Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] Out. Para. 1/1

OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five 
points of inquiry:

 (1) In what does virginity consist?

 (2) Whether it is lawful?

 (3) Whether it is a virtue?

 (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;

 (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity of the 
flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The quotation is from De 
Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual meditation on 
incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But meditation does not concern the 
flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine says 
(De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore virginity 
is not incorruption of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the 
seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without loss of 
virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those organs may 
be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes 
do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a 
midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that 
she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as to 
deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost 
the integrity of that organ." Therefore virginity does not consist in 
incorruption of the flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution 
of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, whether one be 
asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: 
for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that "virginal integrity and holy 
continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of 
angels." Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the 
flesh.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity is 
continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and 
observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from "viror" 
[freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its 
freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, 
virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the 
heat of concupiscence which is experienced in  achieving the greatest 
bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose says 
(De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity free of pollution."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first 
is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of virginity. 
The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that 
which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, causing 
sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely 
the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is 
accidental to the moral act, which as such must be considered in 
reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the 
moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts. But 
the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the 
essence of morality is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since 
then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it 
follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to 
virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is 
related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining 
from this pleasure is the formal and completive element in virginity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that 
which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's purpose; 
and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must always 
retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in mind the 
purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed 
indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a corruptible body." This is 
added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were 
incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual 
meditation on incorruption.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; 
but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with 
virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "although 
virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a bodily quality, 
"yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and 
preserves."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is 
accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely 
abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily 
organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, 
this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or 
foot.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in 
two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys 
virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, 
mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and 
natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose 
of the mind, either during  sleep, or through violence and without the 
mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again 
through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a 
flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not forfeit, because such like 
pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is unlawful?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is 
contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the 
words of Gn. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt eat," 
indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation 
of the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28, "Increase and multiply, 
and fill the earth," express a precept of the natural law, in reference 
to the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin 
to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of 
the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of 
procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently 
sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains 
from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), 
that "he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is 
intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible." 
Therefore virginity is something sinful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden 
times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus 
asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera 
Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to nature, in order that he 
might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin." 
Therefore virginity is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is 
a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:25): "Concerning 
virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore 
virginity is not an unlawful thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right 
reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should 
be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is 
threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, 
for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, 
consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the 
contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as 
the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk. 
10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these goods those that are 
external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which 
belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and 
furthermore those which belong to the active life are  directed to those 
which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason 
dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the 
body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain 
from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to 
possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of 
truth, this is not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like 
manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to 
give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with 
the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal 
pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: 
for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin 
thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and 
in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, 
how she may please her husband." Therefore it follows that virginity 
instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q[122], A[1]). 
Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be 
fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside 
without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the 
fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the 
multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be 
discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, 
and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which 
binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise 
the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of 
procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to 
multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient 
provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to 
carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves 
to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the 
whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are 
standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these things 
are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one 
person.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, 
abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure as 
such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from 
every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and abstains 
therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of 
virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to right reason, as 
stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. 
iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of 
becomingness he follows the mean."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. 
Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from all 
venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato 
alone is related to have done.  Hence it was not through thinking this a 
sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded to the false 
opinion of his fellow countrymen," as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. 
iii).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no virtue is 
in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now virginity 
is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity 
is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above 
(FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: 
else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no one 
could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of 
marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is 
not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad Eustoch.]: 
"Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her 
downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost 
without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal 
purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a 
virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity 
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we 
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the formal and completive element 
in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which 
purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this 
is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material 
element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of 
venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a good action has a 
special matter through having a special excellence, there is a special 
kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great 
expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, 
which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free 
from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own 
deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate 
venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related 
to chastity as magnificence to liberality.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in 
virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal 
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely 
the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which purpose 
gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. 
xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but, because their 
virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is 
formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated above 
(Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in 
them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter of one 
virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the 
matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence. It is in this way 
that one who has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely 
the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which 
is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the 
purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be 
fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind 
as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he 
in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in 
mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which 
preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is 
formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein. For if a 
magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his 
riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person who has lost 
virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but 
the purpose of virginity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be 
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which we 
hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which 
cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced 
venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot 
make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in the FP, Q[25]
, A[4].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by 
vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. 
viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated 
and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh." Hence 
virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it 
abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it 
above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to 
chastity in general; but it does not  attain to that which is perfect in 
this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity 
alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue 
above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. 
For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was equally 
meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot 
children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore virginity is 
not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his 
virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it 
would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any 
married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not preferable 
to marriage.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, 
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to 
the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is 
to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the 
human race." On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual 
good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls the "tribulation of 
the flesh," to which married people are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). Therefore 
virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason and 
the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is 
it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of 
widowhood."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of 
Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. 
This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a 
virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching 
of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the greater good. It 
is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of 
a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good 
of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is 
better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the 
good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in 
thinking "on the things of God" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is 
directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human 
race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace 
the married life have to think "on the things of the world," as the 
Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is 
preferable to conjugal continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still 
more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that 
he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the 
times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal continence was equally 
meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the 
essential reward, but not as regards the accidental reward. Hence 
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both "the celibacy of John and 
the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's battle in keeping with the 
difference of the times: but John was continent even in deed, whereas 
Abraham was continent only in habit."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a 
married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on the 
part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared 
in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who 
is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the 
virgin to say: "I am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of 
celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage." Further on he gives 
the reason for this: "For what I do now, he would have done better, if it 
were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now 
if it behooved me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the person who 
is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says 
(De Virgin. xliv): "Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to 
the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account 
of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this 
woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to 
drink the chalice of the Lord?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it 
be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better 
generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is 
preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): 
"It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those 
women who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in 
order to make them servants of Christ, cannot compensate for lost 
virginity."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For 
Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address ourselves now 
to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their 
vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing, the pride and 
ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ's flock."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the 
greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold fruit, 
according to a gloss on Mt. 13:23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of 
the virtues. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it 
is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is declared in 
the Apocalypse 14:4 that virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He 
goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new canticle," which "no" 
other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, 
would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The 
authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so 
that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have 
departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar." By 
this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic 
state, are preferable to virginity.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some 
particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the 
genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and 
of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity 
antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to 
chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can anyone esteem 
any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her King, 
approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?" 
Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way virginity 
is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels 
that which is directed to the end; and the more effectively a thing is 
directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders 
virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as 
stated above (A[4]). Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the 
virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about 
Divine things, are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more 
mightily in order to cleave to God---since for this end they hold their 
own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries---since for this 
end they give up their own will and all that they may possess---than 
virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore 
virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's flock," 
and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and married 
women.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according 
to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its superiority to 
widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to 
which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (De 
QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the 
sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons." Wherefore 
it does not follow that virginity is simply the greatest of virtues, but 
only in comparison with other degrees of chastity. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[152] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," because 
they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also of the 
flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the 
Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow more closely, 
because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of 
the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having 
preserved integrity of the flesh.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] Out. Para. 1/1

OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)

 We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) 
Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are five 
points of inquiry:

 (1) What is the matter of lust?

 (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?

 (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?

 (4) Whether lust is a capital vice?

 (5) Concerning its daughters.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal 
desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "lust 
affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat and 
drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly 
about venereal desires and pleasures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful [Douay: 
'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and 
drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" 
[*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure 
regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is 
not only about venereal desires and pleasures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [*Written 
by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap 
corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. 
Therefore these belong to lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is 
debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a 
man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like 
pleasures.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to 
pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is 
referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal 
pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest  havoc in a 
man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to 
excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any kind of surfeit."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in 
which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of 
too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name 
of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also 
wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 
15,16).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether no venereal act can be without sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For 
nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a 
great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I 
consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the 
fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no 
venereal act is without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is 
sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency" as 
stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of 
pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is incompatible with the 
act of understanding," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and 
as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] 
states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible 
to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original 
sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no 
venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 
24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a 
sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin 
is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a 
commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the 
patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal 
act is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order 
of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to 
its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the 
dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and 
order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be 
something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature 
of one individual is a true good,  so, too, is the preservation of the 
nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of 
food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the 
use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human 
race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a 
man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole 
human race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it 
be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the 
body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they 
be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human 
procreation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as 
regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is 
an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, 
and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a 
lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from 
virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence 
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that was good which 
Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which 
Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of 
Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, 
and much more that of the Virgin Mary."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; FS, Q[64], A[2]), the 
mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right 
reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal 
act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. 
Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced 
by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; 
what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that 
pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to 
virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering 
spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is 
not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for 
something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be 
against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal 
concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation 
of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the 
reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel 
against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, 
shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is 
not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin." Hence it 
does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains 
something penal resulting from the first sin.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be  a sin. For 
the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus 
from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But 
there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. 
Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what 
is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except 
perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal 
acts, and consequently lust is no sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice 
is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is 
forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle 
(Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: 'luxury']." 
Therefore lust is forbidden.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2

 Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay: 
'luxury'].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one 
to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful 
it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal 
acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the 
common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there 
is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this 
matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the 
dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists 
essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of 
venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. 
i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said to be 
superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive 
power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the 
other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so 
that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the 
decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, 
which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it 
is needed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against lust, 
"You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body." 
Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a man wrongs God 
Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. 
Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus governs His 
servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment, 
lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun 
to be."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since  men are 
more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under 
insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual 
intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether lust is a capital vice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently 
the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 
12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory 
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride of 
mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard 
the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of 
a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a 
capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19, "Who 
despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But despair is 
not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as 
stated above (Q[35], A[4], ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital 
vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital 
vices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a 
capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire 
for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said 
to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is 
venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very 
desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the 
intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is 
connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[148], A[6]), according to some, the 
uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain 
uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, 
however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is 
caused by gluttony materially---in so far as gluttony provides the bodily 
matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final cause, in which 
respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[132], A[4], ad 1), when we were treating 
of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that 
even the capital vices originate therefrom.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly 
through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so 
that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an  obstacle thereto, not 
as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital 
vice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned 
to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, 
self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of 
a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness 
pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as 
prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned 
especially as daughters of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated 
above (Q[128], ad 6; Q[137], A[3]). But lust is contrary, not to 
fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of 
lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the 
origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore 
it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, 
"obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There the 
aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their 
objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered 
in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower 
appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its 
object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of 
the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the 
will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple 
understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is 
hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived thee, 
and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have "blindness of 
mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of 
the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence 
Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: "This 
thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it 
by counseling." In this respect there is "rashness," which denotes 
absence of counsel, as stated above (Q[53], A[3]). The third act is 
judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. 
For it is said of the lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their 
own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments."  In 
this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's 
command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in 
so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered 
from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" 
must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine 
edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who 
declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will 
undo those words."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] Body Para. 3/3

 On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is 
the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards the 
pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there 
is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The 
other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard 
to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to 
enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a future world," 
because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to 
obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance 
is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to 
prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of 
intemperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards 
hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures 
pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above 
(Q[143]). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be 
reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named 
inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's 
heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11, "Fornication and 
wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." 
Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the less a man knows of the 
pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we 
have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with 
it in matter (cf. Q[35], A[4], ad 2; Q[118], A[8], ad 1; Q[148], A[6]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for 
himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point of 
desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[153] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, 
pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold 
inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer 
"obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth 
speaketh" (Mt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd 
concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account 
of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the 
result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought 
to his words. which are  described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account 
of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his 
speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on 
account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing 
blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way 
"to foolish talking," for instance, by expressing a preference for the 
pleasures he desires to anything else.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are 
twelve points of inquiry:

 (1) Into what parts is lust divided?

 (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

 (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

 (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like 
seduction?

 (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

 (6) Of seduction;

 (7) Of rape;

 (8) Of adultery;

 (9) Of incest;

 (10) Of sacrilege;

 (11) Of the sin against nature;

 (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, 
namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the 
unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. 
Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, 
according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a 
virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species 
of lust are diversified in this way.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated 
by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from 
simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with 
one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice. Therefore it seems 
that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a 
woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that a 
man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore 
sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as adultery is.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another woman, 
but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin is 
comprised under lust. Therefore it should be  reckoned among the species 
thereof.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again, when I 
come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that sinned 
before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and 
lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that also 
uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as 
well as fornication.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. 
But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written (Gal. 
5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, 
uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore it seems that 
fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, 
qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that As stated above (Q[153], A[3]), the sin of lust consists 
in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This 
may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this 
pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other 
due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, 
does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object 
which is also its matter, it follows that the species of lust must be 
assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. 
First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In 
this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "vice 
against nature," which attaches to every venereal act from which 
generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and 
advancement of the child when born, there is "simple fornication," which 
is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the 
matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with 
right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways. First, 
with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of 
due honor not being paid to her; and thus there is "incest," which 
consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or 
affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the 
woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is 
"adultery," if under the authority of her father, it is "seduction," in 
the absence of violence, and "rape" if violence be employed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of 
the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by way 
of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated 
above (OBJ[1]) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a 
difference of matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a 
formal difference of object, which difference results from different 
modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (FS, Q[18], A[7]), nothing hinders the 
deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way 
adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of 
injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys 
concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more 
grievous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual 
marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of 
such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of 
sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of 
lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with 
undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the 
species of a moral act, as stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands for 
lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of boys, 
wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that 
"lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal 
act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there signifies 
any kind of excess.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For 
things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one 
another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not 
mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): "That you abstain from 
things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, 
and from fornication." But there is not mortal sin in these observances, 
according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is rejected that is received with 
thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the 
Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have 
of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is not a mortal 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without 
disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without 
disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we 
read (Gn. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and  further 
on (Gn. 30:5,9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of 
his wives; and again (Gn. 38:18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he 
thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple 
fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love of 
God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love 
of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple 
fornication is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple 
fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose [*The 
quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. 
Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness 
is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian teaching is 
summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to this, even though 
he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be 
punished, but he will not perish." Therefore simple fornication is not a 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food is 
to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare 
of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal 
sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this 
would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least 
grievous of the aforesaid species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] OTC Para. 1/3

 On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep thyself . 
. . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a 
crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all 
intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] OTC Para. 2/3

 Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But 
fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal. 5:21), 
who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: "They who 
do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore simple 
fornication is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] OTC Para. 3/3

 Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. 
Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be enjoined 
for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other 
criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a 
mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., 
qu. 37] on Dt. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against going with 
whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it should be 
"venal," since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make this evident, 
we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is 
a mortal  sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that 
tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For 
we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care 
of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, 
but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the 
case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where 
the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is 
indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident 
that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's care 
for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and 
guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and 
external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the 
sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and 
should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it 
is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the 
certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the 
child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were 
indeterminate.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for 
the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, 
the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human 
race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as 
stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows that this union of man and 
woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this 
determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work 
(XP, Q[50], seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. 
Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as 
something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the 
child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, 
make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a 
matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according 
to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a 
particular case.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, 
not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters 
mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and 
Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the 
Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the 
corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, 
considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome 
to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. 
Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though 
they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the 
Jews, as stated above (FS, Q[103], A[4], ad 3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to 
right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as  it is ruled by the 
Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does 
by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right 
reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even 
so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary 
to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore 
just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, 
because he obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to 
right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing 
fornication by God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly 
called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general 
course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God 
commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any 
people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; 
and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of human society, the 
greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in 
preference to all."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no 
purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of 
matrimony (XP, Q[65], A[5], ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse 
him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, 
because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as we have 
shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner 
disadvantageous to the future child.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the 
inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far as these 
works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such 
works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be 
freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent 
until death.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, 
wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future 
child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as 
to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does 
not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony 
is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a 
mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would 
alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 2/2

 Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under 
lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a 
lesser sin.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of  sins. For 
seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a 
greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in 
fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the "flame of sensuous 
pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it seems that fornication is 
the gravest of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a 
person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously 
who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 
1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own 
body," which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems 
that fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the 
sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed 
to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the 
foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:15, 
"Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a 
harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the 
flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first 
with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident. 
The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason 
of its species, which is determined according to the good to which that 
sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to 
be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins 
which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while 
it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins 
that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is 
in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the 
sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous 
according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It 
is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. 
Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; 
see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of all a Christian's 
conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the 
fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo 
Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more 
than by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is 
more difficult to overcome.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not 
merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, 
which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the 
good of his own body by an undue resolution and  defilement thereof, and 
an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that 
fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater 
value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, 
it will be more grievous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human 
race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the 
one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the 
human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who 
is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more 
grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust, through being more 
opposed to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good is greater 
than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are 
against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against 
God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God, but 
consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members 
of our body are Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, 
according to 1 Cor. 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." 
Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. 
For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all uncleanness, or 
covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh 
saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers to "kissing 
and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"), "or 
scurrility" (which "fools call geniality---i.e. jocularity"), and 
afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye this and understand that 
no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of 
idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God," thus 
making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or 
scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being 
prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing. 
But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. 
Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be 
good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes 
without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2

 On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a 
kiss. But according to Mt. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust 
after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." Much 
more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2 

 Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very 
intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those 
who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, 
acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by doing these things a 
man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways. 
First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch 
does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to 
do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of 
one's country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. 
Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus 
he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally 
on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (FS, 
Q[74], A[8]), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but 
also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a 
mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in 
such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the 
pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses 
are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and 
only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they 
are lustful, they are mortal sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because 
they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned 
before.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature 
hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which is 
the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally 
sinful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins 
in their species.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same 
things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he 
sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift 
of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kgs. 3:2, Par. 1). Therefore a man may demerit 
while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the 
use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss 
matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or 
dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that 
nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing 
that it is a sin according to its genus. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act 
according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and 
reproved by God, according to Job 33:15,16, "By a dream in a vision by 
night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [*Vulg.: 'When deep 
sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as 
the passage is given correctly above, Q[95], A[6], OBJ[1]] . . . Then He 
openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are 
to learn." Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against 
his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems 
that nocturnal pollution is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same 
image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind 
of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary 
from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the 
result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin 
in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things 
while one is awake."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, 
in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin 
depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the 
sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be 
suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, 
there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. 
For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images 
formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in 
the FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and 
is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as 
neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 2/5

 Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its 
cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is 
excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated 
either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the 
sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this 
excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is 
cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the 
discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. 
Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for 
instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the 
character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disintegration 
of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution 
is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 3/5

 A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the 
inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some 
previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is 
sometimes purely speculative, for instance  when one thinks about the 
sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is 
accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of 
abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking 
about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this 
leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more 
easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. 
In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as 
certain movements in some degree pass" from the waking state to the state 
of sleep, "the dreams of good men are better than those of any other 
people": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during 
sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good 
disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful 
on the part of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal 
pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were 
speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, 
neither in itself nor in its cause.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 4/5

 The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work 
of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the 
aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, 
namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the 
words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no 
uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] Body Para. 5/5

 On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and 
through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the 
Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer 
from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this 
about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is 
manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the 
result of a previous sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he 
was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for 
this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (3 
Kgs. 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, 
according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by 
sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. 
Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit 
a judgment altogether free, as stated in the FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. 
Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the 
same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning 
to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. 
Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from apprehending anew 
something arising out of the  traces left by his previous thoughts and 
phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the 
interference of a good or bad angel.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of 
lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according 
to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But 
this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which 
pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a 
species of lust, distinct from fornication.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): "Let no 
man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now a species 
is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to 
it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it seems that 
seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to 
injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to another, 
namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury as personal 
to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the seducer for 
damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby 
a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal 
actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we 
must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a 
sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q[153], A[1]). And a 
special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her 
father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated 
without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from 
contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life 
from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: 
and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Ecclus. 
42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she 
make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is 
evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, 
while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is 
not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a 
special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be 
removed by marriage only. Hence  seduction is not simple fornication, 
since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no 
longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Cor. 12:, "And have not done 
penance for the uncleanness and fornication," etc.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as 
applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in 
the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any 
woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: "Nor is it 
lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In this sense, too, 
we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: "If [Vulg.: 'But'] the 
adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was 
not found in adultery [stupro]."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity 
through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a 
greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence 
would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the 
pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold 
injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though 
not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is 
bound to compensation. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16,17): "If a man 
seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her 
and have her to wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he 
shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to 
receive." The other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the 
seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written 
(Dt. 22:28,29): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not 
espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: 
he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of 
silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he 
may not put her away all the days of his life": and this, lest he should 
prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in 
Dt., qu. xxxiv.]


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from 
seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction [stuprum], or 
rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from 
its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a 
seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species 
of lust distinct from seduction.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in 
the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "rape 
is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house 
that after being violated she may be taken to wife." But the employment 
of force is accidental to lust, for  this essentially regards the 
pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be 
reckoned a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written 
(1 Cor. 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife." 
Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the 
council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of 
abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, 
although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of 
their parents." Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust 
distinct from seduction.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife 
without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take her 
away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge of her. 
Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states 
(Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is a 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a 
species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes 
there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a 
virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and 
towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the 
virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from 
her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another 
way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents' 
house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by 
force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by 
act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape 
remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction 
if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus 
says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor 
abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness 
of their crime."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, 
violates a virgin unlawfully.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is 
sometimes used to signify the other.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the 
greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to 
endanger himself by offering violence. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be 
judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who 
is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a 
right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not 
promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, 
and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents' consent. 
Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is 
bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage 
already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. 
As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of 
this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is 
from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] declares the contrary: "Three kinds of 
lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that 
of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The 
second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal 
knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her 
according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity 
[*Cf. Dt. 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from 
such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to 
others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in 
the present tense.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the 
betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using 
violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says 
[*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This law of bygone rulers 
stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose 
marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other 
species?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, 
distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name from a man 
having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram]," 
according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on 
Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions, 
namely either a virgin, or under her father's care, or a harlot, or of 
any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species 
of lust distinct from the others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for what 
reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says 
in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer," and in 
like manner one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every kind of lust 
includes a too ardent love.  Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: 
and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would 
seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the same 
kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman 
is violated who is under another person's authority. Therefore adultery 
is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. 
Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is 
sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the 
marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, or with 
the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special deformity of 
lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's 
marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille 
autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense 
against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession 
to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the 
good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession to a 
woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good 
of another's children. The same applies to the married woman who is 
corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32,33): "Every 
woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For 
first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High" (since there 
it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she 
hath offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the 
children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath 
gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her 
offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, 
while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. 
Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, 
through having a special deformity in venereal acts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his 
sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is always 
adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or 
with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and thus sometimes 
it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another's 
wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other 
sin, according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has 
intercourse: and it has been stated above (A[1]) that the species of lust 
correspond to the various conditions of women.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human 
offspring, as stated above (A[2]). But adultery is specially opposed to 
matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith  which is due 
between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of 
his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently, 
although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; 
and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him 
in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as one who 
is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary 
to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of seduction in another; 
wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters 
concerning adultery we shall speak in the Third Part [*XP, Q[59], A[3]; 
XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. 
For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste'] takes 
its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are 
opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of 
lust, but is lust itself in general.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf. 
Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between a 
man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity 
differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species 
of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does 
not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse between 
those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, 
contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore 
incest is not a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the 
various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse. Now 
incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it 
is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity 
as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],6) wherever we find something 
incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be 
a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related 
by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three 
counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his 
parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in 
near degree from the same parents: so much so indeed that among the 
ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was 
not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should  
see one another naked. Now from what has been said (Q[142], A[4]: Q[151], 
A[4]), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain 
shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of 
them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in 
venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where 
we read: "She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and 
the same is expressed further on with regard to others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 2/4

 The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close 
touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from venereal 
union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and 
thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the Old Law [*Lev. 
18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons 
who must needs live together.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 3/4

 The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many 
friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's 
relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though 
they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. 
Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men 
uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship 
require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; 
nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have 
one."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] Body Para. 4/4

 Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural 
that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this be 
added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love 
would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust: and 
this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a 
determinate species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another 
would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the 
opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as 
stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such 
persons is called "incest" antonomastically.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is related 
by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other, 
consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to 
natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, 
for instance between parents and children who are directly and 
immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their 
parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 
47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a 
precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals 
even have a natural respect for  those that have begotten them. There is 
not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are 
related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to 
this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and 
human or Divine law: because, as stated above (A[2]), sexual intercourse, 
being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and 
sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of 
condemnation when religion forbade it.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the 
same species is not contained under different genera that are not 
subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, 
as stated above (Q[99], A[2]). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex 
illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned 
species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by 
the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not 
reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore 
neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is 
wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how much 
more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of 
morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin 
of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow 
the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters. But 
venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of 
lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), the act of a virtue 
or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes 
the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, 
passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine 
states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to 
the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those 
who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by 
violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the 
species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a 
species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes 
a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also a species of 
irreligion, as of a higher genus.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are 
species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of 
lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may 
coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful intercourse 
between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege 
after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God, 
inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling 
adultery. If the maiden be under her father's authority, it will be 
spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, 
which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others. 
Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If 
any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated 
virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a 
consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for 
sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for 
possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come 
under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done 
to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by partaking 
gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more 
specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of 
which certain persons are specially consecrated.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. 
For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration 
given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under 
vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but under 
bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the 
unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as 
stated above (Q[153], A[2]): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts 
from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not 
a species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust 
(2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the 
uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says: 
"Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[6],9) wherever there occurs a special 
kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there 
is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, 
through being contrary to right reason, and  this is common to all 
lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the 
natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race: and this 
is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen in several ways. First, 
by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal 
pleasure: this pertains to the sin of "uncleanness" which some call 
"effeminacy." Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species, and 
this is called "bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, 
male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rm. 1:27): 
and this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the 
natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other 
monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not 
contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to 
human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, and 
therefore is reducible to the same genus.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal 
pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which 
human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural 
vice.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin 
among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to charity the 
graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our 
neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, than 
unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the 
unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most 
grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it is 
injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than 
the unnatural vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as 
we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed. 
Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who 
are united to him---and such are those whom he defiles by incest---than 
persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he 
defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the 
unnatural vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is 
against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the  sin of 
uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since 
it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient 
should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that 
uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true. 
Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is 
from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali, 
viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that 
which is against nature is the worst."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the 
principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are 
those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes 
things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things 
according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and 
in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most 
grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge 
of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most 
grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. 
Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has 
been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it 
follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes 
incest, which, as stated above (A[9]), is contrary to the natural respect 
which we owe persons related to us.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] Body Para. 2/2

 With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression 
merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the 
presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against 
reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the 
future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. 
Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to 
another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is 
a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to 
another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards 
merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than 
seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of violence. Hence 
rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than 
adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of 
sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so 
the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to 
nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done 
to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): 
"Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at 
all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of 
Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of 
the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they 
should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should 
be  between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He is 
the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above 
(ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as 
the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any 
subsequently established order.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to each 
individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against the 
specific nature are more grievous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[154] A[12] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than 
on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against nature, 
the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the 
mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the 
sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence 
a gloss on Gn. 37:2, "He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime," 
says that "they copulated with cattle." After this comes the sin of 
sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the 
sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more 
grievous if the abuse regards the "vas" than if it affects the manner of 
copulation in respect of other circumstances.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] Out. Para. 1/1

POTENTIAL PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, AND CONTRARY VICES (QQ[155]-170)


OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; 
(2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider 
continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether continence is a virtue?

 (2) What is its matter?

 (3) What is its subject?

 (4) Of its comparison with temperance.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether continence is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species and 
genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But continence is 
co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). 
Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to 
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a virtue is a thing that no one 
makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, 
if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore 
continence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is  lawful, but 
only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, "Faith, modesty," 
etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are 
lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now 
such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that "continence 
is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore continence is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The word "continence" is taken by various people in two 
ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all 
venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal. 
5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, 
and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence 
understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above (Q[152], A[3]
) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying 
that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In 
this sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus 
also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). 
In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so 
far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, 
lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect 
nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject 
to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in 
the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that 
"continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has something 
of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of 
commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same division 
with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to 
reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to that 
which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now 
whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason. 
Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is 
in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with 
perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as 
good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and 
truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil 
desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good 
desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as 
denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, 
but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to 
give its whole attention to the more perfect  goods.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the 
matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): "General 
decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is 
restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem" according to St. 
Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = harmonious"].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the 
good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other passions 
lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire 
for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which 
stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as 
Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not properly 
regard the desires for pleasures of touch.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is continence 
that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel." Now cupidity 
is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire 
for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, "Cupidity [Douay: 'The 
desire of money'] ({philargyria}), is the root of all evils." Therefore 
continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal 
matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only to 
the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch 
is not its proper matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, 
both as regards food---for instance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; 
and as regards venereal matters---for instance the abuse of animals or 
boys. But continence is not about such like things, as stated in Ethic. 
vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper 
matter of continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "continence 
and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and 
intemperance." Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for 
pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q[141], A[4]). Therefore continence 
and incontinence are also about that same matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, 
in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence 
continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a 
man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that 
reason should withhold man from pursuing:  whereas it is not properly 
about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind 
of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in 
pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q[123], AA[3],4). Now it 
is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all 
supervening inclinations, as stated above (FP, Q[60], A[2]). Wherefore 
the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the 
passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly 
to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the maintenance of 
the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance of the species, such 
as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore 
continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of 
touch.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in 
connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter 
wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly 
speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to 
contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a 
general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in 
this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation 
to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies. As to 
anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, 
but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul---in so far as a man 
apprehends that someone has injured him---rather than an inclination of 
nature. Wherefore a man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively 
but not simply.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in 
themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of 
nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as 
being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding 
that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor and 
so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as 
including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted 
sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the 
palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence in 
reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although 
according to the Philosopher they are applicable to both.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it 
regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a 
child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion 
whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent [*See 
A[4]], not absolutely, but relatively."

 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible 
power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate to the 
virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated (A[2]), is 
desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible 
power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible power.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing" [*Categ. 
viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions overcome 
reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that "incontinence is the 
evil inclination of the concupiscible, by following which it chooses 
wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason." Therefore continence is 
likewise in the concupiscible.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or 
the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the concupiscible 
and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would 
be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since continence is 
about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the 
irascible, because it is not properly about the passions of the 
irascible, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore it follows that it is 
in the concupiscible.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the 
evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of 
the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires," according 
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is not in the 
concupiscible power.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that 
subject have a different disposition from that which it has while 
subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same 
disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since 
in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is 
manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as its subject. 
Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since both the 
continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while 
undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful desires. Now 
the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since 
the continent man, though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to 
follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses 
to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs 
reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is 
the will, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[1]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of 
touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is in the 
concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them. For this 
reason it must be in another  power, since resistance is of one thing 
against another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and 
may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, 
in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence 
may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and incontinence to 
the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as 
their proper subject.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although the passions are not in the will as their subject, 
yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is that the 
will of the continent man resists desires.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether continence is better than temperance?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance. For it 
is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent soul." 
Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the 
virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for it is 
written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned, except he strive 
lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil 
desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are 
not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the 
concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in 
the concupiscible, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore continence is a 
greater virtue than temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De 
Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a 
principal virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), continence has a twofold 
signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal 
pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than 
temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said 
above (Q[152], A[5]) concerning the preeminence of virginity over 
chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken as 
denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are 
vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than 
continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that 
which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in 
the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even 
the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by reason so to 
speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly 
resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared to 
temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in 
reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from all 
things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a 
continent soul," in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness of the flesh 
is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or 
of widowhood, as stated above (Q[152], AA[4],5). Secondly it may be 
understood in reference to the general sense in which continence denotes 
any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that "no price is 
worthy of a continent soul," because its value is not measured with gold 
or silver, which are appreciable according to weight.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from 
two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because some 
people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than 
others; and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame the 
concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Such 
like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of 
concupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or strength of 
concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance 
the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in the case of a 
temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its 
cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[155] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible 
power is. Wherefore the good of reason---on account of which virtue is 
praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to 
the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate man---is shown to be 
greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is 
continent.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] Out. Para. 1/1

OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four 
points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

 (2) Whether incontinence is a sin?

 (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;

 (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to 
the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. 
Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as 
continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the 
soul but to the body.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not  result from 
the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily 
temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is 
especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose 
incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence regards 
the body.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. 
Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh lusteth against 
the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the 
flesh rather than to the soul.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now 
they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe 
neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher 
states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of 
the soul.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to 
those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the 
body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to 
a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive 
appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, 
however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, 
but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason 
remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the 
passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason 
altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through the 
vehemence of their passions---the essential conditions of continence or 
incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of 
reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. 
From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part 
of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens 
in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when 
the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; 
and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, 
when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding 
weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is 
called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains 
chiefly to the soul.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain 
powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs 
conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished 
without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of 
the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the 
will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since 
woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that 
for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; 
although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, 
"Who shall find a valiant woman?" And since small and weak things "are 
accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5] the 
Philosopher  speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of 
reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that 
"we do not describe women as being continent, because they are 
vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so 
that they follow their passions readily.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once 
follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of 
passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. 
FS, Q[46], A[5]], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on 
account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, 
on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, 
because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his 
temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also 
the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. 
And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an 
occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes 
the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence of the 
spirit in not resisting strongly.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether incontinence is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine 
says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now 
no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, "I know 
[Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it." 
Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the 
judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore 
incontinence is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes 
incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says 
(Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love, 
exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incontinence is not 
a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. 3:3) 
where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc. 
Therefore incontinence is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two 
ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus 
incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as 
intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q[155], A[2]
). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the 
incontinent man goes astray from that which is  in accord with reason; 
secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is censurable not 
only because it is wrong"---that is, by straying from reason---"but also 
because it is wicked"---that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, 
incontinence about a matter is considered, properly---inasmuch as it is a 
straying from reason---but not simply; for instance when a man does not 
observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, 
which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is 
incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in 
reference to continence (Q[155], A[2], ad 3). In this way incontinence is 
a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but 
because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for 
things that are of themselves desirable.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but 
metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one 
cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said 
to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the 
incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man 
entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like 
incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's help, 
according to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing." Wherefore the 
fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent, does not show 
incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "what we can 
do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, 
not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain 
negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion 
by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not 
properly.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the 
intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, 
the more gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, "That servant who knew 
the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many 
stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his 
conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, 
the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, 
nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges 
what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man  sins more 
gravely than the intemperate.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it 
is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are 
declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to 
be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person's sin is 
cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the 
incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong 
notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing 
well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would 
appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. 
Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the 
incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate 
man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely 
than the intemperate.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine 
says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against 
the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the 
intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his 
choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore 
the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is 
chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live aright" 
[*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of 
the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the 
will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from 
a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will 
is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, 
whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult to remove," the result is 
that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has 
passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having 
sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of 
his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 
2:14) that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most 
wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much worse 
than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the 
inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the 
ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so 
far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the 
reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such 
like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the 
inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both 
the incontinent and the intemperate man,  ignorance arises from the 
appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the 
incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater 
ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one 
respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance 
lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent 
fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of 
the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance 
of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, 
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance 
of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the 
ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice 
(in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): 
whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch 
as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires 
without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that 
"the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains 
the best principle [*{To beltiston, e arche}, 'the best thing, i.e. the 
principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent 
man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches 
concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of 
admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his 
desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q[142], A[2]
). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing 
is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, 
which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the 
same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more 
difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; 
and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to 
the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the 
appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is 
difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man 
proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is 
greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained 
above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is 
sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except 
through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even 
through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, 
"because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm," i.e. 
slight desire. "For what would he have done if he had desired it with 
passion?"


