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Cloning:
the disappearance of direct parenthood and denial of the family
The Pontifical Council for the Family
considers every attempt to clarify the challenge human cloning
represents to be appropriate, aware of the importance of this issue and
with a view to the imminent resumption of work to draw up an
International
Convention against the Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings by the
United Nations Organization. It is a question of contributing to a
satisfactory presentation of the problem, of pointing out the negative
ethical aspects and meanings of human cloning which are contrary to the
dignity of the person and the family.1 This is the aim of
this presentation, which attempts to set out some aspects of cloning to
inform the general public.
For
several decades now, a whole series of biological techniques have been
continuously developing. Their application to human procreation has
surfaced many ethical problems and increasingly points to the need
for an integral anthropology of the human being and a renewed approach
to the role of the family for humanity. In particular, recent attempts
to clone a human being have raised fundamental questions regarding the
family: what it means to be parents and to be a child, the dignity of
the human embryo, and the truth and meaning of human sexuality. Today,
the slow and subtle dissociation taking place between the concepts of
human life and that of the family, which actually is the natural place
where life originates and develops, is one of the most nefarious
consequences of the culture of death.
Indeed,
as the Instruction Donum Vitae, published by the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, affirms: "The human person must be
accepted in his parents' act of union and love; the generation of a
child must therefore be the fruit of that mutual giving which is
realized
in the conjugal act, wherein the spouses cooperate as servants and not
as masters in the work of the Creator who is Love. In reality, the
origin of a human person is the result of an act of giving. The one
conceived must be the fruit of his parents' love. He cannot be desired
or conceived as the product of an intervention of medical or biological
techniques; that would be equivalent to reducing him to an object of
scientific technology".2
The troubling possibility of the cloning of human
beings for "reproductive" purposes through the technical
substitution of responsible procreation is contrary to the dignity of
sonship. Even more troubling are the pressing demands of groups of
researchers for the legalization of cloning in order to subject the
human embryos "produced" to manipulation and experimentation,
and subsequently to destroy them. This state of affairs highlights a
serious deterioration, both in the recognition of the dignity of life
and of human procreation and in the knowledge of the irreplaceable and
fundamental role and value of the family, not only for the individual
but for all humanity.
1.
Cloning, a possibility open to modern biology
The
term "cloning" refers to the technique used frequently in
biology to reproduce cells and micro-organisms, both vegetable and
animal, and, more recently, to reproduce the sequences of genetic
information contained in biological material, such as fragments of DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid), which contain a wide range of codified nuclear
genetic information. It is necessary to complete this description with a
more exact definition of the cloning technique in order to gain a more
adequate knowledge of its nature.
Regarding
its purposes, cloning is a technical procedure of reproduction through
which the genetic material of a cell or organism (vegetable or animal)
is manipulated in order to obtain an individual or a colony of
individuals, each one identical to the first. What distinguishes
cloning from other similar techniques is that in cloning, reproduction
takes place without sexual union (asexual), and without fertilization
or the union of the gametes (agametic); it results in a group of
individuals biologically identical to the donor who provided the
nuclear genetic heritage.
The
individuals obtained by cloning are called clones, a term used to
indicate that each and every one has the same genetic information;
they are not, therefore, descendents only from their progenitor (that
is, there has been no genetic sexual combination of their progenitors).3
This is consequently a type of reproduction that can artificially
replace
— in the animal species (of sexual reproduction) — natural
fertilization or the union of gametes (the cells through which
reproduction naturally occurs), with the resulting advantages, defects
and dangers.
Taking
its technical realization into consideration, "cloning" in the
strictest sense, on the basis of the prospect of the procedure used,
means reproduction obtained through so-called "nuclear
transfer".4 When scientists allude to cloning in the
strict sense of the term, they usually identify it with nuclear
transfer: "Fertilization properly so-called is replaced by the
'fusion' of a nucleus taken from a somatic cell of the individual one
wishes to clone, or from the somatic cell itself, with an oocyte from
which the nucleus has been removed, that is, an oocyte lacking the
maternal genome. Since the nucleus of the somatic cell contains the
whole genetic inheritance, the individual obtained possesses —
except for possible alterations — the genetic identity of the nucleus'
donor. It is this essential genetic correspondence with the donor that
produces in the new individual the somatic replica or copy of the
donor itself”.5
Also known as "cloning" (or
"semi-cloning" or other such terms) are broader and less
appropriate techniques of asexual and agametic reproduction that in
some ways resemble nuclear transfer, especially because of the results
they obtain: a genetically identical descendence. These include
techniques
such as artificial parthenogenesis6 or embryonic fission.7
There
are no particular ethical objections to cloning non-human specimens (to
obtain offspring from them) and biological material (for various uses)
if it is responsibly carried out, just as there are no ethical
objections to the traditional and sometimes ancient horticultural
practices that used this sort of technique which, moreover, has
considerable advantages. The use of cloning in zoology would undoubtedly
bring great benefits. Improvements, for example, in the reproduction of
domestic animals, a reduction in the production costs of certain types
of meat, the possible application of cloning to save species from
becoming extinct, progress in the conditions of experimentation and
research in pharmacology, all make it advisable to continue research by
applying cloning techniques to animal species.
In
spite of this, it must be pointed out that these techniques are still in
the trial stage and their results must be carefully assessed. Could
they have unforeseen consequences in the future? Could they, for
example, produce dangerous genetic malformations, today unknown or
insufficiently known? To what extent might these involve alterations to
the ecology in the medium or long term? Could uncontrolled recourse to
cloning lead to unleashing new diseases and malformations?
2.
