ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou 
hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be 
solicitous about temporal things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. 
Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he 
sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man 
will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be 
solicitous about temporal things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, 
according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought 
me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with 
works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the 
interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about 
temporal things is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 6:31): "Be not solicitous . . . 
saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we 
be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain 
something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there 
is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is 
assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in 
three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we 
seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. 
xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc. . . . He intended 
to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of 
these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the 
Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, 
through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, 
the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which 
ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Mt. 
13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word." Thirdly, 
through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary 
things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for 
laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors 
bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body 
and soul (Mt. 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which God 
watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according 
to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine 
providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in 
seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that 
we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that 
temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do 
what we ought to do.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them 
according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over 
solicitous about them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor 
is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Mt. 6:31, "Be 
not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but solicitude must be 
banished," namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is 
directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it 
be superfluous.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether we should be solicitous about the future?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For 
it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her 
ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master . . 
. provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in 
the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore 
solicitude about the future is praiseworthy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly 
about the future, since its principal part is "foresight of future 
things," as stated above (Q[49], A[6], ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to 
be solicitous about the future.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the 
morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (Jn. 12:6) that 
Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 
4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been 
laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the 
future.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for 
tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says in his 
commentary on this passage.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due 
circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Eccles. 8:6, 
"There is a time and opportunity for every business"; which applies not 
only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time 
has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops 
belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time 
of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during 
the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging 
to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, 
saying: "Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for 
the morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow 
will have its own  solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. 
This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil 
thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this 
that is proposed for our example.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it 
would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man 
were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and "future" 
apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the 
present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), "when we 
see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we 
must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord 
deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the 
Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of 
the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not 
condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such 
things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these 
things."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether these vices arise from covetousness?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As 
stated above (Q[43], A[6]) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude 
in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to 
prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "Venus is full of guile and her 
girdle is many colored" and that "he who is incontinent in desire acts 
with cunning."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as 
stated above (Q[47], A[13]). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the 
more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and 
vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather 
than from covetousness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of 
other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which 
pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of 
stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the 
aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a 
daughter of covetousness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[3]; Q[47], A[13]), carnal prudence and 
craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to 
prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now  among all the moral 
virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, 
for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason 
appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is 
covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from 
covetousness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of 
concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its 
act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit 
inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the 
Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is referring to a 
certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just as 
he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but 
rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds 
that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 
214-217].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to 
pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes 
magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud 
and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from 
covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with 
precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid 
vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in 
plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because 
the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states 
(Rhet. ii, 2,3) [*Cf. Ethic. vii, 6].


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head 
there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) The precepts of prudence;

 (2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of 
prudence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should have 
included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should include a 
precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the 
decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral virtues, it 
seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept 
of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law especially 
with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the teaching of the 
Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Mt. 10:16):  "Be ye . . . prudent 
[Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue 
should have included a precept of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/2

 OBJ 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed to 
the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malach. 4:4): 
"Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb." 
Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts of prudence; 
for instance (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own prudence"; and further 
on (Prov. 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before thy steps." Therefore the 
Law also should have contained a precept of prudence, especially among 
the precepts of the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 2/2

 The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of 
the decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[100], A[3]; A[5], ad 1) when we 
were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue being given 
to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to all, as coming 
under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among the things 
dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the 
practical order what naturally known principles are to the speculative 
order, as shown above (Q[47], A[6]). Now prudence is not about the end, 
but about the means, as stated above (Q[47], A[6]). Hence it was not 
fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should include a precept 
relating directly to prudence. And yet all the precepts of the decalogue 
are related to prudence, in so far as it directs all virtuous acts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral 
virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object 
under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a 
precept, as stated above (Q[44], A[1]; FS, Q[99], AA[1],5). Hence it 
behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are those of the decalogue, 
to refer to justice rather than to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. 
Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating to 
right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the Gospel 
teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament is 
directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it behooved man 
to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the 
act of prudence which is directed to the means.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to 
prudence are fittingly propounded in the Old Law?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to  the 
vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old Law. For 
such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly opposed to 
prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which bear a certain 
resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices connected with it. 
Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for it is written (Lev. 
19:13): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor," and (Dt. 25:13): "Thou 
shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less." 
Therefore there should have also been prohibitive precepts about the 
vices directly opposed to prudence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in buying 
and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud solely in buying 
and selling.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/2

 OBJ 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of 
virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of 
prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any 
contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 2/2

 The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are 
quoted in the first objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), justice, above all, regards the 
aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, 
because justice tends to render that which is due to another, as we shall 
state further on (Q[58], A[2]). Now craftiness, as to its execution, is 
committed chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above (Q[55], A[8]): 
and so it was fitting that the Law should contain precepts forbidding the 
execution of craftiness, in so far as this pertains to injustice, as when 
a man uses guile and fraud in calumniating another or in stealing his 
goods.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do not 
pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of craftiness, and 
so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which 
latter pertain to injustice

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice, can 
be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Lev. 19:13). 
Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in buying and 
selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, "A huckster shall not be justified 
from the sins of the lips": and it is for this reason that the Law 
contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying and selling.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of justice 
pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive of 
stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution of 
craftiness.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] Out. Para. 1/3

ON JUSTICE (QQ[57]-62)

 

OF RIGHT (FOUR ARTICLES)

 After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, the 
consideration of which will be fourfold:

 (1) Of justice;

 (2) Of its parts;

 (3) Of the corresponding gift;

 (4) Of the precepts relating to justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] Out. Para. 2/3

 Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2) 
Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] Out. Para. 3/3

 Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether right is the object of justice?

 (2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right?

 (3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?

 (4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether right is the object of justice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For the 
jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that "right is the 
art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the object of justice, but 
is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore right is not the object of 
justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind of 
right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence, wherefore 
the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as one of the parts 
of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for Augustine 
says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone, and 
consequently governing aright all things subject to man." Now right [jus] 
does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human affairs, for Isidore 
says (Etym. v, 2) that "'fas' is the Divine law, and 'jus,' the human 
law." Therefore right is not the object of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'jus' [right] is so 
called because it is just." Now the "just" is the object of justice, for 
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are agreed in giving the 
name of justice to the habit which makes men capable of doing just 
actions."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with the other 
virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a 
kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say 
that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in 
reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues 
perfect man in those matters only  which befit him in relation to 
himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other 
virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper 
object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a 
work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its 
relation to others. Because a man's work is said to be just when it is 
related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the 
payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to 
be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an 
act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done 
by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be 
right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason 
justice has its own special proper object over and above the other 
virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as 
"right." Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their original 
signification so as to mean something else: thus the word "medicine" was 
first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and 
then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is done. In like 
manner the word "jus" [right] was first of all used to denote the just 
thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art 
whereby it is known what is just, and further to denote the place where 
justice is administered, thus a man is said to appear "in jure" [*In 
English we speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc.], and yet 
further, we say even that a man, who has the office of exercising 
justice, administers the jus even if his sentence be unjust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman an 
expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which 
expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in 
the mind an expression of the particular just work which the reason 
determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this rule be 
expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to Isidore 
(Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the same as right, 
but an expression of right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer 
God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a perfectly just 
repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not properly called "jus" 
but "fas," because, to wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish what we 
can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man repay God as much as he can, 
by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into natural 
right and positive right. For that which is natural is  unchangeable, and 
is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human 
affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in certain cases, nor do 
they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is no such thing as natural 
right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a thing is called "positive" when it proceeds from the 
human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds from the 
human will, else a man's will could not be unjust. Since then the "just" 
and the "right" are the same, it seems that there is no positive right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it transcends 
human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive right, since it is 
based not on human, but on Divine authority. Therefore right is 
unfittingly divided into natural and positive.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "political 
justice is partly natural and partly legal," i.e. established by law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) the "right" or the "just" is a 
work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of 
equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by its 
very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal value 
in return, and this is called "natural right." In another way a thing is 
adjusted or commensurated to another person, by agreement, or by common 
consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he receive so 
much. This can be done in two ways: first by private agreement, as that 
which is confirmed by an agreement between private individuals; secondly, 
by public agreement, as when the whole community agrees that something 
should be deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated to another 
person, or when this is decreed by the prince who is placed over the 
people, and acts in its stead, and this is called "positive right."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is unchangeable, 
must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's nature is changeable, 
wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes fail. Thus the 
restitution of a deposit to the depositor is in accordance with natural 
equality, and if human nature were always right, this would always have 
to be observed; but since it happens sometimes that man's will is 
unrighteous there are cases in which a deposit should not be restored, 
lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited: as 
when a madman or an enemy of the common weal demands the return of his 
weapons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing to be 
just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural justice, and it 
is in such matters that positive right has its place. Hence the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "in the case of the legal just, it 
does not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form or 
another, it only matters when once it is laid down." If, however, a thing 
is, of itself, contrary to natural  right, the human will cannot make it 
just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit 
adultery. Hence it is written (Is. 10:1): "Woe to them that make wicked 
laws."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God. Such 
things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their justice is 
hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree. Hence also 
Divine right may be divided in respect of these two things, even as human 
right is. For the Divine law commands certain things because they are 
good, and forbids others, because they are evil, while others are good 
because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as the 
natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is natural to 
them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the jurist 
[*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the right of nations is that 
which is in use among all nations." Therefore the right of nations is the 
natural right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally 
slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now "slavery belongs 
to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4). Therefore the 
right of nations is a natural right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, right as stated above (A[2]) is divided into natural and 
positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since all 
nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement. Therefore 
the right of nations is a natural right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either 
natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right of 
nations is distinct from natural right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the natural right or just is that 
which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another 
person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as it is 
considered absolutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate 
with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is commensurate 
with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is naturally 
commensurate with another person, not according as it is considered 
absolutely, but according to something resultant from it, for instance 
the possession of property. For if a particular piece of land be 
considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to one 
man more than to another, but if it be considered in respect of its 
adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it has a 
certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man, 
as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to  apprehend a 
thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is common to 
us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration. But 
the right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense, as the 
jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says because "the latter is 
common to all animals, while the former is common to men only." On the 
other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what results from it, 
is proper to reason, wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of 
natural reason which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 
1; De Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all 
men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations." 
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man 
should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural 
reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man 
to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be helped by the former, 
as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore slavery which belongs 
to the right of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the 
first.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are according 
to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, it follows 
that they need no special institution, for they are instituted by natural 
reason itself, as stated by the authority quoted above


