Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are 
four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether fear causes contraction?

 (2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?

 (3) Whether it makes one tremble?

 (4) Whether it hinders action?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether fear causes contraction?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when 
contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn 
inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior 
parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may be 
seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who 
are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and 
heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, as may be seen 
in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the 
contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause 
contraction.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q[41], A[4]). 
But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), 
and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an 
indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction 
is not an effect of fear.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a 
power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[28], A[5]), in the passions of the 
soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while 
the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are 
mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes 
a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as 
to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain 
contraction: the reason of which is that fear arises from the imagination 
of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above 
(Q[41], A[2]). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of 
power, as stated above (Q[43], A[2]): and the weaker a power is, the 
fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination 
that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus 
we observe in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account 
of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when 
seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for 
the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which 
pertains to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction 
of heat and vital spirits towards the  inner parts takes place in regard 
to the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in 
those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of 
the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who 
are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who are angry, by reason 
of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the 
craving for vengeance, the inward movement has an upward direction: 
wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the 
result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in 
those who are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by cold, the 
vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the 
imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon 
the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man 
who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is 
natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing that 
causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, 
attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest help for all 
purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are 
in pain, their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, 
in order to make use thereof in repelling the harmful object. Hence the 
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat 
are concentrated together within, they require to find a vent in the 
voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from 
crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal 
heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad 
1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the 
vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth: the result being 
that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes 
its subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the 
soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there is 
contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: 
for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it experiences a 
contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it 
were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is that "those who are in 
fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears, 
is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. 
Consequently there results a contraction in this appetite, but not in the 
corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is 
free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread 
to the outward parts of the body: the result being that those who are 
ashamed blush.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. 
For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a hindrance 
thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, 
which is requisite for the good use of reason. Therefore fear does not 
make a man suitable for counsel.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and 
deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all 
thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. 
iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid 
evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear is of 
evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore 
fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men 
of counsel."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from 
his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men of 
counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take 
counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves." Now 
things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain 
magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they 
are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (Q[42], A[2]). Wherefore 
men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: 
and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of counsel. 
Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater 
or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems 
better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. 
Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every passion, 
considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it 
to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man 
does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that 
he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a 
man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may 
even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his 
ensuing carefulness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the 
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in  matters he 
despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. 
But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of good 
things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, 
as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of 
difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty, 
especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated 
above.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether fear makes one tremble?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because 
trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold person 
trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a 
parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are thirsty, 
especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are 
being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause trembling.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative 
medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often caused by 
fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not 
cause trembling.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the 
inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward 
parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should 
cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the 
case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is 
followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in fear there takes place a 
certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the 
result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason 
trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power 
in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of 
heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as 
stated in De Anima ii, 4.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, 
the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive parts. 
Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes 
indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary or even 
seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction 
of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 
11).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward  
movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, as 
also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart 
resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech, on 
account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, 
and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the heart; which 
explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the arms and 
hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For 
which reason the knees tremble in those who are afraid, according to Is. 
35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: 
'weak'] knees."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether fear hinders action?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered 
chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. But fear 
disturbs reason, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore fear hinders action.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to 
fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through 
fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would 
not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders action.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness 
hinders action. Therefore fear does too.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and trembling 
work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a 
hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first 
mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be 
hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal 
mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, 
is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward 
members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of 
the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the 
reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain 
solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention. 
If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders 
action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does 
not speak.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a 
disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured 
to his imagination.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, 
since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it hinders 
work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces 
to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby a man 
escapes from what he fears.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] Out. Para. 1/1

OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of 
inquiry:

 (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?

 (2) How is daring related to hope?