Human ‘reproductive’ or ‘therapeutic’ cloning
By
now it is common knowledge that attempts are being made to apply cloning
to "produce" human beings, to use them in research and
eventually, in medical treatment. The mass media, science fiction and a
certain type of popular literature have contributed to raising false
expectations about cloning, given its actual technical possibilities.
Despite this, however, it is certain that (more or less scientifically
exact) investigations and hypotheses have been advanced that aim to
apply cloning experiments to the human being. Recently, this fact has
caught the attention of public authorities worldwide, as well as of
those charged with a special responsibility for the common good.
Two
facets of the problem of cloning human embryos, as it appears today,
have acquired a special prominence: "reproductive" cloning and
"therapeutic" cloning (or for the purpose of scientific
research). The difference between the two is seen in the purpose for
which the cloning is intended: the complete development of an embryo
through implantation in the uterus is the goal of
"reproductive" cloning, whereas "therapeutic"
cloning requires the use of the embryo in its pre-implantation stage in
research for therapeutic ends. Therefore, the purposes of cloning
would be:
1.
To obtain human offspring and to plan a more effective technique for
assisted
procreation, with greater and better possibilities of application for
certain couples ("reproductive" cloning).
2.
To obtain, through this technique, what are known as
"synthetic" embryos or "cell clusters" (in its
earliest stages, every cell of the human embryo is totipotent8
or multipotent9), and hence to extract stem cells10
without the implantation of the embryo in the maternal uterus. The
stem cells extracted, properly checked, have the potential to develop
into specific cells: nerve, cardiac, muscle, liver cells, etc.
("therapeutic" cloning or cloning for the purposes of
scientific research).
3.
Toward the simultaneous global prohibition of all human cloning?
It
is obvious that the application of science to the area of human
procreation
concerns all society, and not solely the scientific community. Thus,
it was not long before work began on drafting legislation in which,
without coercing the legitimate development of science, the ethical and
legal boundaries of its application would be defined once and for all
and the possible cloning of human beings forbidden. In recent years,
laws have been passed in some countries in which human
"reproductive" cloning is strictly forbidden, while research
on human cloning has so far been permitted, on condition that it is
intended for research and therapeutic use (as in the United Kingdom). In
other countries, instead, every kind of cloning has been banned
(Germany), or parliamentary bills have been introduced with a view to
prohibit any type of cloning (United States).11 Concern about
this topic is undoubtedly growing and efforts have been redoubled to
obtain the prohibition of human cloning, not only at a national level
but also through the instruments of international law.
What
prompted this debate was the determination to forbid human reproductive
cloning. Since 1993, the International Bioethics Committee12
has been involved in the issue. The General Conference of UNESCO
approved a "Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights", later adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1998, which states that cloning for reproductive purposes is
contrary to human dignity.13
The
56th General Assembly of the United Nations (12 December 2001) decided
to set up a Committee that would carry its work even further, to
introduce the ban on cloning through an international legal instrument
and, specifically, an international Convention.14 At first,
only a prohibition of reproductive cloning was considered. In August
2001, Germany and France asked Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the
United Nations, for a project that would forbid it everywhere in the
world. By the end of 2001, reproductive cloning was prohibited in 24
countries, including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy,
Spain, India, Japan, Brazil and South Africa.
Recent developments in the international
situation and the initiative of certain countries in favour not only
of the prohibition of reproductive cloning (the proposal of a partial
ban), but of a simultaneous global prohibition of cloning both for
purposes of reproduction and for research and therapy (the proposal of a
total ban), represent a significant change in the work underway for an
International Convention against cloning.
Particularly
important in this regard are: the United States law of 27 February 2003
that totally forbids cloning (currently under examination by the
Senate);
the resolution of the German Bundestag of 7 February 2003, to promote
international initiatives to prohibit it completely (not only partially,
as has so far been the case); the French project of 30 January 2003, for
a reform of the law on biomedicine that will ban it totally (which is
still being debated); and the request for its total ban by the European
Parliament on 10 April 2003 (currently being examined by the European
Commission). All these recent initiatives aim to ban cloning completely,
and not merely reproductive cloning. Today this international
atmosphere, different from that of a few years ago, is now reinforced
by an initiative that the United States and Spain have sponsored and
presented to the United Nations. Its goal is an international Convention
that will put a total ban on all cloning.15
There
are precedents of international instruments that have targeted this
prohibition.
In the context of the Council of Europe, after the Paris Accord (12
January
1997), work began on an anticloning Convention. The European Parliament
accepted and adopted the project of the Council of Europe for an
"explicit prohibition of every form of human cloning", and
in the meantime, it has asked "researchers and doctors
participating
in research on the human genome under no circumstances to intervene in
the cloning of human beings before a legally binding prohibition of it
comes into force".16 The European Convention on Human
Rights and Biotechnology, also known as the "Oviedo Convention",
and the additional Protocol on the prohibition of cloning human beings
was the result of this work and specifically forbade "the
production of human embryos for research purposes" (Art. 18.1).
Thus, the ratification of the Oviedo Convention, by certain European
States had already begun in 1999.
The
European Parliament issued another declaration on 22 November 2001 in
favour of the prohibition of every type of human cloning, this time
throughout the world. This was an amendment to a report on biotechnology
in which the Parliament "insistently repeats that there must be a
universal and specific prohibition, at the level of the United Nations,
on the cloning of human beings at any stage in their growth or
development".
The Parliament then invited the European Commission and the member
States of the European Parliament to continue in this direction. In both
April 2002 and February 2003, the votes of legislators showed that they
were in favour of a ban on cloning for the purpose of extracting stem
cells from the embryo. The Bundestag (February 2003) asked the German
Government to change Germany's position at the United Nations by
opting for the total ban of cloning because it represents an assault on
human dignity, given that there is no substantial moral distinction
between reproductive and therapeutic cloning, which both result in the
creation of living human embryos.