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as 
special species?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of dominion" 
should not be distinguished as special species. For it belongs to justice 
to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose states (De Offic. i, 24). 
Now right is the object of justice, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore 
right belongs to each one equally; and we ought not to distinguish the 
rights of fathers and masters as distinct species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated 
above (A[1], ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or 
kingdom, as stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]), but not to the private good 
of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need for 
a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the master and the 
father pertain to a household, as stated in Polit. i, 2.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among men, 
for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. 
Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right of 
dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct  from civil right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Right or just depends on commensuration with another 
person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may denote 
something that is other simply, as that which is altogether distinct; as, 
for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the other, and both of 
whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and between these according 
to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the "just" simply. Secondly a 
thing is said to be other from something else, not simply, but as 
belonging in some way to that something else: and in this way, as regards 
human affairs, a son belongs to his father, since he is part of him 
somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a slave belongs to his 
master, because he is his instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. 
Ethic. viii, 11]. Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another 
simply, and so between them there is not the just simply, but a kind of 
just, called "paternal." In like manner neither is there the just simply, 
between master and servant, but that which is called "dominative." A 
wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, since she stands 
related to him as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), 
is nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his 
father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind of 
social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the Philosopher 
(Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between husband and wife 
than between father and son, or master and slave, because, as husband and 
wife have an immediate relation to the community of the household, as 
stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows that between them there is "domestic 
justice" rather than "civic."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right, the 
distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man gives 
himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since what 
belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the slave is his 
master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not justice of 
father to son, or of master to slave.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as 
such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is something 
having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence in so far as 
each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a way: and for 
this reason too there are certain laws regulating the relations of father 
to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in so far as each is 
something belonging to another, the perfect idea of "right" or "just" is 
wanting to them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All other differences between one person and another in a 
state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and to 
its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect sense of 
justice. This "just" however is distinguished according to various 
offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial," or 
"priestly" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of the 
simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or right of 
"dominion," but for the reason that something  proper is due to each 
class of person in respect of his particular office.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] Out. Para. 1/1

OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of 
inquiry:

 (1) What is justice?

 (2) Whether justice is always towards another?

 (3) Whether it is a virtue?

 (4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?

 (5) Whether it is a general virtue?

 (6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every 
virtue?

 (7) Whether there is a particular justice?

 (8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?

 (9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?

 (10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

 (11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?

 (12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant 
will to render to each one his right?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as 
being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right" 
[*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according to the Philosopher 
(Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man "capable of doing 
what is just, and of being just in action and in intention." Now "will" 
denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined 
as being a will.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will 
were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is unrighteous. Yet, 
according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore 
justice is not the will.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore justice is 
a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is 
unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that 
it is both "perpetual" and "constant."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right. 
Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that it is in 
none but the sovereign: which is absurd.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is 
love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one his 
right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 1/3 

 I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if 
understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the 
principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the 
good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper 
matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse 
with other men, as shall be shown further on (A[2]). Hence the act of 
justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the 
words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym. 
x), "a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of 
others."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, 
it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher 
says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs 
first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice," and 
"for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these 
is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance is 
involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions 
first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be 
voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and 
"perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act 
is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, 
because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to 
the proper form of a definition, he might say that "justice is a habit 
whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual 
will": and this is about the same definition as that given by the 
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a habit whereby a man 
is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his 
choice."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is 
customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine 
says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what one sees not."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but 
causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the 
part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's will alone 
is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man 
wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary condition of 
justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish 
to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being, because 
one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and 
it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all 
times and in all cases.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of  the act of 
the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the 
"perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always, 
"constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of 
command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of 
justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other 
hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of 
execution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as 
stated above (Q[25], A[1]), so too the service of God includes rendering 
to each one his due.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether justice is always towards one another?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the 
Apostle says (Rm. 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus 
Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. 
Neither therefore does justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it 
belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his 
authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive 
appetite is subject to man, according to Gn. 4:7, where it is written: 
"The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt 
have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion 
over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards oneself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is 
co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less 
than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified by 
justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright shall make 
his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our dealings not only 
with others, but also with ourselves.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of 
justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now 
this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is 
concerned only about our dealings with others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[57], A[1]) since justice by its name 
implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing 
is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to 
justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q[57], A[1]; FS, Q[113], 
A[1]) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings 
capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf. FP, Q[29], A[2]] 
and wholes and, properly speaking, not  to parts and forms or powers, for 
we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, 
nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such 
expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly 
speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in 
one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may 
speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the 
reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many 
agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to 
be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and 
concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each 
part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher 
(Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the 
ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the parts of 
the soul, as stated above (FS, Q[113], A[1]) where we were treating of 
the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to metaphorical 
justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal 
will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); 
although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is 
co-eternal with God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by 
the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But his 
dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation 
to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are 
directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this 
is justice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether justice is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written 
(Lk. 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that are 
commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which 
we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for 
Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that is estimated 
not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness." Therefore to 
do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of 
justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But 
to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of 
necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions 
that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those 
things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior 
but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) 
[*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce 
externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a 
moral virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure 
of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, 
fortitude and justice