 (3) Of the cause of daring;

 (4) Of its effect.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether daring is contrary to fear?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine 
says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice is contrary to 
virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems 
that daring is not contrary to fear.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary 
to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes 
safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes forethought 
for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is 
not contrary to fear.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is 
contrary to fear."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest 
removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is 
farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the 
future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas 
daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that 
same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be 
taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the 
sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they 
are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a 
straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It 
is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of 
it in the first sense.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several 
contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having 
several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (Q[23], A[2]; 
Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold  contrariety: 
one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is 
contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and 
withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to 
hope.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but 
merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not. 
Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is 
opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so 
daring implies safety.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether daring ensues from hope?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because 
daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But 
hope regards good things, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]). Therefore they 
have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring 
does not ensue from hope.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair 
contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair 
excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring 
does not result from hope.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it 
belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore 
daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are 
hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from 
hope.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As we have often stated (Q[22], A[2]; Q[35], A[1]; Q[41], 
A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every 
movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or 
of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by 
reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason of itself, 
good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance: but by 
reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some 
good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through 
some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, 
follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil 
follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. 
Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good 
belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful 
evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, 
therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of 
overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. 
But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is 
because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not 
co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, 
since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently 
daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet 
avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good 
precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, 
so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always lead to 
despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to 
daring, save only when it is strong.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the 
estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet 
daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like 
manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while 
fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not 
a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is an effect, not a part, 
of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether some defect is a cause of daring?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the 
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are strong 
and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore 
daring is caused by a defect.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have 
no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience is a defect. 
Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; 
"like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the 
suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a 
defect.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of 
daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of 
safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent 
or far off." But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal 
of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. 
Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2) daring results from hope and is 
contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or 
banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and 
also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and 
in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause 
of daring in two ways, whether  by raising hope, or by banishing fear; in 
one way, in the part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the 
part of the bodily transmutation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope 
that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon 
victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily 
strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or 
they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of 
friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the 
Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is well 
in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear 
is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of fear; 
for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having 
harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since 
those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed 
others.

 On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the 
incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which 
raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De 
Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are more 
daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural 
heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a 
small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it 
does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those 
whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through the heat in the 
heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that 
"lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": 
hence it has been said above (Q[40], A[6]) that drunkenness conduces to 
hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by 
reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the heart.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but 
through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think greatly 
of himself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, 
not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as through 
being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers 
that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives 
rise to daring.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been 
wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the 
assistance of those who suffer unjustly."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, 
i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary, 
either in oneself or in another.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in 
the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which is 
contrary to daring, as stated above (A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But the daring 
sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 
3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of 
danger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: 
thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But the 
object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the 
difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and 
difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger 
causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "anger makes 
man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is 
being beaten, then is he most daring.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are 
precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of 
dangers they stand aloof."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, 
follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive 
faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; 
its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is 
impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties 
of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face 
the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the 
difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. 
Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment 
of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from 
passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of 
danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty 
turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more 
persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account 
of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however 
great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring face the danger on 
account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as 
stated above (A[3]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the 
heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, as 
occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat 
withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it withdraws to 
the inferior parts. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be 
increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a 
compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil 
presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much 
difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of 
daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does 
ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind 
of hope, as we shall see later on (Q[46], A[1]). Consequently if the 
danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not 
ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will be 
greater daring.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] Out. Para. 1/2

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of 
anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether anger is a special passion?

 (2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?

 (3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?

 (4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?

 (5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?

 (6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?

 (7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of 
justice?

 (8) Of the species of anger.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger is a special passion?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the 
irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several 
passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special 
passion.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as 
is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion is contrary 
to anger, as stated above (Q[23], A[3]). Therefore anger is not a special 
passion.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger 
includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and 
hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a 
special passion.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special 
passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways.  First, by 
predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. 
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things 
generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just 
as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness 
of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its 
active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the 
concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in 
its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due 
to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch 
as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is 
condivided with the other passions, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]). In 
like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of 
the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general 
passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is 
the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]
). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch 
as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the 
movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, 
and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher 
says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for 
revenge as being possible." Consequently if the person, who inflicted the 
injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as 
Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not 
because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its 
movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger 
is the most patent.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary 
passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of 
evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no 
contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no 
contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus 
includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause 
and effect.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the object of anger is good or evil?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of 
Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the sword-bearer 
of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in 
the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore 
anger regards evil as its object.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since  each 
seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object, 
as stated above (Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says 
(Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of 
sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for 
revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: 
since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2

 Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes 
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope 
and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of 
the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in 
two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand 
what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we 
understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways 
the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple 
and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and adheres to 
good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, 
pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the 
appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, 
another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the 
case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some 
good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to 
be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes 
to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold 
tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as 
being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on 
whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which 
bears the character of evil.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between 
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first 
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and 
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love 
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, 
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to 
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of 
hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to 
someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one 
object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it 
seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of 
contrary passions.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 

™Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For 
Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of "desire." 
But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into 
hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is 
inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. 
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa 
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of sorrow and 
desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger 
is a concupiscible passion.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible 
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the 
irascible would not take its name from it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the 
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in 
that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil 
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are 
good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been 
stated (A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it 
seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, 
anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not 
arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we 
make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the 
Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is 
not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for 
a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous and 
that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, 
inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, however, desire 
is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same 
passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming 
inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long 
time engenders hatred.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as 
though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and it has 
been said above (Q[25], A[2]) that the concupiscible passions are the 
causes of the irascible passions.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether anger requires an act of reason?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, 
since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. But the 
sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the 
sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen 
to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive 
to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger 
listens to reason somewhat."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), anger is a desire for vengeance. 
Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted 
and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that 
"anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with 
such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and 
to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion, 
requires an act of reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of 
reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so far as 
the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is 
called the rational appetite. In another way, it follows reason in so far 
as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the 
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not 
in obedience to reason's command, but as a result of reason's denouncing 
the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not 
immediately but through the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by 
the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, 
both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above 
(Q[40], A[3]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to 
reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens 
not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the 
measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and 
yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De 
Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable 
of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk, 
do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a 
judgment of reason. 

™Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger is more natural than desire?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because 
it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But "gentleness is 
contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore 
anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether 
unnatural to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things 
that act according to reason, are not said to act according to nature. 
Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in 
Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a 
craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. 
for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are 
more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more natural than 
anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is 
more natural than desire."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as 
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a 
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without 
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as 
stated above (Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first, on the 
part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we 
consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the object, 
thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual 
pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are 
more natural to man than vengeance.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, 
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is 
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered 
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to 
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the 
generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus 
desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very generic 
nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve 
in him the life both of the species and of the individual. If, however, 
we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a 
rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far 
as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher 
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more 
natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything to rise up 
against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the 
individual, in respect of his particular temperament, thus anger is more 
natural than desire; for  the reason that anger is prone to ensue from 
the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is 
to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies result from 
a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a 
bilious temperament; and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for 
it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to 
anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally 
disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more 
liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to 
desire.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the 
part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, 
a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in 
anger or in any other passion, on account of the moderation of his 
temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes 
from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are 
naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the lion in daring, 
the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of 
reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: 
in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which 
causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man 
"does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above 
(A[4], ad 3).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from 
the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it 
is, in a manner, natural to man.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the 
object.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is 
written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh 
forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous 
than hatred.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than 
merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the object 
of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless 
the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the 
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than 
hatred.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as 
more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more settled 
through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the 
concurrence of several passions, as stated above (A[1]): whereas hatred 
is not. Therefore anger is more settled and  more grievous than hatred.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," 
but anger to "a mote."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its 
object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of 
hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so 
does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a 
difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, 
whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not as 
evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he 
reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it 
has been said above (A[2]) that hatred implies application of evil to 
evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is 
evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, 
than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone 
under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, 
if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in 
this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. 
Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, 
the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing 
desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires 
another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular 
measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own 
sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 
3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is written 
(Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be 
satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under 
the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil 
inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of 
the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. 
ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the 
hater is never appeased."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred 
does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the 
heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear 
the violence of one provoked?"