4.
Why is human cloning, reproductive or therapeutic, ethically
unacceptable?
Concern
about the possibility of human cloning is well justified and there are
very serious reasons for it. The various attempts to introduce an
overall, simultaneous ban on cloning throughout the world is a
response to this concern. Despite the great interest shown in the
realization of these projects and the expectations they have given
rise to in large circles (scientists, groups of sick people hoping for
new therapeutic resources, professional associations, etc.), some of
which, it must be said, are more realistic than others, it would be
irresponsible not to weigh carefully the objections to cloning that are
backed by technical and ethical considerations and profound
anthropological reasoning.
1.
Reproductive cloning
With
regard to attempts to clone a human being for reproductive purposes, the
foreseeable scientific obstacles are very serious, to the point that
many experts have expressed strong doubts as to the actual viability
of a truly scientific project in this regard. Despite the recent, more
or less sensational announcements by the mass media, for the time
being there is no real, scientifically valid proof that shows beyond
all doubt that these attempts would be successful. Moreover, even were
such attempts likely to be successful in the future, consideration
must be given to the very grave risk of illnesses, genetic defects or
monstrosities for which those who produced them would be responsible.
For
example, the nuclear transfer technique has so far not led to any
results
other than a vast quantity of embryos unable to develop correctly.17
On rare occasions when birth is obtained, the animals are frequently
afflicted with diseases and sometimes with various monstrous
malformations, so that their premature death is quite common.18
This seems to be due to defects in the genetic
"reprogramming" of the nuclear transfer. It is clear that in
these conditions cloning for "reproductive" purposes must
not be applied to the human species because of the serious risk it would
involve and the very high mortality rate it entails.19
If
the immorality of reproductive cloning is predetermined by the actual
technical circumstances, the ethical obstacles to human reproductive
cloning are in themselves insurmountable and glaringly at variance with
the common moral sense of humanity.20
Already
in the 1980s the philosopher Hans Jonas addressed the ethical problems
that the eventual cloning of a human person would pose. Cloning would
mean the loss of what Jonas calls the "right of ignorance",
that is, the subjective right to know that one person is not the
replica of another, and a person's right not to know anything about his
future development (such as, for example, future illnesses,
psychological development, the foreseeable moment of natural death,
etc.). As Jonas says, this "ignorance" is in a certain sense
a "condition for the possibility" of human freedom, and to
encroach upon it would mean placing an enormous burden on the
individual's autonomy. The human clone would be brutally conditioned by
knowing that he was a copy of another person, because uncertainty is an
essential ingredient of the human effort to choose freely.
Without
the responsibility of uncertainty, according to Jonas, the clone would
foresee his every move, his own illnesses, and correct his future
psychological
attitudes in an unremitting, hopeless effort to separate himself from
his "original", who would always be an omnipresent shadow
and model, and the track he would be forced to follow or to avoid.
"Being a copy" would become part and parcel of his own
identity, his own being and his own conscience. Thus, a wound would be
inflicted on the human right to live one's life as an original and
unique discovery, basically, a discovery of themselves.21 As
a result, the clone's way through life would become the burdensome
implementation of an inhuman and alienating "programme of
control". Thus, Jonas considers the cloning "method" to
be "the most tyrannical and at the same time enslaving form of
genetic manipulation; its goal is not the arbitrary modification of all
that is inherited but, precisely, its arbitrary establishment, which is
at odds with the strategy that prevails in
nature".22
The
risk of a eugenic use of cloning (both reproductive and therapeutic), in
order to "improve" the race or to select personal
characteristics deemed "superior" to others, is not (despite
the assertions of its supporters) a very distant possibility.
In the Resolution on cloning of 12 March 1997,
the European Parliament declared that it was "firmly convinced that
no society can justify or tolerate the cloning of human beings under any
circumstances: neither for experimental purposes, nor in the treatment
of infertility, nor in diagnosis prior to tissue implantation or
transplantation, nor for any other purpose, since it constitutes a grave
violation of the fundamental human rights and denies the principle of
the equality of human beings by permitting a eugenic and racist
selection of the human species; it is an offence to the dignity of the
person, and furthermore requires experimentation on human beings (§B).
In a second Resolution on cloning of 15 January 1998, the European
Parliament, in requesting the prohibition of human cloning by way of
experimentation for diagnosis "or for any other purpose", even
describes cloning as "anti-ethical" and "morally
repugnant" (§B).
2.
Therapeutic cloning
Advocates
of the therapeutic cloning of human beings often describe it as a
breakthrough that would benefit genetic therapy as a remedy for diseases
thus far beyond the scope of medicine. However, these possible (and
disputable) positive consequences do not basically change the moral
character of cloning in itself. There is a close objective continuity
between reproductive and therapeutic cloning. In both, a human embryo
is "produced", but therapeutic cloning envisions its
subsequent destruction in the extraction of embryonic stem cells or
biological material for use in treatment.
