Aquin.: SMT FS Prologue Para. 1/1

FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (FS) (QQ[1]-114)


TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)


PROLOGUE

 Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be 
made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent being 
endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of 
the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the 
power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of 
His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, 
as having free-will and control of his actions.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] Out. Para. 1/2

OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and 
secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this 
end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is 
ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be 
happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?

 (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?

 (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?

 (4) Whether there is any last end of human life?

 (5) Whether one man can have several last ends?

 (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?

 (7) Whether all men have the same last end?

 (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. 
For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, implies 
something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for 
which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition 
"for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to 
man to act for an end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But 
in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher states 
(Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts 
deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes 
not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's 
foot or hand, or scratches one's  beard, while intent on something else. 
Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the 
principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human 
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs 
to man to do everything for an end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called 
"human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational 
animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those 
actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man 
is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the 
free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason." Therefore those 
actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. 
And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of 
a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to 
man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, 
are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But 
the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human 
actions must be for an end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it 
is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that 
it is a cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, 
else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary 
in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to 
walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for 
instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act 
elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is 
the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the 
first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is 
directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, 
cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a 
human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: 
so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for 
the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts 
for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since 
they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper 
principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, 
but not one that is fixed by reason.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for 
an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,  never acts for an 
unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no 
knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without 
knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the 
idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper 
to the rational nature to act for an end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. 
But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to things 
that lack reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the 
will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end 
belongs to none but a rational nature.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only 
mind but also nature acts for an end."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a 
number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the 
others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes 
is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive 
form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces 
itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of 
intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some 
particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: 
consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of 
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an 
end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, 
by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other 
things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the 
"natural appetite."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its 
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the 
end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an 
arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who 
directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed 
of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over 
their actions through their free-will, which is the "faculty of will and 
reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural 
inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they 
do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain 
anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For 
the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to 
the principal agent, as stated above (FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; FP, Q[103], 
A[1], ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to 
an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is 
proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by 
another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do 
not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether 
void of knowledge. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: 
but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he acts at 
another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is 
not necessary that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational 
creatures.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs 
itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that which 
is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational 
nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in 
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack 
reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they 
have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some 
particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a 
universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the common 
good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of the city. 
Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to 
their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the 
universal good, namely by the Divine will.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether human acts are specified by their end?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For 
the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an 
intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before 
it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a human act 
does not derive its species from the end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one 
and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. Therefore the 
end does not give the species to human acts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): 
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds 
worthy of blame or praise."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and 
not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and 
form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And 
this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, 
in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its 
species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of 
acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement. 
Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement 
proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else  than a 
movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific 
nature. And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as 
actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For human 
acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is 
moved by himself. Now it has been stated above (A[1]) that acts are 
called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the 
object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that 
the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In 
like manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that 
which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the 
thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as 
Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," 
moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for 
moral acts are the same as human acts.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it 
is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just this 
that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered 
as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, 
pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus that 
it gives the species to the human or moral act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from 
the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its 
species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is 
the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is one 
in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the 
will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act in respect of 
its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to the safeguarding 
of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there 
would be several acts in different species of morality: since in one way 
there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a 
movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus 
accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. Now 
moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation 
to a natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently there is no 
reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, 
should not be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is one last end of human life?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that 
we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius 
states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is 
itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the 
diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an 
end. Therefore there is  an indefinite series of ends.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to 
infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same reason 
the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason 
can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the 
apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an 
infinite series of ends.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the 
will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can will 
something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there 
is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end 
of the human will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a 
thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good is that 
which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of 
an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last 
end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed 
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in 
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the 
first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity 
be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we 
cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there 
would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since 
they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be 
observed a twofold order in ends---the order of intention and the order 
of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something 
first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the 
principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove 
this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other 
hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its 
beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to 
work. Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the 
principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to 
the end. Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity 
since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any 
action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; 
while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the 
end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no 
term, but would continue indefinitely.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that 
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for 
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that 
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the 
end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The very nature of good is that something flows  from it, 
but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good has the 
nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not 
prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, already supposed, 
we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are 
ordained to the end. And this would be true if we considered but the 
power of the First Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good 
diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow 
forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that 
there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good 
from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the 
diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written 
(Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from 
principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore 
the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process 
in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an 
essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those 
things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from 
proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or 
number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such 
like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, 
is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact that in 
regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently 
once or several times.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether one man can have several last ends?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the 
same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ. 
Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. 
"in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue." But these are 
clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of 
his will in many things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude 
one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition to one 
another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the 
will does not exclude others.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, 
the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its last end in 
that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. 
riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a 
man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is 
possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several 
things, as last ends. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master 
of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. 
Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their belly": 
viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now 
according to Mt. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as 
are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man 
to have several last ends not ordained to one another.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the 
same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be assigned 
for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a 
man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect 
and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of 
the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, 
but that it is perfected so as to be complete." It is therefore necessary 
for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides 
it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be 
required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the 
appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the 
principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the 
rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is 
naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one 
thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is 
the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, 
is one.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 3/3