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so 
far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought 
by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists 
in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault. 
Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is 
hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him 
on account of the harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other 
hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It 
is not  true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because 
"injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not 
grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled 
when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause prevails 
over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger 
does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong 
inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason 
of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to 
him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or 
habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a 
passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 
ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of 
justice?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one 
has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man and 
irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; 
thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his 
horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an 
obligation of justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there 
justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is angry 
with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it 
is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not 
only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an 
entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state injures 
an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an 
individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore properly 
speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of 
justice or injustice.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 
2,3).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), anger desires evil as being a 
means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we 
are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing 
is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the 
harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the 
angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or 
unjust.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it  follows an 
act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of 
reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by 
their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in man 
there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be 
aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination denounces 
the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even 
against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that 
which occurs in animals against anything that injures them. Secondly, by 
the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher 
(Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or 
with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above all, what 
the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is 
no question of vengeance on them, since they can do us no harm.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically 
speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and 
himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible 
parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on 
himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in 
accordance with the nature of things, a man is never angry with himself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference 
between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, as we 
hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards 
an individual." The reason is that hatred arises from our considering a 
quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a 
thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other hand, ensues from 
someone having injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of 
individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. 
When the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one 
individual [*Cf. Q[29], A[6]].


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably 
assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." For no 
genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three 
are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the beginning of the 
movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is 
called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger waiting for an 
opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these are not different species of 
anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that 
"excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and is 
a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according 
to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos} [rancor]. 
Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in 
course of time spends itself. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, 
namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and anger with 
perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by 
Our Lord (Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying 
"anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his 
brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full 
expression"], and lastly, "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we 
have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is 
imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 
16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of 
Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This 
happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he 
calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused. 
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells 
some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is 
derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which the 
angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] 
which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness 
and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the 
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons {akrocholoi} 
[choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} 
[bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he 
calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have 
retaliated [*Cf. SS, Q[158], A[5]].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection 
are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing prevents 
them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to 
the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of 
temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the 
Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," should not 
signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various 
effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the very 
movement of anger.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR 
ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, 
except in A[4].]


 We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its  remedies. 
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one 
who is angry?

 (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?

 (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;

 (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is 
angry.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who 
is angry?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something 
done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, can do 
nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy iniquities 
be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of 
as being angry with man on account of sin, according to Ps. 105:40: "The 
Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always 
on account of something done against him, that a man is angry.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire 
vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always 
angry on account of something done against us.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry 
especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in; 
thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise 
philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the 
philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us 
angry.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, 
provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep. 
ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore 
a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is 
always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without 
anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him 
such."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire to 
hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury 
has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury 
provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who 
seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so 
does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not 
affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him. 
Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against 
him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of  the soul 
but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on 
sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but 
so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. 
First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so 
far as he harms himself or another; which injury redounds to God, 
inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and 
protection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be 
avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way 
to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the 
nature we have in common.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon 
it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we 
ourselves were despised and injured.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is 
due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight is an 
action.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of 
anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry "when 
we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer 
an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a slight is not 
the only motive of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the 
same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they are 
not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when 
wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a slight is 
not the sole motive of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of 
anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others should 
rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being 
hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being slighted is not the only 
motive for being angry.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a 
desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done 
unbecomingly."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight 
is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful 
treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": 
and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be 
assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a 
means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it 
seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done 
unjustly;  hence that which provokes anger is always something considered 
in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 
3) that "men are not angry---if they think they have wronged some one and 
are suffering justly on that account; because there is no anger at what 
is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through 
ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man 
does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on purpose, or 
from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most 
of all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For 
if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or 
through passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much 
less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes 
away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy 
and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose, 
seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. 
Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at 
all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because 
they do not seem to have acted slightingly."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: 
because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet. 
ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. 
Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is 
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man 
suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or 
slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself 
the cause of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it 
naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything 
derogatory thereto.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus 
forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we think of 
a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not 
hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this seems to show that 
he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when 
another is in misfortune, seem to care little about his good or evil. 
Again he that hinders another from carrying out his will, without 
deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his 
friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far as they are signs of 
contempt, provoke anger.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his 
being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,  2) that 
"some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, 
the poor, and those who are disappointed." But these things seem to 
pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one 
prone to anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very 
much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing or 
weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but 
if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble." But a 
suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather 
than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and 
hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry 
when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are 
prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and well-founded 
hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence 
makes men prone to anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken 
in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus excellence 
is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger 
is an unjust slight, as stated above (A[2]). Now it is evident that the 
more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the 
matter in which he excels. Consequently those who excel in any matter, 
are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, 
a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 2/3

 Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered 
on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid. 
Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that 
grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of 
grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And 
this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more 
easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently 
excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and 
therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in 
another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he has 
more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied 
or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other 
like cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder 
sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to  provoke anger, 
because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with 
him?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being 
more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that 
"we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble 
themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs bite 
not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. 
Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with 
him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases 
at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not provoke 
anger against him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly 
towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they offend us or 
refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my enemy had 
reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's 
defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man 
is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner 
the prince is angry with his subject."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more than 
anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or 
littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our 
anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For 
just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is 
despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. Thus 
a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a 
fool; a master, if by a servant.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited 
contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those 
who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who 
humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Prov. 
15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to 
despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble 
themselves.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of 
death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and 
this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. 
Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to the limit of 
evils. Hence anger ceases in regard  to all who are grievously hurt, in 
so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater 
indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to 
help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry 
with those who are beneath us.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are 
four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether anger causes pleasure?

 (2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?

 (3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?

 (4) Whether it causes taciturnity?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger causes pleasure?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow 
excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as stated in 
Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore 
anger does not cause pleasure.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance 
makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": whence 
we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and 
that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of pleasure, 
anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with 
pleasure.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to 
its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore 
pleasure is not an effect of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that 
anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 
[trl. Pope]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, 
chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and 
therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to 
the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which 
increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said 
(Q[47], AA[1],3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done 
that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. 
Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so 
much the greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if 
vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding 
sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is 
really present, it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one 
way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for  vengeance, as 
stated above (Q[46], A[1]); in another way, by thinking of it 
continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell 
on the thought of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are 
pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about 
vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow 
and consequently anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same 
thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the 
thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its 
beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the 
real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and 
consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking 
vengeance follows from anger.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For 
fervor, as stated above (Q[28], A[5]; Q[37], A[2]), belongs to love. But 
love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. 
Since then the cause is more powerful than its effect, it seems that 
anger is not the chief cause of fervor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, 
increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts. 
But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. 
ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." Therefore fervor is not the 
proper effect of anger.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the 
addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," as the 
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is 
fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of the 
bile."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[44], A[1]), the bodily transmutation 
that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement 
of the appetite. Now it is evident that every appetite, even the natural 
appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it, 
if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though 
the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. Since then the 
appetitive movement of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a 
contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great 
force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance;  and hence ensues 
great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger. And because the 
movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action 
of cold, but one of prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, 
the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and 
vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's 
passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so 
disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in 
their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) "the heart that 
is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body 
trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow 
fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth 
indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the 
beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently when a man 
suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his 
love thereof the more: the result being that his heart is moved with 
greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that 
anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to be felt more.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to 
be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a certain 
sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence 
it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this reason 
sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying 
that "love springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed 
there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness 
with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary 
evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for 
this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from 
an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of 
which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is weakened by 
time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But 
anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done. Consequently the cause of 
anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it 
vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first 
felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the further the 
sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, 
so long as the cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long, 
it seems to make men forget their friendship." But in the presence of a 
friend, the cause of friendship is continually being multiplied by time: 
wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, 
were its cause continually multiplied.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the 
strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon  spent having burnt 
up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. 
Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with 
another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. 
Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be greater: because 
the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with 
the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to be of little or no 
account.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. 
Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem to hinder 
the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated in Ethic. 
vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man 
show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "an 
angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem to 
hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he 
also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by 
juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more clearly 
when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the 
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are more angry if they receive 
unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored": 
and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger, and facilitates 
the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of 
reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the 
light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily 
organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for 
the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the 
body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the 
body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of 
drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated (A[2]) that anger, above 
all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as 
to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, 
anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according 
to Ps. 30:10: "My eye is troubled with wrath."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the 
appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the 
passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it 
listened but imperfectly to reason, on account  of the commotion of the 
heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of 
anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to 
him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of 
hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as 
not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise 
the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which 
pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the 
Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open 
in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." 
Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, 
in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame 
and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those 
things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of 
vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the 
reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another 
facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases 
anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth, suffers a loss 
therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, 
and because it was unforeseen. Consequently it causes greater grief: just 
as a great good, through being received unexpectedly, causes greater 
delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, 
anger is increased also.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because 
taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces to 
speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord 
(Mt. 5:22): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother"; and " . 
. . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and " . . . whosoever 
shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore anger does not cause 
taciturnity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out 
into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28): "As a city that 
lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot 
refrain his own spirit in speaking." But anger, above all, hinders the 
judgment of reason, as stated above (A[3]). Consequently above all it 
makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not cause 
taciturnity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 12:34): "Out of the abundance of the 
heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in 
the heart, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore above all it conduces to 
speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not 
vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[3]; Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows 
an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may 
cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason 
prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its 
inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled 
speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes when the mind 
is disturbed, anger, as if in judgment, commands silence." On the part of 
the impediment to reason because, as stated above (A[2]), the disturbance 
of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members 
which reflect more distinctly the emotions of the heart, such as the 
eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above (A[2]), "the tongue 
stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently 
anger may cause such a disturbance, that the tongue is altogether 
deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from 
curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze 
the tongue and other outward members.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to 
the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the 
inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility 
of the outward members; and sometimes even death. If, however, the 
disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart" 
thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] Out. Para. 1/3

TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)


OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the 
consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic 
principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is 
power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q[77], 
seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place 
we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the 
principles of human acts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] Out. Para. 2/3

 Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, 
the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of their 
generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished 
from one another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] Out. Para. 3/3

 Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether habit is a quality? 

 (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?

 (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?

 (4) Of the necessity of habit.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether habit is a quality?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says 
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'to 
have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other 
categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and money and 
other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be 
clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But one 
predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a 
quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book 
of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the order of that 
which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to 
the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments 
(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to 
have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, 
inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in 
another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] 
either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard 
to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And so 
the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called 
because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, 
opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which 
are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which 
there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for 
instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. 
Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, 
for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, 
further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action 
or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, 
for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned 
or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a 
habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and 
that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about 
ourselves. And  therefore these constitute a special genus of things, 
which are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the 
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between 
clothing and the man who is clothed."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard 
to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since 
this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the 
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition 
whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either 
in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And 
in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say that habit is 
a quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for 
thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which we 
understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: 
and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that 
which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes 
on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or 
as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes 
in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: 
bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the 
predicament "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he 
says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in 
course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as 
inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he 
includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as 
perfected science and virtue.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. 
Because, as we have said (A[1]), habit, in so far as it is a quality, is 
"a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." 
But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well 
or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, in regard to 
heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a 
distinct species of quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments 
(Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, just as 
sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from 
the other species of quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to 
the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or  passion. Now, no 
genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; 
but "differences should be proper to a genus," as the Philosopher says in 
Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to 
change," it seems not to be a distinct species of quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments 
(Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) 
reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now 
Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the 
difference of these species as follows. He says "that some qualities are 
natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always 
there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and these 
can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are adventitious, "are 
habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or 
difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the 
point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the 
second species of quality: while others regard a thing which is in act; 
and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply 
rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have 
the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of 
an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems 
unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities, which 
are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions 
which are not adventitious but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. 
Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is 
the more natural is always first.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 2/5

 Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and 
habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a 
certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 
3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a certain 
determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in 
accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is 
determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a 
difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the 
potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being, is 
called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is 
clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 3/5

 Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be 
taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to 
action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are 
matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or 
determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have 
the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in 
itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or 
evil, so it does  not concern the fourth species of quality whether a 
thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 4/5

 But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or 
passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And 
therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease 
or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we do 
not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because 
movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and 
evil are said in respect of an end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 5/5