Ample
uncertainty continues to surround the technical aspects of therapeutic
cloning. On the one hand, people are saying that cloning would be a
source of embryonic stem cells (which, since they are not
differentiated, and because of their greater "plasticity",
would be interesting from the biological point of view). However,
people do not always take sufficiently into account the precarious
condition of the cloned embryo and the high probability of producing
various neoplasias (cancers and tumours) in the candidate for
treatment into whom the cells would be introduced. This is why many
researchers suggest that research into adult stem cells might lead to
greater success, without the ethical limitations that the use of
embryonic stem cells involves.23
On
the other hand, it is also necessary to consider the considerable
practical difficulties that the immunological rejection of these
embryonic stem cells would create. These problems further weaken the
argument of those who claim that human cloning can justifiably be used
in such research. To get round the immunological rejection of embryonic
stem cells by cloning of an embryo implies exploiting the human embryo
to the full. As Elisabeth Monfort underlines, "The use of
embryonic stem cells necessarily involves the technique of therapeutic
cloning to prevent tissue rejection. To refuse cloning and accept the
use of embryonic stem cells... is an irresponsible and even hypocritical
stance that is certainly intended to reassure those who still have
doubts" .24
Therapeutic
cloning to obtain stem cells not only implies the production of an
embryo, but also its manipulation and subsequent destruction. It is
unacceptable
to consider a human being, at any stage of his development, as a store
of spare "material" or a source of tissue and organs, like
"spare parts". The moral complexity of cloning can be better
understood if we take into account that what it would produce,
manipulate
and destroy are not "things", but human beings like us. One
way of facing this issue would be to put ourselves in the shoes not of
the scientists who produce the clones, but of the embryo (which is
what we too once were). Surely we would not want to enter the world in a
laboratory rather than as the offspring of our parents' union. Nor would
it be acceptable to be the sole survivor among tens or hundreds of our
twin brothers or sisters, discarded as "defective". It would
be even less agreeable to be engineered in order to produce
"parts" that another needs at a later date (kidneys, for
example); or to die after this short and painful birth that was
"produced" precisely for this end.
Of course, the use of stem cells for cell therapy
could pave the way to a whole series of beneficial types of research
that today offer very interesting prospects; but the use of embryonic
stem cells for this goal (and, consequently, of therapeutic cloning to
obtain them), has proven to be a scientific process that is
unreliable, difficult and ethically unacceptable. On the other hand,
when research on adult stem cells, satisfactory both from the ethical
and technical viewpoints, is carried out in a dignified and
responsible way and subjected to ethical criteria, it represents the
way forward and a future of hope that raises no special ethical
objections.25
3.
Technical, ethical and anthropological objections to human cloning
Certain
arguments that make it possible to go more deeply into the rational
reasons of the immorality of cloning, show the ethical continuity
between "reproductive" and "therapeutic" cloning.
A deep complementarity links these arguments since they develop
various rational, ethical aspects that derive from the ontological
dignity of the human embryo, as they are interconnected with one another
and with the anthropological and ethical status of the embryo, which
must be the starting point in the whole complex issue.26
a.
Irrefutable probability of the human character of the embryos obtained
Procuring
human embryos for cloning, either for reproduction or for therapy and
research, would imply destroying a large number of them. For example,
in order to obtain Dolly the sheep, hundreds of embryos were
"wasted". And this is not all: the high risk of transmitting
diseases or malformations that this technique would involve are an
additional reason. This is especially true with regard to "therapeutic"
cloning. Hence, it is obvious that the harvesting of embryonic stem
cells necessarily passes through the production (and subsequent
destruction) of an embryo, which many researchers themselves no longer
insist on defining as an "accumulation of cells", a term
coined to avoid the anthropological and consequently ethical question
posed by the embryo. In fact, researchers acknowledge that these
techniques begin by producing what they call "early embryo",
that is, an embryo in its initial state. But then a question arises:
what is this embryo? What would its ethical and juridical status be? The
question points to another that is inherent in it: what is the status of
every human embryo?
The
assertion that the human being must be respected and treated as a person
from the very moment of conception is vital to a correct explanation of
the problem of the identity and status of the human embryo. "The
formulation in these terms of the fundamental ethical duty to the unborn
child has become vitally necessary, because of the problems raised
by biotechnological development".27
The
expression "pre-embryo" was used precisely to avoid the
fundamental anthropological and ethical question concerning the status
of the embryo.28 "The problem", people say,
"is that the embryo in its initial phase has no individuality or
identity since, being formed of totipotent cells, one or more human
individuals cannot yet be identified in it". But let us use our
reason. The embryo (we are referring to the so-called
"pre-embryo"), is a being. By this word "being" we
mean an existing, living reality susceptible of its own biological
development, differentiated and autonomous (it possesses in itself the
capacity for growth) as regards the adequate and necessary means for
its subsistence and for "nourishing" its own autonomous
development. In addition, and in particular, it develops for its own
sake, without having any "role" external to its own life. A
cell is not an individual being because it functions as a part of a
whole; its development is part of the development of the whole of
which it forms a part. On the other hand, the embryo is not part of any
whole, it is not fundamental to the (biological) life of the mother; if
we "reproduce" embryos in the laboratory, as such they have
no "use" unless we plant them in a female uterus to continue
the biological cycle that leads to their birth or, for this same
purpose, unless they spend the whole of the gestation period in the
laboratory — although it is true that with time, since they have not
been implanted, they will be "rejected", "destroyed"
or simply "killed", terms that in this case are synonymous.29
In fact, if the question regarding the embryo is
anthropologically and ethically precise, it must also be said that
from the ethical viewpoint, there is a basic question that is very
important for ethics: what isn't it? in other words: can we be certain
that the embryo thus generated is not human? From the moral viewpoint,
the admission alone of the probability (that none of the current studies
has been able to deny) that we have before us a human being, a product
of the cloning technique, has crucial weight. It is obvious that someone
looking at a shadow who is unsure whether it is an animal or a man and
who fires a shot, is guilty of murder. Before firing, he is morally and
strictly bound to make sure that it is not a person. This ethical
principle seems to have been infringed in these practices in which the
harvesting of human embryonic stem cells must necessarily pass through
the creation and destruction of an embryo in the first phases of its
life.
b.