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man 
himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. For a 
man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the 
rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates 
human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, 
and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly 
from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the 
luster of virtue appears above all in justice."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the 
person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a 
harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, 
spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. Hence it is 
written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence, 
and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous 
men) can have nothing more profitable in life."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from "constraint," and 
this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises 
from the obligation of a "command," or from the necessity of obtaining an 
end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without 
doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, 
when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does 
however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, 
"If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon 
me."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by making 
them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other 
men.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether justice is in the will as its subject?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For 
justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in 
the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now  it 
belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. 
Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not 
directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. 
Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "rational by 
participation," viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will 
as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude 
of the will observed for its own sake."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that 
virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act 
of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing 
something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or 
reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just 
through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of 
action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive 
power as its subject.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and 
the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is 
divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the FP, 
Q[81], A[2]. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot 
proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does 
not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to 
another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in 
the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: 
hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the 
will, as may be seen above (A[1]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude 
of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account 
of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; 
and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on the 
apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in 
relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, 
and this belongs to justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are 
"rational by participation," but the entire "appetitive" faculty, as 
stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now 
the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the 
subject of moral virtue.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether justice is a general virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice 
is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, "She teacheth 
temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "general" 
is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under 
the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are 
temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is 
reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any 
way be reckoned a general virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (A[2]
). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general sin, 
because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore 
neither is justice a general virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is 
every virtue."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Justice, as stated above (A[2]) directs man in his 
relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as 
regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations 
with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves 
all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its 
proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now 
it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation 
to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to 
a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the 
good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, 
whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to 
certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to 
which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, 
in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that 
justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to 
direct to the common good, as stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows 
that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal 
justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs 
the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, 
not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on 
(AA[7],12).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, 
viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive 
of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of 
particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as 
its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge 
whereof belongs to the intellect.  Hence justice can be a general virtue 
rather than temperance or fortitude.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to another, 
especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so 
far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and 
in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written 
(1 Jn. 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all 
virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially 
the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that 
"virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their 
mode of being." Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or 
logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the 
same as every virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all 
virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue." 
Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that 
virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of 
temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed 
to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all 
the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the 
multitude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore 
it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the 
whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or 
purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. 
Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not 
belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it 
seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able 
to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be 
virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the 
virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good 
citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a 
man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the 
same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the 
other.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Body Para. 1/3 

 I answer that, A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by 
"predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse and 
the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be 
essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, 
for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and 
forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general 
"virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its 
effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are 
illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need 
for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in 
relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not 
essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to 
what has been said (A[5]), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, 
in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its 
own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for 
just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs 
the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, 
in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. 
Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper 
object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal 
justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it 
regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the 
sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is 
secondarily and administratively in his subjects.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Body Para. 2/3

 However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so 
far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal 
justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually 
general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as 
all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that 
the Philosopher speaks.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Body Para. 3/3

 Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue 
commanded by legal justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that 
virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further 
end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered 
strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end. 
Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from 
every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and 
this virtue is legal justice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general 
justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues,  as neither is 
there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his 
relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular 
justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" 
and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in matters 
relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA[5],6). Therefore there is 
not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters 
relating to the individual.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands the 
household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice 
there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the 
same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the 
common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore 
neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Mt. 5:6, "Blessed are 
they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By 
justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue 
which is opposed to covetousness."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), legal justice is not essentially 
the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man 
immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to 
direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these 
virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. 
Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for 
particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as 
temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for 
particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his 
relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so 
immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. 
Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man 
immediately to the good of another individual.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of the 
individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," but 
also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common" good differs 
from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole" 
differs from that of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) 
that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the 
like differ only as many and few and not specifically."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher 
(Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of 
husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one 
person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons 
there is not justice simply,  but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" 
justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether particular justice has a special matter?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. 
Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates," says: 
"Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it 
flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this 
would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every 
special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice 
has no special matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has 
four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz. 
temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the 
fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore particular 
justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to 
others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to 
this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular 
justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of 
moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according 
to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only 
the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also 
those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect 
of external actions and external things by means of which men can 
communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is 
to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we 
consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is 
directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, 
but only about external actions and things, under a certain special 
aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through 
them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of 
the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which 
moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly 
justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind 
of diffusion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the cardinal virtues 
may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a 
determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this 
latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage  quoted: for he says that 
"prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is 
the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of 
mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our 
neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common 
principle of the entire order between one man and another."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral matter, 
are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the 
specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are 
capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow 
that the matter of justice is general.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether justice is about the passions?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and 
pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above 
[*FS, Q[23], A[4]; FS, Q[31], A[1]; FS, Q[35], A[1]] when we were 
treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is 
about the passions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in 
relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified 
unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the 
passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual 
lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. 
Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so 
is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would 
not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the 
passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is 
about operations.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The true answer to this question may be gathered from a 
twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, 
whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above (FS, Q[22], 
A[3]; FS, Q[59], A[4]), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose 
movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, 
as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and 
concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice 
is about man's relations with another, and we are not directed 
immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not 
about the passions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its 
proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but  every moral 
virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, 
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and pain are the 
principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a 
good": and in this way too they belong to justice, since "a man is not 
just unless he rejoice in just actions" (Ethic. i, 8).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: External operations are as it were between external things, 
which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their origin. 
Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without 
there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another's 
property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will 
to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another's property 
without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in 
so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in 
so far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other moral 
virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of 
another's property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality 
that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it 
as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, 
external operations take their species, not from the internal passions 
but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, 
external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of 
the other moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The common good is the end of each individual member of a 
community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the 
other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another 
individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good, 
is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is 
disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which 
is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice 
extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external 
operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us to perform the 
actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a temperate person . 
. . and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v, 5).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For 
the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is 
defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which observes the mean 
fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice observes the rational 
and not the real mean.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess 
nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the 
case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about 
things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice 
does not observe the real mean.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the 
rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies 
according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too 
little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: 
for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one 
who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not 
the real, but the rational mean.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean 
of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion, so that 
it is the real mean.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[9]; FS, Q[59], A[4]), the other moral 
virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which 
is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject 
of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with 
their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is 
measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by 
comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is 
only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so 
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly 
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists 
in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the 
external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, 
as stated in Metaph. x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]: wherefore 
justice observes the real mean.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice 
satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. 
First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and 
there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this 
sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good 
absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being 
abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to 
find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or 
ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good 
simply.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a 
prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each 
injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this 
implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render  to each 
one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act 
of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is 
not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in 
rendering to each one his own.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which we 
may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it pertains to 
liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what is his. Therefore 
the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things 
duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery and 
so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong 
solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not 
sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each 
one his own.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that 
renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it 
disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[8],10), the matter of justice is an 
external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is 
made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by 
justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him according to 
equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing 
else than to render to each one his own.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary 
virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, as 
we shall state further on (Q[80], A[1]). Wherefore to succor the needy, 
which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which 
pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as 
to their principal virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of 
justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, and 
whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is that 
justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary 
interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those 
expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to all 
other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to each one 
of what is his own.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the 
moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what 
is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to  give of one's own, and this 
is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than 
itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the 
virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more 
excellent than justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as 
stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult things than 
justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 
6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most 
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it 
stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common 
good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the 
virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the 
evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular 
justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first 
reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more 
excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas 
the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto 
appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. 
The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are 
commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, 
whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being 
well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of 
another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says 
(Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most 
profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to 
others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and 
the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is 
useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so 
in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, 
while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of 
the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas 
liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man's 
own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the 
latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult  things, it 
is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice 
is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] Out. Para. 1/1

OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points 
of inquiry:

 (1) Whether injustice is a special vice?

 (2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?

 (3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?