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the 
incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the 
passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful, indeed it is 
pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures 
or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist 
desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is 
less grievous than incontinence of anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so 
vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of 
one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in 
anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent 
in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not" 
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in 
anger is worse than the incontinent in desire.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now 
incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a 
man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than 
adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads. Therefore incontinence 
of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "incontinence 
of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. 
First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason. 
In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, 
because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of 
anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates 
them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger partakes 
somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done 
to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not 
tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of 
vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in 
accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the 
movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the 
quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who 
by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one 
who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore 
also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to 
anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those 
who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now 
that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed 
more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, 
whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by 
stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works  with 
pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain 
previous displeasure.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the 
evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus incontinence 
of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things 
that are harmful to one's neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than 
anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more 
difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though 
it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does 
it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more 
disgraceful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its 
result.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] Out. Para. 1/1

OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. 
Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?

 (2) Whether each of them is a virtue?

 (3) Whether each is a part of temperance?

 (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. 
For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 
5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2]. Since, 
then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an 
inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken 
by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the 
same.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency is a 
virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably 
provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently clemency moderates 
hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi], hatred is caused by 
anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore 
seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But 
the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and clemency. 
Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are  absolutely the same.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca (OBJ[1]
) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior": whereas 
meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. 
Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is "about 
passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of external 
actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that 
moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect as 
virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it 
belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft, whereunto he is 
inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which is restrained by 
liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, 
which is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; 
because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too 
severe punishment, while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate 
punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, 
concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ from one 
another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while 
meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; 
whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied 
externally for the purpose of vengeance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of things that 
are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man loving 
another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment in itself, 
but only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or the 
correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate 
punishment ---and this pertains to clemency---while hatred is an obstacle 
to such mitigation. For this reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to 
hatred" that is to punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from 
inflicting too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates 
not hatred but punishment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of 
anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned with 
the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. 
Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are called cruel 
who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing." Those 
who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake may be called savage 
or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love 
another.

 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For 
no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these are apparently 
opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor 
meekness is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic. ii, 
2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; for 
clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore 
neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Mt. 5:4) among the 
beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from 
the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man is 
conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue properly 
that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes its possessor 
good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore clemency 
and meekness are virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of 
appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now this 
is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating 
punishment, "is guided by reason," according to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 
5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as 
stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and 
meekness are virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness 
is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external 
infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be 
opposed to clemency, which also regards external punishing, as stated 
above (A[1]). Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they 
are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible in the 
infliction of punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency 
mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this 
is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are 
not about the same thing.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the habit 
that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is 
denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name 
of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess, 
because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done 
to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since "scarcely anyone 
belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust observes [*Cf. Q[120]]. 
As to clemency, it  mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is 
according to right reason, but as regards that which is according to 
common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some 
particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it 
were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De 
Clementia ii, 1): "Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those 
whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment; and 
remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear 
that clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek 'epieikeia' 
[*Cf. Q[120]]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards 
the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency 
differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A[3], ad 1).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are 
delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being 
reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of 
temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A[2]). 
But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which 
pertains to justice, as stated above (Q[120], A[2]). Therefore seemingly 
clemency is not a part of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas 
meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and 
vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said to 
be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now this is 
opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed 
to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence 
rather than of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is 
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." Tully 
also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far as 
they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the 
virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name 
of justice consist in a certain "equality," those of fortitude in a 
certain "strength of mind," those of temperance in a certain "restraint," 
inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the 
pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in a 
certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness 
represses anger, as stated above (AA[1],2). Therefore both clemency and 
meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly 
are reckoned to be  parts thereof.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of 
punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with 
the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of the 
law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a 
certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not 
exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to 
clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "it is 
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." This 
moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, whereby 
a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another. Wherefore 
Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is a certain smoothness 
of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain 
roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on 
the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, 
rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with 
temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: "Unsoundness" is corruption of "soundness." Now just as 
soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due 
to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing 
from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs both in 
respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in 
respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that humane feeling 
whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards all other men" (Ethic. 
viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is 
opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment 
of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this 
account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest 
virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man 
to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above 
all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James 1:21): 
"With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and (Ecclus. 5:13): "Be meek 
to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) 
that "Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his 
great meekness." Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is 
more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be most 
acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): "That which is 
agreeable" to God is "faith and  meekness"; wherefore Christ expressly 
invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Mt. 11:29), where He says: 
"Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; and Hilary declares 
[*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells in us by our meekness of 
soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written 
(Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be 
beloved above the glory of men": for which reason it is also declared 
(Prov. 20:28) that the King's "throne is strengthened by clemency." 
Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that "the 
meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome 
evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would 
seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose [*Hilary 
the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to 
all things," observes that "piety is the sum total of the Christian 
religion." Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are 
annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not 
indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It is 
impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest 
virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man 
from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to 
obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, 
charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good 
simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain 
restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations. 
For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its 
impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth: 
wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is 
written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep thy soul in meekness." Yet the 
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass 
more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as 
a principal virtue. as stated above (Q[141], A[7], ad 2). As to clemency, 
inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to 
charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards 
our neighbor, and hinder his evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing 
an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man 
self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, 
because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words 
of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger. Wherefore 
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be meek is not to 
contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our evil 
ways, or understand it not,  as though we might know better and have a 
clearer insight of the truth."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in 
so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards 
the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[157] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by 
concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our 
neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety 
relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for instance 
God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil, because this evil 
is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it as affecting 
oneself, as stated above (Q[30], A[2]): and this results from friendship 
which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does 
this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this 
through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person 
be no further punished.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] Out. Para. 1/1

OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to 
meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger there 
are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?

 (2) Whether anger is a sin?

 (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

 (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

 (5) Of its species;

 (6) Whether anger is a capital vice?

 (7) Of its daughters;

 (8) Whether it has a contrary vice?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is lawful to be angry?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in 
his exposition on Mt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. 
says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in the genuine codices 
the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether." 
Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's evil 
is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason: for the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen perfectly to 
reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when anger sunders the 
tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot"; and 
Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever cause it arises, 
the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind." Therefore 
it is always evil to be angry.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 
2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy brother 
in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this 
should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35, "Revenge is Mine." 
Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. 
Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God judges 
with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry is 
always an evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely 
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause, 
shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in 
danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, 
crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive 
appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above (FS, 
Q[46], A[1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with regard to 
the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in 
them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very species, which is 
derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, 
denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another's good, and such 
displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the 
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes 
something evil." Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire 
for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, 
evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is 
in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in 
anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason 
demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger 
is deserving of praise.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as 
emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed 
anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above (FS, Q[24], A[2]
) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome 
considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with 
one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong.---But, according to 
the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 
4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the 
sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to 
reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, 
antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has 
therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the 
movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in 
accordance with reason, this anger is  good, and is called "zealous 
anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must beware lest, when 
we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go 
before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever 
ready, as its handmaid, to obey." This latter anger, although it hinder 
somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not 
destroy the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that 
"zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds 
it." Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason 
be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art 
also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what 
has to be done, while having to act.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to 
the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance 
as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the 
sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto by the 
reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of 
judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish "is God's 
minister," as stated in Rm. 13:4.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; 
but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, 
since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of 
which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that 
"anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the 
command of reason."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. 
But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we incur blame 
thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. 
Now anger is a passion as stated above (FS, Q[46], A[1]) in the treatise 
on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. 
But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person's 
evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine 
asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss 
on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of anger is 
not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that 
"the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure is contrary to the 
will. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De 
Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to be angry, 
and it is the natural act of a power,  namely the irascible; wherefore 
Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that "to be angry is 
the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation and 
anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from you."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Anger, as stated above (A[1]), is properly the name of a 
passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is 
regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason 
aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in 
relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to 
which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge 
to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger 
is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 
45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way 
whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the 
punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or 
again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, 
namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then 
the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in 
relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger 
should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and 
if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though 
just vengeance be desired.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by 
reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not include 
the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by 
reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on 
the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and 
blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he 
who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own 
sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to 
a mutable good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his 
reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is 
not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them 
arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise. 
Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man's 
power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this 
movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be 
inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that "the angry man acts 
with displeasure," means that he is displeased, not with his being angry, 
but with the  injury which he deems done to himself: and through this 
displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his 
reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in accord 
with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to 
man's nature.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether all anger is a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is written 
(Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger indeed killeth 
the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence mortal sin 
takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal 
condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord said 
(Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of 
the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the three things 
mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a 
pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal damnation 
corresponding to various sins." Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. Now 
anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his 
commentary on Mt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. where 
he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. Therefore 
anger is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: 
"Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two 
ways, as stated above (A[2]). First, on the part of the appetible object, 
as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the 
point of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. 
Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin by reason of 
the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in 
relation to the subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of 
anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the 
desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, 
which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one proceeded to 
action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child 
slightly by the hair, or by some other like action. Secondly, the 
movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for 
instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the 
outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the 
point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if 
through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God 
and his neighbor. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger 
is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by anger, 
because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they 
fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury 
to their neighbor.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the 
words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the 
judgment" (Mt. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the 
movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury 
of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to this 
desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a 
mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have said.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger is the most grievous sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom 
says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more repulsive than the 
look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless* face, and most 
of all than a cruel soul." [*'Severo'. The correct text is 'Si vero.' The 
translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing uglier.' And if his 
'face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul!']. Therefore anger is the 
most grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to 
be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is said to 
be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives 
man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for Chrysostom says 
(Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way from madness; it is 
a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a 
demon." Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their outward 
effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most grievous sin. 
Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; 
for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred 
and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), the inordinateness of anger is 
considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, 
and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible 
object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for 
anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of 
a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the evil which it desires 
the sin of anger agrees with  those sins which desire the evil of our 
neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely 
another's evil as such, and the envious man desires another's evil 
through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires another's evil 
under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is 
more grievous than envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire 
evil as an evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good 
such as honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of 
justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man 
desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends 
to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking. the sin of anger 
is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the 
good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the 
pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of 
concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the 
incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of 
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account 
of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4, 
"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear 
the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "The 
heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the 
tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and 
fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds 
indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward 
gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger, 
that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from 
anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect of 
justice, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned 
by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some angry persons 
are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or "stern." 
According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose anger "is 
appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this apparently 
pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can 
be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circumstances.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or "stern" 
persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge, or 
punishment." Now this also pertains to the  unquenchableness of anger. 
Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says 
(Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of 
the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in 
danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his brother, "Thou 
fool." But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. 
Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says 
"there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is 
called wrath [*'Fellea,' i.e. like gall. But in FS, Q[46], A[8], St. 
Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render 'wrath']," 
and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and "rancour." Now these 
three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For "wrath" he describes 
as "having beginning and movement," and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) 
ascribes this to "choleric" persons: "ill-will" he describes as "an anger 
that endures and grows old," and this the Philosopher ascribes to 
"sullenness"; while he describes "rancour" as "reckoning the time for 
vengeance," which tallies with the Philosopher's description of the 
"ill-tempered." The same division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 
ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is 
not unfitting.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the 
passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when 
treating of the passions (FS, Q[46], A[8]) how it is to be applied to the 
passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of 
Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the 
distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and 
as set down by the Philosopher.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two 
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards 
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. 
Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures 
too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause 
of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man's 
memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, 
wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In another way, it 
happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn 
desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern" people, who do not put 
aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his 
pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the 
aforesaid species.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a  
long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person has 
an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds 
locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward 
signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his 
own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with 
time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of 
"ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire 
for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled 
only by revenge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to 
the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of the human 
act [*Cf. FS, Q[46], A[8], OBJ[3]]. For the first degree is an inward 
conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever is angry with 
his brother." The second degree is when the anger is manifested by 
outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to 
this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!" which is an 
angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly 
breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under 
the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is done by a 
mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say 
to his brother Thou fool!" Consequently it is clear that the second adds 
to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is 
a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], 
ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation 
is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case 
"judgment" is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine 
says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, 
there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case "council" is 
assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be 
inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i.e. "decisive 
condemnation."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital 
sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the 
name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should 
be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay: 'passionate'] 
man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all vices: if it be 
closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the 
soul is armed for every crime." Now no capital vice is the origin of all 
sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be 
reckoned among the capital vices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the 
capital vices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[84], A[3],4), a capital vice is 
defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for 
which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its 
object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge 
is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by 
its excellence, as stated above (A[4]). [*Honesty must be taken here in 
its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view 
of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The second is on the part of its 
impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of 
inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, 
the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from an 
injury inflicted.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5]; Q[153], A[4]; 
FS, Q[84], A[4]), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a 
most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire 
thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a 
more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under 
the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, 
that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment of 
reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the 
cause of certain special sins, which are called its daughters.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to 
anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, 
indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in 
Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be 
accounted a daughter of anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule 
(Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride. Now 
pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all vices," as 
Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should 
not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to 
anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] Body Para. 1/3 

 I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as 
consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on the 
part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy 
[indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called "indignation." 
The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises 
various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, 
according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with 
burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the mind."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] Body Para. 2/3

 Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a 
twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger 
in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man who says 
to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which denotes 
disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks 
out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is "blasphemy," 
if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] Body Para. 3/3

 Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger 
gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of 
injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately 
proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since, 
according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall 
off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part 
of pride [*Cf. Q[162], A[7], ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But 
the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the 
mind, proceeds from anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a 
previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, 
even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through 
displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. 
Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather 
than from anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with 
pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and 
daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger, 
resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by 
being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges "with 
tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be 
altogether without anger.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether  useless. 
But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in 
the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that 
lack of anger is not a vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil is to 
be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all 
movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a 
vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, 
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is not angry, 
whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed 
of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but 
even the good to do wrong."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a 
simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through 
passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without 
doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken 
in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus 
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom): "Anger, when it 
has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, 
denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is angry with reason, his 
anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be 
angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive 
appetite, which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. 
This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, 
since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher 
appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the 
sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of 
the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion 
of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will 
directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be 
angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's punishing 
by judgment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the 
sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt 
execution [*Cf. FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason's dictate: else, the sensitive 
appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature does nothing 
without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[158] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is 
cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of the passion 
in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal 
of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger 
is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] Out. Para. 1/1 

OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of 
inquiry:

 (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

 (2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca 
says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who exceed in 
punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a 
part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently cruelty is 
not opposed to clemency.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and will 
have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is 
not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q[157], A[4], ad 3). Therefore 
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, 
as stated above (Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal 
of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, "But he that is cruel casteth 
off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of 
clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in 
exacting punishment."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas" 
[rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have 
an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and 
bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q[157], A[3], ad 1; A[4], ad 
3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, 
whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is directly 
opposed to clemency.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment 
according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to 
this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the 
external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hardness of 
heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and 
recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs 
to mercy [*Cf. Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another's unhappiness by a 
beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another's 
unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes 
excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency 
than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, 
cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of 
beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in 
itself a punishment.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or 
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue. 
Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. 
Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were 
savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending to 
piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of 
punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now this 
has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1). Therefore cruelty is 
the same as savagery.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of 
excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, which 
latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice 
which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed 
to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory 
says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which enervates, 
let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without 
unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency." Therefore 
savagery is the same as cruelty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is 
angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not 
said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a 
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals 
of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some 
motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. 
Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who 
in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person 
punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's torture. 
Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for 
such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does 
either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial 
emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of the 
person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty 
differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from 
bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to 
it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But  savagery or 
brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed 
not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher 
(Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which according to us, 
would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may 
say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this 
implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the truth," on 
account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate 
punishment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[159] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard 
the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account of 
his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty 
disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of punishment is 
opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] Out. Para. 1/1

OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of 
its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

 (2) What is the matter of modesty?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For 
modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: 
since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De 
Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order." Therefore modesty 
is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of 
temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly 
on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore 
modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our 
neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24,25, "The servant of the Lord must not 
wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them 
that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice 
or of charity, as stated above (Q[33], A[1]). Therefore seemingly modesty 
is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a 
part of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[141], A[4]; Q[157], A[3]), temperance 
brings moderation into those things wherein it is most  difficult to be 
moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever 
there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there 
must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the 
life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to 
everything: thus it was stated above (Q[134], A[3], ad 1), that while 
magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for 
liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is 
need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is 
not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to 
temperance as its principal.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated 
to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is 
appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode which 
is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the 
virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Some things need tempering on account of their strength, 
thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: 
wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty 
about weaker passions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation 
which is necessary in all virtues.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether modesty is only about outward actions?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the 
inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet 
the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." 
Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are 
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is 
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will 
not be concerned with inward passions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to 
the appetite---which is proper to the moral virtues---and about things 
pertaining to knowledge---which is proper to the intellectual 
virtues---and again about things pertaining to the irascible and 
concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot 
be about all these things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the 
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of 
them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), modesty differs from temperance, 
in that temperance moderates those matters where  restraint is most 
difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. 
Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever 
they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, 
they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to 
lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of 
touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished 
temperance from modesty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) 
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of 
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held 
modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require 
moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the 
mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility." The 
second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is 
moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third 
regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly 
and honestly [*Cf. Q[145], A[1]], whether we act seriously or in play. 
The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain 
special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions "meekness, 
simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken 
above (Q[143]); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned {eutrapelia} to 
pleasures in games, as stated above (FS, Q[60], A[5]). All these are 
comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty 
regards not only outward but also inward actions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. 
Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain 
outward signs.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are 
comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from 
regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so 
great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is 
between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is 
about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great 
difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, 
there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[160] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] Out. Para. 1/2

OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride 
which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity; 
(3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward 
attire.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] Out. Para. 2/2 

 Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether humility is a virtue?