The dignity of the human embryo
The
result of fertilization is a new totipotent, unicellular biological
individual called a "zygote". It must be recognized that
cloning has exactly the same result as that of fertilization. There are
no grounds for asserting, in spite of genetic abnormalities, that
cloning does not produce a zygote. It is then necessary to establish a
close analogy between fertilization and cloning. It should also be noted
that there is no rational reason to deny to embryos obtained through
cloning the same rights as those to which embryos obtained through the
process of artificial fertilization are entitled, and therefore, even
more justifiably, to which all embryos begotten through the natural
process of human fertilization are entitled. What, for example, would be
the essential difference between them, given the totipotentiality of
their cell makeup that is not disputed by anyone?
The
development of the embryo is the first stage of the human individual.
Father
Angelo Serra considers the three main properties that characterize the
human epigenetic process, which, according to C.H. Waddington, can be
described as "the continuous emergence of a form of preceding
stages": in other words: 1) coordination. "Embryonic
development,
from the fusion of the gametes or 'syngamy', until the appearance of
the embryonic disk at or after 14 days, is a process that manifests a
coordinated sequence and the interaction of molecular and cellular
activity, under the control of the new genome". This property
requires the rigorous unity of the subject that is developing. It is
not a cluster of cells but a real individual. 2) Continuity.
Syngamy30 begins to a new cycle of life. "Everything
would indicate that an uninterrupted and gradual differentiation of a
very specific human individual takes place, according to a single,
rigorously defined programme that begins at the zygote stage". This
quality of continuity implies and establishes the unicity or
uniqueness of the new human being. 3) Gradualness. The final form
must be reached gradually. This growth is permanently oriented from the
zygote stage to the final form because of an intrinsic epigenetic law.
Every human embryo keeps its own identity, individuality and unity. The
living embryo that originates in the fusion of the gametes is not a
mere accumulation of available cells, but a real, developing human
individual. Yes, from that instant it is a child! The embryo is a human
individual. The abusive introduction of the term pre-embryo was a
trick to pacify consciences and allow experimentation until the end of
the stage of implantation, that is, in the human species, about 14 days
after fertilization has taken place. Thus, the convenient conclusion has
been that the embryo would not exist for the first two weeks following
fertilization.31
c.
The embryo has human dignity, even when it consists of only one cell
The
refusal, therefore, to recognize the human condition of the embryo
obtained
through cloning (whether for reproductive purposes or to obtain
embryonic
stem cells from it) in the first days of its development is part of the
discussion on the human embryo's anthropological and ethical status.
These embryos are denied their individual character and it is said
that they have no "human life". This is a contradiction. If we
are dealing with embryos and not merely "oocytes that have
divided" (and are on their way to extinction), then they are human
individuals, endowed with human life, and not "clusters" of
cells. The researcher I. Wilmut (famous for obtaining Dolly, the first
cloned sheep; today he is a determined opponent of the reproductive
cloning of humans, but clearly favours cloning for therapeutic
purposes), recognizes that "when an embryo is created, an
automatic-pilot
takes over its initial development". If the embryo were the
"cluster of cells", as some say it is, it would not be its own
"automatic-pilot", it would have no autonomy nor a unitary
teleology of its own that it clearly demonstrates it possesses.
From
the moment of its conception, in fertilization, the embryo shows that it
is an autonomous entity that immediately begins developing and grows
gradually, continuously and harmoniously; and the constant teleological
integration and cooperation of all its cells is part of this growth.
It is an organism that develops, without interruption, in accordance
with the programme outlined in its genome. Thus, without any outside
intervention it becomes in succession a zygote, morula, blastocyst, an
implanted embryo, a fetus, a child, an adolescent and an adult.32
If this happens in natural fertilization, why would not the same thing
happen in cloning?
This
point presents a contradiction since it refuses to recognize that the
result
of cloning is equivalent to the result of fertilization. This
distinction (cloned-embryo; fertilized-embryo) that refers back to the
false distinction between the so-called "pre-embryo" and the
embryo, an erroneous distinction as mentioned earlier, has become in
practice the greatest obstacle to the acknowledgment that an embryo
has human status.33 If the cloned human embryo were not
human, then "what" would it be? To what animal species would
it belong? Would it possess a human genome but not be human? It is not
necessary to insist here on the contradictions implied in these denials.
A human embryo, thus recognized by reason as a human individual
endowed with an organism of its own, has its own proper dignity and
therefore deserves respect. This "dignity" is not due to
some external addition, but is inherent in its being, in itself and for
itself.
If
people refuse to admit that the embryo has human dignity under the
pretext
that it possesses no actual consciousness, then the dignity of people
who are asleep or in a coma should also be denied. If the dignity of
the embryo is rejected, then one could also deny the dignity of the
child.34
The human being, whatever his financial,
physical or intellectual condition, cannot be used as a means or an
object.
The subtle offence to this fundamental principle is aggravated when
this human being is powerless to defend himself against an unjust
aggressor. If a person agrees to treat a human being as a means and
not as an end, he himself must one day agree to be treated in the same
way. Nor should he protest. Even if the therapeutic application of
stem cells obtained through the creation and destruction of human
embryos
were to be clearly demonstrated (something that has not been done),
morals, common sense and sound judgment would be opposed to it: one
cannot do evil for a good end. The end does not justify the means. The
history of humanity is rich in teaching on this subject. As the
philosopher J. Santayana said: "Those who do not know history are
condemned to repeat it".
d.
