Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] Out. Para. 1/1

OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five 
points of inquiry:

 (1) In what does virginity consist?

 (2) Whether it is lawful?

 (3) Whether it is a virtue?

 (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;

 (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity of the 
flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The quotation is from De 
Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual meditation on 
incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But meditation does not concern the 
flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine says 
(De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore virginity 
is not incorruption of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the 
seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without loss of 
virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those organs may 
be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes 
do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a 
midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that 
she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as to 
deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost 
the integrity of that organ." Therefore virginity does not consist in 
incorruption of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution 
of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, whether one be 
asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: 
for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that "virginal integrity and holy 
continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of 
angels." Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the 
flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity is 
continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and 
observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from "viror" 
[freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its 
freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, 
virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the 
heat of concupiscence which is experienced in  achieving the greatest 
bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose says 
(De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity free of pollution."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first 
is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of virginity. 
The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that 
which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, causing 
sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely 
the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is 
accidental to the moral act, which as such must be considered in 
reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the 
moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts. But 
the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the 
essence of morality is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since 
then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it 
follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to 
virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is 
related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining 
from this pleasure is the formal and completive element in virginity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that 
which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's purpose; 
and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must always 
retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in mind the 
purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed 
indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a corruptible body." This is 
added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were 
incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual 
meditation on incorruption.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; 
but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with 
virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "although 
virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a bodily quality, 
"yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and 
preserves."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is 
accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely 
abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily 
organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, 
this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or 
foot.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in 
two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys 
virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, 
mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and 
natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose 
of the mind, either during  sleep, or through violence and without the 
mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again 
through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a 
flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not forfeit, because such like 
pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is 
contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the 
words of Gn. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt eat," 
indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation 
of the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28, "Increase and multiply, 
and fill the earth," express a precept of the natural law, in reference 
to the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin 
to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of 
the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of 
procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently 
sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains 
from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), 
that "he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is 
intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible." 
Therefore virginity is something sinful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden 
times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus 
asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera 
Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to nature, in order that he 
might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin." 
Therefore virginity is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is 
a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:25): "Concerning 
virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore 
virginity is not an unlawful thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right 
reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should 
be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is 
threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, 
for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, 
consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the 
contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as 
the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk. 
10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these goods those that are 
external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which 
belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and 
furthermore those which belong to the active life are  directed to those 
which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason 
dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the 
body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain 
from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to 
possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of 
truth, this is not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like 
manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to 
give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with 
the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal 
pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: 
for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin 
thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and 
in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, 
how she may please her husband." Therefore it follows that virginity 
instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q[122], A[1]). 
Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be 
fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside 
without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the 
fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the 
multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be 
discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, 
and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which 
binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise 
the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of 
procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to 
multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient 
provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to 
carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves 
to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the 
whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are 
standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these things 
are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one 
person.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, 
abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure as 
such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from 
every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and abstains 
therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of 
virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to right reason, as 
stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. 
iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of 
becomingness he follows the mean."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. 
Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from all 
venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato 
alone is related to have done.  Hence it was not through thinking this a 
sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded to the false 
opinion of his fellow countrymen," as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. 
iii).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no virtue is 
in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now virginity 
is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity 
is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above 
(FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: 
else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no one 
could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of 
marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is 
not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad Eustoch.]: 
"Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her 
downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost 
without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal 
purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a 
virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity 
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we 
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the formal and completive element 
in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which 
purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this 
is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material 
element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of 
venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a good action has a 
special matter through having a special excellence, there is a special 
kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great 
expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, 
which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free 
from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own 
deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate 
venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related 
to chastity as magnificence to liberality.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in 
virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal 
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely 
the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which purpose 
gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. 
xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but, because their 
virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is 
formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated above 
(Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in 
them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter of one 
virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the 
matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence. It is in this way 
that one who has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely 
the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which 
is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the 
purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be 
fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind 
as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he 
in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in 
mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which 
preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is 
formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein. For if a 
magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his 
riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person who has lost 
virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but 
the purpose of virginity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be 
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which we 
hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which 
cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced 
venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot 
make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in the FP, Q[25]
, A[4].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by 
vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. 
viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated 
and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh." Hence 
virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it 
abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it 
above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to 
chastity in general; but it does not  attain to that which is perfect in 
this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity 
alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue 
above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. 
For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was equally 
meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot 
children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore virginity is 
not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his 
virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it 
would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any 
married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not preferable 
to marriage.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, 
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to 
the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is 
to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the 
human race." On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual 
good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls the "tribulation of 
the flesh," to which married people are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). Therefore 
virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason and 
the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is 
it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of 
widowhood."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of 
Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. 
This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a 
virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching 
of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the greater good. It 
is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of 
a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good 
of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is 
better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the 
good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in 
thinking "on the things of God" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is 
directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human 
race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace 
the married life have to think "on the things of the world," as the 
Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is 
preferable to conjugal continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still 
more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that 
he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the 
times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal continence was equally 
meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the 
essential reward, but not as regards the accidental reward. Hence 
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both "the celibacy of John and 
the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's battle in keeping with the 
difference of the times: but John was continent even in deed, whereas 
Abraham was continent only in habit."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a 
married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on the 
part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared 
in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who 
is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the 
virgin to say: "I am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of 
celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage." Further on he gives 
the reason for this: "For what I do now, he would have done better, if it 
were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now 
if it behooved me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the person who 
is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says 
(De Virgin. xliv): "Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to 
the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account 
of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this 
woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to 
drink the chalice of the Lord?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it 
be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better 
generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is 
preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): 
"It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those 
women who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in 
order to make them servants of Christ, cannot compensate for lost 
virginity."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For 
Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address ourselves now 
to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their 
vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing, the pride and 
ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ's flock."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the 
greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold fruit, 
according to a gloss on Mt. 13:23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of 
the virtues. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it 
is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is declared in 
the Apocalypse 14:4 that virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He 
goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new canticle," which "no" 
other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, 
would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The 
authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so 
that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have 
departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar." By 
this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic 
state, are preferable to virginity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some 
particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the 
genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and 
of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity 
antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to 
chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can anyone esteem 
any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her King, 
approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?" 
Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way virginity 
is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels 
that which is directed to the end; and the more effectively a thing is 
directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders 
virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as 
stated above (A[4]). Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the 
virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about 
Divine things, are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more 
mightily in order to cleave to God---since for this end they hold their 
own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries---since for this 
end they give up their own will and all that they may possess---than 
virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore 
virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's flock," 
and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and married 
women.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according 
to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its superiority to 
widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to 
which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (De 
QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the 
sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons." Wherefore 
it does not follow that virginity is simply the greatest of virtues, but 
only in comparison with other degrees of chastity. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," because 
they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also of the 
flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the 
Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow more closely, 
because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of 
the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having 
preserved integrity of the flesh.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] Out. Para. 1/1

OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)

 We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) 
Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are five 
points of inquiry:

 (1) What is the matter of lust?

 (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?

 (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?

 (4) Whether lust is a capital vice?

 (5) Concerning its daughters.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal 
desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "lust 
affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat and 
drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly 
about venereal desires and pleasures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful [Douay: 
'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and 
drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" 
[*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure 
regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is 
not only about venereal desires and pleasures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [*Written 
by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap 
corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. 
Therefore these belong to lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is 
debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a 
man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like 
pleasures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to 
pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is 
referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal 
pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest  havoc in a 
man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to 
excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any kind of surfeit."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in 
which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of 
too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name 
of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also 
wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 
15,16).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether no venereal act can be without sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For 
nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a 
great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I 
consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the 
fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no 
venereal act is without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is 
sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency" as 
stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of 
pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is incompatible with the 
act of understanding," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and 
as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] 
states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible 
to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original 
sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no 
venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 
24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a 
sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin 
is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a 
commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the 
patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal 
act is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order 
of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to 
its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the 
dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and 
order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be 
something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature 
of one individual is a true good,  so, too, is the preservation of the 
nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of 
food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the 
use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human 
race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a 
man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole 
human race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it 
be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the 
body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they 
be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human 
procreation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as 
regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is 
an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, 
and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a 
lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from 
virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence 
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that was good which 
Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which 
Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of 
Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, 
and much more that of the Virgin Mary."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; FS, Q[64], A[2]), the 
mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right 
reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal 
act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. 
Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced 
by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; 
what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that 
pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to 
virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering 
spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is 
not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for 
something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be 
against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal 
concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation 
of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the 
reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel 
against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, 
shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is 
not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin." Hence it 
does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains 
something penal resulting from the first sin.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be  a sin. For 
the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus 
from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But 
there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. 
Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what 
is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except 
perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal 
acts, and consequently lust is no sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice 
is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is 
forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle 
(Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: 'luxury']." 
Therefore lust is forbidden.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay: 
'luxury'].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one 
to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful 
it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal 
acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the 
common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there 
is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this 
matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the 
dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists 
essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of 
venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. 
i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said to be 
superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive 
power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the 
other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so 
that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the 
decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, 
which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it 
is needed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against lust, 
"You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body." 
Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a man wrongs God 
Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. 
Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus governs His 
servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment, 
lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun 
to be."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since  men are 
more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under 
insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual 
intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether lust is a capital vice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently 
the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 
12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory 
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride of 
mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard 
the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of 
a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a 
capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19, "Who 
despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But despair is 
not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as 
stated above (Q[35], A[4], ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital 
vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital 
vices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a 
capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire 
for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said 
to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is 
venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very 
desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the 
intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is 
connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[148], A[6]), according to some, the 
uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain 
uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, 
however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is 
caused by gluttony materially---in so far as gluttony provides the bodily 
matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final cause, in which 
respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[132], A[4], ad 1), when we were treating 
of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that 
even the capital vices originate therefrom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly 
through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so 
that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an  obstacle thereto, not 
as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital 
vice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned 
to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, 
self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of 
a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness 
pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as 
prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned 
especially as daughters of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated 
above (Q[128], ad 6; Q[137], A[3]). But lust is contrary, not to 
fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of 
lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the 
origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore 
it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, 
"obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There the 
aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their 
objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered 
in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower 
appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its 
object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of 
the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the 
will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple 
understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is 
hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived thee, 
and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have "blindness of 
mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of 
the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence 
Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: "This 
thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it 
by counseling." In this respect there is "rashness," which denotes 
absence of counsel, as stated above (Q[53], A[3]). The third act is 
judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. 
For it is said of the lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their 
own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments."  In 
this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's 
command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in 
so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered 
from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" 
must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine 
edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who 
declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will 
undo those words."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Body Para. 3/3

 On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is 
the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards the 
pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there 
is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The 
other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard 
to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to 
enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a future world," 
because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to 
obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance 
is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to 
prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of 
intemperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards 
hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures 
pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above 
(Q[143]). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be 
reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named 
inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's 
heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11, "Fornication and 
wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." 
Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the less a man knows of the 
pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we 
have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with 
it in matter (cf. Q[35], A[4], ad 2; Q[118], A[8], ad 1; Q[148], A[6]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for 
himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point of 
desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, 
pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold 
inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer 
"obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth 
speaketh" (Mt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd 
concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account 
of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the 
result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought 
to his words. which are  described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account 
of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his 
speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on 
account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing 
blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way 
"to foolish talking," for instance, by expressing a preference for the 
pleasures he desires to anything else.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are 
twelve points of inquiry:

 (1) Into what parts is lust divided?

 (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

 (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

 (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like 
seduction?

 (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

 (6) Of seduction;

 (7) Of rape;

 (8) Of adultery;

 (9) Of incest;

 (10) Of sacrilege;

 (11) Of the sin against nature;