 (2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?

 (3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?

 (4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?

 (5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;

 (6) Of the degrees of humility.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether humility is a virtue?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys 
the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They humbled his 
feet in fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility 
seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): "There is 
one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is 
apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at great 
things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that 
humility is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect" 
(Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the imperfect: 
wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be subject to 
none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions, 
according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the 
Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it 
comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem 
not to be a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, "He hath regarded the 
humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the virtues, 
humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: 
'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[23], A[2]) when we were treating 
of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive to the 
appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to 
the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the 
former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, 
the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above (FS, Q[61], A[2]) 
that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards 
an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue, 
while for those  which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part 
of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. 
Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult 
good: one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things 
immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to 
strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of 
great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. 
Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so called 
because he is, as it were, 'humo acclinis'" [*Literally, 'bent to the 
ground'], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. 
First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when one is cast down 
by another, and thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an 
intrinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well, for instance 
when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place 
according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord (Gn. 18:27), "I will 
speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a 
virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, 
"not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and 
becomes like to them" (Ps. 48:13).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a virtue, 
conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. 
Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: 
wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine says in a letter 
(Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it would seem to 
aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward 
movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is 
reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly 
in the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 
5).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things 
against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great things in 
accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not 
opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is according 
to right reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First 
absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in 
respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility 
is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards His 
assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a 
restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state or time. 
Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with God his 
perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Is. 40:17, "All 
nations are before Him as if they had no being at all." In this way 
humility may be competent to every man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to 
civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined 
according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of 
legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards 
chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself 
by subjecting himself to others.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether humility has to do with the appetite?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but the 
judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride 
concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 
22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first of all 
shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (Ps. 130:1), "Lord, my heart 
is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty." Now eyes are the chief aids to 
knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned 
with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the 
whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing contained 
in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian 
teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according to 1 Cor. 
12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it belongs to 
humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the estimate 
thereof.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive 
movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus 
fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it 
is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the difficulties that 
occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb 
the desire of great things, it would follow that humility is not a 
distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore 
humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great 
things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to outward 
show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding excessive 
expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with the movement 
of the appetite.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the 
humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord, 
rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice concerns the 
appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than with 
the estimative power.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it belongs properly to humility, 
that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above 
him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which 
surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own  deficiency belongs 
to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless humility is 
essentially in the appetite itself; and consequently it must be said that 
humility, properly speaking, moderates the movement of the appetite.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes 
respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially wont 
to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with 
others. But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially 
concerned with knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through 
confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things through 
confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility; especially since 
the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in God's 
sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "It is one thing to 
raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up against God. He 
that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself 
up against Him, him He casteth down."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining 
daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason in 
both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of 
death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which pertains to 
humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against 
despair. Because the reason for strengthening the soul against despair is 
the acquisition of one's proper good lest man, by despair, render himself 
unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for 
suppressing presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows 
that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him 
according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility 
would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to God; and for 
this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, 
which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby 
man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to 
daring differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses 
daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like 
fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses 
hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore excessive 
self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done 
with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly 
humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the 
inward movement of the appetite.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to  subject 
oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), humility consists 
chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man 
that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious 
worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): "Humility 
should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some men are of the 
highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their 
inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to 
all men.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment 
of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself to another 
by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects 
himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence 
Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through excessive humility 
the superior lose his authority." Therefore a man ought not, by humility, 
to subject himself to all.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each 
esteem others better than themselves."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is 
God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's: but 
whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's, according to 
the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is 
only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A[1], ad 5; A[2], ad 3), 
properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore 
every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself 
to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of God's: but 
humility does not require a man to subject what he has of God's to that 
which may seem to be God's in another. For those who have a share of 
God's gifts know that they have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we 
may know the things that are given us from God." Wherefore without 
prejudice to humility they may set the gifts they have received from God 
above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the 
Apostle says (Eph. 3:5): "(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the 
sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner. 
humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own 
to that which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to 
esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle 
says without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are Jews, 
and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may esteem his 
neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have 
some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject 
himself to him with humility.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which 
is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we 
revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all 
our neighbors for God's sake,  according to 1 Pt. 2:13, "Be ye subject . 
. . to every human creature for God's sake"; but to God alone do we owe 
the worship of latria.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that which 
we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss [*St. 
Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem others better than 
themselves," says: "We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we 
should in truth think it possible for another person to have something 
that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our 
own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in 
the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may subject 
himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment 
to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Rule (Ep. 
ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in 
the sight of God." On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in 
the outward acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce 
to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and 
others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man 
who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others 
take it.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or 
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is 
subject to God, as stated above (A[3]). Now it belongs to a theological 
virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned 
a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility 
would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, 
and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is 
not a part of temperance or modesty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as 
stated above (A[1], ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of 
temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q[129], A[5]). Therefore it 
would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt hear 
the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know 
that humility which God regards is the same as what they called 
{metriotes}, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this evidently pertains to 
modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or 
temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] Body Para. 1/1 

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[137], A[2], ad 1; Q[157], A[3], ad 2), 
in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that 
results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence 
it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the 
impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, 
and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are 
reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the 
movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which 
is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like 
meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the 
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in 
proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man 
we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above (Q[160], A[2]), 
among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is 
comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), 
inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: 
wherefore it is written (1 Pt. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet 
and meek spirit."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, 
which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes of 
all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by 
reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or 
temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a 
sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above 
(Q[137], A[2], ad 1; Q[157], A[3], ad 2). Consequently, although humility 
is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty 
or temperance by reason of its mode.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they 
differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of 
fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For 
Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the publican (Lk. 
18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if humility is such a 
fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes the justice that 
is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it 
with justice? It will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of 
God." Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now justice 
is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, 
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the 
greatest of the virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C[1]]): 
"Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? Attend 
first of all to the foundation of humility."  Now this would seem to 
imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently 
it is greater than the other virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the 
greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth himself shall 
be exalted" (Lk. 14:11). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), "Christ's 
whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human 
nature which He assumed." Now He especially proposed His humility for our 
example, saying (Mt. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble 
of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the "lesson 
proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God." 
Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to Col. 
3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity." Therefore humility is not 
the greatest of virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: 
which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore the 
theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for 
their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the 
ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is 
in the reason itself from which it issues, but by participation it is in 
the appetite ordered by the reason; and this ordinance is the effect of 
justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good 
subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other 
virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the 
theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the 
reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility 
stands before all others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice 
which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the 
other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the 
publican (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility "he went down 
into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom says [*De incompr. Nat. Dei, 
Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride 
with justice, in the other sin with humility: and you will see that sin 
outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of humility: 
while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, 
but by the weight and size of pride."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason of a 
certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is the 
first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, 
which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues are 
in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of 
virtue may be understood in  two ways. First by way of removing 
obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels 
pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man submissive and ever open to 
receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written (James 4:6): "God 
resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." In this sense 
humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, 
a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step 
towards God. Now the first step towards God is by faith, according to 
Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God must believe." In this sense faith is 
the foundation in a more excellent way than humility.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are 
promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise 
earthly riches, according to Mt. 6:19,20, "Lay not up to yourselves 
treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven." 
Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who despise worldly 
joys, according to Mt. 4:5, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall 
be comforted." In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to 
humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it is proper to 
it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. 
[*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever 
abased, for it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that 
his exaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was 
because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual welfare 
consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he 
is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. Hence our 
Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by 
giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be despised. 
Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man's untrammeled access 
to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than 
disposition, so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God 
directly, are greater than humility.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the 
Rule of the Blessed Benedict?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are set 
down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives these degrees 
in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] are unfittingly 
distinguished. The first is to be "humble not only in heart, but also to 
show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground"; the second 
is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice"; the 
third is "not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter"; the fourth 
is "to maintain silence until one is asked"; the fifth is "to do nothing 
but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery"; the 
sixth is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all"; the seventh 
is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all  purposes"; the 
eighth is "to confess one's sin"; the ninth is "to embrace patience by 
obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to 
subject oneself to a superior"; the eleventh is "not to delight in 
fulfilling one's own desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be 
always mindful of everything that God has commanded." For among these 
there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience 
and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false 
opinion---and this is inconsistent with any virtue---namely to declare 
oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself 
to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are 
unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other 
virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern outward 
actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward 
actions.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of 
humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself contemptible"; 
the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to confess it"; the fourth, 
"to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it"; the 
fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said of us"; the sixth, "to suffer 
oneself to be treated with contempt"; the seventh, "to love being thus 
treated." Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a gloss on Mt. 3:15 says: "Perfect humility has three 
degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and 
not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is 
to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors; 
this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject 
ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness." Therefore 
the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure of 
humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is 
imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be 
entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed 
according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that 
it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]) humility has essentially to do 
with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his 
soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the 
cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what 
we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the 
reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads to 
certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that 
which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For "a 
man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his  
countenance" (Ecclus. 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility 
include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth 
degree, "that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Body Para. 2/4

 Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest one 
aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three ways. 
First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to the eleventh 
degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's superior judgment, 
and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being deterred from 
this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way, 
and this belongs to the ninth degree.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Body Para. 3/4

 Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms 
in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. First by 
acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the 
eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things, 
and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect 
one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth 
degree.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] Body Para. 4/4

 Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of 
these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart from 
the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have 
reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak, 
which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in 
speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do with outward 
gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which regards the 
first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless 
mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself 
the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which we 
acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others have. 
Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink you that some persons 
are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better 
than they." Again, without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in 
all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability, so 
as to refer all one's sufficiency to God, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, "Not 
that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: 
but our sufficiency is from God." And there is nothing unbecoming in 
ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, 
just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act 
of one virtue proceeds from the act of another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a 
gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward man. 
The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the 
outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the inward root. It 
is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here 
enumerated. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to 
knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first 
degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it 
would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded by 
the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of 
one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert one's 
failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three degrees 
have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but 
outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consist of 
words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), "there is 
nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard, for 
even worldly people do this: but we should especially be humble towards 
those who make us suffer," and this belongs to the fifth and sixth 
degrees: or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to embrace 
external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so that all 
these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely the 
nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either of 
higher or lower or of equal degree.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[161] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: This argument also considers the degrees of humility not 
according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the aforesaid 
degrees are assigned, but according to the various conditions of men.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] Out. Para. 1/1

OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first 
man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head there 
are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether pride is a sin?

 (2) Whether it is a special vice?

 (3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?

 (4) Of its species;

 (5) Whether it is a mortal sin?

 (6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?

 (7) Of its relation to other sins;

 (8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether pride is a sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object 
of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do; and He is 
not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: 
for it is written (Is. 60:15): "I will make thee to be an everlasting 
pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and generation." Therefore 
pride is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God:  for every 
creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this become 
the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness. Now it 
is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is love of one's own 
excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent." 
Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride imitates exaltedness; 
whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all." Therefore pride is not a 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a 
contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice is 
found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Tobias 4:14): "Never suffer pride to 
reign in thy mind or in thy words."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims 
higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): "A man is 
said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he 
really is"; for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud. 
Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that which 
is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride denotes 
something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have the 
character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the 
soul's evil is to be opposed to reason." Therefore it is evident that 
pride is a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways. First, as 
overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this sense we say 
that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate "super-abundance"; 
in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called pride: and it is 
thus that God promises pride as significant of super-abundant good. Hence 
a gloss of Jerome on the same passage (Is. 61:6) says that "there is a 
good and an evil pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a 
pride that denotes the glory which He bestows."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those 
things in which men may take pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Reason has the direction of those things for which man has 
a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule of 
reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the 
case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now pride is 
the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the "desire for 
inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he asserts (De Civ. Dei 
xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality 
of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over our 
fellow-creatures."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, 
in a way, is concerned about the same matter as  magnanimity, as stated 
above (Q[161], A[1], ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is 
akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to 
magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to 
great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw the 
mind from the inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now 
pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great things, 
is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the 
mind's attachment to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is 
opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of 
mind. In the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, 
both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to 
humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as 
it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a 
certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as 
pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending towards great 
things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether pride is a special sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says 
(De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin that is not labelled 
pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that "without pride 
no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible." Therefore pride is a 
general sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man from 
wickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may deliver 
him from pride']," says that "a man prides himself when he transgresses 
His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [*De Parad. viii], 
"every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of 
the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But 
pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): 
"Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it 
raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an 
all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body"; and Isidore 
says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is "the downfall of all 
virtues." Therefore pride is not a special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a 
general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one man is 
proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and 
earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride 
is not a special but a general sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he look 
into the question carefully, he will find that, according  to God's law, 
pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the genus is not 
different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a 
special sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First 
with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its 
proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a 
special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's own excellence, as 
stated (A[1], ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain 
influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic 
character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways. First 
directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is 
one's own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is 
inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, 
that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the 
Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, "Thou 
hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will 
not serve."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride 
admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, but 
it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though 
one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through 
contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the 
Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance. 
and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De 
Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done amiss which are not done 
through pride."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De 
Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he 
is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that 
not all sins are committed through pride. We might, however, reply that 
these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect 
of pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every 
sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely contempt of the 
commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but 
sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not 
affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide 
effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly 
he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride himself against God, 
effectively always, but not always affectively.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by 
direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every 
virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special 
virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way a sin 
destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride 
destroys every virtue, in so far as  it finds an occasion of pride in 
every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence 
it does not follow that it is a general sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect 
may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of one's 
excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the irascible 
faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen mind is an 
obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light." Now the 
knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational 
faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud observe 
other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them with 
humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride": wherefore 
it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now observation 
pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, 
but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists 
essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "The 
beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God." Now the 
irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to 
God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber Sententiarum, sent. 294, 
"Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the 
irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the 
irascible.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of 
fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the 
irascible.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained 
from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be other 
than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the 
proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of 
one's own excellence, as stated above (AA[1],2). Wherefore pride must 
needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may 
be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of 
the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of 
the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader 
sense, so as to belong also to the intellective appetite,  to which also 
anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God 
and the angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice 
pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad 
sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in 
the FP, Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[82], A[5], ad 1 and 2.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were 
merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend, 
pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive 
appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common 
both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the 
subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part 
of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as 
applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also 
to the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, 
and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud 
man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge 
of truth from Him, according to Mt. 11:25, "Thou hast hid these things 
from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from the proud, who are wise and 
prudent in their own eyes, "and hast revealed them to little ones," i.e. 
to the humble.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written 
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive 
instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is 
directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in 
their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory says 
(Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths be 
conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and if 
they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is written (Prov. 
11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[161], AA[2], 6), humility observes the 
rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does 
not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater 
than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own 
excellence, since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, 
the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher than 
what become him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate 
self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other 
people's failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory 
(Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy men, by a like observation of other people's 
virtues, set others above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not 
that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in 
the reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the 
sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general  signification, as 
stated above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), "love 
precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause," wherefore 
it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this 
sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence," inasmuch 
as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, 
and this belongs properly to pride.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned 
by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks by which 
every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they 
think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be 
from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when 
they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to 
appear the exclusive possessors of what they have." For pride is a vice 
distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. 
Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his 
good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. 
Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of 
different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as stated 
above (Q[110], A[2]; Q[112]). Therefore it should not be accounted a 
species of pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are 
not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that "nothing is 
so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and Augustine says 
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a 
sin one has committed." Again, presumption whereby one aims at having 
what is above one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore 
the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different 
species of pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm [*Eadmer, 
De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride, saying that 
there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed." Bernard 
[*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons twelve degrees of 
pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, 
singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one's sins, deceitful 
confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit." Now these apparently 
are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the 
latter would seem to be assigned unfittingly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Body Para. 1/3 

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2,3), pride denotes immoderate 
desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord 
with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results 
from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. 
First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one 
has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a 
man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that 
his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his 
competency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely "boasting 
of having what one has not."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Body Para. 2/3

 Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to 
have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. 
Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he 
had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his 
own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one's own good in two 
ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two 
species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has from himself that 
which he has from God," or "when he believes that which he has received 
from above to be due to his own merits."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] Body Para. 3/3

 Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in 
so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good 
more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite 
is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we have the 
fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others and wishes 
to be singularly conspicuous."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, 
universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed 
by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief 
does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, judges that for the 
time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an 
unbeliever, as he would be, were he to say that universally fornication 
is good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to unbelief 
to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that 
grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it 
belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's 
own excellence, to boast of one's goods as though one had them of 
oneself, or of one's own merits.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the 
outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not: 
but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by 
Gregory to be a species of pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from 
another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude. 
To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third 
species, since by so doing a man ascribes to  himself the good of 
innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, 
would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists in 
wishing to be preferred to others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of 
any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is 
uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 2/3

 The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of 
opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken 
above (Q[161], A[6]). For the first degree of humility is to "be humble 
in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the 
ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in looking 
around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of 
humility is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of 
voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud 
of speech. The third degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and 
disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The fourth 
degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which 
is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is "to do nothing but 
to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to which is 
opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than 
others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and acknowledge 
oneself viler than all," to which is opposed "arrogance," whereby a man 
sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is "to think 
oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes," to which is opposed 
"presumption," whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are 
above him. The eighth degree of humility is "to confess one's sins," to 
which is opposed "defense of one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace 
patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances," to which 
is opposed "deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be 
punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of 
humility is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The 
eleventh degree of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own 
desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing 
freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to 
this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 3/3

 In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but 
also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated above 
with regard to humility (Q[161], A[6]).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether pride is a mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on Ps. 
7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely, the 
universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so 
would every sin be. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is 
apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God, nor as 
to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, 
one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God's honor, or our 
neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not 
opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory 
says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime and 
heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most 
evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect." 
But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore 
pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly 
regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (Q[161], A[1], ad 
5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a 
man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the 
Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), 
"But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure 
of the rule which God hath measured to us." Wherefore it is written 
(Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from 
God" because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man not 
being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that 
not to be subject to God is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this 
consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its 
genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal 
by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain 
motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through 
forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so 
too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are 
venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[2]) pride is a general sin, not by its 
essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their 
origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but 
only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a 
mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as 
the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought. 
Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, 
a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and this again is a 
transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, 
so that one ought to be subject to another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but 
as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue an 
occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the 
accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1. Hence some are 
even proud of their humility.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For 
the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to 
be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule 
(Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil 
deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them." 
Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good," as 
the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which pride is 
opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q[61], A[5]). 
Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as 
unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are more grievous 
sins than pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But 
pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rm. 1:28, where it 
is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were 
delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not 
convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did iniquitously," 
says: "The greatest sin in man is pride."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a 
mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from the 
immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now 
on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride being the 
greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is 
not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue. But on the 
part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins 
man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or 
through desire for any other good whatever; whereas pride denotes 
aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and 
His rule. Hence Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says 
that "while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God"; for 
which reason it is specially stated (James 4:6) that "God resisteth the 
proud." Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a 
consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very 
nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs 
to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which 
belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most  
grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which is 
the formal complement of sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account 
of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught 
on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult is it to resist 
concupiscence, on account of its connaturality," as stated in Ethic. ii, 
3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of 
the sin; because a man sins the more grievously, according as he yields 
to a less impetuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 
12,15).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being 
hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes 
occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine 
says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and it is written 
(Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf. Ps. 139:6, 
'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.: 'they'] have hidden a 
snare for me." Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of 
pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the 
judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, 
both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, "Why 
is earth and ashes proud?" and by considering God's greatness, according 
to Job 15:13, "Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" as well as by 
considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, 
according to Is. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as 
the flower of the field"; and farther on (Is. 64:6), "all our justices" 
are become "like the rag of a menstruous woman."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the 
object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this way pride 
has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be 
the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part of aversion, 
since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact 
of its arising out of proud contempt, is rendered more grievous than if 
it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair 
and the like.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion 
one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, 
so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by 
allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though they be less 
grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono 
ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all vices; whether because it is 
appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it 
originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less 
perceptible. on the other hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because 
from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God's 
dispensation, it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the 
clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the  flesh, 
that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a 
wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to 
contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be 
more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall 
into other sins.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether pride is the first sin of all?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the 
first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all 
sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. 
xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not done with pride." 
Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning of . . 
. pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God 
precedes pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the 
order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all 
virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and seducers 
shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of 
wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins 
as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and daring." 
Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning 
of all sin."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is 
essential. Now it has been stated above (A[6]) that aversion from God, 
which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and 
to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the 
conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all sins," as 
stated above (FS, Q[84], A[2]), when we were treating of the causes of 
sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as 
though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is 
naturally liable to arise from pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, 
not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as  being the first 
part of pride. For it has been said above (A[5]) that pride regards 
chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns 
to be subject to a creature for God's sake.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as 
that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first 
to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the 
first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which sometimes man 
is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7, "Rase it, rase it, even 
to the foundation thereof," says that "by heaping vice upon vice a man 
will lapse into unbelief," and the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some 
rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that 
which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride is the 
cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may 
be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or 
weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause 
whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And as that which is the 
first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on 
Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin," says: "Namely 
from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God, and 
the first in those who withdraw from God."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, 
not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he is more 
likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since 
Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst. Caenob. v, 1: 
Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both 
covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice. Therefore 
pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride begets 
envy, nor is it ever without this companion." Now envy is reckoned a 
capital vice, as stated above (Q[36], A[4]). Much more therefore is pride 
a capital vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among 
the capital vices.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],5, ad 1) pride may be considered 
in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; secondly, as having 
a general influence towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to 
be certain special sins from which many  kinds of sin arise. Wherefore 
some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it 
together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking into 
consideration its general influence towards all vices, as explained above 
(A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to 
be the "queen and mother of all the vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 
45): "Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished and captured the 
heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven 
principal vices, that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] Body Para. 2/2

 This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause 
thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets 
the outward show of excellence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[162] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from 
pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it is still 
more principal than the capital vices themselves.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his 
sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?

 (2) What the first man coveted by sinning?

 (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?

 (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether pride was the first man's first sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first sin. For 
the Apostle says (Rm. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of one man many 
were made sinners." Now the first man's first sin is the one by which all 
men were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore 
disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Lk. 4:3, "And the devil said 
to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in 
overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as 
appears from Mt. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If thou be the Son of 
God, command that these stones be made bread." Therefore the first man's 
first sin was not pride but gluttony.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil in 
tempting man promised him knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore inordinateness 
in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. 
Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the  first sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1 Tim. 
2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says: "The 
Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to accept a 
falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that 
tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, 
as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead . . ." Now it 
pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore man's first sin 
was unbelief and not pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning 
of all sin." Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according 
to Rm. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this world." Therefore man's 
first sin was pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the 
character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first 
found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of 
the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine 
says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so 
long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the inward 
movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved 
towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently 
man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed 
to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, 
that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it 
was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to 
result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of 
the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that 
the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting 
inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it 
inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by 
the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted in his 
coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to 
pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by 
man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose 
inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for 
the sake of something else. Now the first thing he coveted inordinately 
was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result 
of his pride. This agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad 
Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that "man puffed up with pride obeyed the 
serpent's prompting, and scorned God's commands."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. 
For it is written (Gn. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree was good to 
eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the 
fruit thereof, and did eat." Yet the very  goodness and beauty of the 
fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive words of 
the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): "Your eyes shall be opened and you shall 
be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. 
Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from 
their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began by 
saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and evil."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), "the woman 
had not believed the serpent's statement that they were debarred by God 
from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the 
love of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption." This does 
not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as 
soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was 
puffed up, the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken 
truly.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist in his 
coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is 
competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness is competent 
to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn. 1:26): "Let us 
make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did not sin by coveting 
God's likeness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in order 
that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the 
serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil." Now 
the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the 
Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men naturally 
desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man 
was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled them with 
the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin consists in a 
deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the 
first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is 
impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, 
"Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?" Therefore the first man 
did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps. 68], 
"Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," says: 
"Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Body Para. 1/5 

 I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute 
equality [*Cf. FP, Q[93], A[1]]: and such a likeness to God our first 
parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to 
the mind, especially of a wise man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Body Para. 2/5

 The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature 
in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates somewhat of 
God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 
ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they 
imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect 
falls short of its cause." Now every good existing in a creature is a 
participated likeness of the first good.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Body Para. 3/5

 Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his 
measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted 
God's likeness inordinately.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Body Para. 4/5

 It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is 
a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational 
creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in 
reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness 
was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man---of 
whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man "to His image and 
likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. 28:12): "Thou 
wast the seal of resemblance." Secondly, as to knowledge: and this 
likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately 
after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we 
read: "Full of wisdom." But the first man, at his creation, had not yet 
received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to 
the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness 
actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there 
remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] Body Para. 5/5

 Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted 
God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a 
likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's 
likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to the 
serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might 
decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he 
should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. 
Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own power 
of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to 
obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the 
woman's mind was filled with love of her own power." On the other hand, 
the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards power. Wherefore 
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power 
rather than God's." Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to 
God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order 
of the Divine rule.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did 
not sin by coveting this, as stated.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge, 
absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one's 
measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, "O God, 
who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of himself, even as God is 
of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was 
unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, 
bound by His command."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous 
than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): "Great was the 
wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin." Now it was very 
easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they had nothing within 
them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more 
grievous than other sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our 
first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death entered into 
this world," as the Apostle says (Rm. 5:12). Therefore that sin was more 
grievous than other sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest 
(Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents was 
the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man 
who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall 
suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now our 
first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade. 
Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one 
results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is a 
graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from 
some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is more 
essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be 
grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other. Accordingly we 
must say that the first man's sin was not graver than all other sins of 
men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, 
has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride whereby one 
denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets 
God's  likeness inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as 
stated (A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin 
was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must 
accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not 
simply.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting 
from the person of the sinner.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin 
corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species but 
as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of 
our original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon 
the whole human nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs 
be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows from 
another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is 
the greatest.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's. For 
it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): "Adam was not seduced, but the woman being 
seduced was in the transgression": and so it would seem that the woman 
sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the 
latter is the graver sin, according to Lk. 12:47,48, "That servant who 
knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will, shall 
be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy 
of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes." Therefore Adam's sin was 
more grievous than Eve's.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi de 
Temp.]): "If the man is the head, he should live better, and give an 
example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him." Now he who 
ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore 
Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most 
grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, because 
while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf. Q[21], A[2], OBJ[3]. St. 
Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there], 
and this pertains to the sin of presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam 
sinned more grievously than Eve.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was more 
grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gn. 3. Therefore she 
sinned more grievously than the man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, As stated (A[3]), the gravity of a sin depends on  the 
species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we must 
assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the 
man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the 
woman.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Body Para. 2/4

 As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to 
be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 
xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity 
of pride."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Body Para. 3/4

 But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, 
for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man. 
For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words, namely that God 
had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like to 
Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the 
forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain 
something against God's will. On the other hand, the man did not believe 
this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God's likeness 
against God's will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto 
by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but 
suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her 
neighbor. Thirdly, the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin out of a 
certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will 
offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to 
have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] Body Para. 4/4

 It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the 
man's.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed 
up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her 
sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still 
greater pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the circumstance of personal 
condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than the 
woman's.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[163] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to contempt 
of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]), it was due to 
the fact that, "having had no experience of God's severity, he thought 
the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven [*Cf. FS, Q[89], A[3], ad 1].


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this 
head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common 
punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis. 

™Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether death is the punishment of our first parents' sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our first 
parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a 
punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. 
Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact that 
his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is included in 
the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment of our first 
parents' sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in 
man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, "The death of 
man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal." But in 
dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore neither is it so 
in men.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of particular 
individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature. Therefore it 
would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents' sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents. 
Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it 
would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this 
is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than 
others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above (FP, 
Q[48], A[6]; FP, Q[49], A[2]). But death, apparently, is not from God: 
for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made not death." Therefore death is 
not the punishment of the first sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit 
is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is 
sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it 
would seem that death is not a punishment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death 
apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is dead, 
and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a 
punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have 
followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents 
lived a long time after their sin (Gn. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, death 
is not a punishment of sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12): "By one man sin entered 
into this world, and by sin death."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a 
favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is  a punishment of 
that fault. Now as we stated in the FP, Q[95], A[1]; FP, Q[97], A[1], God 
bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his 
mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to 
his rational mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through sin 
man's mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither 
were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence there followed 
so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason: nor was 
the body wholly subject to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily 
defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject 
to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. 
Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the 
body are due to the lack of the body's subjection to the soul.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite 
against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also are 
death and all defects of the body.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the 
principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form and 
matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, 
immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form. 
The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which 
corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is 
natural to man. Now this condition attached to the nature of the human 
body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the 
human body to be the organ of touch, and consequently a mean between 
objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of 
contraries, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other 
hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter to 
form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its 
matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be 
of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness 
may make it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary 
result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice; for, 
if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would 
not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore 
when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt 
from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which favor, however, 
was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly death is 
both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter, and penal on 
account of the loss of the Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. 
FS, Q[85], A[6]].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition 
attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries. But it 
does not regard the form, for man's soul is immortal, whereas the souls 
of dumb animals are mortal.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as particular 
individuals, but also as principles of the whole human  nature to be 
transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favor 
preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the entire human 
nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity, incurred death.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a 
punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in 
those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which 
results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one who has 
been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down 
in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a 
human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance 
happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and 
proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine 
favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained. 
But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other 
penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments need not be 
equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, 
since God foreknows all future events, Divine providence has so disposed 
that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. 
This is not on account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, 
as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of 
Rm. 9:11, "When they . . . had not done any good or evil"; and also 
contrary to statements made in the FP, Q[90], A[4]; FP, Q[118], A[3], 
namely that the soul is not created before the body: but either in 
punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is something 
belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often punished in their 
children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare 
of the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be 
turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that 
he may be crowned for his patience.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil of 
human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling man 
through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being 
a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore Augustine says 
(Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death, except in so far as 
it is a punishment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the 
wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous make 
good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both 
evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, while good men 
die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make 
good use of death, their death is to them meritorious.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the 
privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the 
privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense 
but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the 
corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now  we may speak of 
corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the 
term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life departs, 
death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. 
In another way corruption may be taken as including the previous 
alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards 
death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while in motion towards 
the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[1] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et 
Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents lived 
thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the 
death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably 
appointed in Scripture?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our first 
parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which would have 
occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for 
sin. Now seemingly there would have been "pain in child-bearing," even 
had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is such that 
offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the 
"subjection of woman to man" results from the perfection of the male, and 
the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the 
earth "to bring forth thorns and thistles," and this would have occurred 
even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of 
the first sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not, 
seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of 
conceptions" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not be 
described as the woman's punishment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is transmitted 
to all, as we have stated with regard to death (A[1]). But all "women's 
conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor does "every man eat bread in the 
sweat of his face." Therefore these are not suitable punishments of the 
first sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in 
the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would seem 
that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of 
man.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be 
naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles 
in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the 
"flaming sword turning every way."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to  the 
necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality by 
the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to 
eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gn. 3:22: "See, 
lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of life . . . and live for 
ever."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and 
clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture, according 
to Ps. 144:9, "His tender mercies are over all His works." Therefore God 
is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, already reduced 
through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gn. 3:22, "Behold Adam is 
become as one of Us, knowing good and evil."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according to 1 
Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are 
content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents 
before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. 
Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God made for them 
garments of skin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in 
evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment would not 
deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, 
that their eyes were opened, according to Gn. 3:7. But this outweighs in 
good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted from sin. 
Therefore the punishments resulting from our first parents' sin are 
unsuitably described.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, These punishments were appointed by God, Who does all 
things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast ordered all 
things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (Wis. 11:21).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of their 
sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor, whereby the 
integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal 
of this favor human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were 
punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which 
was befitting the state of integrity, namely the place of the earthly 
paradise: and this is indicated (Gn. 3:23) where it is stated that "God 
sent him out of the paradise of pleasure." And since he was unable, of 
himself, to return to that state of original innocence, it was fitting 
that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that 
were befitting his original state, namely food (lest he should take of 
the tree of life) and place; for "God placed before . . . paradise . . . 
Cherubim, and a flaming sword." Secondly, they were punished by having 
appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid 
favor: and this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the 
body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was 
appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman punishment 
was appointed in  respect of two things on account of which she is united 
to the man; and these are the begetting of children, and community of 
works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children, 
she was punished in two ways: first in the weariness to which she is 
subject while carrying the child after conception, and this is indicated 
in the words (Gn. 3:16), "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy 
conceptions"; secondly, in the pain which she suffers in giving birth, 
and this is indicated by the words (Gn. 3:16), "In sorrow shalt thou 
bring forth." As regards family life she was punished by being subjected 
to her husband's authority, and this is conveyed in the words (Gn. 3:16), 
"Thou shalt be under thy husband's power."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in 
matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to 
provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished in 
three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words (Gn. 
3:17), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the cares of his 
toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the earth; hence the 
words (Gn. 3:17), "With labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the 
days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers 
of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gn. 3:18), "Thorns and thistles 
shall it bring forth to thee."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the 
soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the rebellion 
of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gn. 3:7): "The eyes 
of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived themselves to be 
naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, indicated by the words 
(Gn. 3:22), "Behold Adam is become as one of Us." Thirdly, by the 
reminder of their coming death, when it was said to him (Gn. 3:19): "Dust 
thou art and into dust thou shalt return." To this also pertains that God 
made them garments of skin, as a sign of their mortality.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3

 Reply OBJ 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been 
painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as, in giving 
birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of pain, but by 
the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving the union of 
both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but of deliberate action" 
[*Cf. FP, Q[98], A[2]].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3

 The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as 
inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since even 
before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"), but as to 
her having now to obey her husband's will even against her own.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3

 If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and 
thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because their 
growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et Resp. in 
Gen. lxxix], however, holds that,  before sin, the earth brought forth no 
thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former opinion is the better.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a 
punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children, for 
this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of the 
numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through carrying her 
offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly stated: "I will 
multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman who 
conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with pain: 
except the Blessed Virgin, who "conceived without corruption, and bore 
without pain" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf. oct. Assum. B. V. M.], 
because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature, 
transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman neither conceives nor 
bears, she suffers from the defect of barrenness, which outweighs the 
aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his 
bread in the sweat of his brow: while those who do not themselves work on 
the land, are busied with other labors, for "man is born to labor" (Job 
5:7): and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored in the 
sweat of their brow.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man 
for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself 
deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things that 
have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in things 
pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is prepared for man 
by Christ.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation, 
this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on account of the 
extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. 
This is denoted by the "flaming sword," which is described as "turning 
every way," as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes 
this heat. And since the movements of corporal creatures are set in order 
through the ministry of the angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 
4), it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, there 
should be cherubim "to keep the way of the tree of life." Hence Augustine 
says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 40): "It is to be believed that even in the 
visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there 
was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 6: After sin, if man had ate of the tree of life, he would not 
thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that beneficial food 
he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words "And live for ever," 
"for ever" signifies "for a long time." For it was not expedient for man 
to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 7: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39),  "these words 
of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to 
others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud 
likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that which he coveted to 
be, but did not keep that to which he was made."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of 
unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect of 
external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Secondly, to 
hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members wherein the 
rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest. Now these two 
motives do not apply to the primitive state. because then man's body 
could not be hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the FP, Q[97], A[2], 
nor was there in man's body anything shameful that would bring confusion 
on him. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23): "And they were both naked, to wit 
Adam and his wife, and were not ashamed." The same cannot be said of 
food, which is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain 
the body.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[164] A[2] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 9: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must not 
imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed, 
especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, 
and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that they 
saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before, 
this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not hitherto."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] Out. Para. 1/1

OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which 
there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?