Personality of the embryo
The
moral evaluation of human cloning, therefore, depends essentially on its
goal or objective and does not primarily stem from the subjective
intention
for which these techniques are used. The very uncertainty as to the
human
nature of the product of these techniques suffices to make it a duty
not to produce it. However, over and above the strict moral duty not to
produce it, there are many serious reasons for holding not only that
embryos obtained in this way should be duly respected as befits their
human dignity, but also that they are human persons who are first
manipulated and then destroyed.
e. Inhumanity in the production and
consequent destruction of embryos created by cell nuclear replacement
(so-called "therapeutic" cloning)
Upholders
of the so-called "therapeutic cloning" always insist that
their intention is not to go as far as "reproductive"
cloning but to destroy the human embryo thus created in the very first
days of its development. According to their reasoning (widely reported
in the press, the mass media and political speeches), this approach
would be "ethical", whereas reproductive cloning would not.
Human
cloning that could lead to the birth of a human being is to be judged an
immoral method of artificial procreation.35 In
"therapeutic cloning", this process is interrupted
intentionally: a human embryo is voluntarily created, later to be
destroyed in order to extract embryonic stem cells from it. In an
ethical
perspective, this procedure is even worse. To accept it would be on a
par with accepting a radical equality between the human species and
others (P. Singer). Rejection of the possibility to kill one human life
for the purpose of healing other human lives does not originate in a
specifically religious stance but in the force of the arguments and
reasoning of common sense and the power of a coherent anthropology and a
personalistic bioethics.
f.
Human cloning is contrary to the dignity of life and procreation
The
application of the techniques of cloning to human beings, with the
intention
of creating embryos, both to implant them subsequently in a uterus
(reproductive)
or to extract their stem cells and then destroy them (therapeutic
cloning or cloning for research), not only concerns the dignity of
human life and its inalienable rights, but is also contrary to the moral
value of the intrinsic union between life, sexuality and procreation.
The orientation of human sexuality to procreation is not a "biological
addition", but corresponds to human nature and is manifested in
the natural inclination for procreation by men and women. These
techniques, instead, separate the procreative aspects of human sexuality
from its unitive aspects and are thus contrary to the dignity of
sexuality and procreation.
Cloning
techniques are, in themselves and always, "reproductive".
Recent
experiences also show that human cloning, despite the enormous
difficulties,
is not impossible in principle. The ethical question thus concerns not
only the dignity of human life and the exploitation and eventual
destruction of the embryo, but also the specific and precisely sexual
way in which human procreation occurs that has a moral value of its
own which these techniques fail to respect.
g.
Cloning of human embryos is contrary to the dignity of the family
An
important ethical factor that is often overlooked should also be
considered. The human being is a social being. In human beings, the
sexual and procreative dynamic takes place naturally in a context in
which sexuality and procreation are harmoniously integrated in the
reality of conjugal love, which fills with meaning human sexuality open
to life. In marriage, love and responsibility converge in openness to
life and continue in the educational task, through which parents devote
the maximum care to their children.
Human
cloning ruptures this whole dynamic. In cloning, life appears as an
element that has nothing whatsoever to do with the family. The embryo
"appears", so to speak, on the margins not only of sexuality
but also of genealogy. Every human being has the right to be born from
the integral love — physical and spiritual — of a father and a
mother,
to receive their care, to be accepted by his parents as a gift and to be
raised by them. When we see looming on the horizon the disturbing
possibility of manipulating a conceived human being, of subjecting the
embryo to experimentation only to destroy it once the cells or the
biological knowledge desired have been obtained, then it is the very
concept
of filial, maternal and paternal relationship that is in crisis, and
the idea of family is shattered.
5.
Conclusion
Recent
developments in science show that human cloning, in spite of immense
technical difficulties and the profound ethical and anthropological
objections to it, is more than a hypothesis: it is becoming a
possibility. The various attempts by law and by international accords
to prevent this possibility from becoming reality, and to obtain
recognition of it as a crime against the human person, are not based
on a vague fear of progress and technology, but on important and
judicious ethical motivations and on a clearly identified
anthropological
concept of the human person, sexuality and the family. It is up to
public authorities, parliaments and international bodies to take a
firm stand. This truly is a key problem for the future of humanity and
for a safeguarding of the dignity of scientific research and the efforts
to promote the life, health and well-being of human beings, which
justifies
the adoption of appropriate measures by the community of the peoples
who make up the great human family.
NOTES
1
"The Pontifical Council for the Family has the task of promoting
the pastoral care of the family and of the specific apostolate in
the area of the family, by putting into effect the teachings and
directives of the ecclesiastical Magisterium, so that Christian families
may carry out the educative, evangelizing and apostolic mission to which
they have been called. In particular... b) it attends to the spread of
the doctrine of the Church regarding family problems so that it can be
integrally known and correctly presented to the Christian people both
in catechesis and on a scientific level;... c) it promotes and
coordinates
pastoral activity with regard to the problem of responsible parenthood
according to the teaching of the Church;... e) it encourages, sustains
and coordinates the efforts in defence of human life throughout the
entire span of its existence from the very first moment of conception;
f) it promotes, through the work of specialized scientific institutes
(theological and pastoral), studies aimed at integrating the theological
sciences and the human sciences on themes related to the family, so
that the doctrine of the Church may be better understood by men of good
will" (John Paul II, "Motu proprio" Familia a Deo Instituta,
9 March 1981, 3, V; Osservatore Romano English edition [ORE],
1 June 1981, pp. 1, 10).
2
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation Donum
Vitae, 22 February 1987, II, B, 4, c.; ORE, 16 March 1987, p.
6.