 (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, 
namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the 
unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. 
Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, 
according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a 
virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species 
of lust are diversified in this way.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated 
by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from 
simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with 
one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice. Therefore it seems 
that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a 
woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that a 
man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore 
sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as adultery is.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another woman, 
but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin is 
comprised under lust. Therefore it should be  reckoned among the species 
thereof.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again, when I 
come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that sinned 
before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and 
lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that also 
uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as 
well as fornication.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. 
But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written (Gal. 
5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, 
uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore it seems that 
fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, 
qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that As stated above (Q[153], A[3]), the sin of lust consists 
in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This 
may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this 
pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other 
due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, 
does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object 
which is also its matter, it follows that the species of lust must be 
assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. 
First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In 
this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "vice 
against nature," which attaches to every venereal act from which 
generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and 
advancement of the child when born, there is "simple fornication," which 
is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the 
matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with 
right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways. First, 
with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of 
due honor not being paid to her; and thus there is "incest," which 
consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or 
affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the 
woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is 
"adultery," if under the authority of her father, it is "seduction," in 
the absence of violence, and "rape" if violence be employed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of 
the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by way 
of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated 
above (OBJ[1]) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a 
difference of matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a 
formal difference of object, which difference results from different 
modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (FS, Q[18], A[7]), nothing hinders the 
deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way 
adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of 
injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys 
concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more 
grievous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual 
marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of 
such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of 
sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of 
lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with 
undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the 
species of a moral act, as stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands for 
lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of boys, 
wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that 
"lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal 
act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there signifies 
any kind of excess.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For 
things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one 
another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not 
mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): "That you abstain from 
things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, 
and from fornication." But there is not mortal sin in these observances, 
according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is rejected that is received with 
thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the 
Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have 
of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is not a mortal 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without 
disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without 
disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we 
read (Gn. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and  further 
on (Gn. 30:5,9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of 
his wives; and again (Gn. 38:18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he 
thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple 
fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love of 
God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love 
of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple 
fornication is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple 
fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose [*The 
quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. 
Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness 
is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian teaching is 
summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to this, even though 
he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be 
punished, but he will not perish." Therefore simple fornication is not a 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food is 
to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare 
of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal 
sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this 
would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least 
grievous of the aforesaid species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] OTC Para. 1/3

 On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep thyself . 
. . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a 
crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all 
intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] OTC Para. 2/3

 Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But 
fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal. 5:21), 
who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: "They who 
do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore simple 
fornication is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] OTC Para. 3/3

 Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. 
Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be enjoined 
for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other 
criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a 
mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., 
qu. 37] on Dt. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against going with 
whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it should be 
"venal," since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make this evident, 
we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is 
a mortal  sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that 
tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For 
we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care 
of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, 
but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the 
case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where 
the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is 
indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident 
that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's care 
for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and 
guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and 
external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the 
sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and 
should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it 
is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the 
certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the 
child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were 
indeterminate.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for 
the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, 
the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human 
race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as 
stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows that this union of man and 
woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this 
determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work 
(XP, Q[50], seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. 
Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as 
something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the 
child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, 
make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a 
matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according 
to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a 
particular case.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, 
not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters 
mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and 
Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the 
Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the 
corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, 
considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome 
to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. 
Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though 
they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the 
Jews, as stated above (FS, Q[103], A[4], ad 3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to 
right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as  it is ruled by the 
Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does 
by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right 
reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even 
so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary 
to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore 
just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, 
because he obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to 
right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing 
fornication by God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly 
called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general 
course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God 
commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any 
people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; 
and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of human society, the 
greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in 
preference to all."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no 
purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of 
matrimony (XP, Q[65], A[5], ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse 
him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, 
because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as we have 
shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner 
disadvantageous to the future child.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the 
inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far as these 
works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such 
works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be 
freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent 
until death.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, 
wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future 
child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as 
to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does 
not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony 
is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a 
mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would 
alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 2/2

 Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under 
lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a 
lesser sin.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of  sins. For 
seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a 
greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in 
fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the "flame of sensuous 
pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it seems that fornication is 
the gravest of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a 
person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously 
who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 
1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own 
body," which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems 
that fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the 
sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed 
to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the 
foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:15, 
"Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a 
harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the 
flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first 
with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident. 
The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason 
of its species, which is determined according to the good to which that 
sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to 
be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins 
which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while 
it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins 
that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is 
in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the 
sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous 
according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It 
is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. 
Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; 
see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of all a Christian's 
conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the 
fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo 
Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more 
than by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is 
more difficult to overcome.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not 
merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, 
which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the 
good of his own body by an undue resolution and  defilement thereof, and 
an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that 
fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater 
value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, 
it will be more grievous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human 
race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the 
one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the 
human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who 
is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more 
grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust, through being more 
opposed to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good is greater 
than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are 
against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against 
God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God, but 
consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members 
of our body are Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, 
according to 1 Cor. 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." 
Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. 
For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all uncleanness, or 
covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh 
saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers to "kissing 
and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"), "or 
scurrility" (which "fools call geniality---i.e. jocularity"), and 
afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye this and understand that 
no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of 
idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God," thus 
making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or 
scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being 
prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing. 
But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. 
Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be 
good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes 
without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a 
kiss. But according to Mt. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust 
after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." Much 
more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2 

 Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very 
intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those 
who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, 
acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by doing these things a 
man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways. 
First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch 
does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to 
do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of 
one's country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. 
Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus 
he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally 
on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (FS, 
Q[74], A[8]), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but 
also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a 
mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in 
such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the 
pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses 
are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and 
only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they 
are lustful, they are mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because 
they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned 
before.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature 
hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which is 
the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally 
sinful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins 
in their species.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same 
things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he 
sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift 
of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kgs. 3:2, Par. 1). Therefore a man may demerit 
while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the 
use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss 
matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or 
dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that 
nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing 
that it is a sin according to its genus. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act 
according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and 
reproved by God, according to Job 33:15,16, "By a dream in a vision by 
night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [*Vulg.: 'When deep 
sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as 
the passage is given correctly above, Q[95], A[6], OBJ[1]] . . . Then He 
openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are 
to learn." Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against 
his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems 
that nocturnal pollution is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same 
image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind 
of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary 
from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the 
result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin 
in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things 
while one is awake."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, 
in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin 
depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the 
sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be 
suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, 
there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. 
For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images 
formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in 
the FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and 
is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as 
neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 2/5

 Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its 
cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is 
excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated 
either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the 
sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this 
excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is 
cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the 
discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. 
Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for 
instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the 
character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disintegration 
of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution 
is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 3/5

 A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the 
inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some 
previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is 
sometimes purely speculative, for instance  when one thinks about the 
sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is 
accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of 
abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking 
about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this 
leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more 
easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. 
In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as 
certain movements in some degree pass" from the waking state to the state 
of sleep, "the dreams of good men are better than those of any other 
people": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during 
sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good 
disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful 
on the part of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal 
pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were 
speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, 
neither in itself nor in its cause.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 4/5

 The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work 
of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the 
aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, 
namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the 
words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no 
uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 5/5

 On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and 
through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the 
Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer 
from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this 
about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is 
manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the 
result of a previous sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he 
was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for 
this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (3 
Kgs. 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, 
according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by 
sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. 
Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit 
a judgment altogether free, as stated in the FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. 
Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the 
same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning 
to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. 
Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from apprehending anew 
something arising out of the  traces left by his previous thoughts and 
phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the 
interference of a good or bad angel.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of 
lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according 
to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But 
this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which 
pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a 
species of lust, distinct from fornication.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): "Let no 
man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now a species 
is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to 
it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it seems that 
seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to 
injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to another, 
namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury as personal 
to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the seducer for 
damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby 
a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal 
actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we 
must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a 
sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q[153], A[1]). And a 
special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her 
father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated 
without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from 
contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life 
from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: 
and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Ecclus. 
42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she 
make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is 
evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, 
while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is 
not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a 
special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be 
removed by marriage only. Hence  seduction is not simple fornication, 
since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no 
longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Cor. 12:, "And have not done 
penance for the uncleanness and fornication," etc.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as 
applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in 
the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any 
woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: "Nor is it 
lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In this sense, too, 
we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: "If [Vulg.: 'But'] the 
adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was 
not found in adultery [stupro]."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity 
through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a 
greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence 
would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the 
pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold 
injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though 
not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is 
bound to compensation. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16,17): "If a man 
seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her 
and have her to wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he 
shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to 
receive." The other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the 
seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written 
(Dt. 22:28,29): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not 
espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: 
he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of 
silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he 
may not put her away all the days of his life": and this, lest he should 
prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in 
Dt., qu. xxxiv.]