 (4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether injustice is a special virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is 
written (1 Jn. 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever committeth 
sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now iniquity would 
seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, 
so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. 
Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But 
injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is 
opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in 
like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a 
special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will. 
But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). 
Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a 
special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice 
which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special 
vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good 
which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the 
intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of 
sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the 
character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in accord 
with what has been said above about justice (Q[58], AA[5],6). Secondly we 
speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and 
another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or 
honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a 
special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so 
Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which  all sin is 
repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the 
virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice 
and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated 
above (Q[58], A[9], ad 2).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, 
i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another 
person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point 
of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same 
applies to injustice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust 
thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above (FS, 
Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the 
proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be 
called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an 
unjust thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a 
false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do suddenly an 
unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is 
unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false unless it 
were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to 
be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, 
and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is 
intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust 
thing, is said to be unjust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do 
an unjust thing without being unjust."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in 
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, 
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To 
this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act 
which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that 
a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a 
lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For 
the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its 
indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that 
which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention. 
Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust 
thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it 
is unjust, properly speaking he  does an unjust thing, not directly, but 
only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust: 
hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may 
happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the 
habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, 
anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the 
injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. In the latter 
case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has 
a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. 
Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper 
to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit 
of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through 
passion, without having the habit of injustice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal 
acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from 
choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake 
of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The object of temperance is not something established 
externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, i.e. 
the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. 
Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be 
temperate either materially or formally. In like manner neither can it be 
called intemperate: and in this respect there is dissimilarity between 
justice and the other moral virtues; but as regards the proportion 
between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For 
injustice is inequality, as stated above (A[2]). Now a man by injuring 
himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. Therefore a 
man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever does 
himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can 
voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having 
committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished according 
to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can do himself an 
injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice 
voluntarily.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that 
injustice. But it may happen that a man does an  injustice to one who 
wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. 
Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are 
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on 
the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas 
passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the same 
respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; 
viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, wherefore 
man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the 
other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will, since 
in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, 
considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must 
conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice 
except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that 
accidentally and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is 
unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man does 
anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man 
voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he 
does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a man's 
ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit 
something of his own free-will, either by his own or by another's action.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways. First, 
with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it 
may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for 
instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than 
justice, is always referred to another person. Secondly, this or that man 
may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as 
belonging to God, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills 
himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to 
God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human 
law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 
3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the 
point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that 
which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above (A[2]), 
and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent 
and patient, as stated above (A[2]). Accordingly we must reply that 
injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always 
accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the 
formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an 
injustice, and yet the other man does not  suffer an injustice, because 
he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an 
injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who 
does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only 
materially.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins 
mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a 
venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in 
reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in 
ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." Therefore not 
everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but 
slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be 
accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. 
ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter 
Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto that 
a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other 
virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an 
injustice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. 
Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of 
God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or 
to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q[64], seqq.). 
Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were treating 
of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to 
charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on 
another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will 
the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury 
inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a 
mortal sin according to its genus.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as 
referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance of particular 
circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves pardon, and not to 
ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice 
through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above 
(A[2])

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of 
the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed 
not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: 
for instance, if a man take an apple  or some such thing from another 
man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or 
displeased.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not 
always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human 
passions; hence there is no comparison.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] Out. Para. 1/1

OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

 In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are 
six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?

 (2) Whether it is lawful to judge?

 (3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?

 (4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?

 (5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law?

 (6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether judgment is an act of justice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The 
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he 
knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. 
Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment 
belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as 
stated above (Q[58], A[4]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man 
judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of 
charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is 
given to us" (Rm. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than 
to justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper 
matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in everything," 
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does not 
belong to justice any more than to the other moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But the 
act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges are 
not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of 
justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned 
into judgment."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such. Now 
a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus dicens] 
and right is the object of justice, as stated above (Q[57], A[1]). 
Consequently the original meaning of the word "judgment" is a statement 
or decision of the just or right. Now to decide  rightly about virtuous 
deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste 
person decides rightly about matters relating to chastity. Therefore 
judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs 
properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) 
that "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification 
of justice."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a right 
decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right 
decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a right 
judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the virtue 
itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an act of 
reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define. The 
other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends his 
aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment 
proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it proceeds from 
fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice 
inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence 
pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well according to 
common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as 
stated above (Q[51], A[3]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has 
an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine 
rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces judgment 
through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces judgment 
through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas justice 
regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q[58], A[2]). 
Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in matters 
relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are in question, 
there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking 
judgment in its broader sense, as explained above (ad 1). But in matters 
of justice, there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is 
"able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. 
Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other 
virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q[58], 
A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in the 
subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which 
denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as 
existing chiefly in one who has authority.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to judge?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except 
what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with punishment, 
which those who judge not will escape, according to Mt. 7:1, "Judge not, 
and ye shall not be judged."  Therefore it is unlawful to judge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest 
another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth." Now God 
is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we say 
that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful for a 
sinner to judge, according to Rm. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man, 
whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou 
condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest." 
Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges 
and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people 
with just judgment."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. 
Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that three 
conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, 
that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come 
from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to 
the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the 
judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the 
rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted" or "unjust": 
secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority, 
and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly, when the reason 
lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a 
judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called 
judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is 
about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine 
states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about 
Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, since 
they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on Mt. 5. Or 
again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus 
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He forbids the 
judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is 
written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on (Dt. 
1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge 
those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom [*Hom. 
xxiv] says on the words of Mt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all does this hold 
when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal 
arising in the hearts of others. If however they are not public but 
hidden, and there be an urgent  necessity for the judge to pronounce 
judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility 
and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "If we 
find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan 
together with him, and invite him to strive against it together with us." 
And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as 
to deserve to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning another, 
he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of 
another or a like sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from 
suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about an 
evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is 
about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any but 
an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human 
judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent 
matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful 
to judge from suspicions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him 
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's 
opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of 
another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an 
injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A[1]). 
Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated 
above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would always 
be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is false, because "we 
cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in 
Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." Therefore a judgment 
based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus 
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on the 
words of Mt. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment our Lord 
does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives, but 
that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own 
righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on mere 
suspicion."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes 
evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three 
causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very fact, 
as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think evil of 
others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in the way, 
whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools." Secondly, this is 
due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates or 
despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight 
indications to  think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what 
he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long experience: wherefore the 
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old people are very suspicious, for 
they have often experienced the faults of others." The first two causes 
of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the 
third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads 
to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently 
suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the 
more vicious it is.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man 
begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This is a 
venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation without which 
no man can go through this life," according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, 
"Judge not before the time." The second degree is when a man, from slight 
indications, esteems another man's wickedness as certain. This is a 
mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without 
contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to say: "If then 
we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human, we must nevertheless 
restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a definite and fixed 
opinion." The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a 
man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently 
is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not indeed 
the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the matter in 
point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another 
without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does him 
an injury.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since justice and injustice are about external operations, 
as stated above (Q[58], AA[8],10,11; Q[59], A[1], ad 3), the judgment of 
suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by external 
action, and then it is a mortal sin, as stated above. The internal 
judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is related to the external 
judgment, even as the internal to the external act, for instance as 
desire is related to fornication, or anger to murder.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. 
Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it 
happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number of fools 
is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought of man's 
heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore doubts 
should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he leads 
a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns 
neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a doubtful point 
for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard 
to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst, 
according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it seems that 
doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the 
worst.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not 
judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best 
sense."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact 
that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and 
despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another 
man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident 
indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by 
interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen 
to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently 
through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently 
through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case 
an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of 
men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or 
evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm 
no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question 
of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil 
if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of the intellect, and 
the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone 
should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the 
other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is 
considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being 
formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is 
judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. 
For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a 
man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we 
may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to 
our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither 
does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of 
contingent singulars in themselves.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the best 
in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to 
apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or  another's, in order for 
the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is 
expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious 
against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. 
Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by 
deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we 
should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging 
of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether we should always judge according to the written law?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the 
written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But written 
laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, "Woe to them 
that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice." Therefore 
we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual happenings. 
But no written law can cover each and every individual happening, as the 
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not 
always bound to judge according to the written law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's intention 
may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the lawgiver 
himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not 
always to judge according to the written law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these earthly 
laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, when once 
they are established and passed, the judges may judge no longer of them, 
but according to them."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), judgment is nothing else but a 
decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just in 
two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called 
"natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is 
called "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now laws are 
written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in 
different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural right, 
but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force, not from 
the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains positive 
right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else 
judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive right.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the natural 
right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force,  because neither 
can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law contains anything 
contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force. For 
positive right has no place except where "it matters not," according to 
the natural right, "whether a thing be done in one way or in another"; as 
stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2). Wherefore such documents are to be 
called, not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above (FS, 
Q[95], A[2]): and consequently judgment should not be delivered according 
to them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either always 
or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too laws that are 
rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they were observed they 
would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in such cases judgment 
should be delivered, not according to the letter of the law, but 
according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence the jurist says 
[*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or 
favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render 
burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare 
of man." In such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; 
and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by being 
usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now truth is not 
impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who 
ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing, no matter who 
declares what is just, and this is what is meant by judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is related 
to the praise of some that they punished sins without having authority 
over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the Egyptian (Ex. 
2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri the son of Salu 
(Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto justice" (Ps. 105:31). 
Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now prelates 
having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters concerning the 
secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to judge 
aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown above (A[1], 
ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who 
judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law. Neither 
therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i.e. without 
authority. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest 
another man's servant?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the 
written law, as stated above (A[5]), he that pronounces judgment, 
interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some 
particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to interpret 
and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by public authority, 
so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority, which 
extends over those who are subject to the community. Wherefore even as it 
would be unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that was 
not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, if a man compels 
another to submit to a judgment that is pronounced by other than the 
public authority.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept 
it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other 
hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to 
be judged by one who has no public authority.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority 
received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from 
Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he 
thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save 
Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the 
Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked, without 
himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose 
says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off a blow from a 
fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker"; and he 
quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ. Exod. 
qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives proof 
of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful seeds have 
grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great 
fertility," in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he 
was to deliver his people.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for God 
by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he was 
nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his concern as 
of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. 22:20; Lev. 20; Dt. 
13,17].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the 
body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not usurped if 
the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are 
subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the 
spiritual by the temporal authority.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are  perfections of the 
individual, and consequently their absence does not make a judgment to be 
usurped, as in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment its 
coercive force.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, 
which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative 
justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, 
i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will be 
twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since 
restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must 
consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive 
justice; (2) restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and 
commutative?