3
The term "clone", used by the British geneticist and
physiologist J.B.S. Haldane (Biological Possibilities for the Human
Species of the Next Ten-Thousand Years, 1963), originally derived
from botany: "a colony of organisms that in an asexual manner —
that is, without the intervention of sex — proceed from a single
progenitor" (Herbert John Webber, 1903). Its root is the Latin word
"colonia, coloniae" (and the verb "colo, is, colui,
coltum") that comes from the Greek klwn,
klwnoV
(“klon, klonós), which means "a new shoot to plant" and
alludes to the natural asexual reproduction of certain plants, such as
the rose-bush, that can be reproduced by planting a portion of it. Cf.
H.J. Weber, New Horticultural and Agricultural Terms, Science
28 (1903), pp. 501-503; A.A. Diamandopoulos, P.C. Goudas, Cloning's
not a new idea: the Greeks had a word for it centuries ago, Nature
6815/408, 21-28 December 2000, p. 905.
4
J. Loeb, in 1894, artificially stimulated parthenogenesis in sea
urchins, but it was the German Nobel Prize-winner H. Spemann who
succeeded in 1914 in transferring nuclei to salamander cells. He was the
first, in 1938, to suggest the nuclear transfer in the cells of mammals.
In 1981, this technique, which had been considerably improved, was
applied
successfully to rats and, in 1986, to sheep and cows. In 1997, I. Wilmut
of the Roslin Institute, U.K., was successful in obtaining the birth of
the first cloned sheep in the world, the famous "Dolly".
5
Pontifical Academy for Life, Riflessioni sulla Clonazione, 11
July 1997; ORE, 9 July, 1997, n. 2, p. 10. Cf. D. Tettamanzi
(edited by M. Doldi), "Cloning", Dizionario di Bioetica,
Piemme, Casale Monferrato, 2002; L. Ciccone, Bioetica. Storia,
Principi, Questioni, Ares, Milan, 2003, pp. 143-176; I. Wilmut et
al., Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells,
Nature, 385, 997, pp. 810-813.
6
Natural parthenogenesis consists in the formation of a new individual
from a female gamete (oocyte) without the participation of a male
gamete (spermatozoon). This natural phenomenon occurs in females that
produce spontaneous embryos without previous fertilization (in certain
species of invertebrates, not in mammals), or in biological individuals
that originated in hybridization (the cross-breeding of different
species). Since there is no recombination, the progeny are identical
replicas of the single progenitor, that is, natural clones.
7
Embryonic fission consists in the separation from the embryo of a few
cells, in such a way that a complete adult develops from each of the
resulting separated cells, complete with the same genetic heritage.
8
The totipotentiality of a cell consists in its ability to generate all
the cells and tissues of a complete organism, including (if
satisfactory circumstances exist) the development of an individual. In
the human, each embryonic cell remains totipotent for a few days after
fertilization. Homozygous germination (the phenomenon of identical
twins) is the
result
of an incidental embronic fission of the totipotent cells that make up
the embryo in the first stages of its development.
9
Cellular multipotentiality implies the capacity of a cell to generate
differentiated cells and tissue of parts of the organism, but not of
all or each of them, nor a complete individual. In the human being, in
particular, multipotentiality concerns the capacity to generate cell
lines and differentiated tissue derived from each one of the embryonic
layers, that is, the ectoderm, mesoderm and endoderm.
10
A stem cell is a non-differentiated cell that can make an infinite
number of exact copies of itself. Stem cells are able to produce
specialized cells of the tissues of an organism, such as the cardiac
muscle, brain or liver tissue, bone marrow, etc. Scientists today are
able to keep stem cells alive in vitro for an indefinite period,
and they are beginning to know how to produce differentiated cells
according to need.
11 House of Representatives, HR 534, February 2003.
12
This is an agency of the United Nations system, created in the context
of UNESCO.
13
Resolution 53/192.
14
Ad Hoc Committee on an International Convention against the
Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings.
15
"It is impossible to control the efficacy of human cloning for
reproductive ends if therapeutic cloning is not also forbidden... a
partial prohibition could give rise to the appearance of clandestine
cloning for reproductive ends and the establishment of an illegal trade
in oocytes... the juridical principle of precaution must guarantee the
protection of the weakest party, in this case, the human embryo... the
experience accumulated in animal cloning has revealed the
unreliability of the techniques used as well as the considerable risks
of malformation and deformities in the embryo.... Opposing human
cloning is not equivalent to rejecting scientific progress or progress
in genetic research. Cloning is not the only strategy for research for
the development of regenerative medicine... a general endorsement of
research into adult stem cells would help to make the most of their
potential and demonstrate their effectiveness". Memorandum
Contro la Clonazione Terapuetica. Spanish Delegation to the United
Nations, February 2002.
16
Resolution of the European Parliament of 12 March 1997, §2 and §11.
17
Ian Wilmut, "father" of Dolly the sheep, and Rudolf Jaenisch
testified to this before the United States Senate.
18
On this point, there is an abundant scientific bibliography. For
example, see the works of D. Humpherys, K. Eggan, H. Akutsu, K.
Ochedlinger, W.M. Rideout, D. Biniszkiewicz, R. Yanagimachi, R.
Jaenisch, Epigenic Instability in ES Cells and Cloned Mice,
Science, 293 (5527), 6 July 2000, pp. 95-97; D. Bourchis, D. Le Bourhis,
D. Patin, A. Niveleau, P. Comizzoli, J.-P. Renard, E. Viegas-Péquignot,
Delayed and incomplete reprogramming of chromosome methylation
patterns in bovine cloned embryos, Current Biology, 2 October 2001,
Vol. 11, n. 19; Y-K. Kang, D-B Koo, J-S. Park, Y-H. Choi, A-S. Chung,
K-K. Lewe, Y-M. Han, Aberrant methylation of donor genome in cloned
bovine embryos, Nature Genetics, June 2001, Vol. 28, n. 2, pp.
173-177.