 (2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by 
the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the angels' sin 
and to man's, according to Mt. 25:41, "Go [Vulg.: 'Depart from Me'] you 
cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his 
angels." Now the angels' first sin did not follow a temptation from 
without. Therefore neither should man's first sin have resulted from an 
outward temptation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the 
demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full well 
that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would seem 
unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should have 
an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation  of an assault is 
akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it 
was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): "He that hath not been 
tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, God's wisdom "orders all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1), 
inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting 
it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "it 
belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature." Now it is 
a condition attaching to human nature that one creature can be helped or 
impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should both allow 
man in the state of innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should 
cause him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor of grace, 
it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him 
against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist the temptation 
of the demon.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Above the human nature there is another that admits of the 
possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above the angelic 
nature. Now only one that is already become evil through sin can tempt by 
leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that by an evil angel man 
should be tempted to sin, even as according to the order of nature he is 
moved forward to perfection by means of a good angel. An angel could be 
perfected in good by something above him, namely by God, but he could not 
thus be led into sin, because according to James 1:13, "God is not a 
tempter of evils."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would 
fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free will, to 
resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's nature required 
that he should be left to his own will, according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God 
left" man "in the hand of his own counsel." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad 
lit. xi, 4): "It seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any 
special praise, if he were able to lead a good life simply because there 
was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature he 
had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the 
persuader."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it: but, 
in the state of innocence, man was able, without any difficulty, to 
resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault was not a 
punishment to man.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first temptation 
was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the angel was above 
man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came  upon man through an 
angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon the woman 
through the man; in other words the woman should have been tempted by the 
man, and not the other way about.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by suggestion. 
Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without making use of an 
outward sensible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed with 
a spiritual mind, and adhered less to sensible than to intelligible 
things, it would have been more fitting for man to be tempted with a 
merely spiritual, instead of an outward, temptation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some 
apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance of good 
than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil 
through a serpent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom, speech, 
and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal. Therefore the 
serpent is unfittingly described (Gn. 3:1) as "more subtle than any of 
the beasts of the earth," or as "the most prudent of all beasts" 
according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and likewise is 
unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been punished 
by God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, That which is first in any genus should be 
proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of 
sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according to 
Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the concupiscence of sin in 
the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, by 
pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the higher reason by 
consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the order of the 
first temptation was fitting.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and 
sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold 
incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the 
Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge which man naturally 
desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did by having 
recourse to those sensible things, which are most akin to man, partly by 
tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him in the same 
species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin 
to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them to eat of the 
forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal 
agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation in 
bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the woman was weaker 
than the man, and consequently more liable to be deceived, and because, 
on account of her union with man, the devil was able to deceive the man 
especially through her. Now there is no parity between principal agent 
and instrument, because the  principal agent must exceed in power, which 
is not requisite in the instrumental agent.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man 
spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than outward 
suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man's 
imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. FP, Q[91], A[3]]; whereas by an 
outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an outward creature. 
Now the devil had a minimum of power against man before sin, wherefore he 
was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward 
suggestion.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), "we are not to 
suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation; but 
as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the 
animal he was allowed to use for that purpose."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), "the serpent 
is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the cunning of the 
devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or 
cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent or cunning man 
in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. 
xi, 28) did the serpent understand the sounds which were conveyed through 
it to the woman; nor again are we to believe that its soul was changed 
into a rational nature, since not even men, who are rational by nature, 
know what they say when a demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. 
xi, 29) the serpent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat 
spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the 
latter was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent 
was not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its 
own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to everlasting 
fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to the serpent were 
directed to him who wrought through the serpent."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[165] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2

 Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17,18), 
"his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that for which 
we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the 
last judgment. For when it was said to him: 'Thou art cursed among all 
cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are set above him, not in 
power, but in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no 
heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but they continue to live 
in the nature which they received." It is also said to him: "'Upon thy 
breast and belly shalt thou creep,'" according to another version [*The 
Septuagint] "Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that 
the impulse of the soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, 
because this part of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he 
creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou 
eat all the days of thy life' may be understood in two ways. Either 
'Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' 
namely sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind 
of temptation,  namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat 
earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities 
between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted by the devil, 
except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness 
of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of 
the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is 
resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait for the woman's heel, that 
if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize 
hold of her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the 
very outset of the evil temptation."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] Out. Para. 1/1

OF STUDIOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. 
Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) What is the matter of studiousness?

 (2) Whether it is a part of temperance?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of 
studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies 
study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, 
in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowledge 
is not the special matter of studiousness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, 
which is derived from "cura" [care], may also refer to elegance of 
apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the 
Apostle says (Rm. 13:14): "Make not provision [curam] for the flesh in 
its concupiscences."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): "From the least of them even 
to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to'] covetousness." Now 
covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the 
possession of wealth, as stated above (Q[118], A[2]). Therefore 
studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not properly about 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 27:11): "Study wisdom, my son, and 
make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that 
reproacheth." Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as 
that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about 
"knowledge."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the 
mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by 
knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge 
precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by his 
knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a 
result it regards any other things the working of which requires to be 
directed by knowledge.  Now the virtues lay claim to that matter about 
which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about 
dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Therefore 
studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except 
in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason. Hence 
studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards 
the things for which he has an affection, according to Mt. 6:21, "Where 
thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And since man has special 
affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows that man's 
thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man 
seeks to know how he may best sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is 
accounted to be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things 
pertaining to knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this 
it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. Accordingly 
studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For 
a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness. Now all 
virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the 
Philosopher, who frequently employs the term "studious" ({spoudaios}) in 
this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9). [*In the same sense Aristotle says in 
Ethic. iii, 2, that "every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to 
do."] Therefore studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of 
temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A[1]), pertains to knowledge. 
But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the 
appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual 
virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act 
of prudence as stated above (Q[47], A[9]). Therefore studiousness is not 
a part of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal virtue 
resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not resemble 
temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a 
kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in 
excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of 
the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice 
that is in default, namely, neglect of study, rather than to the vice 
which is in excess, namely curiosity. wherefore, on account of its 
resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a studious man is 
one  who is curious to study." Therefore studiousness is not a part of 
temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "We are forbidden 
to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows." Now 
curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness 
is a part of temperance.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[141], AA[3],4,5), it belongs to 
temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend 
excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in respect of 
his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, 
so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus 
the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All 
men have a natural desire for knowledge."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; 
wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, 
as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is 
comprised under modesty for the reason given above (Q[160], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as 
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge of 
prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term "studiousness," which 
properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive 
power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (FS, Q[9], A[1]). 
Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act 
of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, 
and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other 
good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man's 
appetite being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or 
that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of 
seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[166] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be 
virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally 
inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us. chiefly to fear 
dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is 
chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such 
dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the 
flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on 
the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and 
so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, 
lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily 
nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. 
Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind of 
restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a  part of 
temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its 
praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of 
things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to 
this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards 
knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of 
learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this 
virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] Out. Para. 1/1

OF CURIOSITY (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points 
of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?

 (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective 
knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there 
can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now 
intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man's perfection 
would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to 
act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. 
Nom. iv) that "the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with 
reason," whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the 
vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives 
from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, 
according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord God," and Wis. 
7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know 
the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements," 
etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since "all things 
are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13), and "the Lord is a God of 
all knowledge" (1 Kgs. 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of 
truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not 
sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective 
knowledge of truth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of 
intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical 
sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for 
Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of the 
king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered 
the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have 
consented to learn that which was unlawful": and Augustine says (De 
Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers made any true 
statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from unjust 
possessors." Therefore  curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be 
sinful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: "Is it 
not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, 
the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in 
vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now vanity of 
understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about 
intellective sciences may be sinful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[166], A[2], ad 2) studiousness is 
directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in 
the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge 
itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the 
knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is 
good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either 
because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Cor. 8:1, 
"Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the knowledge of truth in 
order to sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Body Para. 2/5

 On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of 
truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the 
knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for 
instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in 
their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some there 
are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty 
of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing 
something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore 
the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is 
thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about 
which they argue." In like manner, those who study to learn something in 
order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of 
Jer. 9:5, "They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored 
to commit iniquity."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Body Para. 3/5

 Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed 
to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four ways. 
First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study 
that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad 
Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading 
stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, 
when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, 
as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. 
This is superstitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 
4): "Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful 
curiosity in seeking knowledge from the demons."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Body Para. 4/5

 Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without 
referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God. 
Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying creatures, we 
must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever 
mount towards immortal and abiding  things."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] Body Para. 5/5

 Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his 
own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore 
it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things that are too high for 
thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of 
His works be not curious," and further on (Ecclus. 3:26), "For . . . the 
suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in 
vanity."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man's 
sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the 
perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states 
(Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain 
truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due 
manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness 
consists.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is 
good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge 
of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth 
inordinately, since even the desire for good should be regulated in due 
manner.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and 
commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired 
through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rm. 1:19. Since, however, 
certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the 
Apostle says (Col. 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and 
vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according to 
Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain 
philosophers that "they make an unholy use of divine things against that 
which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of 
God."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive 
knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so 
too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice 
concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or 
gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about 
things known by the sight.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; 
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred in 
the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and 
overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not seem to 
be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the 
representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher 
states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the 
knowledge of sensible objects. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into 
our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 Jn. 2:16]. Now, 
seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because 
according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of them commandment 
concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard 
the knowledge of such like particular sensible objects.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that "concupiscence 
of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 Jn. 
2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic 
arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our 
neighbor's faults," and all these are particular objects of sense. 
Therefore since concupiscence of the eves is a sin, even as concupiscence 
of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 
Jn. 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of 
sensible things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two 
things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is 
directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, 
man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those 
things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the second place, 
it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective knowledge, 
whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ study for the 
purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when 
the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns 
man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. 
x, 35), "I go no more to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in 
the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will 
distract me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and 
unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, 
I become foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things 
is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to 
lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is directed to 
detraction. on the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the 
knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining 
nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this 
studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use 
of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising from 
the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine 
(Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes" because "the 
sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all 
sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says further on: "By this 
it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity 
is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, 
melodious, fragrant, savory, soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake,  
seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering 
annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man prone to 
the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees represented. 
Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such sights make men 
adulterers and shameless.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[167] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire into them, 
with a good intent, either for one's own good---that is in order to be 
encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor---or for our 
neighbor's good---that is in order to correct him, if he do anything 
wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one's position. 
This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24, "Consider one another to 
provoke unto charity and to good works." But to observe our neighbor's 
faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting 
them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them, is 
sinful: hence it is written (Prov. 24:15), "Lie not in wait, nor seek 
after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] Out. Para. 1/1

OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR 
ARTICLES)

 We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of 
the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the 
body that are done seriously?

 (2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?

 (3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;

 (4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the 
body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul, 
according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of the king's daughter is within," 
and a gloss adds, "namely, in the conscience." Now the movements of the 
body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about 
them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the Philosopher 
states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in man by nature, 
since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and 
the same applies to other differences of outward movements. Therefore 
there is no virtue about movements of this kind.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed to 
another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and 
fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another 
person, nor are they passions. Therefore no  virtue is connected with 
them.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as 
stated above (Q[166], A[1], OBJ[1]; A[2], ad 1). Now it is censurable to 
apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for Ambrose says 
(De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of 
authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print of tranquillity: 
yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and 
artless movement." Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style 
of outward movements.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The beauty of honesty [*Cf. Q[145], A[1]] pertains to 
virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of 
honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of the voice and 
the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they be unduly 
soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her 
reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty." Therefore 
there is a virtue about the style of outward movement.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man 
being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward 
movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are 
set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is 
a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold 
standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly, in 
respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place. 
Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct consists in 
becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex and person," and 
this regards the first. As to the second, he adds: "This is the best way 
to order our behavior, this is the polish becoming to every action."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward 
movements: namely "taste" [ornatus] which regards what is becoming to the 
person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in 
movement and behavior; and "methodicalness" [bona ordinatio] which 
regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one's 
surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical knowledge of 
separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, 
according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the body, and the laughter of 
the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose says 
(De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the 
body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a  man is 
inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what is 
lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose 
says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement: and if nature 
fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of the 
inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul. 
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these things," i.e. 
the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden in our hearts is 
esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other 
hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish." It is moreover from 
our outward movements that other men form their judgment about us, 
according to Ecclus. 19:26, "A man is known by his look, and a wise man, 
when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance." Hence moderation of 
outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the 
saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let 
nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is 
becoming to the holiness of your state." Wherefore the moderation of 
outward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher 
mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are 
directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements 
belongs to "friendliness or affability" [*Cf. Q[114], A[1]]. This regards 
pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to 
others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward 
movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs 
to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q[9]], whereby a man, by word and 
deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's outward 
movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do not 
agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to 
study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be 
corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without 
artifice, but not without correction."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there can be a virtue about games?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For 
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who laugh, 
for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only 
excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done 
virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a 
virtue about games.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us," as 
stated above (FS, Q[55], A[4]). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.]: 
"It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what 
happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and 
they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no virtue about games. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful actions 
are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of virtue that 
the agent in choosing should "direct his action to something else," as 
the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be no virtue 
about games.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, spare 
thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high 
pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of the mind from 
work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and 
virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the 
Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to games the virtue of 
{eutrapelia}, which we may call "pleasantness."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's refreshment, 
because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal 
to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose 
power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Consequently 
when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and 
becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul works, the body is at 
work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that 
operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, 
and therefore, when the soul arises above sensibles, through being intent 
on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain 
weariness of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be 
those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness 
is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since 
thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps 
certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily 
labor. In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than 
another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. 
Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so 
weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the 
soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (FS, Q[25], A[2]; FS, Q[31], 
A[1], ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs 
consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of 
the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it 
is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were 
scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is 
said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And 
when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he 
could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing 
it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that 
in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Body Para. 2/4

 Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the 
soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary at 
times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the 
soul. This is in agreement with the statement of  the Philosopher (Ethic. 
iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that 
is associated with games": and consequently it is sometimes necessary to 
make use of such things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Body Para. 3/4

 Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points 
which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure 
in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. 
Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind of joke is 
discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing to be 
observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence 
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware lest, when we seek 
relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of 
good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that, "just as we do not 
allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that 
which is consistent with good behavior, so our very fun should reflect 
something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all 
other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, 
and take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the 
hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] Body Para. 4/4

 Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a 
habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can be 
a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness 
({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy 
turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and 
inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is 
comprised under modesty. [*{Eutrapelia} is derived from {trepein} = 'to 
turn'].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; 
wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the audience is 
weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or 
amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the 
subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the 
greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I will speak of great 
things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human 
speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: 
"Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are 
incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse 
to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of 
fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; of 
whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have accounted our life a 
pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so begotten 
by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for 
hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species are 
not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from  such actions is 
directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this 
be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Hence Tully 
says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, 
but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, 
then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of play. For 
that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful. Now play is 
sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they 
were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either no sin or 
but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive 
play.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital 
vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does not 
seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not 
to be a sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since 
they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of play were 
a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who 
employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, would sin as 
accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related 
in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that is was revealed to 
the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would be with him in the 
life to come.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled with 
sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A mourning 
that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate 
joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since 
mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the 
excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which 
falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (A[2]) that 
playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. 
Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: 
and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of 
the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, 
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be "discourteous, 
insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man, for the purpose of 
jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to his 
neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident 
that excessive play is a mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due 
circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue  times 
or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This 
may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to 
play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of 
God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church 
rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a 
venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as 
to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the intention 
alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an 
intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which 
is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, or 
diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their 
species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no excuse 
for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory 
(Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written 
(Ex. 32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to 
play."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated (A[2]), play is necessary for the intercourse of 
human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful 
employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the 
object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful in itself; 
nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, 
namely that they use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and 
that they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And 
although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in reference to 
other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they 
perform other actions both serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the 
moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they 
give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do 
not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. on the 
other hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those 
comedians who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in 
their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that "to give one's 
property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue"; unless by chance 
some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to 
assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 
86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man 
by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin 
is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a penitent says 
(De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him refrain from games 
and the sights of the world, if he wishes to  obtain the grace of a full 
pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. But 
some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it is 
written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and (Tobias 
3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither have I 
made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness." Therefore there 
can be no sin in the lack of mirth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, 
and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor receives 
the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. 
Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack 
of mirth to be a vice.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now 
it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no 
pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca 
[*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De Continentia] says (De 
Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your conduct be guided by wisdom 
so that no one will think you rude, or despise you as a cad." Now a man 
who is without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also 
burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. 
Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the 
Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures 
it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in quest 
for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 
6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof." 
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): "We should make few friends 
for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season 
life, just as little salt suffices for our meat."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon 
to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because 
this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the 
state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: "I sat 
alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The words of Tobias 3 
refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his adding: "Neither 
have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[168] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but 
only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore  it would seem to 
pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls 
"friendliness," or {eutrapelia}, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he 
names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to 
which it belongs to restrain pleasure.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] Out. Para. 1/1

OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and 
under this head there are two points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward 
apparel?