 On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard 
to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, 
which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 
text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that they 
are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that 
which is disposed in accordance with its nature." And since the form 
itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why a thing is 
made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider 
both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult; 
inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And 
so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition 
whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says 
that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the 
passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has 
the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. 
And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, for 
this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], 
ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality except 
in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs 
to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the quality's relation 
to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, 
a man is not said to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a 
relation to the nature of a thing, with regard to its suitability or 
unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so 
far as they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of 
a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according 
to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat 
and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing, 
concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the 
Philosopher, in the first species of quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some 
give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the 
Predicaments.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: This difference, "difficult to change," does not 
distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from  
disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the 
genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of habit 
(Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against 
habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be divided against 
habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect within the same 
species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the 
genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we 
call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. 
And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. 
Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one 
subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the 
first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, 
because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we 
call habits those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are 
not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences 
and virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The 
latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: 
for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of 
speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature, 
easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly 
changeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in 
regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: 
for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to 
lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than 
that he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" 
implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" does not.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are 
specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion and 
movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though 
apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate differences 
which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus 
of substance we often take accidental instead of substantial differences, 
in so far as by the former, essential principles are designated.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether habit implies order to an act?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For 
everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says (De 
Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is 
still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning." 
Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs 
to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in the 
definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be 
the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is 
essential is first in every genus.  If therefore, habit also is a 
principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so habit 
and disposition will not be the first species of quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and 
beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is not 
essential to habit to be a principle of act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is 
that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says 
(De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in 
regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which the 
habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to 
have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some 
relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable 
thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further 
ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of 
an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit 
implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, 
consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or 
conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in 
the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is 
disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to 
its nature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in 
which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. For, 
as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the 
thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit 
is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit 
principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature 
and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act. 
Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally 
relation to an act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this 
respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of 
potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first 
act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 
5.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but 
to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is 
related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in 
relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature is a 
principle of act, it consequently implies a relation  to act. Wherefore 
the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man, or one of his 
members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a 
healthy man." And the same applies to other habits.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether habits are necessary?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are 
well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above. But a 
thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a 
thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for 
habits.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies 
sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without any 
habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for 
habits.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: 
and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given, 
therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But 
perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the 
nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As we have said above (AA[2],3), habit implies a 
disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, 
by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. 
Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three 
conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is disposed 
should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it 
should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a 
being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose 
substance is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can 
find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality 
in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways 
and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality 
in regard to something else, but in regard to that only, there we find no 
room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature 
has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be 
composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in a state of 
potentiality to another form, as we said in the FP, Q[56], A[2], there is 
no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in 
respect of operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a 
state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of  those 
things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, 
capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject 
well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple 
qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one 
single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but "simple 
qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health, 
beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which 
may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher 
says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and 
disposition is "the order of that which has parts either as to place, or 
as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 
3). Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and 
operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative 
adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the 
subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. 
But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the 
end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed 
operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for 
the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse 
ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of 
habits.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it 
needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a 
relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we 
have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their 
operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined 
to one mode of operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will 
be made clear further on (Q[54], A[3]): whereas the same power has a 
relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the 
powers be determined to good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)

 We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are 
six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?

 (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or 
in respect of its power?

 (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?

 (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?

 (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?

 (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is a habit in the body?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the 
Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that  whereby we act when we 
will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are 
natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is 
a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a 
habit.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But 
change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided 
against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De 
Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called 
habits.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As we have said above (Q[49], AA[2] seqq.), habit is a 
disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to 
form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to 
operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every 
operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body 
or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those operations 
which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: 
because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and 
we have already said (Q[49], A[4]) that it is when the subject is in 
potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As 
to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they 
belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits 
are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits 
are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such 
operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in 
the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with 
promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a 
habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as 
a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like 
are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit 
perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily 
changeable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the 
Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of 
the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of 
quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle mentions 
health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they 
belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example: so that 
he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult 
to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are 
called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the 
intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health 
and  sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. 
vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition 
to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but 
not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the 
principle of which is the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on 
account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be 
difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as 
long as such