Approved Authors

 

The term "approved authors" refers to moral theologians whose explanation of the  moral theology tradition is recognized by the Church as faithful statements of that tradition, and whose opinions on the application of the moral principles to particular cases can safely be followed by Catholics. Although this recognition of an author is sometimes explicitly positive, as when a theologian is canonized or even proclaimed a doctor of the Church (e.g. St. Alphonsus Liguori, Doctor Moralis), it is typically implicit, the author has universal recognition for orthodoxy and competence, such as indicated by general use in seminaries. Such authors (in English) have included Fr. Heribert Jone, OFM Cap. and Fr. Henry Davis, S.J.

Such authors do not exist today, in the strict sense of widely used and ecclesiastically approved authors, though the role is effectively filled by theologians of orthodoxy and competence such Msgr. William Smith, William May, Germain Grisez, Janet Smith and others.


Resolving Differences of Opinion

What Must be Accepted. Catholics must accept as a matter of the faith the moral truths revealed in Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition, and taught by the Magisterium. These are binding on Catholic consciences in the same way that Catholics are obliged to believe the dogmatic teachings of the Church. Although moral teachings have not generally been taught by the Church in extraordinary, infallible magisterial acts, most have been taught "semper et ubique" (always and everywhere) and so belong to the infallible Ordinary Magisterium. Certainly, the just war doctrine falls into this category, even though it has admitted of refinements and clarifications over time and remains capable of being definitively or even solemnly defined (see the CDF Commentary on Pope John Paul II's Ad Tuandem fidem).

Where Differences May Occur. Morally good acts are always composed of three elements: 1. an act which is objectively good in itself, 2. a good motive and 3. appropriate circumstances. When it comes to the application of the moral law to particular cases different approved authors, or Catholics in general, may come to different conclusions about what to do or not do. 

The disagreement could conceivably occur concerning the first element, the act itself. While some acts are ruled out by the moral law contained in Scripture (murder, adultery, theft, lying, etc..), or as taught by Sacred Tradition  (contraception, abortion, euthanasia, etc.), others acts further removed from the basic categories of good and evil may require a new decision of the Magisterium clarifying how the moral law applies (e.g. the new bio-technologies as they were invented). Disagreement might also occur at the level of the motive, such as what constitutes a sufficiently good motive  for acting (e.g. the debate as to what part societal vengeance may play in decisions about capital punishment). However, the most frequent cause of disagreement concerns the circumstances which justify an action. St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that there are 8 integral parts to a circumstantially justified, or prudent, action. They are:

1) memory (experience concerning what happens in similar situations), 
2) understanding (of the principles upon which the judgment is based), 
3) docility (being able to learn from others, esp. the Church), 
4) shrewdness (connecting the principles with the goal of the action), 
5) reason (concluding aptly), 
6) foresight (of  the future consequences of action), 
7) circumspection (judging well the fitness of the proposed action in the particular circumstances), and 
8) caution (concerning the evils to be faced in the pursuit of good). 

Given this prudential element in moral decision making, it is not surprising that with so many variables even experts can come to different conclusions on how to satisfy the moral law in particular cases. 

This problem has occupied the Church for centuries, with theologians proposing different solutions (moral systems) for resolving doubts of conscience (i.e. may I do this, or, does the moral law forbid it?). For example, a person proposes to act in a certain way. Exercising due diligence he consults the opinions of others (approved authors, or for the ordinary layman, a confessor, director, pastor or others who should be familiar with such authors). From them he hears various opinions. The first opinion is that he is free to act. However, it seems only slightly probable since the arguments for it are weak. The second opinion also says he is free to act. It does so with solid argumentation, is well-founded and therefore solidly probable. The third opinion says that he may not act. It seems even more probable than the second opinion. Finally, the fourth opinion states that he may not act, unless he knows absolutely that the action will not offend against the moral law. 

One would think that the fourth choice would be required of us, acting only when we know with certainty that we are not sinning. However, this system of resolving doubts, called absolute tutiorism (rigorism), is actually condemned by the Church, since it teaches falsely that Catholics must attain to absolute certainty of conscience before acting. The standard of the moral law is a morally certain conscience. Such a certainty is not absolute, but enough to give peace to the conscience that "I may do this" or "I must avoid that". Keep in mind that this concerns doubtful cases, which typically are complex ones, and not simple cases of good versus evil. Obviously, one CAN be absolutely certain about acts which the Church teaches are intrinsically evil, and, in complex cases one may choose to follow the safest course. However, one may not teach, as absolute tutiorism does, that Catholics are obliged to follow that course, nor require it of others. 

The Church has also condemned the opposite system, laxism, which teaches that one may follow even an only slightly probable opinion favoring liberty. While the Church certainly believes in Christian liberty (cf. 1 Cor. 8), such liberty must have the probability of being within the bounds of the moral law, or put another way, must be improbably sinful. 

This leaves us with opinion two (well-founded and favoring liberty), and opinion three (more probable but favoring the law). While one is free to follow the more probable opinion and not act, one is permitted to act by choosing opinion two, since it is also well-founded, though less so than its contrary. This system, called Probabilism, was devised by St. Alphonsus Liguori, whom the Church has declared her Doctor Moralis. It enables Catholics to form a certain conscience in doubtful cases based on solid theological opinion, while avoiding rigorism (which is usually accompanied by some degree of scrupulosity) and laxity. While there are other systems tolerated by the Church (such as Probabiliorism  and Equiprobabilism), Probabilism is certainly the most favored, as indicated by the honors given to its proponent, and its wide use.  

Each person, therefore, is responsibly before God for forming their conscience properly, weighing the moral issues with due diligence, and and attaining and following a certain conscience, even by recourse to the probable opinion of approved authors. One may not act in doubt. The moral acts taken may fall short of absolute perfection (of which God alone is capable, given the finite character of human knowledge and judgment), but the person who does all the above stands innocent before God of sin.  " For as you judge, so will you be judged, and the measure with which you measure will be measured out to you" (Mt. 7:2).





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