 The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their 
species from the end, as stated above (A[3]), they must needs receive 
their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as 
natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. Since, 
then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one 
genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every 
genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a 
first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as 
man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man 
to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one 
last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: All these several objects were considered as one perfect 
good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although it is possible to find several things which are 
not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect 
good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The power of the will does not extend to making opposites 
exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend to 
several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, 
for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be 
serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. 
Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 
1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot 
be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does 
not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that 
end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires 
or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end 
of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love 
it for its own sake."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he 
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, 
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And 
if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, 
of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the 
beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly 
the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning 
of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved 
through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same 
relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. 
Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as 
they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the 
appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object 
of the appetite, which is the last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external 
end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him 
pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is desired 
as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, which is 
the ultimate end. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever 
one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, 
which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to 
any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed 
to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be 
thinking of the end at every step.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all men have the same last end?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before 
all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some 
turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have 
not the same last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. 
If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various 
pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of 
individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they 
differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not 
the same last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in 
desiring the last end, which is happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, 
considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing 
in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect 
of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the 
fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in 
which the last end consists, as stated above (A[5]). But as to the thing 
in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last 
end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; 
others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to 
some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of 
honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of 
all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most 
pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with 
well disposed affections desires for his last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really 
consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, 
which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of 
the various things in which men seek to find their last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first 
principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above 
(A[5]).


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether other creatures concur in that last end?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. 
For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e. 
God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things 
concur in man's last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things 
to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last end; because 
He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 
5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object 
of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore 
other things, too, concur in man's last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as 
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible for 
animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore 
other things do not concur in man's last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is 
twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing 
itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition 
of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body 
is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; 
and the end of the miser is money as "thing," or possession of money as 
"use."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 2/3

 If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the 
end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the 
last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's 
last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do 
not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures 
attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible 
to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share 
in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 3/3

 Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means 
the acquisition of the last end.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what 
it is; (3) how we can obtain it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] Out. Para. 2/2

 Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: 

 (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?

 (2) Whether in honor?

 (3) Whether in fame or glory?

 (4) Whether in power?

 (5) Whether in any good of the body?

 (6) Whether in pleasure?

 (7) Whether in any good of the soul?

 (8) Whether in any created good?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since 
happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which has the 
greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written 
(Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness 
consists in wealth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a 
state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." Now 
money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a 
sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore 
happiness consists in wealth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it 
seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything 
else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (Eccles. 
5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than 
in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines in 
giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the 
generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in 
wealth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in 
wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), 
viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a 
remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, 
dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a 
direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for 
the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. 
For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. as 
a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, 
rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of 
nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Ps. 
8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 3/3 