19
This
observation on "reproductive" cloning is also valid as an
objection to "therapeutic" cloning. Its application in the
clinical field of stem cells harvested from cloned embryos would, to say
the least, be dubious in these circumstances. The cells of these
embryos show serious genetic defects; therefore, the proposal of
transferring abnormal embryonic stem cells to a human person does not
seem rational.
20
Alvin Toeffler's book, Future Shock (1970), sketches a fantastic
futuristic vision of man who makes copies of himself ("man will
be able to make biological carbon copies of himself"), and reflects
in a literary way on the prospects to which these techniques give rise
as well as on anxiety about their consequences. Cf. Lee M. Silver, What
are clones? They're not what you think they are, Nature, 5 July
2001, Vol. 412, n. 6842, p. 21.
21
Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung (The Main Responsibility),
ed. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1984.
22
Cf. Hans Jonas, Cloniamo un uomo: dall'eugenetica all'ingegneria
genetica, in Technica, Medicina ed Etica, ed. Einaudi, Turin,
1997, p. 136.
23
Natalia López Moratalla, Las células adultas llevan clara ventaja a
las embrionarias, en Palabra, December 2002.
24
Elisabeth Montfort, La bioéthique, entre confusion et responsabilité,
in AAVV (under the direction of Elisabeth Montfort, Bioéthique. Entre
confusion et responsabilité. Actes du Colloque de Paris. Assemblée
nationale, 1 Octobre 2001. Three-monthly review, Liberté
politique, ed. Francois-Xavier de Guibert, Paris, 2003, pp. 27-28.
25
Pontifical Academy for Life, Dichiarazione sulla produzione e
sull'uso scientifico e terapeutico delle cellule staminale, 25
August 2000.
26
D. Tettamanzi, Nuova bioetica cristiana, Piemme, Casale
Monferrato, 2000, pp. 235-268; L. Ciccone, Bioetica. Storia,
Principi, Questioni, Ares, Milan, 2003, pp. 61-80; R.C. Barra, Status
giuridico dell'embrione umano, in Lexicon. Famiglia, vita e
questioni etiche, EDB, Bologna, 2003; E. Sgreccia, Manuale di
Bioetica (Vol. I), Vita e pensiero, Milan, 1998, pp. 361-422;
C. Caffarra, Il problema morale dell'aborto, in AAVV (edited by
A. Fiori-E. Sgreccia) L'aborto, Vita e pensiero, Milan, 1975, pp.
313-320.
27
I. Carrasco de Paula, Il rispetto dovuto all'embrione umano:
prospettiva storico-dottrinale, in Pontifical Academy for Life, Identità
e statuto dell'embrione umano, Libr. ed. Vaticana, 1988, p. 31.
28 The expression
"pre-embryo" is deceptive and was contrived to support
abortion. Cf. A. Serra, Lo stato biologico dell'embrione umano.
Quando comincia l’ ‘essere umano?, in Pontifical Academy for
Life, Commento interdisciplinare all' Evangelium Vitae, Libr. ed.
Vaticana, 1997.
29
R.C. Barra, Status giuridico dell'embrione umano, in Lexicon. Famiglia,
vita e questioni etiche, EDB, Bologna, 2003.
30
"Syngamy" means that part of fertilization that consists in
the process initiated by the penetration of the sperm into the oocyte,
for the purpose of the uniting the chromosomal content of both the
pronuclei formed (amfimixis).
31
Cf. Angelo Serra, L'uomo-embrione. Il grande misconosciuto, ed.
Cantagalli, Siena, 2003, pp. 41-52. Cf. also the items "Dignity of
the human embryo" and "Embryonic selection and reduction"
in Lexicon. Termini ambigui e discussi su famigia, vita e
questioni etiche, (edited by) the Pontifical Council for the Family,
EDB, Bologna, 2003.
32
The technical expressions: zygote, morula and blastocyst correspond to
descriptions of the embryo on the basis of the phase in its
development, according to histological and physiological criteria.
33
The deceptive idea of the "pre-embryo" was coined, as is
well known, by the Warnock Committee, and today is generally accepted
and deeply rooted in many milieu: A. Serra, Pari dignità
all'embrione umano in Pontifical Council for the Family, I figli;
famiglia e società nel nuovo Millennio. Atti del Congresso
Internazionale Teologico-Pastorale. Vatican City, 11-13
October 2000, Libr. ed. Vaticana, 2001, pp. 313-320; R. Colombo, La
famiglia e gli studi sul genoma umano, op. cit., pp. 321-325;
A. Serra, R. Colombo, Identità e statuto del'embrione umano: il
contributo della biologia, in Pontifical Academy for Life,
Identità e statuto dell'embrione umano, Libr. ed. Vaticana, 1988,
p. 157; D. Tettamanzi, Nuova bioethica cristiana, Piemme, Casale
Monferrato, 2000, pp. 235-268; L. Ciccone, Bioetica. Storia, Principi,
Questioni, Ares, Milan, 2003, pp. 61-80; R. C. Barra, Status
giuridico dell'embrione umano, in Lexicon. Famiglia, vita e
questioni etiche, EDB, Bologna 2003; Ph. Caspar, La problématique
de l'animation de l'embryon. Survoi historique et enjeux
dogmatiques, in Nouvelle Revue Théologique, 1991, n. 123.
34
Rationality, conscience and autonomy would constitute a person,
according to authors such as H.T. Engelhardt or P. Singer. H.T.
Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1986; Manuale di bioetica, Mondadori, Milan,
1991; Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1993; Cf. L. Palazzani, Il concetto di persona tra bioetica e diritto,
Turin, Giappichelli, 1996.
35
Cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum Vitae, I,
6.
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