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Dear Francis,
I researched Free and Faithful in Christ and I must advise you not to
use this work to guide you in your moral deliberations. I provide the
following information for you and for any who reads this. It is not that
his work has no merit whatsoever, but one must sift carefully through
misleading and unclear statements to find something of value.
God's Peace, Fr. Augustine Mary
FREE AND FAITHFUL IN CHRIST: MORAL THEOLOGY FOR CLERGY AND LAITY
— By
Bernard Haring
VOL. 1 GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY NEW YORK: CROSSROAD, 1978
VOL. 2, THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE NEW YORK: CROSSROAD, 1979
VOL. 3: LIGHT TO THE WORLD NEW YORK: CROSSROAD, 1981
Bernard Haring said, "moral theology would be absolutely
unfaithful to its task if, in its whole content, it did not give
particular attention to ecumenism" (General Moral Theology,
3).
Bernard Haring states emphatically that he is committed to biblical
ethics, to a relational anthropology, and a defense of human historicity
over against the presuppositions of a defensive legalism (cf. General
Moral Theology, 7-27, 76-82, 96-101, 127-29).
Bernard Haring's work organizes various moral subjects under
categories such as "truth" and "healing" in an ambiguous
and non-convincing manner. There is also extensive repetitiveness in the three volumes, especially in regard to his constant
attack on legalism. William Werpehowski of Villanova University says the
following about Haring's work:
Disparate social, scientific and
philosophical materials are considered somewhat haphazardly and,
together, serve either to confuse outright or to make very general
points that in effect underplay evident substantive differences in those
materials. For example, in a chapter on fundamental option, Haring will
survey the work of Erikson, Spranger, Kierkegaard, Maslow, and Frankl,
celebrating their collective 'outstanding grasp of wholeness' without
giving serious attention to deep contrasts in approach (cf. General
Moral Theology, 168-81). His undefended aside that these differences are
'more a matter of complementarity than contradiction' (General Moral
Theology, 219) only enhances the fear that his procedure will perplex
more than enlighten, or at least leave the reader with precious little
in the way of synthesis.
Furthermore, Bernard Haring's attitude of 'creative fidelity to the
Magisterium' gives one pause to say the least. In his work, The Law of
Christ, Haring states,
But what shall we say of an ecclesiastical
writer, theologian, or scientist who thinks he has reasons to reject the
judgment of the Church's authority, particularly if his own intellectual
attitude or position has been affected? . . . .He should first of all
carefully study. . . . All further public defense of his position must
be studiously and respectfully avoided, unless he is absolutely
convinced in conscience that defense of his condemned views is of great
importance for the understanding or defense of the faith and for the
promotion of Christian piety. (v. 2, 52)
This statement allows for
a public defense against a decision of the Magisterium. While couching
the statement amidst others such as "complete submission to the
doctrinal magisterium" that which is at least tantamount to dissent
is permitted.
Haring likes terms such as 'creative fidelity' and 'creative
liberty.' They are ambiguous and can easily lead to misinterpretation.
Also, Haring's distancing himself from natural law as a basis of moral
theology, claiming a new type of biblical morality is questionable. As
Lisa Cahill of Boston College states, "On concrete issues, Haring
follows neither the traditional natural law method nor a detailed
analysis in light of specifically relevant biblical texts or themes. He
seems to prefer a commonsense approach to past and present Roman
Catholic teaching." Thus we see a departure from rooting his
teaching in objective sources.
Finally, Haring's treatment of fundamental option leaves much to be
desired. The following quotation from Veritatis Splendor, 65-68 is very
helpful in clarifying the ambiguity of Haring:
65.2 Some authors, however, have proposed an even more radical revision of
the relationship between person and acts. They speak of a
"fundamental freedom," deeper than and different from freedom
of choice, which needs to be considered if human actions are to be
correctly understood and evaluated. According to these authors, the key
role in the moral life is to be attributed to a "fundamental
option," brought about by that fundamental freedom whereby the
person makes an overall self-determination, not through a specific and
conscious decision on the level of reflection, but in a
"transcendental" and "athematic" way. Particular
acts which flow from this option would constitute only partial and never
definitive attempts to give it expression; they would only be its
"signs" or symptoms. The immediate object of such acts would
not be absolute Good (before which the freedom of the person would be
expressed on a transcendental level), but particular (also termed
"categorical") goods. In the opinion of some theologians, none
of these goods, which by their nature are partial, could determine the
freedom of man as a person in his totality, even though it is only by
bringing them about or refusing to do so that man is able to express his
own fundamental option.
65.3A distinction thus comes to be introduced between the fundamental
option and deliberate choices of a concrete kind of behavior. In some
authors this division tends to become a separation, when they expressly
limit moral "good" and "evil" to the transcendental
dimension proper to the fundamental option, and describe as
"right" or "wrong" the choices of particular "innerworldly"
kinds of behavior: those, in other words, concerning man's relationship
with himself, with others and with the material world. There thus
appears to be established within human acting a clear disjunction
between two levels of morality: on the one hand the order of good and
evil, which is dependent on the will, and on the other hand specific
kinds of behavior, which are judged to be morally right or wrong only on
the basis of a technical calculation of the proportion between the
"premoral" or "physical" goods and evils which
actually result from the action. This is pushed to the point where a
concrete kind of behavior, even one freely chosen, comes to be
considered as a merely physical process, and not according to the
criteria proper to a human act. The conclusion to which this eventually
leads is that the properly moral assessment of the person is reserved to
his fundamental option, prescinding in whole or in part from his choice
of particular actions, of concrete kinds of behavior.