 And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of 
natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means, 
he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less 
can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is 
impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in 
wealth.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of 
fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be 
obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not 
from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose 
sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual 
things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov. 17:16): "What 
doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they 
suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial 
wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, 
which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet 
this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the 
sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, 
the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we 
possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29): 
"They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and 
for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we 
already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the 
sense of Our Lord's words (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," 
by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason 
of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: 
and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good 
does not consist therein.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man's happiness consists in honors?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For 
happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says 
(Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by 
which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). 
Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great 
excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. 
But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the 
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." 
Therefore happiness consists in honor. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But 
nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in 
all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore 
happiness consists in honor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the 
honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the 
person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore 
happiness does not consist in honor.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For 
honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and 
consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in 
the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially 
to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. 
those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore 
honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist 
therein.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that 
reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor 
from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to 
offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the 
virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a 
virtue, but ambition.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a 
sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes 
them excellent.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his 
natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. 
Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose 
judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For 
happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the 
trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the 
Apostle says (Rm. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to 
be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." 
Therefore happiness consists in glory.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius 
(Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of 
others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose 
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists "in being well 
known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to 
be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. 
Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves 
eternity, when you think of your fame in future time." Therefore man's 
happiness consists in fame or glory.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame 
or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe their 
renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more 
shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own 
praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. 
For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose 
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is 
related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for human 
knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the 
cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which 
is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather 
human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, 
is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently 
man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's 
good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's 
beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; 
according to Ps. 90:15,16: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I 
will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, 
especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this 
reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be 
deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18): 
"He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with 
men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is 
written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His 
Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Lk. 12:8 
owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was 
quoting from memory].

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the 
knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from 
good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or 
inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize 
with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as 
famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by 
false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But 
happiness endures of itself, and for ever. 

™Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man's happiness consists in power?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things 
desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning. 
But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to 
be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called "gods" (Ex. 
22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness 
consists in power.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest 
perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those 
who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary 
to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men 
shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists 
in power.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most 
imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man 
cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of 
anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded 
by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still 
more?"

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and 
this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as 
is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. 
Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness 
is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist 
in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists 
in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness 
is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the 
foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because, 
since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in 
Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. 
But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many 
goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and 
such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil 
can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for 
it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the 
hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. 
Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that 
are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods 
mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to 
fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it 
is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power 
otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not 
enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he 
become like Him in goodness also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use 
of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use 
of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: 
therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme 
good consists in power.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For 
it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the riches of 
the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. 
Therefore it consists in the health of the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better 
than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. But for 
man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, 
therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health of the 
body belongs more than anything else to happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle 
from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the 
scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause 
consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end 
consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause 
is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which 
attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most 
desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things 
pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. 
But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the 
elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. 
Therefore man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the 
goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing 
be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the 
preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, 
the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained 
to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is 
entrusted to the  captain that he may steer its course, so man is given 
over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. 15:14: "God made man 
from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it 
is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not 
the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot 
be the preservation of man's being.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the 
preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of man is 
some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and 
though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the 
human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (FP, Q[75], A[2]); and 
the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the 
instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means 
he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the 
goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is 
man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so 
are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with 
reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which 
are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul is preferred to 
all bodily goods.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, 
surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes 
all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being 
itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the 
whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of 
any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an 
additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage 
Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, 
and intelligent better than living things.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument 
proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every 
perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, 
some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being 
which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For 
since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, 
but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to 
anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in 
wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists 
principally in pleasure and delight.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the  effect than 
the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in 
its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most 
the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is 
pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will 
and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems 
that man's last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire 
is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even 
irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore 
happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses 
to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad 
ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we 
should not say that the very beasts are happy too."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the 
name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), 
although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in 
them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is 
distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is 
a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We 
must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting 
from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a 
man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or 
in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the 
perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is 
a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. 
Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the 
perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting 
therefrom as its proper accident.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that 
way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of 
the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the 
body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For since 
the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of 
the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain 
infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied 
down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as 
compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted 
and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, 
in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows 
the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, 
which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is 
abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. 
Consequently it is evident that good  which is fitting to the body, and 
which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not 
man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of 
the soul. Hence it is written (Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of 
her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither 
happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire 
delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus it 
is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards 
and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, 
so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the 
preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or 
rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, 
i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently 
is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is 
desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from 
the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of 
our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures 
are desired by the majority.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and 
yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as 
stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the 
supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some 
good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and 
supreme good.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's 
happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external 
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not 
consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above 
(AA[4],5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the 
good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire 
money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he 
desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other 
goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from 
the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore 
happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of 
the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is 
perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is 
something belonging to man. But it is not something  belonging to the 
body, as shown above (A[5]). Therefore it is something belonging to the 
soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that 
which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake." 
But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to 
be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the 
soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[8]), the end is twofold: namely, 
the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the 
attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last 
end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or 
something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as 
something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from 
being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially 
virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its 
fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last 
end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, 
habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good 
fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the 
universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, 
and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's 
last end.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession 
thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, 
thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last 
end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing 
itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and 
makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. 
Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the 
soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can 
desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but 
also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way 
nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good 
of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is 
loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that 
for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently 
it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves 
anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be 
occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of  the soul, 
is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, 
viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated 
above.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. 
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites the ends of 
first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may 
gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher 
nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is 
above man in the order of nature, as stated in FP, Q[111], A[1], it seems 
that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to 
it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the 
universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man 
who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. 
Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural 
desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing 
his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which 
surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy 
by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's 
happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is 
the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is 
written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps. 143:15)."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's 
happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite 
altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained 
to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appetite, is the 
universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal 
true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the 
universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God 
alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore 
God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 
102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone 
constitutes man's happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic 
nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last 
end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the 
common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and 
perfect good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further 
end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but 
something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared 
as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its 
last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, 
but God himself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is 
capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less 
than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is 
infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the 
whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] Out. Para. 1/2

WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are 
required for it.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] Out. Para. 2/2

 Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?

 (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?

 (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the 
intellectual part?

 (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an 
operation of the intellect, or of the will?

 (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation 
of the speculative or of the practical intellect?

 (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it 
consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

 (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. 
angels?

 (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His 
Essence?


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether happiness is something uncreated?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius 
says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is happiness 
itself."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to 
be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it 
seems that happiness is the same as God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends 
naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to 
God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 
5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is 
something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): 
"Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness 
is not something uncreated. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[2], A[7]), our end is 
twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus 
for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or 
possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say 
that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the 
intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, 
then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His 
infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the second 
way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is 
nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the 
last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness 
in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we 
consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something 
created.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by 
acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On 
the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by 
participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. And this 
participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, 
is something created.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the 
attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as 
the attainment of the end is called the end.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether happiness is an operation?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle 
says (Rm. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, 
life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being of 
living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an 
operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a 
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state does 
not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: 
since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not 
imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding 
therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does 
not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are 
many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human 
operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other 
occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is 
an operation according to perfect virtue."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created, 
existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness 
is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is 
actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently 
happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that 
operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher 
calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can 
be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially 
considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said 
to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must 
of necessity consist in an operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of 
the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown (Q[2]
, A[5]) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not 
that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that His Being is His 
Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which 
operation the principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active 
and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense 
eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from Jn. 17:3: "This 
is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in 
general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he 
signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the 
aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the state of a happy 
man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the 
very essence of happiness, showing by what man is established in this 
state, and that it is by some kind of operation. And so it is that he 
proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds 
from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to cut." And 
such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action 
and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is 
stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the 
agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is 
a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an operation can be 
happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2 

 Reply OBJ 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according 
as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of 
perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For 
in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His 
operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, 
the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are 
united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only 
and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, 
the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united 
to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, 
is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. 
And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness 
cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's 
happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and 
after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." 
But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the 
angels . . . in heaven" (Mt. 22:30).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2

 Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: 
because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by 
one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far 
as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we 
fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of 
happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more 
continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with 
many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is 
busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any 
time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can 
always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by 
sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the 
latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to 
Objections 5 and 6 are evident.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the 
intellective part only?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the 
senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than that of 
the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective 
operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot understand without a 
phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation 
of the senses also.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a 
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some goods 
are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore 
it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find  proved in 
Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby in 
all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive 
operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in 
common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore 
happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) 
essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of 
sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness 
consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is 
his last end, as shown above (A[1]): to Which man cannot be united by an 
operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above 
(Q[2], A[5]), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body, 
which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both 
antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect 
happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the 
intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in 
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the 
resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says 
(Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain 
overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will 
be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (SS, QQ[82]
-85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not 
depend on the senses.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses is 
required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this 
life.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the 
aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source of 
all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this 
imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice 
for the most perfect operation of this life.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the 
lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the 
imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the 
perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of 
the intellect or of the will?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness consists in 
peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy 
end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's 
happiness is in the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of 
the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the 
last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, 
who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the 
will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on 
(Q[9], AA[1],3). Therefore happiness regards the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's 
most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the 
will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation 
of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13). Therefore it seems 
that happiness consists in an act of the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who 
has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a little further 
on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: 
for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some 
good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the 
will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that 
they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, 
as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the 
knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for 
happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as 
it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, 
then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it 
to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been 
said (AA[1],2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last 
end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of 
the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it 
desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it 
is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the 
end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will 
from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, 
by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be 
present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act 
of the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 2/3 