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from 
seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction [stuprum], or 
rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from 
its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a 
seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species 
of lust distinct from seduction.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in 
the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "rape 
is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house 
that after being violated she may be taken to wife." But the employment 
of force is accidental to lust, for  this essentially regards the 
pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be 
reckoned a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written 
(1 Cor. 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife." 
Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the 
council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of 
abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, 
although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of 
their parents." Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust 
distinct from seduction.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife 
without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take her 
away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge of her. 
Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states 
(Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is a 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a 
species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes 
there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a 
virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and 
towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the 
virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from 
her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another 
way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents' 
house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by 
force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by 
act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape 
remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction 
if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus 
says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor 
abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness 
of their crime."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, 
violates a virgin unlawfully.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is 
sometimes used to signify the other.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the 
greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to 
endanger himself by offering violence. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be 
judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who 
is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a 
right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not 
promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, 
and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents' consent. 
Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is 
bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage 
already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. 
As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of 
this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is 
from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] declares the contrary: "Three kinds of 
lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that 
of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The 
second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal 
knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her 
according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity 
[*Cf. Dt. 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from 
such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to 
others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in 
the present tense.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the 
betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using 
violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says 
[*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This law of bygone rulers 
stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose 
marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other 
species?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, 
distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name from a man 
having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram]," 
according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on 
Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions, 
namely either a virgin, or under her father's care, or a harlot, or of 
any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species 
of lust distinct from the others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for what 
reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says 
in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer," and in 
like manner one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every kind of lust 
includes a too ardent love.  Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: 
and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would 
seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the same 
kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman 
is violated who is under another person's authority. Therefore adultery 
is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. 
Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is 
sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the 
marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, or with 
the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special deformity of 
lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's 
marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille 
autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense 
against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession 
to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the 
good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession to a 
woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good 
of another's children. The same applies to the married woman who is 
corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32,33): "Every 
woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For 
first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High" (since there 
it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she 
hath offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the 
children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath 
gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her 
offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, 
while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. 
Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, 
through having a special deformity in venereal acts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his 
sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is always 
adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or 
with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and thus sometimes 
it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another's 
wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other 
sin, according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has 
intercourse: and it has been stated above (A[1]) that the species of lust 
correspond to the various conditions of women.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human 
offspring, as stated above (A[2]). But adultery is specially opposed to 
matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith  which is due 
between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of 
his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently, 
although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; 
and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him 
in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as one who 
is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary 
to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of seduction in another; 
wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters 
concerning adultery we shall speak in the Third Part [*XP, Q[59], A[3]; 
XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. 
For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste'] takes 
its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are 
opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of 
lust, but is lust itself in general.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf. 
Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between a 
man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity 
differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species 
of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does 
not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse between 
those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, 
contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore 
incest is not a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the 
various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse. Now 
incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it 
is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity 
as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],6) wherever we find something 
incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be 
a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related 
by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three 
counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his 
parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in 
near degree from the same parents: so much so indeed that among the 
ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was 
not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should  
see one another naked. Now from what has been said (Q[142], A[4]: Q[151], 
A[4]), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain 
shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of 
them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in 
venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where 
we read: "She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and 
the same is expressed further on with regard to others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 2/4

 The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close 
touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from venereal 
union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and 
thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the Old Law [*Lev. 
18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons 
who must needs live together.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 3/4

 The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many 
friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's 
relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though 
they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. 
Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men 
uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship 
require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; 
nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have 
one."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 4/4

 Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural 
that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this be 
added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love 
would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust: and 
this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a 
determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another 
would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the 
opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as 
stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such 
persons is called "incest" antonomastically.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is related 
by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other, 
consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to 
natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, 
for instance between parents and children who are directly and 
immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their 
parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 
47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a 
precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals 
even have a natural respect for  those that have begotten them. There is 
not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are 
related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to 
this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and 
human or Divine law: because, as stated above (A[2]), sexual intercourse, 
being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and 
sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of 
condemnation when religion forbade it.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the 
same species is not contained under different genera that are not 
subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, 
as stated above (Q[99], A[2]). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex 
illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned 
species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by 
the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not 
reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore 
neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is 
wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how much 
more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of 
morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin 
of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow 
the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters. But 
venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of 
lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), the act of a virtue 
or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes 
the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, 
passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine 
states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to 
the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those 
who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by 
violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the 
species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes 
a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also a species of 
irreligion, as of a higher genus.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are 
species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of 
lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may 
coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful intercourse 
between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege 
after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God, 
inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling 
adultery. If the maiden be under her father's authority, it will be 
spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, 
which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others. 
Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If 
any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated 
virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a 
consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for 
sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for 
possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come 
under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done 
to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by partaking 
gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more 
specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of 
which certain persons are specially consecrated.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. 
For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration 
given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under 
vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but under 
bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the 
unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as 
stated above (Q[153], A[2]): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts 
from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not 
a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust 
(2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the 
uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says: 
"Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[6],9) wherever there occurs a special 
kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there 
is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, 
through being contrary to right reason, and  this is common to all 
lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the 
natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race: and this 
is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen in several ways. First, 
by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal 
pleasure: this pertains to the sin of "uncleanness" which some call 
"effeminacy." Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species, and 
this is called "bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, 
male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rm. 1:27): 
and this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the 
natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other 
monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not 
contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to 
human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, and 
therefore is reducible to the same genus.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal 
pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which 
human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural 
vice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin 
among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to charity the 
graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our 
neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, than 
unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the 
unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most 
grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it is 
injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than 
the unnatural vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as 
we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed. 
Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who 
are united to him---and such are those whom he defiles by incest---than 
persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he 
defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the 
unnatural vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is 
against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the  sin of 
uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since 
it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient 
should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that 
uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true. 
Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is 
from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali, 
viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that 
which is against nature is the worst."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the 
principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are 
those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes 
things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things 
according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and 
in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most 
grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge 
of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most 
grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. 
Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has 
been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it 
follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes 
incest, which, as stated above (A[9]), is contrary to the natural respect 
which we owe persons related to us.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Body Para. 2/2

 With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression 
merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the 
presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against 
reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the 
future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. 
Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to 
another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is 
a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to 
another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards 
merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than 
seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of violence. Hence 
rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than 
adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of 
sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so 
the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to 
nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done 
to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): 
"Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at 
all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of 
Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of 
the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they 
should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should 
be  between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He is 
the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above 
(ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as 
the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any 
subsequently established order.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to each 
individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against the 
specific nature are more grievous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than 
on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against nature, 
the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the 
mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the 
sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence 
a gloss on Gn. 37:2, "He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime," 
says that "they copulated with cattle." After this comes the sin of 
sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the 
sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more 
grievous if the abuse regards the "vas" than if it affects the manner of 
copulation in respect of other circumstances.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] Out. Para. 1/1

POTENTIAL PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, AND CONTRARY VICES (QQ[155]-170)


OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; 
(2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider 
continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether continence is a virtue?

 (2) What is its matter?

 (3) What is its subject?

 (4) Of its comparison with temperance.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether continence is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species and 
genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But continence is 
co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). 
Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to 
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a virtue is a thing that no one 
makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, 
if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore 
continence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is  lawful, but 
only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, "Faith, modesty," 
etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are 
lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now 
such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that "continence 
is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore continence is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The word "continence" is taken by various people in two 
ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all 
venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal. 
5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, 
and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence 
understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above (Q[152], A[3]
) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying 
that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In 
this sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus 
also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). 
In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so 
far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, 
lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect 
nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject 
to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in 
the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that 
"continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has something 
of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of 
commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same division 
with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to 
reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to that 
which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now 
whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason. 
Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is 
in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with 
perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as 
good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and 
truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil 
desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good 
desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as 
denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, 
but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to 
give its whole attention to the more perfect  goods.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the 
matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): "General 
decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is 
restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem" according to St. 
Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = harmonious"].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the 
good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other passions 
lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire 
for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which 
stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as 
Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not properly 
regard the desires for pleasures of touch.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is continence 
that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel." Now cupidity 
is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire 
for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, "Cupidity [Douay: 'The 
desire of money'] ({philargyria}), is the root of all evils." Therefore 
continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal 
matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only to 
the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch 
is not its proper matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, 
both as regards food---for instance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; 
and as regards venereal matters---for instance the abuse of animals or 
boys. But continence is not about such like things, as stated in Ethic. 
vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper 
matter of continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "continence 
and in