 (2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?

 (3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?

 (4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as 
counter-passion?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative 
and distributive?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably 
assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the 
many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the 
common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the 
goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods 
of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would 
be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes 
worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again." 
Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his 
own, as stated above (Q[58], A[2]). But when things are distributed, a 
man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something 
which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to 
justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the 
subject, as stated above (Q[58], A[6]). But it belongs exclusively to the 
sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to 
justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic. v, 
4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. 
Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal 
justice. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a 
virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one 
person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. 
Therefore they are not different species of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says 
(Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other, commutations."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], AA[7],8), particular justice is 
directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a 
part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a 
part. In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to 
which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This 
order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the 
mutual dealings between two persons. In the second place there is the 
order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of 
that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. 
This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common 
goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, 
distributive and commutative.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in 
his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation to be 
observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive 
justice directs.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that 
which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that 
when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of 
individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs 
to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet 
distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are 
distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution. 
Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state 
but to the members of a family, and such distribution can be made by 
authority of a private individual.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Movement takes its species from the term "whereunto." Hence 
it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those matters 
which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to 
particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by 
way of distribution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in 
respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different kinds of 
due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his 
personal property in another way. 

™Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in 
commutative justice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be 
observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of these is 
a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A[1]). Now the mean is 
taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. 
Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both 
distributive and commutative justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the 
mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one 
virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we 
have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's deserts 
are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; 
thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a 
private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in 
both kinds of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in 
distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion," 
whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in distributive justice something 
is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole 
is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the 
importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. 
Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of 
the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the 
community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged 
according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy 
according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of 
community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not 
according to equality between thing and thing, but according to 
proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one 
person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses 
that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 
3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," 
wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example 
we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion 
equals 1-1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its 
half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 
exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on 
account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen 
chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of  commutation is found 
primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that 
the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become 
richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will 
be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which is gauged 
according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 
4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, by 1. 
Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them 
receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one that is the receiver, 
will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be 
justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that 
has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is 
the mean.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean, 
is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, 
in justice, depends on the diversity of things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein 
distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality 
of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of 
arithmetical proportion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the 
quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a 
private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's station is 
considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered in 
so far as it causes a diversity of things.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds 
of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the 
case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and 
commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they are 
not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive 
justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be distributed 
among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are 
the subject matter of commutations between one person and another, and 
this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the matters of 
distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from that 
of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ specifically, 
where there is no specific difference, there ought to be no diversity of 
matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative justice as 
one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter. Therefore the matter 
of these species of justice  is, seemingly, not of many kinds.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that "one kind of justice 
directs distributions, and another commutations."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[51], AA[8],10), justice is about 
certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These 
consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, persons or even 
works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that 
which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person 
of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, or even by showing 
respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of 
another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter 
of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are 
the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same, 
since things can be distributed out of the common property to 
individuals, and be the subject of commutation between one person and 
another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of 
laborious works.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the 
principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, and 
works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For 
distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice 
directs commutations that can take place between two persons. of these 
some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when anyone 
uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, and this 
may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the 
offence may be committed against the other man's chattel or person, or 
against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his 
chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called "theft," if openly, it 
is called "robbery." If it be against another man's person, it may affect 
either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against 
the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is 
treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly 
slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his personal 
dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so 
forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and openly, by being 
accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a 
personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly 
(for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the 
latter be induced to leave his master: which things can also be done 
openly. The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever 
injury may be committed against the principal, may be committed against 
them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master 
are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave 
is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are 
when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he 
transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case 
of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. A voluntary 
transfer belongs to justice  in so far as it includes the notion of debt, 
and this may occur in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his 
thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens in selling and 
buying. Secondly when a man transfers his thing to another, that the 
latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its 
owner. If he grant the use of a thing gratuitously, it is called 
"usufruct" in things that bear fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in 
things that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even 
the use is granted gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a 
man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the 
purpose of its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or 
under some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one 
man stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary 
or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the 
equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same 
species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for the 
Replies to the Objections.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as 
retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the judgment 
of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, 
according to Mt. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you shall be judged: 
and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again." 
Therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to someone 
according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this equality 
regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a 
person has done for the good of the community; while in commutative 
justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss. Now in 
respect of either equality there is retaliation in respect of the deed 
committed. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same 
as retaliation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on the 
difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who does an 
injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and 
involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the mean of 
justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us. Therefore 
it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is 
not always the same as retaliation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid 
for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to 
injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his 
neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be  struck back. This 
kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): "He shall render 
life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away what 
belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that secondly 
retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to another, 
should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the 
Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and kill or sell it, 
he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep." 
Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations, where 
action and passion are on both sides, although voluntariness detracts 
from the nature of passion, as stated above (Q[59], A[3]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of 
equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely 
that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not 
always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action. 
Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one who 
is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species that he 
might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only struck 
back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when a man 
despoils another of his property against the latter's will, the action 
surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing, because the 
man who caused another's loss, himself would lose nothing, and so he is 
punished by making restitution several times over, because not only did 
he injure a private individual, but also the common weal, the security of 
whose protection he has infringed. Nor again would there be equality of 
passion in voluntary commutations, were one always to exchange one's 
chattel for another man's, because it might happen that the other man's 
chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to 
equalize passion and action in commutations according to a certain 
proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence 
retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no 
place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive justice we 
do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion 
and action (whence the expression 'contrapassum'), but according to 
proportion between things and persons, as stated above (A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with the 
conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned 
to merits, and punishments to sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his 
services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, 
justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not between 
the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing received by 
one person and the thing received by another according to the respective 
conditions of those persons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is 
aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence it 
requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, 
not on part, but on the part of the thing. 

™Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] Out. Para. 1/1

OF RESTITUTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight 
points of inquiry:

 (1) of what is it an act?

 (2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one 
has taken away?

 (3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?

 (4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?

 (5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom 
something has been taken?

 (6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore 
it?

 (7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?