 This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the 
acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man 
would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the 
moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, 
or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it 
is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an 
intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by 
an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end 
when attained.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the 
intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the 
will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is 
"joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of 
happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the 
very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent 
thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which 
disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as 
when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being 
at rest.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is 
the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, 
from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's 
first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet 
motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will 
belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. 
delight or enjoyment.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge 
precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," as 
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an 
intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a 
sensible end by an act of sense.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has 
what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of 
his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a 
necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good 
things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the 
will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for 
instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical 
intellect?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the  practical 
intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming like God. 
But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of 
things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which 
derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in 
an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical 
intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect, 
which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference 
to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the 
perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said 
to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's happiness consists in an 
act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative 
intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the 
practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, 
viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's happiness consists in 
an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is 
promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting 
perfection of our joys."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative 
rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three 
reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs 
be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that of his 
highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is 
the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the 
object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect. 
Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in 
the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each 
man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, 
therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to 
him.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 2/4

 Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought 
principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is 
not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very 
actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the 
last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the 
practical intellect.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 3/4

 Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative 
life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and 
the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things 
pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in 
common with man, although imperfectly. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 4/4

 Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to 
come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such 
as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of 
the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated 
in Ethic. x, 7,8.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is 
one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation 
to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the 
speculative intellect to God is one of union and "information"; which is 
a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to 
the principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not practical 
but merely speculative knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is 
outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the 
contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is 
perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has 
not; but it directs man thereto.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last 
end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions 
would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of 
him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative 
intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the 
speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration 
of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that 
"happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in 
distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative 
virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to 
the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore man's final 
happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be 
man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative 
sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire 
to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative 
sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in 
the consideration of speculative sciences.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is 
perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the 
human intellect is reduced to act by  the consideration of speculative 
sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences, 
man's final happiness consists.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory 
in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. 
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration of 
these.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, 
one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to 
understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by 
imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of 
some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, 
with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is 
in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular 
instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the 
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe 
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond 
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is 
virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of 
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher 
clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end 
of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration 
of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles 
can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot 
consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by 
something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something 
higher. Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is 
lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form 
of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to 
that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or 
something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to 
that which is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be 
through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been 
shown (FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the 
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect. 
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the 
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms 
there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration 
of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect 
happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect 
happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2], ad 4).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired,  but also 
any likeness or participation thereof.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the 
consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect 
act.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, 
namely, angels?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of 
separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi 
in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we 
fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he means final 
happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by 
contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness 
consists in contemplating the angels.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be 
united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect 
figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of 
human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as 
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human 
intellect consists in contemplating the angels.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; 
just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual 
nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the 
angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be 
united to the angels by contemplation.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth, 
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's 
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), man's perfect happiness consists 
not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in 
that which is so by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the 
perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that 
power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. 
Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not 
perfect the intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the 
order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); 
whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now 
angels have being by participation: because in God alone is His Being His 
Essence, as shown in the FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation 
of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we 
should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of 
the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative 
science. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by 
contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God 
Himself.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created by 
the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should consist 
in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with 
his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in FP, Q[90], A[3]. 
Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with 
God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of 
its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated 
in the FP, Q[111], A[2], ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps 
man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, 
according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's final 
perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that 
of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power: and thus 
the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found 
the fulness of its formal object.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision 
of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that 
which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something 
altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not 
altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, 
namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. 
But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine 
intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not 
reach to this, but consists in something less.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we 
shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else 
than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points 
must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as 
something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the 
perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now 
the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a 
thing, according to De Anima  iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains 
perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an 
intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to 
know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; 
that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may 
be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is. 
Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, 
there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, 
"what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is 
stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a 
man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some 
cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from 
wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he 
arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created 
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that 
intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in 
it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet 
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs 
to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its 
perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone 
man's happiness consists, as stated above (AA[1],7; Q[2], A[8]).