 (2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection 
with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong to us by 
nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and places. 
Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that "among the ancient 
Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with sleeves and 
reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is scandalous for anyone hailing 
from a reputable place to be without them." Now according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the 
virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or vice about such things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with outward 
attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in outward 
attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar 
use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise it would 
seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in praise of 
certain people (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered about in sheepskins and in 
goatskins." Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in 
this matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or 
intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with matter of 
this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor 
is there a theological virtue connected therewith, since that has God for 
its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by the 
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it. Therefore it seems that 
there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with this kind of attire.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] pertains to virtue. Now a certain 
honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says (De Offic. 
i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without affectation, 
with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not with costly and 
dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that nothing be lacking 
to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to increase its beauty." 
Therefore there can be  virtue and vice in the outward attire.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, It is not in the outward things themselves which man 
uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them 
immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in 
comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore 
Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary to 
the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs generally 
prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom or law of 
any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, 
whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which harmonizeth not with 
its whole, is offensive." Secondly, the lack of moderation in the use of 
these things may arise from the inordinate attachment of the user, the 
result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, 
either in accordance with the custom of those among whom he dwells or 
contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 
12): "We must avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads 
not only wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but 
frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, while 
under the restraint of established morality, it displays its deformity in 
a most lawless outbreak."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Body Para. 2/4

 In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. 
First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so far 
as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says 
(Hom. xl in Ev.): "There are some who think that attention to finery and 
costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the word of God 
would not say so expressly that the rich man who was tortured in hell had 
been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly 
apparel" (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) "save for vainglory." 
Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to 
dress, in so far as dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, 
when a man is too solicitous [*Cf. Q[55], A[6]] in his attention to 
outward apparel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Body Para. 3/4

 Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in 
connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which excludes the 
seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of 
avoiding excessive expenditure and parade"; "contentment" [*Cf. Q[143], 
OBJ[4]], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he 
says that "contentedness is the habit that makes a man satisfied with 
what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in his 
manner of life" (according to the saying of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8): 
"Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be 
content;"---and "simplicity," which excludes excessive solicitude about 
such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a habit that makes a 
man contented with what he has."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] Body Para. 4/4

 In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two 
ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite  study or 
trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says 
(Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak trail 
on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly, by 
seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire. Hence 
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only the glare 
and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of mourning may 
be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy 
under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 
7) that "both excess and inordinate defect are a subject of ostentation."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although outward attire does not come from nature, it 
belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally 
inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward 
raiment.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again the 
ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than others, 
not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of 
their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is not sinful in 
them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever uses 
outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds observed by the good 
people among whom he dwells, either signifies something by so doing, or 
is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for sensual pleasure 
or ostentation."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not 
always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if this be 
done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above others, 
it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done to tame the flesh, 
or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. Hence 
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever uses transitory 
things with greater restraint than is customary with those among whom he 
dwells, is either temperate or superstitious." Especially, however, is 
the use of coarse raiment befitting to those who by word and example urge 
others to repentance, as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking 
in the passage quoted. Wherefore a gloss on Mt. 3:4, says: "He who 
preaches penance, wears the garb of penance."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate; 
wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the 
virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to 
deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with man's 
estate.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal 
sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine law is a mortal 
sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a  precept of the Divine 
law; for it is written (1 Pt. 3:3): "Whose," namely women's, "adorning, 
let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, 
or the putting on of apparel." Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: "Those 
who are clothed in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those 
who are bedecked with gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the 
adornments of mind and body." Now this is not done without a mortal sin. 
Therefore the adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): "I hold that not only 
virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without exception, 
should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's work and 
fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow pigments, 
black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters the natural 
features." And afterwards he adds: "They lay hands on God, when they 
strive to reform what He has formed. This is an assault on the Divine 
handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to see God, 
having no longer the eyes that God made, but those the devil has unmade; 
with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art bedecked." But this is 
not due except to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not 
devoid of mortal sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's 
clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately. Now 
the former is a sin, for it is written (Dt. 22:5): "A woman shall not be 
clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel." 
Therefore it seems that also the excessive adornment of women is a mortal 
sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: On the contrary, If this were true it would seem that the makers 
of these means of adornment sin mortally.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind 
the general statements made above (A[1]) concerning outward apparel, and 
also something special, namely that a woman's apparel may incite men to 
lust, according to Prov. 7:10, "Behold a woman meeteth him in harlot's 
attire, prepared to deceive souls."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through 
despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 7:34) 
that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how 
she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married woman adorn herself 
in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in 
a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin desire to 
give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to 
incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this 
intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they 
do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is 
not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same applies to men in 
this respect.  Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "I do not 
wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or costly attire 
except in the case of those who being neither married nor wishful to 
marry, should think how they may please God: whereas the others think on 
the things of the world, either husbands how they may please their wives, 
or wives how they may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming 
for women though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle 
commands them to cover the head." Yet in this case some might be excused 
from sin, when they do this not through vanity but on account of some 
contrary custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of those who 
were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves that they 
might please other men": and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian is 
speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married women to adorn 
themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the latter be afforded 
an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): 
"Women . . . in ornate [Douay: 'decent'] apparel, adorning themselves 
with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or 
costly attire": whence we are given to understand that women are not 
forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately but to do so 
excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this is a 
kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore Augustine 
says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with paints in order to have 
a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit. I doubt whether 
even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, by whom alone" 
(i.e. the husbands) "are they to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn 
themselves." However, such painting does not always involve a mortal sin, 
but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt 
of God, and it is to like cases that Cyprian refers.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a 
beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from some 
cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since according 
to the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23), "such as we think to be the less honorable 
members of the body, about these we put more abundant honor."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel should 
be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the general 
custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear man's clothes, 
or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of sensuous pleasure; 
and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Dt. 22) because the Gentiles 
used to practice this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous 
superstition. Nevertheless this may be done sometimes without sin on 
account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, 
or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar motive.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[169] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 4: In the case of an art directed to the production of goods 
which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen sin in 
making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for 
instance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining to 
idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which may 
be employed by man either for a good or for an evil use, such as swords, 
arrows, and the like, the practice of such an art is not sinful. These 
alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super 
Matth.]: "The name of art should be applied to those only which 
contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life." In the 
case of an art that produces things which for the most part some people 
put to an evil use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, 
nevertheless, according to the teaching of Plato, they should be 
extirpated from the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since 
women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of 
their estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please 
their husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do 
not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing means 
that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says (Super Matth.) 
that "even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand in need of 
restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by abusing its needs, 
and debasing art by art."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)

 We must next consider the precepts of temperance:

 (1) The precepts of temperance itself;

 (2) The precepts of its parts.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably 
given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue than 
temperance, as stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[141], A[8]; FS, Q[66], A[4]
). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the 
decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts of the Law. 
Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue 
the prohibition of adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated 
above (Q[154], AA[1],8).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also 
about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the decalogue 
include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and 
drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, should they 
include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal 
pleasure.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue 
precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order that 
obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts  of the decalogue 
are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the precepts of the 
decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly 
prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative precept 
forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue (Ex. 
20:14,17).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the 
commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts 
concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue 
contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and 
of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery 
would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since thereby 
a man lays hold of another's property for his own use, by abusing his 
neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a 
special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also 
as desired in thought.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is 
not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as 
adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And 
yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be 
sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts 
of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way 
with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our 
neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for a 
father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has 
no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of his wife, for 
he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*1 Cor. 7:4].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[122], AA[1],4) the precepts of the 
decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to 
be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common 
affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance 
varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks (De Bono 
Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and customs.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably 
given in the Divine law?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed to 
temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts of 
the Decalogue, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), are certain universal 
principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the beginning of all 
sin," according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among  the precepts of the 
Decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the 
decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to fulfil 
the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now since 
humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to dispose man to 
the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is accounted one of 
the degrees of humility, as stated above (Q[161], A[6]); and the same 
apparently applies to meekness, the effect of which is that a man does 
not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. 
Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that the Decalogue should have 
contained precepts of humility and meekness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery is 
forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of our 
neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to 
modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore Augustine says in his 
Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let nothing be done to offend 
the eye of any person whatever." Therefore it seems that this kind of 
inordinateness should also have been forbidden by a precept of the 
Decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, suffices the authority of Scripture.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in 
two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. Considered in 
themselves they have no direct connection with the love of God or of our 
neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things pertaining 
to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may regard the love 
of God or of our neighbor: and in this respect the decalogue contains 
precepts that relate to the prohibition of the effects of the vices 
opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is 
opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder 
(and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses 
due honor to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which 
leads many to transgress the precepts of the first table.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in the 
heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common. Hence 
there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the 
Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to the 
observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, wherefore 
they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the 
Decalogue.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[170] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's 
neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are  murder, 
adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as 
being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (Q[168], A[1], 
ad 1,3).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] Out. Para. 1/4

TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ[171]-182)


PERTAINING TO KNOWLEDGE (QQ[171]-175)


OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

 After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to 
men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things 
which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference 
between men as regards things connected with the soul's habits and acts. 
First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 1 Cor. 
12:4,7: "There are diversities of graces . . . and to one . . . by the 
Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge," 
etc. Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the 
active and the contemplative life, which correspond to diverse purposes 
of operation, wherefore it is stated (1 Cor. 12:4,7) that "there are 
diversities of operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who 
"was busy about much serving," which pertains to the active life, 
differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the 
Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk. 10:39,40), which pertains to the 
contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties 
and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, "And He gave some 
apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some 
pastors and doctors": and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of 
which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): "There are diversities of ministries."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] Out. Para. 2/4

 With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be 
considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, 
some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to 
knowledge may be comprised under "prophecy," since prophetic revelation 
extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things 
relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed by all and are 
matters of "faith," and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern the 
perfect and belong to "wisdom." Again, prophetic revelation is about 
things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good 
or evil; this pertains to the "discernment of spirits." Moreover it 
extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to "knowledge," 
as we shall explain further on (Q[177]). Accordingly we must first of all 
consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] Out. Para. 3/4

 Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its 
cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] Out. Para. 4/4

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?

 (2) Whether it is a habit? 

 (3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?

 (4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?

 (5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift 
of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?

 (6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. For it 
is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after death the body of Eliseus 
prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said of Joseph that "his 
bones were visited, and after death they prophesied." Now no knowledge 
remains in the body or in the bones after death. Therefore prophecy does 
not pertain to knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that prophesieth, 
speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not knowledge itself, 
but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and madness. 
Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is written (Osee 
9:7): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad [*Vulg.: 
'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is not a cognitive 
perfection.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so inspiration 
regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a kind of motion. 
Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or "revelation," according to 
Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i]. Therefore it would seem that 
prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Kgs. 9:9): "For he that is now called 
a prophet, in time past was called a seer." Now sight pertains to 
knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge, 
because, to wit, prophets know things that are far [procul] removed from 
man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name from 
{phanos}, "apparition," because things appear to them from afar. 
Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament, they 
were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and surveyed 
things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen nations they were known as 
"vates, on account of their power of mind [vi mentis]," [*The Latin 
'vates' is from the Greek {phates}, and may be rendered 'soothsayer'] 
(Etym. viii, 7).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): "The manifestation of the 
Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (1 Cor. 14:12): 
"Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church," it follows that 
prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as the prophets 
declare for the instruction of  others, the things they know through 
being taught of God, according to the saying of Is. 21:10, "That which I 
have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto 
you." Accordingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii, 7), "prophets" may be 
described as "proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar 
[porro fantur]," that is, speak from a distance, "and foretell the truth 
about things to come."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be 
confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the operation of 
the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, "They . . . preached 
everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs 
that followed." Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with the working of 
miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances. 
Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): "There arose no more a prophet in 
Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs 
and wonders."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the third 
point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic utterances.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are not 
true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): "Hearken not to 
the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they 
speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord," 
and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that follow their own 
spirit, and see nothing."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind 
be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is written 
(Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to 
thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the motion of 
the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the Spirit 
entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After the mind's 
intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the things of 
God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to me." 
Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising 
of the mind, according to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of the Almighty 
giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as regards the very 
perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means 
the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to Job 12:22, 
"He discovereth great things out of darkness."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prophecy is a habit?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to Ethic. 
ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power,  passion, and habit." 
Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all men, since the 
powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not a passion, since 
the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as stated above (FS, Q[22]
, A[2]); whereas prophecy pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in 
the foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in 
act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is not 
always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore 
seemingly prophecy is a habit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. Now 
grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as stated 
above (FS, Q[110], A[2]). Therefore prophecy is a habit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A habit is something "whereby we act when we will," as 
the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says (De Anima iii). 
But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, as appears in the 
case of Eliseus (4 Kgs. 3:15), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him 
concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a 
minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come 
down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and fill his mind with 
things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore 
prophecy is not a habit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made 
manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the 
material sight takes place through material light, so too the 
manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual 
light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light by 
means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to its 
cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that surpasses natural 
reason, as stated above (A[1]), it follows that prophecy requires an 
intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the 
saying of Micah 7:8: "When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light." Now 
light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an abiding form, 
as material light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a 
passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic 
light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a 
prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For 
Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is 
lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind, yet 
so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift." 
Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kgs. 4:27): "Her soul is in 
anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me." The 
reason for this is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by 
way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly to 
the effect of knowing the principle of the things manifested by that 
light; thus by the light of the active intellect the intellect knows 
chiefly the first principles of all things known naturally. Now the  
principle of things pertaining to supernatural knowledge, which are 
manifested by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in 
His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this 
light is by way of an abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, 
"In Thy light we shall see light."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] Body Para. 2/3

 It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul 
by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Ex. 
33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock," 
etc., and 3 Kgs. 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the mount before the 
Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that even as the air 
is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the prophet's mind is 
always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple who has not yet 
acquired the principles of an art needs to have every detail explained to 
him. Wherefore it is written (Is. 1:4): "In the morning He wakeneth my 
ear, so that I may hear Him as a master." This is also indicated by the 
very manner in which prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the 
Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or that "the word of the Lord," 
or "the hand of the Lord was made upon him."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] Body Para. 3/3

 But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly 
speaking, prophecy is not a habit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise 
absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be principles of 
moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from 
habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of those who perform an 
action from the judgment of their reason before having the habit of that 
action.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand 
passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher 
says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, to be passive." 
For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is passive to 
the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge the 
human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the Divine light.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, there 
remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion---thus wood 
once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the prophet's 
intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there remains an 
aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind has once been 
aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its former devotion. 
Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) that our prayers need 
to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while 
his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his being 
deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a prophet unto 
the nations."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above human 
nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance of 
the act---for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the 
uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and for such acts man is 
not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing is above human 
nature as to the mode but not the substance of the act---for instance to 
love God and to know Him in the mirror of His creatures---and for this a 
habitual gift of grace is bestowed.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future contingencies. 
For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine 
inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with 
unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future contingencies. 
Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is 
differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things; and 
from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits; and from 
knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts are 
differentiated by their objects, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2]). 
Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected with any 
of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future contingencies 
alone.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of species, as 
stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2]). Therefore, if one prophecy is about 
future contingencies, and another about other things, it would seem to 
follow that these are different species of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some prophecies 
are "about the future, for instance (Is. 7:14), 'Behold a virgin shall 
conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as (Gn. 1:1), 'In 
the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some are "about the 
present," as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), "If all prophesy, and there come in one 
that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made manifest." 
Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can 
extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the 
body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge 
extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect. Now 
prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is possible 
to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and corporeal; 
and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them all. Thus by 
the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections 
of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is written, "I saw 
the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated." Moreover his  prophecy 
contains matters referring to natural bodies, according to the words of 
Is. 40:12, "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. 
It also contains matters relating to human conduct, according to Is. 
58:1, "Deal thy bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains 
things pertaining to future events, according to Is. 47:9, "Two things 
shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Body Para. 2/4

 Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it 
must be observed that the more remote things are from our knowledge the 
more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three 
degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either 
sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the 
knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense things present 
to him locally, which another man does not know by human sense, since 
they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what his 
disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kgs. 5:26), and in like manner 
the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to another, 
according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and again in this way what one man knows by 
demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Body Para. 3/4

 The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of 
all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable, 
but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of the 
Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," 
etc. (Is. 6:3).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] Body Para. 4/4

 The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men, 
through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies, 
the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated 
universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is 
predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation of 
future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy 
apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "And 
since a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name 
loses its significance when he speaks of the past or present."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper 
signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the 
other gratuitous graces.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We might also 
reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have the 
common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine revelation; 
whereas those that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge," and the 
"interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through natural reason, 
but are manifested in a higher way through the enlightening of the Divine 
light. As to "faith," although it is about things invisible to man, it is 
not concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but with a man's 
certitude of assent to things known by others.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine 
light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although the 
things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known 
prophetically?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all 
that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos 3:7): "The Lord 
God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the 
prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically is something done by 
God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to the 
prophet.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). Now prophecy is a 
"Divine revelation," as stated above (A[3]). Therefore it is perfect; and 
this would not be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were 
revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is that which lacks nothing" 
(Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of prophecy are revealed 
to the prophet.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more powerful 
than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human science. Now 
a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that science; 
thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar. Therefore it would seem 
that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes the 
spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind and nowise 
the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to the 
future." Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not exist 
simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are 
connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above (FS, 
Q[65], AA[1],2) that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on 
account of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are known 
through some principle are connected in that principle and depend 
thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as regards all to 
which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all that can be known 
through that principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown, or 
known only in a general way, it does not follow that one knows all those 
things at the same time, but each of them has to be manifested by itself, 
so that consequently some of them may be known, and some not.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by 
the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see in 
itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible matters 
of prophecy; but each one knows some  of them according to the special 
revelation of this or that matter.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are 
necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every one, 
but some to one, and some to another.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the 
genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that 
"prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e. 
imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection in 
heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): "When that 
which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." 
Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic 
revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which prophecy is 
directed.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that science, 
whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore to have 
the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to 
that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic knowledge is not 
known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the comparison fails.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit 
from what he says by the prophetic spirit?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what he says 
by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit. For 
Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could, 
through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express, discern 
betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul." Now prophecy 
is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore the prophet 
always distinguishes what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he 
says by his own spirit.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome [*Pelagius. 
Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] says. Now the 
prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that hath a dream, let 
him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with 
truth." Therefore the prophet can distinguish what he has through the 
spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is greater 
than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now he that has 
science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it. 
Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much more certain 
that he has it.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be 
observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter certain 
things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesying, 
and think they are speaking by the prophetic  spirit."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: in 
one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious 
instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without knowing it," as 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the 
greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express 
revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by 
God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In truth the Lord sent me to 
you, to speak all these words in your hearing." Else, were he not certain 
about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would 
not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be gathered from 
the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to 
sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he 
not been most certain of the Divine revelation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] Body Para. 2/3

 On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by 
instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully whether 
his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And 
those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all manifested with 
prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the 
genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to understand the saying of 
Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to error, "they are very soon 
set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For instance, cf. 2 Kgs. 7:3 seqq.], and 
from Him they hear the truth, so that they reproach themselves for having 
said what was untrue," as Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[5] Body Para. 3/3

 The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that 
is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the 
objections is clear.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that things known or declared prophetically can be 
false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated above (A[3]
). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would 
happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Is. 38:1): "Take 
order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not live," and 
yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kgs. 20:6). Again the Lord 
said (Jer. 18:7,8): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a 
kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation 
against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will 
repent of the evil that I have thought to do them." This is instanced in 
the example of the Ninevites, according to Jn. 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg.: 
'God'] had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would 
do to them, and He did it not." Therefore the matter of prophecy  can be 
false.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is 
absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the 
consequent of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to 
the antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a syllogism, and a 
syllogism whose premises are necessary always leads to a necessary 
conclusion, as we find proved in I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a 
prophecy cannot be false, the following conditional proposition must 
needs be true: "If a thing has been prophesied, it will be." Now the 
antecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely necessary, since 
it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is also necessary 
absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about 
contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot 
be false.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy is 
a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with 
invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not be invariable, if 
its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false can come under 
prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said (AA[1],3,5), 
prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of teaching on 
the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge 
is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of the disciple 
is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher, even as in natural things 
the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the 
generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when he says [*Comment. in Daniel 
ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge." 
Consequently the same truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and 
utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false can 
possibly come, as stated in the FP, Q[16], A[8]. Therefore nothing false 
can come under prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As stated in the FP, Q[14], A[13] the certitude of the 
Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular 
events, because that knowledge regards the future as present and already 
determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an "impressed 
likeness" or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge," does not by its 
unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future things.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. 
First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees them in 
their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees 
the order of causes in relation to their effects. And though future 
contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, 
yet, considered as in their causes, they are not so determined but that 
they can happen otherwise. Again, though this twofold knowledge is always 
united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic  
revelation, because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a 
par with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic 
revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so 
far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and such 
things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this saying of Is. 
7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes, however, the prophetic 
revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as 
knowing the order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is 
otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for 
the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be 
natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a 
result. In this way we are to understand the saying of Is. 38:1: "Thou 
shalt die, and not live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body 
has a tendency to death": and the saying of Jonas 3:4, "Yet forty days, 
and Nineveh shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that 
it should be destroyed." God is said "to repent," metaphorically, 
inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by 
"changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. FP, 
Q[19], A[7], ad 2].

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[171] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as the truth 
of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional proposition: 
"If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same way as the 
proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in both cases it is 
impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the consequent is 
necessary, considered, not as something future in our regard, but as 
being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the FP, Q[14], 
A[13], ad 2.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are 
six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether prophecy is natural?

 (2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?

 (3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?

 (4) Whether a good life is requisite?

 (5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?

 (6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prophecy can be natural?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory says 
(Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is 
sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says (Gen. 
ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is withdrawn from 
the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future [*Cf. FP, Q[86], 
A[4], ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can 
acquire prophecy naturally.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one wakes 
than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally  foresee the 
future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divinat. per 
Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]). Much more therefore can 
a man naturally foreknow the future.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb animals. 
Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that concern 
them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from their 
gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences; and in like 
manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered from their 
movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more therefore can 
men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of such things is 
prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall fail, 
the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident that 
prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now "nature 
does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9]. Therefore it 
seems that prophecy is from nature.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (2 Pt. 1:21): "For prophecy came not by 
the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by 
the Holy Ghost." Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through 
the gift of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[171], A[6], ad 2) prophetic 
foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they 
are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to 
foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the 
Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in 
the FP, Q[14], A[13]. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the future 
cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On the other 
hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a natural 
knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death 
in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of the order 
of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be 
understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the 
soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul 
to contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord 
with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that our 
souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas; but 
that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; yet in 
some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily purity. 
According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not much 
obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow such like 
future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion Augustine says 
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it that the soul cannot always have this 
power of divination, since it always wishes to have it?"

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle, 
that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as  stated in the FP, 
Q[84], A[6], it is better to have recourse to another explanation, and to 
hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can 
acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped by their 
natural disposition, which depends on the perfection of a man's 
imaginative power, and the clarity of his understanding.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two ways 
from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First, because 
the former can be about any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas 
the latter foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about certain 
effects, to which human experience may extend. Secondly, because the 
former prophecy is "according to the unchangeable truth" [*Q[171], A[3], 
OBJ[1]], while the latter is not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the 
former foreknowledge, and not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, 
because, as stated above (Q[171], A[3]), prophetic knowledge is of things 
which naturally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that 
prophecy strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine 
revelation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it 
becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances 
[*Cf. FP, Q[88], A[4], ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the 
subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the 
impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them 
while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) 
that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain future things, 
by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as it is receptive 
even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future things by a 
revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, because according to 
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were so, it would be able to 
foreknow the future whenever it willed," which is clearly false.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from the 
revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as stated 
above (Q[95], A[6]), when we were treating of divination. Now both these 
causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than while awake, 
because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external sensibles, so 
that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions either of spiritual 
substances, or even of natural causes; although as regards the perfection 
of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleeping.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future events, 
except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination 
is moved more than man's, because man's imagination, especially in 
waking, is more disposed according to reason than according to the 
impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much more amply in man, 
that which the impression of natural causes effects in dumb animals; and 
Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man still more. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of human 
acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government of a 
people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature 
is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come through the 
angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom "conveyeth 
herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and the 
prophets." Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately. Therefore it 
also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the medium of the 
angels.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. But 
the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 
"There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Therefore the 
prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy is a 
"Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the angels, it would 
be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by 
means of the angels.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious fathers 
received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and he is 
speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is 
conveyed by means of the angels.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rm. 13:1), "Things that are of God 
are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God.']." Now 
the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. 
v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the 
angels hold a middle position between God and men, in that they have a 
greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than men have. 
Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed from God 
to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine 
enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed 
by the angels.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a perfection of 
the will, in which God alone can form an impression; whereas prophecy is 
a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an 
impression, as stated in the FP, Q[111], A[1], wherefore the comparison 
fails between the two.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as 
their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by means of 
the angels.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal 
agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is like an 
instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of 
the angels, is said to be Divine.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for 
prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the 
disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, "The 
Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make a comparison 
naturally turns to those things of which he has experience, and among 
which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their enemies to 
the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who was 
a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is inspired by the 
lion's roar." Now that which is received by a thing according to the mode 
of the recipient requires a natural disposition. Therefore prophecy 
requires a natural disposition.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than those 
of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the considerations 
of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural indisposition 
from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science. Much more therefore 
is a natural disposition requisite for the contemplation of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle than an 
accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are hindered by 
an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew 
[*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of the 
marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even 
though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation." Much more 
therefore does a natural indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would 
seem that a good natural disposition is requisite for prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.): 
"He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes him a 
Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a 
prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but 
depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (1 
Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing 
to every one according as He will."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), prophecy in its true and exact 
sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from a 
natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we 
must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires 
neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in His 
corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into being 
matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a previous 
disposition in His  spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the 
spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as 
requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able at 
the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a 
soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the very instant of 
its creation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the thing 
prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no change in a 
prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible 
with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural cause, 
and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in matter. This 
cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an 
obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were altogether 
deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might be hindered 
from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion, whether of 
anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other passion. But 
such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the Divine power, 
which is the cause of prophecy.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy. For it 
is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God "through nations conveyeth 
herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and prophets." 
Now there can be no holiness without a good life and sanctifying grace. 
Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and sanctifying grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according to 
Jn. 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever 
I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you." Now God reveals His 
secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it would seem that the 
prophets are the friends of God; which is impossible without charity. 
Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is 
impossible without sanctifying grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 7:15): "Beware of false prophets, who 
come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening 
wolves." Now all who are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening 
wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. Therefore no man is a 
true prophet except he be good by grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De 
Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that  "if 
interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be 
bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that the gift of 
prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only 
to the best men.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, To those who had said, "Lord, have we not prophesied in 
Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you" (Mt. 7:22,23). Now "the 
Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy can be in 
those who are not God's by grace.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view. 
First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace. 
Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the outward 
actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that man's soul 
may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 
18): "A man is not transferred from the left side to the right, unless he 
receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a lover of God and of his 
neighbor." Hence whatever can be without charity can be without 
sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life. Now 
prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts. First, 
on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to the 
intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is 
perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons 
prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had 
without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For 
prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the 
Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is 
given to every man unto profit"; and is not directly intended to unite 
man's affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore 
prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this 
goodness.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of the 
soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is an 
obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised very 
high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is hindered by 
strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external things. Hence we 
read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kgs. 4:38) that they "dwelt together 
with [Vulg.: 'before']" Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, 
lest worldly employment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for 
the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and such are 
those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by sanctifying grace to 
their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and prophets." Others, however, 
receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of others. Hence Jerome 
commenting on Mt. 7:22, says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of 
miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of 
those who do these things, but either to the invoking the name of Christ, 
or to the condemnation of those who invoke, and for the good of those who 
see and hear." 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage [*Jn. 
15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon as we hear 
them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is to know. 
Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because having 
renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of perfect 
love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to prophets.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those 
whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in 
Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and falsely 
ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be sinners, are 
called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves, because they do 
not purpose the destruction of Christians." And since prophecy is 
directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such are false 
prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are simply 
the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best as regards 
the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of 
prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For 
prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prol. in 
Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore no 
prophecy can be from a demon.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for prophetic 
knowledge, as stated above (Q[171], AA[2],3). Now the demons do not 
enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the FP, Q[119], A[3]. 
Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now 
prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on Rm. 
12:6, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith," says: 
"Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with prophecy, which is 
the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since believers, 
after receiving the Spirit, prophesied." Therefore prophecy cannot be 
bestowed by the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (3 Kgs. 18:19): "Gather unto me all 
Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and 
fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel's 
table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem 
that there is also a prophecy from the demons.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As stated above (Q[171], A[1]), prophecy denotes 
knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that  an 
intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed 
from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human 
intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the intellects 
of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. Hence the 
demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain things remote from 
men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those things 
which God alone knows are remote simply and most of all.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] Body Para. 2/2

 Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine 
revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may be 
called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom 
something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as 
prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false 
prophets," or "prophets of idols." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 
xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as 
these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a 
false prophet."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and 
simple acceptation.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by 
enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by 
audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true prophecy.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from Divine 
prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom says 
[*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John 
Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as 
diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes 
utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never." Wherefore it is written (Dt. 
18:21,22): "If in silent thought thou answer: How shall I know the word 
that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that 
same prophet foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and it come not to 
pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken."


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never foretell the 
truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on 1 Cor. 12:3] 
says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost." 
Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the Holy Ghost, because 
"there is no concord between Christ and Belial [*'What concord hath 
Christ with Belial?']" (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore it would seem that they 
never foretell the truth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of 
truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of 
untruth, according to 3 Kgs. 22:22, "I will go forth, and be a lying 
spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the  prophets inspired by 
the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q[111], A[6]). 
Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44) that "when he 
speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and the 
father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets, the devil 
speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's minister to declare 
the truth, since "light hath no fellowship with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What 
fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore the 
prophets of the demons never foretell the truth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that "Balaam was a diviner, 
for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic 
art." Now he foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be 
found in Num. 24:17: "A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a scepter shall 
spring up from Israel." Therefore even the prophets of the demons 
foretell the truth.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in 
relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one that is 
wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge 
to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says 
[*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, 40] that "no 
teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood." Hence 
the teaching of the demons, with which they instruct their prophets, 
contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect 
is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth, even as the will is 
seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says 
[*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John 
Chrysostom]: "The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in 
order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie."

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the 
demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was 
evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to 
him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God 
makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He 
foretells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the 
truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness to 
it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more easily 
led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true things 
about Christ.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they 
foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the author 
of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the good 
spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then 
this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth, 
in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is not true; 
whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of 
untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even the very spirit 
of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false, as stated 
above.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[172] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which they have of 
themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves but 
of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue 
of their own nature that they sometimes foretell the truth, as stated 
above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth 
which is to be accomplished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries 
to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; FP, 
Q[109], A[4], ad 1).


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is 
conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?

 (2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of 
certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?

 (3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction 
from the sense?

 (4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things 
prophesied?


Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of God, for 
a gloss on Is. 38:1, "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die and 
not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of God's foreknowledge in 
which all things are written." Now God's foreknowledge is His very 
essence. Therefore prophets see God's very essence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that eternal 
truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with the mind's eye 
the type both of our being and of our actions." Now, of all men, prophets 
have the highest knowledge of Divine things. Therefore they, especially, 
see the Divine essence.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets "with 
unchangeable truth." Now future contingencies exist thus in God alone. 
Therefore the prophets see God Himself.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The vision of the Divine essence is not made void in 
heaven; whereas "prophecy is made void" (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore prophecy 
is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence. 

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar off. 
Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. 11:13) that "they were 
beholding . . . afar off." But those who are in heaven and in the state 
of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were, from near at 
hand, according to Ps. 139:14, "The upright shall dwell with Thy 
countenance." Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge differs from 
the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so that it is 
distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect, and when the 
latter comes the former is made void, as appears from the words of the 
Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10).

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] Body Para. 2/3

 Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge and 
the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets see the 
very essence of God (which they call the "mirror of eternity") [*Cf. De 
Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art. 2, ad 4], not, however, 
in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, but as containing 
the types [*Cf. FP, Q[15]] of future events. But this is altogether 
impossible. For God is the object of bliss in His very essence, according 
to the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Happy whoso knoweth Thee, 
though he know not these," i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible to see 
the types of creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both 
because the Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are 
made---the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a 
relationship to the creature---and because knowledge of a thing in 
itself---and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly 
bliss---precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something 
else---and such is the knowledge of God as containing the types of 
things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as 
containing the types of creatures, and yet not as the object of bliss. 
Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vision of 
the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not see in the Divine 
essence Itself the things they do see, but that they see them in certain 
images, according as they are enlightened by the Divine light.

Aquin.: SMT SS Q[173] A[1] Body Para. 3/3

 Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic visions, 
says that "the wise theologian calls that vision divine which is effected 
by images of things lacking a bodily form through the seer being rapt in 
divine things." And these images illumined by the Divine light have more 
of the nature of a mirror than the Divine essence: since in a mirror 
images are formed from other things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet 
t