 (8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of commutative 
justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one may 
restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore 
restitution is not the act of any part of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be 
restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and 
passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution 
would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now 
something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but also 
in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his 
due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of commutative than of 
distributive justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act 
of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore 
to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person 
in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in restitution we 
consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for 
another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is an 
act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs 
to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or 
against his will, as in robbery or theft.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly 
speaking, although it may have been his at some time:  wherefore it is a 
mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what 
is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, since the 
thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of 
the formal aspect of justice, which considers that thing as belonging to 
this particular man: and so it is not restitution properly so called.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something done 
over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally 
to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one 
person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in 
respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term "commutation" has 
passed from such like things to those actions and passions which confer 
reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term 
"restitution" is applied, to things which though they be transitory in 
reality, yet remain in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when 
the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man 
remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom 
less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the 
latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his 
due: and consequently it pertains to commutative justice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for 
salvation?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been 
taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation. 
But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a 
man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem necessary for 
salvation to restore what one has taken from another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, 
for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, 
without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away 
another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is not necessary 
for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses 
his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has 
been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not 
necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is 
seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little is 
almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher says 
(Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from  obtaining a benefice 
or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since 
this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for 
salvation to restore what one has taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a man 
restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Restitution as stated above (A[1]) is an act of 
commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore 
restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is 
by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be 
taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need 
for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the 
safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is 
necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices 
to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our 
parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that 
which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation 
should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived 
another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor, 
the condition of either party being duly considered according to the 
judgment of a good man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: There are three ways in which one may take away another's 
good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man 
reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and 
then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue 
and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name, by 
confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but 
unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin contrarily to the right 
order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far 
as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying 
that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to 
restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in 
other cases, as stated above (ad 1).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be 
undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its effect, 
viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the opinion of 
other men.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a 
benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the honor of God 
or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more 
worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make 
restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to 
injure the person whom one  hinders, through hatred, revenge or the like. 
In this case, if before the benefice has been definitely assigned to 
anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by 
counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to make some 
compensation, after taking account of the circumstances of persons and 
things according to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not 
bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and 
might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the 
other hand, the benefice had already been assigned to a certain person, 
and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same 
as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and 
consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in 
proportion, however, to his means.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the exact 
amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): "If a man shall steal an ox 
or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, 
and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound to keep the 
commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound to restore 
four- or fivefold.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "What things soever were written, were written for our 
learning" (Rm. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Lk. 19:8) to our Lord: "If I 
have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold." Therefore a 
man is bound to restore several times over the amount he has taken 
unjustly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not bound 
to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the amount of 
his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay it, 
and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust 
taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the 
exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to restore more than 
the exact amount taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two things 
must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing, which 
inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The 
other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the 
part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence but fails.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, since 
thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough that a man 
restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as regards the 
sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which belongs 
to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by the judge, he is not 
bound to restore  more than he took, but when once he is condemned, he is 
bound to pay the penalty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law 
fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this 
commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man is 
bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above (FS, Q[104], A[3]). 
Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law, and then the same 
answer would apply.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was 
bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half of my 
goods I give to the poor."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more by 
way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has not 
taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to remove that 
loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than 
the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's seeds, you inflict 
on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you would seem 
to be bound to make restitution accordingly. Therefore a man is bound to 
restore what he has not taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the stated 
time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible profits from 
that money, and yet he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that 
a man is bound to restore what he did not take.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a man 
is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him, according 
to Mt. 25:26, "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and gather where 
I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one should restore to a 
man also, something that one has not taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it 
re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not 
take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make such 
a restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another person, seemingly, 
takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having "less"* 
than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English than in Latin, 
where 'damnum' stands for 'loss,' and 'minus' for 'less.' Aristotle 
merely says that to have more than  your own is called 'gain,' and to 
have less than you started with is called 'loss.'] Therefore a man is 
bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought upon 
another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what 
he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made good by 
repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies another by 
destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house. 
Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining what 
he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made good in 
equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it 
actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely 
virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified by receiving 
the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him, 
but more, and this is not necessary for salvation, as stated above. 
However he is bound to make some compensation, according to the condition 
of persons and things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: because 
the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not actually but 
only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the profit not yet 
actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has sown 
in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing either the 
shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had received 
nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects from us the fruit of 
His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, although the gifts 
themselves are from God without us.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing 
has been taken?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the 
person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to injure 
anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to 
others, were one to restore to him what has been taken from him; if, for 
instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore restitution 
need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not 
deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that which 
another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who 
are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary to make 
restitution to the person from whom one has taken something.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is 
sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a thing 
has been taken, either because he is dead, or because  he is too far 
away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need not 
always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have 
received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from others 
(our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore 
sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than make 
restitution to one from whom we have taken something.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the 
restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken something 
from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his 
hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's property. Therefore he 
ought not to restore to the Church from whom he has taken: and so 
restitution should not always be made to the person from whom something 
has been taken away

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 13:7): "Render . . . to all men 
their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative 
justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, as 
stated above (A[2]; Q[58], A[10]). Now this equalizing of things is 
impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking 
to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person 
from whom a thing has been taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously 
injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, 
it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is 
directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all 
possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains 
another's property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it, 
that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to 
keep it more securely.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First 
through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is the 
case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose 
what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him: and, since 
the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the 
price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly a man gives 
unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving 
itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornication: 
wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, however, she has 
extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown 
altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible,  for instance by 
giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): 
but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person. If 
the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made 
to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he be very far away, 
what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it be of great 
value and can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe place 
to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised of the fact.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his 
parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he 
ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and 
he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is due to 
another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he 
could and should even take what belongs to another in order to succor a 
parent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the Church 
of her property. First by laying hands on Church property which is 
committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a bishop 
appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is clear that 
he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who are its 
lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person (for instance a 
relative or a friend) Church property committed to himself: in which case 
he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care, 
so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands 
on Church property, merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have 
a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which 
case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound 
to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of justice, by 
taking away from him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now 
it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which belongs to another, 
no longer has it, through its having passed into another's hands. 
Therefore it should be restored, not by the person that took it, but by 
the one that has it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by making 
restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the case of 
theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to 
restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now 
sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one of them 
restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not 
always bound to restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction.  Now 
restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing 
is bound to restore it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken another's property, 
two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By reason 
of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his 
possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his, 
should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it according to 
the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the taking of the 
thing that is another's property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is 
injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery: 
in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the 
thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing 
is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, 
though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured 
person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make 
compensation for the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in 
addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man 
takes another's property for his own profit but without committing an 
injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: and 
then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing, 
but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the thing: for he 
is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would 
not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes 
another's property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as 
in the case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no 
obligation on account of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; 
but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. 
Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his 
part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to 
lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has more 
than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than his due 
may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those 
things which one man may receive from another without loss to the latter, 
as when a person takes a light from another's candle. Consequently 
although he that has taken something from another, may have ceased to 
have what he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since 
that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he 
that took the thing, on account of the injurious taking, and he that has 
it, on account of the thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other 
men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so he may 
make restitution of another's property through the priest to whom he 
confesses.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation 
for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing  has been taken 
unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient 
compensation from one, the others are not bound to any further 
restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the person who has 
made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them from so doing.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have 
not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now none should 
be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to 
restitution save the one who has taken.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's 
property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a 
thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, 
the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both 
because he would receive restitution many times over, and because 
sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from 
someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are 
not bound to restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to 
safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to 
the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. 
Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying or 
withstanding a thief.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 1:32): "They who do such things are 
worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that 
consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner they that consent 
are bound to restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), a person is bound to restitution 
not only on account of someone else's property which he has taken, but 
also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an 
unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly 
and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in 
three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take, 
either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for 
his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving 
him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the 
thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow 
evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from 
evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by 
omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or 
robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by 
sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 2/4

 "By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by 
participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not  denouncing."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 3/4

 It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator 
is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command: because he 
that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution 
principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without 
whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of 
receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them 
assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes part 
in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the 
theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority 
who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if 
by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them 
in payment of their preserving justice here below.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 4/4

 In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to 
restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious 
cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to 
restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust 
taking resulted from such causes.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, 
but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, 
or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in 
the deed; first of all, the "commander"; secondly, the "executor," and in 
due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, 
another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those 
who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are 
bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man 
commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be 
made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who 
has been unjustly injured.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or 
reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is 
obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly 
princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested 
with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate restitution, 
and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts do not bind 
for always. Now the necessity of making restitution is binding through an 
affirmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to immediate 
restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is 
sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is 
bound to immediate restitution.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. Now 
time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. Since then 
the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are 
determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems that neither 
in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore 
at once.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, All matters of restitution seem to come under one head. 
Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay 
compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of him that hath 
been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning." 
Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, to delay, 
and restitution should be made at once.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's 
property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property 
of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the use of what 
belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong 
to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to renounce 
one's sin at once, according to Ecclus. 21:2, "Flee from sin as from the 
face of a serpent." Consequently one is bound to immediate restitution, 
if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered to 
grant the use of the thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is 
affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to 
withhold another's property.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability 
excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is altogether 
excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. He 
is, however, bound either himself or through another to ask the person to 
whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to 
virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we are 
bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of 
unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands to reason 
that the time is determinate in the point of restitution being immediate.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] Out. Para. 1/2

VICES OPPOSED TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Q[63])


OF RESPECT OF PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of 
justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to 
distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the  vices opposed to 
commutative justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?