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying 
towards happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[1], A[8]), the end has a twofold 
acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this 
way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and 
indeed of all things, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]). Secondly, as to the 
attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is 
different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes 
to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his 
Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees 
It indeed, but comprehends It not.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: 
and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether delight is required for happiness?

 (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?

 (3) Whether comprehension is required?

 (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?

 (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?

 (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?

 (7) Whether any external goods are necessary?

 (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?

 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether delight is required for happiness?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For 
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of 
faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the 
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides 
vision is required for happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as 
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something 
else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists 
in seeing God, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]); it seems that delight is not 
necessary for happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be 
unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the 
intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). 
Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy 
in truth."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. 
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary 
for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for 
the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends 
are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on 
it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way 
delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite 
being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing 
else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without 
concomitant delight.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the 
will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. 
Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who 
sees God cannot need delight.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the 
intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in 
Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and 
perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the 
operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention 
because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that 
delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be 
less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a 
sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of 
prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect. 

™Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For 
"delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection 
ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the 
operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet 
more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they 
afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which 
are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species, 
lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, 
delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment 
corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle 
says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the 
cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), 
and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the 
operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before 
delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that 
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness 
of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an 
operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation. 
Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act 
of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (Q[1], A[1], 
ad 2; Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because 
that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation 
in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects 
operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. 
Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a 
perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the 
universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And 
consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, 
operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect 
apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in 
delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to 
delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of 
nature, adjusted delights to operations on  account of the operations. 
And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the 
order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the 
intellectual appetite.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of 
delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good 
gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its 
end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. 
For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. xxxciii De 
Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him 
is impossible." Therefore happiness is without comprehension.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his 
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect 
and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is 
sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him. 
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are 
determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the 
true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to 
delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may 
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual 
race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good fight, I have 
finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid 
up for me a crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for 
Happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those 
things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in 
which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end 
partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his 
intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end 
pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the 
will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of 
the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For 
sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no 
longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to 
attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is 
possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the 
attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation 
of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this  relation alone 
causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding 
three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds 
to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation 
of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already 
stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with 
Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible 
end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or 
enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the 
comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by 
the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended 
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the 
holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs 
after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say 'catch.'] 
him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is 
necessary for Happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is 
the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not 
possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since 
it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but 
a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision 
itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of 
comprehension.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for 
Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the 
intellect, as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the will, by 
reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for 
the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 
4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will 
none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For it can be answered 
that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore 
rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the 
operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. Therefore 
Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not 
depend on rectitude of the will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not 
necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, after 
arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is 
ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once obtained, 
rectitude of the will is no  longer necessary.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of 
heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all 
men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both 
antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the 
will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in 
comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter. 
Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly 
disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained 
thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of 
the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (Q[3], A[8]), final 
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very 
essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God, 
of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as 
the will of him who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever 
he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this is 
precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that 
Happiness cannot be without a right will.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the 
intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the 
intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is 
happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required 
antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in 
order to strike the target.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the 
getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as 
movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when 
the end has been gained: but the due order to the end is necessary.


Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the 
perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But 
Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without 
the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part 
of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its 
whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (Q[3], 
AA[2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing 
operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the 
soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as 
neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul 
cannot be happy without the  body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, 
without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul 
separated from the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the 
operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is "not 
hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, 
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a natural desire 
to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to 
speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. 
to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy 
without the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But 
this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be 
united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore 
the soul is not happy while separated from the body.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul 
without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad 
lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] 
are the dead who die in the Lord."

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in 
this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it 
is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For 
the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, 
either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in 
this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, 
as was shown in the FP, Q[84], AA[6],7. Consequently that happiness which 
can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to 
perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have 
maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; 
and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, 
do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will 
receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by 
authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 
5:6): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he 
points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and 
not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith 
and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not 
present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their 
bodies, are in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are 
confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to 
be present with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of the 
saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence 
of God, wherein is true Happiness. 

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the 
body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it 
looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the FP, Q[84], A[7]. Now it 
is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, 
as stated in the FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since man's perfect 
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not 
depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.

Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 3/3

 We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's 
perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus 
the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for 
its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to 
man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first 
way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. 
For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect is the 
soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, 
wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. 
ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the 
souls of the dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot 
see