66.1 There is no doubt that Christian moral teaching, even in its
Biblical roots, acknowledges the specific importance of a fundamental
choice which qualifies the moral life and engages freedom on a radical
level before God. It is a question of the decision of faith, of the
obedience faith (cf Rom 16:26) "by which man makes a total and free
self-commitment to God, offering the full submission of intellect and
will to God as he reveals.'" (112) This faith, which works through
love (cf. Gal 5:6), comes from the core of man, from his
"heart" (cf. Rom 10:10), whence it is called to bear fruit in
works (cf. Mt 12:33-35; Lk 6:43-45; Rom 8:5-10; Gal 5:22). In the
Decalogue, one finds, as an introduction to the various commandments,
the basic clause: "I am the Lord your God..." (Ex 20:23,
which, by impressing upon the numerous and varied particular
prescriptions their primordial meaning, gives the morality of the
Covenant its aspect of completeness, unity and profundity. Israel's
fundamental decision, then, is about the fundamental commandment (cf.
Jos 24:14-25; Ex 19:3-8; Mic 6:8). The morality of the New Covenant is
similarly dominated by the fundamental call of Jesus to follow him — thus
he also says to the young man: "If you wish to be perfect...then
come, follow me" (Mt 19:21); to this call the disciple must respond
with a radical decision and choice. The Gospel parables of the treasure
and the pearl of great price, for which one sells all one's possessions,
are eloquent and effective images of the radical and unconditional
nature of the decision demanded by the Kingdom of God. The radical
nature of the decision to follow Jesus is admirably expressed in his own
words: "Whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses
his life for my sake and the Gospel's will save it" (Mk 8:35).
66.2Jesus' call to "come, follow me" marks the greatest
possible exaltation of human freedom, yet at the same time it witnesses
to the truth and to the obligation of acts of faith and of decisions
which can be described as involving a fundamental option. We find a
similar exaltation of human freedom in the words of Saint Paul:
"You were called to freedom, brethren" (Gal 5:13). But the
Apostle immediately adds a grave warning: "Only do not use your
freedom as an opportunity for the flesh." This warning echoes his
earlier words: "For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast
therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery" (Gal 5:1).
Paul encourages us to be watchful, because freedom is always threatened
by slavery. And this is precisely the case when an act of faith — in the
sense of a fundamental option — becomes separated from the choice of
particular acts, as in the tendencies mentioned above.
67.1 These tendencies are therefore contrary to the teaching of
Scripture itself, which sees the fundamental option as a genuine choice
of freedom and links that choice profoundly to particular acts. By his
fundamental choice, man is capable of giving his life direction and of
progressing, with the help of grace, towards his end, following God's
call. But this capacity is actually exercised in the particular choices
of specific actions, through which man deliberately conforms himself to
God's will, wisdom and law. It thus needs to be stated that the
so-called fundamental option, to the extent that it is distinct from a
generic intention and hence one not yet determined in such a way that
freedom is obligated, is always brought into play through conscious and
free decisions. Precisely for this reason, it is revoked when man
engages his freedom in conscious decisions to the contrary, with regard
to morally grave matter.
67.2 To separate the fundamental option from concrete kinds of behavior
means to contradict the substantial integrity or personal unity of the
moral agent in his body and in his soul. A fundamental option understood
without explicit consideration of the potentialities which it puts into
effect and the determinations which express it does not do justice to
the rational finality immanent in man's acting and in each of his
deliberate decisions. In point of fact, the morality of human acts is
not deduced only from one's intention, orientation or fundamental
option, understood as an intention devoid of a clearly determined
binding content or as an intention with no corresponding positive effort
to fulfill the different obligations of the moral life. Judgments about
morality cannot be made without taking into consideration whether or not
the deliberate choice of a specific kind of behavior is in conformity
with the dignity and integral vocation of the human person. Every choice
always implies a reference by the deliberate will to the goods and evils
indicated by the natural law as goods to be pursued and evils to be
avoided. In the case of the positive moral precepts, prudence always has
the task of verifying that they apply in a specific situation, for
example, in view of other duties which may be more important or urgent.
But the negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete
actions or kinds of behavior as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any
legitimate exception. They do not leave room, in any morally acceptable
way, for the "creativity" of any contrary determination
whatsoever. Once the moral species of an action prohibited by a
universal rule is concretely recognized, the only morally good act is
that of obeying the moral law and of refraining from the action which it
forbids.
68.1 Here an important pastoral consideration must be added. According
to the logic of the positions mentioned above, an individual could, by
virtue of a fundamental option, remain faithful to God independently of
whether or not certain of his choices and his acts are in conformity
with specific moral norms or rules. By virtue of a primordial option for
charity, that individual could continue to be morally good, persevere in
God's grace and attain salvation, even if certain of his specific kinds
of behavior were deliberately and gravely contrary to God's commandments
as set forth by the Church.
68.2 In point of fact, man does not suffer perdition only by being
unfaithful to that fundamental option whereby he has made "a free
self-commitment to God."(113) With every freely committed mortal
sin, he offends God as the giver of the law and as a result becomes
guilty with regard to the entire law (cf Jas 2:8-11); even if he
perseveres in faith, he loses "sanctifying grace,"
"charity" and "eternal happiness."(114) As the
Council of Trent teaches, "the grace of justification once received
is lost not only by apostasy, by which faith itself is lost, but also by
any other mortal sin."(115)
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