 (2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?

 (3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?

 (4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether respect of persons is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word 
"person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. FP, Q[29], A[3], 
ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal 
dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than 
things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not conversely. 
But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of 
persons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to 
respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes 
upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to Mt. 
24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field' [*'Bed' is the reading of 
Lk. 17:34]], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore 
respect of persons is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now 
respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1:17: "Neither shall you respect any 
man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice. 
For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various 
things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity. 
Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by reason of which 
the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect 
not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, "There is 
no respect of persons with God [Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge 
regards causes, not persons." For instance if you promote a man to a 
professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider 
the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on 
someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is 
proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular man 
(e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you 
give him something not for some cause that renders him worthy of it, but 
simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not 
amount to a reason why this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred 
to his person: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy or a 
professorship, because  he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it 
is respect of persons. It may happen, however, that a circumstance of 
person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards 
another: thus consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an 
estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: 
wherefore consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to 
respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows, 
accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice 
in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin is 
opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances of 
a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of persons 
we consider circumstances that do not so result.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things 
which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things pertaining 
to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be 
considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons 
themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were; 
and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely 
speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: There is a twofold giving. one belongs to justice, and 
occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of 
persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one 
gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of the 
gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a giving there 
is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may, without 
injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will, 
according to Mt. 20:14,15, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? . 
. . Take what is thine, and go thy way."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual 
goods?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the 
dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of respect of 
persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of 
consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby a man is 
rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this apparently is not 
a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do so. Therefore the sin 
of respect of persons does not take place in the conferring of spiritual 
goods.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor 
man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James 2:2,3. 
Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more 
readily granted to the rich and powerful than to  others. Therefore the 
sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of 
spiritual goods.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it suffices 
to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose the better 
man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who 
is less good for a higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a 
sin in spiritual matters.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) 
the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." Now this would 
seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons 
would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in 
spiritual matters.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of our 
Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words a gloss 
of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the promotion of a 
rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor 
man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.]

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), respect of persons is a sin, in 
so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in which 
justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual 
things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a 
more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing 
temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is 
allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, it must be 
observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two ways. First, 
simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in 
the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in relation to 
the common good; for it happens at times that the less holy and less 
learned man may conduce more to the common good, on account of worldly 
authority or activity, or something of the kind. And since the 
dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common good, 
according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to 
every man unto profit," it follows that in the dispensation of 
spiritualities the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the 
better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows 
gratuitous graces on the less worthy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's 
kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking, 
and in relation to the common good: and then if they are preferred to the 
more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of 
spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner, 
with power to give them away as he will, but the dispenser, according to 
1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, 
and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Sometimes however the 
prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of 
persons he can lawfully give preference to his kindred  since there is at 
least this advantage, that he can trust the more in their being of one 
mind with him in conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have 
to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example 
from him and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard 
to their deserts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for 
the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more 
necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that 
there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more readily to 
such persons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of 
law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect the 
better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as 
regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one who is 
better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good. 
For if it is possible to have one who is more competent for a post, and 
yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have some cause for this. If 
this cause have anything to do with the matter in point, he who is 
elected will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which is 
taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly be 
respect of persons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a particular 
Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the common good, 
since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For this reason 
it was commanded (Dt. 17:15): "Thou mayest not make a man of another 
nation king, who is not thy brother."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in 
showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than 
"reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," as the 
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be 
honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is 
written (Ex. 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother." Again masters, 
though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according to 
1 Tim. 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their 
masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to 
respect persons in showing honor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): "Rise up before the hoary 
head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to savor of 
respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according 
to Dan. 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people [*Vulg.: 
'Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to 
govern the people.']." Therefore  it is not a sin to respect persons in 
showing honor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith . . . 
with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] 
says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into your assembly a 
man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins 
not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is respect of persons to 
honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii in 
Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor, not the nature 
wherein they are made to God's image, but wealth," so that, wealth not 
being a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons. 
Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the rich 
for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored for 
other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of 
respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing 
honor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue, 
wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now it 
is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own 
virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and prelates, although they 
be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place, and as representing 
the community over which they are placed, according to Prov. 26:8, "As he 
that casteth a stone into the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor 
to a fool." For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to 
Mercury, "the heap of Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, 
when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble [*'Lapillus' or 'calculus' 
whence the English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a 
fool honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community: 
and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account of 
their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of 
all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, 
though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis. 4:8,9, 
"venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of 
years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life 
is old age." The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a 
higher position in the community: but if they be honored merely for their 
wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take 
place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to 
distributive justice, as stated above (A[1]): whereas  judicial sentences 
seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of 
persons does not take place in judicial sentences.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it 
is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a heavier 
punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on 
one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of persons does 
not take place in judicial sentences.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be merciful to 
the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the person of the 
needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to accept 
the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the person of 
the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[60], A[1]), judgment is an act of 
justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, 
those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of 
persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted 
to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of 
justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered 
corrupt by respect of persons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of 
the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and 
distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some 
common good is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to 
restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be 
considered in view of the form of judgment, in as much as, even in 
commutative justice, the judge takes from one and gives to another, and 
this belongs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons may 
take place in any judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a 
crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, 
because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity 
of things, as stated above (Q[58], A[10], ad 3; Q[61], A[2], ad 3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as 
far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying of Ex. 
23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] Out. Para. 1/2

VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE (QQ[64]-81)


(A) BY DEEDS (QQ[64]-66) 

™OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative 
justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation 
to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to 
voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary 
commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor against his will: and 
this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when 
one's neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person 
connected with him, or in his possessions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] Out. Para. 2/2

 We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first 
place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury 
on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether 
it is lawful to kill a sinner?

 (3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public 
person only?

 (4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?

 (5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

 (6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?

 (7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

 (8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle 
says (Rm. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of God purchase to 
themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the power, resisteth the 
ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves 
damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all living things 
should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8,9, "Who maketh grass to grow 
on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts their food." Therefore it 
seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now 
life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same reason it is 
apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed 
save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, according 
to the Divine law, on one who killed another man's ox or sheep (Ex. 
22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear it 
said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to trees, for 
they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no 
fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, 'Thou shalt not 
kill' refer to the killing of a man."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 1/2 

 I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for 
which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for 
the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from 
imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of 
a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so 
too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for 
animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man 
use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as 
the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that 
animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be 
done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to 
take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the 
use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God 
Himself: for it is written (Gn. 1:29,30): "Behold I have given you every 
herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all beasts of the 
earth": and again (Gn. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be 
meat to you."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and 
plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine 
says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both 
their life and their death are subject to our use."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason 
whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by 
another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are 
naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing the 
ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is 
not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord 
in the parable (Mt. 13) forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes 
wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a 
sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now 
according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, 
according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but 
that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems 
altogether unjust to kill sinners.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever,  to do that 
which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and 
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, 
since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we wish our 
friends to live and to exist," according to Ethic. ix, 4. Therefore it is 
nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not 
suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all the 
wicked of the land."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it is lawful to kill dumb 
animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the 
imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the 
whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the 
sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the 
whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or 
infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and 
advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared 
to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous 
and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is 
praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the 
common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor. 
5:6).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the 
cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the 
wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either 
because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many 
followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as 
Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that 
we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be 
delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to 
death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, 
but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the 
latter may be lawfully put to death.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays 
sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He 
allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for 
His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; 
for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows 
time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and 
consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he 
is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish 
state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to 
others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did 
not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like 
to them," and Prov.  11:29: "The fool shall serve the wise." Hence, 
although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his 
dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is 
to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more 
harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has 
sinned?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who 
has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on 
account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded (Ex. 32:27): "Let 
every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor." Therefore it is 
lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), man, on account of sin, is 
compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private individual to 
kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same 
reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has 
sinned.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for 
doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of evildoers is 
useful for the common good, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore it is 
deserving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque 
percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public 
authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all 
the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given 
him."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), it is lawful to kill an evildoer 
in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so 
that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare. 
Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has 
been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the 
care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public 
authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can 
lawfully put evildoers to death.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really does 
the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to 
Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes his service to one 
who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that 
wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's command, slew their 
neighbors and friends, would seem not to have done this themselves, but 
rather He by whose authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the 
foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the 
robber by the authority of  the judge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the 
case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; 
whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not 
for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On the other hand a 
man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; hence a 
public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the 
common good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for 
the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some 
other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person 
to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the 
welfare of the whole.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For clerics 
especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye 
followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are called upon to 
imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship puts 
evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their 
firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay twenty-three thousand men 
on account of the worship of the calf (Ex. 32), the priest Phinees slew 
the Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed 
Agag king of Amalec (1 Kgs. 15), Elias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kgs. 
18), Mathathias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 
Mach. 2); and, in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira 
(Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more 
united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister" lawfully puts 
evil-doers to death, according to Rm. 13:4. Much more therefore may 
clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual power, put evil-doers 
to death.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully 
exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely 
office to slay evildoers, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore those clerics 
who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3): "It behooveth . . . a 
bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is the 
reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. 
First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is 
represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who,  when He was struck did not 
strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1 Pt. 2:23). 
Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should 
imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As the judge of the 
people is himself, so also are his ministers." The other reason is 
because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein 
no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they 
should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting 
ministers of the New Testament.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is 
right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone should 
imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though God 
slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that all should 
imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Saphira 
to death by his own authority or with his own hand, but published their 
death sentence pronounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old 
Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed corporal 
penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay with their own hands.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things 
than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual 
welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly 
princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but 
that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their 
authority.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a 
sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an 
injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins 
by killing himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to 
kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an 
evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser 
danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut 
off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body. 
Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, for 
example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill 
himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and yet 
he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful for a 
man to kill himself. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, it is related (2 Mach. 14:42) that a certain Razias 
killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands 
of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth." Now 
nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is 
not unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it follows 
that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man---not 
another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills 
nothing else than a man."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three 
reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result 
being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists 
corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the 
inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love 
himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the 
natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such, 
belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as 
such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures 
the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly, 
because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills 
and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, 
even as he who kills another's slave, sins against that slave's master, 
and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to 
him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, 
according to Dt. 32:39, "I will kill and I will make to live."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to 
justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should 
have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to 
oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by reason 
also of its opposition to justice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to 
death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is 
judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public 
authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: although he may 
lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will: 
wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which 
pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the passage 
from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man's 
free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take 
his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape 
any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because the ultimate and 
most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states 
(Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to  
escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in 
order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one's own 
life on account of one's having committed a sin, both because by so doing 
one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time 
needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer 
except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for 
a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to 
commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir; 
of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided 
she does not consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no 
stain on the body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that 
fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's, 
especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because 
one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is 
most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. 
Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should 
consent to sin, because "evil must not be done that good may come" (Rm. 
3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small 
account and an uncertain event, for it is uncertain whether one will at 
some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from 
sin under any temptation whatever.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson is 
to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the 
ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders 
through him, had secretly commanded him to do this." He assigns the same 
reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution 
took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from 
being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he 
may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal 
evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason some, among 
whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude), 
yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness of soul unable to 
bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De 
Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the 
innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the 
contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27). Now 
Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to 
slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent 
person.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's 
neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more  grievous 
injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a 
greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the 
latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to 
the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a 
sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous 
person.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not 
a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, 
to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to 
judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to 
be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the 
executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has 
been unjustly sentenced.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just person 
thou shalt not put to death."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, 
in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man 
in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he 
be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is 
destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above (A[2]) the 
slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which 
is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men 
preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of 
the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the 
sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills an 
innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes: 
indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he fears Him.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the 
essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, 
sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he 
injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to 
charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less 
deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, 
because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he 
despises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, "He that despiseth you 
despiseth Me." On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the 
just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false 
witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with 
great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he 
cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If 
even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in 
accordance with the  evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent 
man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out 
the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the 
sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there 
would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it 
contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the 
judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but 
the judge whose minister he is.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in 
self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not 
agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; 
unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it 
not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be 
in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man in self-defense, 
kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be 
unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from sin 
in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's life for 
the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among contemptible things he 
reckons "those which men may forfeit unwillingly," as appears from the 
context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the 
body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the 
sake of the life of his own body.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis] 
says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom you have 
consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as 
to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their 
former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it 
lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever." Now 
clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. 
Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or 
adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery 
or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the 
spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no 
man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his 
own life.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Mt. 
7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rm. 
12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my dearly 
beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also 
unlawful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be  found 
breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he 
that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful 
to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty 
of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one 
of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral 
acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according 
to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained 
above (Q[43], A[3]; FS, Q[12], A[1]). Accordingly the act of self-defense 
may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the 
slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to 
save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to 
everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though 
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it 
be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, 
uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he 
repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according 
to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it 
is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the 
limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a 
man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the 
other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of 
another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the 
public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (A[3]), it 
is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except 
for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in 
self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier 
fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling 
with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private 
animosity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one 
man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage 
quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. 
Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," whereby he 
indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second 
Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking 
a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man 
to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, 
is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily 
directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence 
sometimes results the taking of a man's life.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes 
from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not  defending 
yourselves---that is, not striking your enemy back."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Out. Para. 1/1

Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing 
someone by chance. For we read (Gn. 4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in 
mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but 
this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gn. 4:23], and that he was 
accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder 
through killing a man by chance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a woman 
with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue thereupon, 
he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen without any intention 
of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing 
someone by chance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons 
prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due 
save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt 
of murder.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we do a 
thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause 
harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us." Now it sometimes 
happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done 
for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted 
guilty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance is a 
cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance happenings, 
strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every 
sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows 
that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary 
and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that 
which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who 
does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to 
remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in 
two ways: first when a man causes another's death through occupying 
himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he 
does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a man 
pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a 
person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person's death: whereas 
if he be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, 
but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his 
action results in someone's death.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man's 
life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of  homicide.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: 
wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the 
animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing 
that death is the natural result of such a blow.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted on those 
who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or 
failing to take sufficient care.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] Out. Para. 1/1

OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. 
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) The mutilation of members;

 (2) Blows;

 (3) Imprisonment;

 (4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are 
aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. 
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in departing 
from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to 
nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God that a man's body 
should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it 
should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems that it is always a 
sin to maim a person.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts 
of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful 
to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. 
Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public 
authority.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the 
welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for 
the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I, sect. 
4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they might 
preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to 
maim a person.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for 
the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member 
of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for 
the body. Now a member of the human body is of  itself useful to the good 
of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when 
a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly 
so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it 
cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of 
man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he 
is a part, as stated above (Q[61], A[1]; Q[64], AA[2],5), it may happen 
that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole 
body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so 
far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of 
restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully 
deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so 
is he deprived of a member on account of certain